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Abstract 
For more than a century, the collective management of authors’ rights has greatly 
facilitated the licensing of music to the benefits of right holders and commercial users 
alike.  In the online realm, however, the rationale of the collective administration of 
copyright has been challenged and its functioning re-configured.  At a moment in time 
where the Internet has made the cross-border distribution of recorded music easier 
than ever, right holders are yet to find licensing solutions appropriate for multi-
territorial online uses.  This, in turn, slows down the uptake of legal online music 
services and prevents the realisation of the Digital Single Market, pursued within the 
EU.  The European Commission has intervened twice, first in 2005 in the form of a 
non-binding Recommendation, and later in 2008, when it held that the collecting 
societies’ practice of restricting their activities to their respective domestic territory was 
anti-competitive.  Arguably, the contradictory effects of EU action have exacerbated 
rather than remedied the existing difficulties that cross-border online music services 
face in clearing the necessary authors’ rights.  
This thesis proposes to re-contextualise this problem around cultural diversity, 
which is a recurring buzzword in the ongoing debates and which EU institutions are 
legally obliged to promote and to respect.  Despite this seeming acknowledgment of 
the concept, no sound legal analysis of its scope or its implications for the field of 
online music has yet been proposed.  Pursuing such analysis, this thesis first examines 
the meaning of cultural diversity under EU law to submit an understanding of it as 
intercultural pluralism.  It then assesses the boundaries of the EU obligation to 
promote cultural diversity in view of the goals of the UNESCO Convention on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.  An analysis of the 
relationship between the two sets of norms suggests interpreting the EU mandate of 
promoting cultural diversity in light of the scope of the international obligations 
wherever EU action affects cultural creations.  Applied to the context of online music, 
this novel interpretation implies that cultural diversity is promoted if all groups within 
the EU (a) have the ability to express their cultural identity through online music; and 
(b) are in a position to access online music expressing different cultures from within 
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and outside the EU.  Cultural diversity thus calls for the licensing regime to be re-
organised so that online music services may, in a simple and effective way, clear the 
rights necessary for the online use of the entire available EU repertoire as well as a 
diverse foreign and, ideally, the entire worldwide repertoire. 
Finally, this thesis assesses the current online licensing mechanisms in a practical 
application of these findings, testing the commonly raised argument that collective 
rights management promotes cultural diversity and investigating, in parallel, whether 
the practical consequences of the EU interventions have promoted the diversity of 
online music. 
 
 - 1 - 
Part 1:  The Ambit of the Thesis  
1 Background 
The research proposed in this thesis examines the intersection of two specific areas of 
EU law – culture and copyright.  In the cultural field, the focus is on the obligation of 
EU institutions to mainstream cultural considerations into their action and, more 
specifically, to promote and respect cultural diversity (TFEU Article 167(4)).  In the 
field of copyright, this thesis concentrates on the system of collective management of 
authors’ rights in music and its continuing struggle to find satisfactory solutions to 
license the use of online music across national borders.  
This research was sparked by a curious observation that emerged from the 
debate on what EU legal framework would be appropriate to facilitate multi-territorial 
licences for online music and, more specifically, what role it should hold for authors’ 
societies: both proponents and opponents of the collective licensing through authors’ 
societies argued that their respective proposals promoted cultural diversity.  This 
observation is symptomatic of the widespread practice of employing the term ‘cultural 
diversity’ as a buzzword rather than to base its use on a shared conceptual 
understanding.  This is all the more surprising if one bears in mind the obligation of 
TFEU Article 167(4) and the increase in importance that the principle of cultural 
diversity has received with its inclusion in TEU Article 3(3) and CFREU Article 22.  
Against this background, the objective of this thesis is two-fold.  On the one 
hand, it seeks to propose elements of a conceptual framework for the notion of 
cultural diversity under EU law that could (and, as we will later argue, should) guide 
the EU institutions in their task to take cultural diversity into consideration when 
adopting a primarily non-cultural measure.  On the other hand, this research aims to 
apply this theoretical groundwork to the practical area of multi-territorial licensing of 
online music. 
 - 2 - 
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2 Research Questions 
With this objective in mind, this study seeks to respond to several, more concrete, 
questions.  In order to determine elements of a conceptual framework for cultural 
diversity, it starts by asking: What is cultural diversity?  What does cultural diversity 
mean in relation to online music?  As will be shown in part 2, these seemingly 
innocuous questions are difficult to answer – in particular, due to the lack of precision 
and the various connotations with which the term ‘cultural diversity’ is used.  The 
analysis concludes that cultural diversity is to be understood in the sense of 
intercultural pluralism and a working concept of diversity in online music is 
formulated accordingly. 
Part 3 seeks to develop the concept into a more workable guideline for 
analysing the multi-territorial licensing of authors’ rights in online music.  This part is 
transitional in the sense that it applies the abstract and theoretical findings of part 2 to 
the concrete and practical characteristics of and changes to the framework for the 
licensing of authors’ right in online music that will be addressed in parts 4 and 5.  Its 
objective is to equip us with more tangible legal, practical and economic criteria to 
assess whether the way in which authors’ rights in online music are licensed promotes 
the diversity in online music.  The first step is an enquiry into the exact scope of the 
obligation to respect and promote the diversity of the EU’s cultures in TFEU 
Article 167(4) and how it applies to online music.  Most importantly in this regard, the 
analysis of the interplay between this norm and Article 7 of the 2005 Convention 
suggests a harmonious interpretation of TFEU Article 167(4) in light of Article 7 of 
the 2005 Convention wherever an EU measure affects the diversity of cultural 
expressions.  The discussion then turns to the value chain of online music and 
explores at which points in that value chain the way in which authors’ rights in music 
are licensed has the potential to influence diversity in online music.  Finally, we review 
the existing economic literature on diversity in order to determine whether it would be 
possible to measure diversity in online music.  
 - 4 - 
Parts 4 and 5 look at the licensing of authors’ rights in online music across the 
EU, focusing on distinct practical aspects with a view to determining whether those 
aspects promote diversity in online music.  In particular, part 4 scrutinises the 
collective licensing of authors’ rights in music, before part 5 turns to the instances in 
which the EU intervened in the past, notably with the 2005 Commission 
Recommendation on Collective Cross-border Management of Copyright and Related 
Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services1 and the 2008 Commission Decision in 
the CISAC case.2  The choice to assess these particular aspects as to whether they have 
promoted diversity in online music is motivated by the hope that the findings could 
also make a useful contribution to the larger debate on the appropriate EU legal 
framework to facilitate multi-territorial licensing.  This is most obvious in relation to 
the two recent EU interventions: if the conclusion is that they did not promote 
diversity in online music, this should be an argument for the EU to change its focus in 
addressing the problem of multi-territorial licensing.  But an argument as to the future 
direction of fostering multi-territorial licensing can also be deduced from the analysis 
of the collective licensing system.  Unlike the EU institutions, collecting societies are 
not the addressees of TFEU Article 167(4).  This notwithstanding, should the way in 
which they collectively license their members’ rights be found to promote diversity in 
online music, this would be a strong argument to strengthen the role of collective 
rights management in the future framework for multi-territorial licensing.  
Against this background, part 4 asks whether the cultural functions of 
collecting societies promote diversity in online music, using the German collecting 
society GEMA as an example.  Finally, part 5 seeks to determine whether the practical 
changes that have been prompted by the 2005 Recommendation and the 2008 CISAC 
Decision promoted diversity in online music.  While the question that guides the 
research in both parts is the same, the object of the analysis differs in so far as the 
efforts of the collecting societies are directed at incentivising musical creation, whereas 
                                                   
1  European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 18 October 2005 on Collective Cross-border 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services [2005] OJ L 276/54. 
2  CISAC (COMP/C2/38.698), Decision C(2008) 3435 final (European Commission, 16 July 2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38698/38698_4567_1.pdf>. 
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the recent changes after the EU interventions have a bearing on how easily already 
created music can be licensed for online uses.  
 - 6 - 
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3 Methodology 
The research presented in this thesis is the result of both desk-based as well as 
qualitative empirical analysis.  
The enquiry into the meaning of cultural diversity in part 2 is predominantly 
based on a review of international standard-setting instruments and policy documents 
adopted by UNESCO and the CoE.  This approach takes into account that an 
internationally agreed concept of cultural diversity first emerged in two Declarations 
adopted in the fora of the two organisations and was further shaped by the 2005 
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions.  The analysis is deliberately broad in the sense that it seeks to trace the 
origins of the cultural diversity discourse as well as its broad lines of development.  To 
this end, it not only takes into account the three mentioned instruments but, in 
addition, other relevant materials with references to cultural diversity that have been 
adopted under the aegis of UNESCO and CoE since the inception of these 
organisations.  This is motivated by the desire to counter today’s lack of conceptual 
consensus in the use of the term with a solid understanding of the various dimensions 
that have historically been ascribed to cultural diversity and continue to shape it.  
Notwithstanding the emphasis on the development of the concept in international law 
and intergovernmental practice, the results are also cross-checked as to whether they 
can validly apply under the EU legal order.  This ensures the focus that is necessary to 
then apply the deduced working concept of cultural diversity in the context of multi-
territorial music licensing in the EU.  While the EU legal framework does not contain 
any definition of cultural diversity, the validity of the results is confirmed by the 
political practice of the EU institutions.  
Part 3 aims to develop legal and practical as well as economic criteria that allow 
the concept of diversity in online music to be used as a workable policy guideline.  
Chapter 7 – the legal analysis – takes the form of expository research, analysing the 
scope of TFEU Article 167(4) and its relationship with the 2005 Convention, in 
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search of legal guidance as to when EU measures promote cultural diversity and, more 
precisely, the diversity of online music.  Chapter 8 presents the practical application of 
these findings in that it places the results of the legal analysis into the context of the 
licensing of online music, exploring at which point in the value chain of online music 
measures regulating the licensing framework could have an impact on the diversity of 
online music.  Chapter 9, finally, is the result of a desk-based analysis of the existing 
economic literature on the measuring of diversity, the diversity of cultural expressions 
and diversity in music.  
Methodologically, the research presented in part 4, assessing whether GEMA’s 
cultural functions promote diversity in online music, is carried out in two steps.  
Notably, we first describe the characteristics of GEMA’s cultural functions.  Applying 
the earlier developed criteria for diversity in online music to the thus expounded 
factual situation, we are able to deduce a result.  The factual exposition of GEMA’s 
cultural functions relies on a review of the relevant GEMA statutes and pre-existing 
legal writing.  Most importantly, however, it also finds its basis in a qualitative 
assessment of empirical data gathered by way of two questionnaires to which GEMA 
kindly agreed to respond.3  Without the additional information received, it would not 
have been possible to make informed assertions as to how GEMA’s cultural functions 
influence diversity in online music with the same degree of certitude. 
The analysis of the practical consequences of the two types of EU intervention, 
carried out in part 5, follows patterns similar to that of GEMA’s cultural functions.  
Here, the factual presentation of how EU cross-border music services obtain the 
necessary licences in the aftermath of EU intervention is facilitated by a review of legal 
writing, public consultation documents, news articles and press releases.  In addition, 
it is most usefully informed by some of the empirical data received from GEMA. 
As this research was originally submitted on 1 March 2013, in principle it does 
not engage with academic writing, court decisions or legislative changes that occurred 
after that date.  
                                                   
3  The responses were received on 26 March and 6 April 2012.  The wording of the questionnaires is 
reproduced in the Annex.  
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4 Limits 
In addressing the described research questions, it was necessary to limit the research in 
various respects.  The following paragraphs explain the rationale behind the most 
important of these choices. 
4.1 Focus on Authors’ Economic Rights in Music 
Copyright law grants the creators of protected subject matter the exclusive right to 
exploit their works or authorise others to do so.  Within the typical value chain of 
online music, the law provides for both authors’ as well as related rights.4  On the one 
hand, the authors of musical works are granted exclusive rights in their composition or 
lyrics.  However, in order for a musical work to be exploited online it must have been 
performed and, moreover, this performance must have been recorded.  While both of 
these acts depend on the authors’ permission, the resulting performances and sound 
recordings enjoy protection in themselves.  Importantly, the authors’ exclusivity also 
encompasses secondary uses of their works.5  As a consequence, the online 
exploitation of recorded music affects both the related rights of the performer and the 
producer of the sound recording as well as the copyright in the musical work 
embodied in the recording.  The following illustration visualises this relationship.6 
                                                   
4  The terms ‘copyright’ and ‘authors’ rights’ underline the different rationale for protection in 
common and civil law systems.  Whereas the former primarily encourages the production of new 
works, the latter in addition stresses the natural rights of authors in their creations.  Authors’ rights 
differ from related right in that the protection of authors aims at rewarding or incentivising creation, 
whereas the law accords related rights to producers of works that are typically derived from the 
authors’ creations in recognition of the entrepreneurial efforts and technical and organisational 
skills involved; see Bently and Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (3rd edn, 2009) 32. 
5  Schovsbo 170. 
6  Taken from European Commission, Proposed Directive on Collective Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights and Multi-territorial Licensing, 7. 
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To offer online music, a service provider must clear both the authors’ rights 
and the related rights.  This notwithstanding, the present analysis limits itself to the 
former.  This is a consequence of the structure of the licensing market for related 
rights; they are typically in the hands of record companies, who pursue the business 
model of creating or acquiring the rights in sound recordings in order to promote and 
exploit them.7  Given that one of our research questions is whether collective licensing 
and, more specifically, the cultural functions that collecting societies promote the 
diversity of online music, the analysis can only be conducted in an environment that 
possesses such collective structures.  In stark contrast to the way that authors’ rights are 
licensed, however, the management of related rights is collectivised to a very small 
extent only – notably where this serves the record companies’ business interests.8  The 
licensing of related rights, therefore, largely escapes the scope of the present study. 
Moreover, our analysis is limited to authors’ economic rights and does not 
concern itself with the moral rights that authors of musical works equally enjoy (such 
                                                   
7  Garnett and others, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (15th edn, 2005) para 27–142.  As to the 
contractual arrangements with performers and producers of sound recordings, see Hertin and 
Klages, ‘Tonträgerlizenzvertrag/Bandübernahmevertrag’ in Schütze and Weipert (eds) Münchener 
Vertragshandbuch (6th edn, 2009) 982, 955-961, 982-986. 
8  Record producers rely on collecting societies for certain uses.  Yet even where this is the case, the 
societies are not appointed exclusively and thus lack the bargaining power that typically characterises 
authors’ rights societies; see Gerlach, AEPO-Artis Seminar 2010: Performers' Rights in Today's European 
Environment: How to Adapt the Existing Rights to the New Uses of Performances? (2010). 
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as the right of paternity or the right of integrity).  This choice also finds its rationale in 
the fact that this research proposes to contextualise cultural diversity in the practical 
area of multi-territorial licensing of authors’ rights.  As moral rights cannot be 
transferred or assigned, however, they are not the object of any such licences and an 
online music service provider is always under the obligation to observe an author’s 
moral rights irrespective of whether or not it has entered into a licensing agreement 
covering the authors’ economic rights.   
4.2 Focus on the Cultural Activities Undertaken by GEMA 
Part 4 aims to assess whether the system of collective rights management promotes 
diversity in online music.  More concretely, the objective is to analyse what collecting 
societies themselves portray as cultural functions and thereby confirm or disconfirm 
the commonly raised claim that these functions enhance cultural diversity.9  Given 
that collecting societies in at least 24 EU member states runs explicit cultural and 
social schemes, it is impossible to provide a complete picture within the boundaries of 
this thesis.  Instead, part 4 closely analyses a particularly suitable example of such 
cultural activities, notably those undertaken by GEMA.  
The choice of GEMA is motivated by two reasons.  On the one hand, its ten 
per cent deduction from the performing royalties to cultural and social ends10 is typical 
of a widespread practice amongst authors’ societies.  On the other hand, an analysis of 
the society’s cultural contributions is facilitated by the fact that they are governed by 
the detailed rules of its published Distribution Plans.11  In contrast, cultural support by 
the UK Performing Rights Society, for example, is practiced on a much smaller scale 
and within complete discretion of the PRS Board.12  While it is clear that the analysis 
                                                   
9  See below at 11, on page 147. 
10  See below at 11.2.1, on page 174. 
11  The General Principles and the Implementing Provisions of the three Distribution Plans are 
reproduced in GEMA, GEMA-Jahrbuch 2011/2012 (2011) 291–347. 
12  While the PRS constitution allows for a maximum cultural deduction of one per cent, in practice, in 
2005 the society only used less than half of the permitted maximum and donated it entirely for the 
support of new music; KEA European Affairs 128.  Moreover, the amount spent this way seems to 
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of GEMA’s cultural support mechanisms cannot be seen as representative of all EU 
societies in this respect, it allows us to draw more general conclusions about the way 
that cultural measures would need to be designed in order to promote diversity in 
online music.   
In addition, there is much to suggest that the result of our analysis may even be 
more generally valid.  Notably, GEMA fails to promote the diversity of online music 
because it bases its cultural functions on evaluative criteria in reference to the musical 
work or its author in question.  It appears likely that collecting societies who distribute 
parts of their revenues according to cultural considerations will do so based on 
perhaps different but equally evaluative criteria, in which case their schemes would 
neither promote cultural diversity in online music as deduced from TFEU Article 
167(4) in light of Article 7 of the 2005 Convention.  While it cannot be excluded that 
there may be a collecting society with cultural schemes based on the ideas of cultural 
pluralism, this would be unlikely as the collecting societies’ explicit cultural schemes 
developed from the idea of supporting the ‘national arts’ and thus stand in a different 
conceptual tradition.13  
4.3 Focus on the Impact of the Practical Consequences of Collective 
Licensing and EU Interventions on the Diversity of Online Music 
Finally, we chose to limit the scope of the examination of the 2005 Recommendation 
and the 2008 CISAC Decision in part 5 to the assessment of whether the practical 
consequences of these interventions have promoted the diversity of online music. 
It would also have been possible to focus on the interventions themselves and 
assess their legitimacy and appropriateness.  In that case, the interventions would have 
had to be examined by reference to their primary aims to create a single market and to 
                                                                                                                                                
fluctuate frequently; for the year 2001, for example, it was reported to have been equalled only one 
tenth of the permitted maximum; Winghardt, Gemeinschaftsrechtliches Diskriminierungsverbot und 
Inländerbehandlungsgrundsatz in ihrer Bedeutung für urheberrechtliche Vergütungsansprüche innerhalb der 
Europäischen Union (2001) 54. 
13  See below at 11.5, on page 198. 
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safeguard free competition.  The decision not to follow this route was motivated by the 
fact that legal research already exists proposing this type of analysis.  Moreover, it 
would have shifted the centre of gravity of the study too far away from the diversity of 
online music.  
Likewise, one could have also enquired whether the EU Commission, in 
adopting the measures, fulfilled its obligation to take cultural considerations into 
account.  As TFEU Article 167(4) obliges the EU institutions to adopt the most 
culturally-friendly amongst several equally effective measures, this would have required 
an analysis of whether the primary goals of a single market and free competition could 
have been attained in a more culturally-friendly way, thus again taking us too far away 
from our main objective.   
As a consequence of these deliberate choices, our research does not put us into 
a position from which we could assert, in any well-informed manner, what the EU 
legal framework for the cross-border licensing of authors’ rights in online music should 
look like.  What our research does show, however, is that it is possible to conceptualise 
a working concept of the diversity of online music and how that notion can be used as 
a guideline to direct or assess policy choices in this practical area of copyright licensing. 
It is therefore hoped that this insight may also be deemed a helpful contribution to the 
ongoing debate on multi-territorial licensing.  
 - 14 - 
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Part 2:  Developing a Notion of Diversity in Online Music Applicable 
under EU Law 
Although ‘cultural diversity’ is an omnipresent claim in the debate on the future 
organisation of music licensing for online uses and although TFEU Article 167(4) 
obliges the EU institutions to promote cultural diversity, there is hardly any 
substantive discussion of the legal meaning of the term or explanation of how it 
applies to online music.  Providing such analysis is the two-fold aim of this part.  The 
endeavour is underpinned by the belief that the debate on online music and, in 
particular, multi-territorial licensing, would benefit from a more focused approach and 
that cultural diversity, once substantiated as diversity in online music, must be a 
guiding factor for the European legislator when regulating in the area. 
We first analyse the meaning of ‘culture’ under EU law (chapter 5).  In an 
attempt to discern the meaning of cultural diversity under EU law, the descriptive and 
the normative dimensions of cultural diversity must be distinguished (chapter 6).  The 
analysis of the meanings that the EU legal order ascribes to the terms ‘culture’ and 
‘cultural diversity’ will allow us to formulate a working concept of diversity in online 
music that is able to serve as the basis of the research in the subsequent parts of the 
thesis. 
During our quest for an appropriate understanding of culture and cultural 
diversity, we analyse the meanings that have been attributed to these terms in 
international law and intergovernmental practice and, more precisely, in the work of 
the two international organisations with a particular mandate in the cultural field and 
thus the most important impact on the cultural policies of the EU and its member 
states: the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO)14 and the Council of Europe (CoE).15   
                                                   
14  Established in 1946, UNESCO is a specialised UN agency with the task ‘to contribute to peace and 
security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture’; 
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in UNESCO (ed), 
Basic Texts (2010) 5, Article I(1). 
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15  The CoE was founded in 1949 with the aim ‘to achieve a greater unity between its members’ ‘by 
discussion of questions of common concern and by agreements and common action’ and is open to 
any European state; Statute of the CoE, 1 ETS, Articles 1(a)-(b), 4. 
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5 The Notion of ‘Culture’ under EU Law 
We start our enquiry into the meaning of cultural diversity by determining how 
‘culture’ is understood under EU law.  In so doing, we acknowledge the widespread 
agreement that the ordinary meaning of ‘cultural diversity’ should be equated with 
‘diversity of cultures’.  In the EU legal framework, for example, both variants are used; 
Articles 3(3) of the TEU, 165(1) of the TFEU and 22 of the CFREU speak of ‘cultural 
diversity’, whereas TFEU Articles 167(1) and (4) as well as the Preamble of the 
CFREU paraphrase this as ‘diversity of cultures’16. 
Certainly, such definitions, in reality, relocate the problem, immediately raising 
the question ‘what is culture?’  As a starting point for a deeper analysis of the exact 
contours of cultural diversity, they are nevertheless useful as they clarify that one’s 
understanding of the concept is largely shaped by the way in which one defines 
culture. 
5.1 The Lack of a Definition of ‘Culture’ in the EU Treaties 
TFEU Article 167 establishes the EU’s competences in the field of culture.  
Paragraph 1 spells out a double task: to ‘contribute to the flowering of the cultures of 
the member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity’ and ‘at the 
same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore’.  Paragraph 2 then lists 
specific areas in which the EU may take action, namely the ‘improvement of the 
knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples’, the 
‘conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance’, ‘non-
commercial cultural exchanges’, and the ‘artistic and literary creation, including in the 
audiovisual sector’.  This enumeration may be taken to indicate that the EU’s cultural 
                                                   
16  Another example can be found in the 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 
which speaks of the ‘diverse forms across time and space [that] culture takes’ (Article 1).  Similarly, in 
its 2009 World Report on cultural diversity, the UNESCO Secretariat defines ‘cultural diversity’ as 
‘the wide range of distinct cultures’; UNESCO, Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue 
(2009) 4. 
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competences are limited.  What is more, they do not purport to replace the member 
states’ competences.  The wording of Paragraph 2 underlines this very strongly, stating 
that EU action must encourage the cooperation between member states and – only if 
necessary – may support and supplement their action.  Accordingly, TFEU Article 6(c) 
lists culture as one of the areas in which the EU is competent ‘to carry out actions to 
support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States’.  Cultural 
competences are therefore shared between the EU and its member states – with the 
EU, however, only taking a subsidiary role while the cultural prerogatives remain with 
the member states.17  This is also expressed by TFEU Article 167(5), which specifically 
excludes any harmonisation of domestic laws in the area of culture. 
While the first two Paragraphs establish explicit internal competences vis-à-vis 
the member states, TFEU Article 167(3) adds the explicit external competence to 
‘foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations 
in the sphere of culture’. 
Despite these limited competences in the cultural field that TFEU Article 167 
confers upon the EU, the exact boundaries of the concept of culture in the EU remain 
vague: the EU treaties neither provide a definition of the term nor prescribe a 
particular theoretical framework for ‘culture’. 
As a result of this open-ended construction of culture, the concept remains 
dynamic, thereby allowing the EU a considerable degree of leeway to pursue a cultural 
policy that responds to the needs of the time, be they social, technological or 
political.18  Moreover, not defining culture at the EU level can also be seen as a 
contribution to cultural diversity in itself.  A 2007 Eurobarometer survey, 
commissioned by the European Commission’s Directorate General Education and 
Culture, demonstrated that the perceptions of the term ‘culture’ vary considerably 
                                                   
17  Ress and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, paras 28-36.  See also TFEU Article 2(5), which states that in areas 
where the EU has the competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the 
actions of the member states it may not supersede the member states’ competences. 
18  Craufurd Smith, ‘The Evolution of Cultural Policy in the European Union’ in Craig and de Búrca 
(eds) The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, 2011) 869, 874-–875; the dynamic character of the European 
concept of culture is also emphasised by Ress and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, para 86, and Frenz, 
Handbuch Europarecht (2011) para 4091. 
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among member states.  Representative sample groups of the population of all 27 EU 
member states at the time were asked to choose from 15 possible options in order to 
respond to the request: ‘Please tell me what comes to mind when you think about the 
word “culture”’.  In Sweden, 75 per cent of the questioned participants answered 
‘arts’, whereas in the UK this option was chosen by only 20 per cent.  In Poland, 44 
per cent picked the answer ‘life style and manners’, which in France was only 
associated with culture by 4 per cent of the participants.19  A top-down approach that 
uses a uniform interpretation of culture across the entire EU would disregard the fact 
that the member states took great care to retain their cultural prerogative and violate 
the principle of subsidiarity. 
Given this lack of a legal definition, we will now turn to the ordinary meaning 
of the word ‘culture’, in an attempt to more easily discern the contours of the concept. 
5.2 The Ordinary Meaning of ‘Culture’ 
Determining the ordinary meaning of the word ‘culture’ is a difficult task.  In 1976 
Raymond Williams wrote that ‘culture is one of the two or three most complicated 
words in the English language’.20  The fact alone that until this day his quote is 
regularly included in studies on the topic indicates that the concept of culture has not 
become easier to explain since then.  On the contrary, one can observe a proliferation 
in the use of the terms ‘culture’ and ‘cultural’ not only within academic spheres but in 
all corners of society.  It has thus been remarked that the term culture ‘has escaped all 
academic control and has undergone a marked inflation of usages’.21 
The term culture carries a multitude of varied connotations – many of which, 
in addition, have changed over time.  This section traces back the most commonly 
adopted explanations of culture, discerns the broad trends in the interpretation of 
                                                   
19  European Commission, European Cultural Values (2007) table QA2; see also Langen, EU Cultural 
Policy 1974-2007 (2010) 31–32. 
20  Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (1976) 76; see also Daswani, Management of 
Cultural Pluralism in Europe (1995) 7–8. 
21  Isar, ‘Cultural Diversity’ (2006) 23 Theory, Culture & Society 372, 373; similarly Sewell, ‘The 
Concept(s) of Culture’ in Bonnell and Biernacki (eds) Beyond the Cultural Turn (1999) 35, 38. 
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culture, and endeavours to illustrate the bearing these different interpretations have 
on the notion of cultural diversity.  To do so, an extensive approach is taken that 
transcends the merely legal field.  Two broad concepts can be contrasted: the 
evaluative (5.2.2) and the anthropological view of culture (5.2.3).  A third perspective 
is sometimes distinguished from these two, the view of culture as intellectual activity 
(5.2.1). 
5.2.1 Culture as Intellectual Activity 
This relatively narrow view describes culture as an intellectual and artistic activity.22  
To a large extent, this sense of culture represents the common understanding of the 
term in today’s everyday language.  Within this understanding, culture can be broken 
down into culture as a product and culture as a process.23  The former aspect then 
refers to the creative works produced through intellectual and artistic activity while the 
latter focuses on the creative process.  To embrace this definition of culture does not, 
however, exclude adherence to either the evaluative or the anthropological view of 
culture, nor does it advocate one over the other.  Conversely, the extent of what 
intellectual and artistic activity can be considered as culture differs in the evaluative 
and anthropological views; the former displaying a tendency of favouring so-called high 
culture and the latter adopting a more permissive approach that includes and even 
goes beyond popular culture. 
5.2.2 The Evaluative View of Culture 
The origin of the term ‘culture’ lies in the Latin word cultura signifying the cultivation 
or tending of natural growth.24  In today’s language, this meaning is still alive in 
biological expressions such as ‘bacterial culture’.25  From the 16th century onwards, the 
                                                   
22  Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (2nd edn, 1983) 90. 
23  Shaheed, Report of the Independent Expert in the Field of Cultural Rights (2010) para 5. 
24  For a more detailed etymological explanation see Williams, Keywords 1983, 87–89. 
25  Barnard and Spencer, ‘Culture’ in Barnard and Spencer (eds) The Routledge Encyclopedia of Social and 
Cultural Anthropology (2nd edn, 2010) 168, 168. 
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term was also used to describe individual human development – be it physical or 
intellectual.26  It was then in the late 17th century that it came to stand for 
improvement of society as a whole.27  At that time the evaluative view of culture 
developed where the notion represented higher standards of human wholeness or 
perfection.28  Matthew Arnold offered an early encapsulation of this idea in 1873 
when he wrote: ‘culture, the acquainting ourselves with the best that has been known 
and said in the world’.29  The decision as to what constitutes the best is, of course, 
highly judgmental and adds a claim of universality to the concept.  Notably, it implies 
the existence of a ‘single, grand evolutionary scale’: some people, or indeed societies, 
have more culture than others and some human products are more cultural than 
others.30  Those intellectual and artistic activities that in today’s language could be 
summarised as ‘high culture’ were regarded as particularly cultural, such as visual art, 
music, dance and literature. 
In today’s world, the evaluative interpretation of culture remains rather 
hypothetical.  Although the distinction between ‘high culture’ and the rest is still made 
by many, the claim that such ‘high culture’ is the only type of intellectual and artistic 
creation that can claim cultural value is no longer widely supported.31  Furthermore, it 
is incompatible with the principle of equality of all cultures that is proclaimed in many 
                                                   
26  Williams, Keywords 1983, 87; Bennett, ‘Culture’ in Bennett and others (eds) New Keywords (2005) 63, 
65. 
27  In this sense, the term was initially used interchangeably with that of ‘civilisation’.  The late 19th and 
early 20th century, however, saw an increasing tension between the two, with ‘civilisation’ standing 
for material and mechanical progress brought about by industrialisation and ‘culture’ for higher 
moral, spiritual and human standards; see Bennett, Culture, 65–66, and Williams, Keywords 1983, 
89–90, who notes that sometimes, complicating matters further, the same distinction was made with 
an exact reversal of the terms.  A more thorough account of the term ‘civilisation’ is given by Tsing 
and Hershatter, ‘Civilization’ in Bennett and others (eds) New Keywords (2005) 35.  On the 
relationship between the notions of culture and civilisation see also Kaempfer ‘Culture, civilisation 
et diversité culturelle’ in UNESCO (ed), Déclaration universelle de l'UNESCO sur la diversité culturelle: 
commentaires et propositions (2003), 93–96. 
28  Bennett, Culture, 65. 
29  Arnold, Literature & Dogma: An Essay towards a Better Apprehension of the Bible (1873) xiii. 
30  Barnard and Spencer, Culture, 171 and 168. 
31  Bennett, Culture, 64. 
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recent international standard-setting instruments on cultural diversity embracing a less 
restrictive understanding of culture.32 
5.2.3 The Anthropological View of Culture 
It was in the early 20th century that an anthropological sense of culture started to 
develop, which is commonly portrayed as seeing culture as a particular way of life or 
identity of a society.33  The consensus evoked by this simplification, however, is 
deceptive; in reality, the 20th century was marked by numerous debates amongst 
(mostly Northern American) anthropologists about the correct definition of culture.  
Traditionally, the way of life of a society was seen by many as being embodied in its 
particular ensemble of customary behaviour, institutions and artefacts.  Others, 
however, put the emphasis on each society’s shared system of concepts or mental 
representations, established by convention and reproduced by traditional 
transmission.34  In 1952, the width of the different approaches was strikingly 
demonstrated by Kroeber and Kluckhohn when they provided a survey of 152 different 
definitions of culture.35  For the purposes of our study, however, suffice it to 
emphasise the common traits of all the different variants of the anthropological view 
of culture.36  Proponents of the anthropological view condemn the ethnocentric 
evolutionism that the evaluative interpretation of culture embodies and replace it with 
a pluralistic vision.  They began to speak of ‘cultures’ instead of ‘culture’: the world 
was thus no longer seen as being informed by one culture but as made up of lots of 
different cultures.  Moreover, advocates of this current of thought refused to continue 
to judge any of these different cultures according to a supposedly universal but in 
                                                   
32  See below at 6.3, on page 34. 
33  Bennett, Culture, 67. 
34  Ingold, ‘Introduction to Culture’ in Ingold (ed) Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology (1994) 329, 
329; Godelier, ‘La diversité culturelle du point de vue de l'anthropologie’ [2010] Les Cahiers du 
Musée des Confluences 11, 15. 
35  Kroeber and Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (1952). 
36  A detailed analysis of the most important schools of thought in anthropology and social sciences is 
provided by Ingold; Sewell; Barnard and Spencer, Culture, and – with a particular emphasis on the 
conceptual history of culture in Germany – Klein, ‘Kultur’ in Baur and others (eds) Handbuch 
Soziologie (2008) 237. 
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reality strongly Eurocentric scale of progress.  Rather, they explained it by the values 
and standards prevalent in that society itself,37 thus adopting a position of cultural 
relativism in which every culture is worthwhile in its way.38  Such relativistic tendencies 
also had a bearing on what was regarded as cultural production and consumption.  
Increasingly, the boundaries between ‘high culture’, ie those works or processes of 
intellectual and artistic activity that according to the evaluative view of culture 
represent ‘the best that has been known or said’ and the rest have blurred with the 
result that today ‘high culture’ looks more and more like one cultural market amongst 
others.39 
In general, the anthropological view led to a significantly broadened 
understanding of culture.  In its most extreme form, it could be argued that 
‘everything is culture’.  Whether such an approach is to be welcomed appears 
doubtful.  Where everything is culture, the term culture surrenders all accuracy and 
loses the capacity to be meaningfully employed in the political debate.40 
During recent decades, the anthropological sense of culture has increasingly 
been qualified with a view to the dynamic nature of culture.  In fact, the definition of 
culture as a particular way of life, often used synonymously with the word society, has 
been criticised for having favoured a taxonomising attitude in which culture is fixed 
with distinct and separate entities.  This logic, it has been argued, led to ‘“billiard-ball” 
representations of cultures as neatly bounded wholes’41 in which humanity at large is 
‘parcelled up into a multitude of discrete cultural capsules’.42  However, it ignores the 
fact that the different cultures are interconnected and that cultural distinctions are 
fluid and impermanent.43  Against these pitfalls, it is increasingly emphasised that 
                                                   
37  Ingold 329. 
38  Barnard and Spencer, Culture, 168.  It is important to note that cultural relativism has a related but 
distinct meaning in the debate on the universal application of cultural rights; see below n 242. 
39  Bennett, Culture, 67. 
40  For a more detailed description of the ‘everything is culture’ phenomenon, see Ellmeier, ‘EU-
Kulturpolitik — Europäische Kulturpolitik? Ökonomie, Politik und Kultur im Kontext’ in Ellmeier 
and others (eds) Kulturpolitik in Europa - Europäische Kulturpolitik? (1997) Teil 2, text after fn 27. 
41  Isar 372. 
42  Ingold 330. 
43  Bennett, Culture, 68. 
 - 24 - 
culture is ‘a living process, historical, dynamic and evolving’.44  This attitude is also 
reflected in the current usage of culture, which stresses the processes of differing rather 
than being different.45  In order to accentuate this shift of emphasis, it has been 
proposed to ‘say that people live culturally rather than that they live in cultures’46 or to 
speak of cultures in difference rather than different cultures.47  In recent political 
practice, this shift has been mirrored by the emphasis of intercultural dialogue within 
the cultural diversity debate.48  
If we link this rather theoretical discussion back to online music, the concrete 
object of our study, the observation emerges that this field would be regarded as 
cultural under all three perspectives of culture: music is the product of intellectual 
creativity, has traditionally been conceived as a way by which cultivation can be 
achieved, and is an expression of the author’s way of life and thus his or her cultural 
identity.  Still, the evaluative and the anthropological views of culture would differ in 
the extent to which they would consider music as a cultural form.  From an evaluative 
perspective, some music is more cultural than others; common lines of demarcation 
might, for example, be drawn between serious and light music.  Under an 
anthropological approach to culture, however, there is no such abstract hierarchy. 
5.3 The Concept of ‘Culture’ in International Law and 
Intergovernmental Practice 
Additional insight into how the notion of culture should be interpreted at the EU 
level can also be gained by looking at the way in which it has been used in 
international law and intergovernmental practice and, more specifically, within 
UNESCO and the CoE. 
                                                   
44  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 21 on the Right of 
Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art. 15, para. 1 (a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights) (2009) para 11. 
45  Bennett, Culture, 68. 
46  Ingold 330 (original emphasis). 
47  Bennett, Culture, 68. 
48  See in more detail below, at 6.3.2, on page 43. 
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The principle that domestic legal norms should be construed in so far as 
possible in conformity with international law is a common method of interpretation in 
domestic legal orders.  Its application in EU law has been postulated in legal 
literature,49 and on several occasions, the ECJ has interpreted EU norms in light of 
international law.50  Moreover, TFEU Article 167(3) grants the EU the explicit 
external competence to foster cooperation in cultural matters with third countries and 
international organisations.  It follows that where the EU adopts international 
instruments in pursuing this competence – the 2005 Convention being a case in 
point – it would be contradictory not to take them into account.51  Third, 
accommodating notions of international law and intergovernmental practice does not 
necessarily violate the prerogative in cultural matters that EU member states were 
careful to retain.  Notably, where EU member states elaborate on the way in which 
they see culture or cultural diversity in international fora, this should contribute to a 
common understanding amongst them, and also be taken into account when 
interpreting EU law.   
Within UNESCO, the understanding of culture has changed considerably over 
the last 60 plus years.  To a large extent, this development mirrors the evolution of the 
theoretical approaches to culture described in 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.  In the first years of its 
existence, UNESCO’s main efforts had been on the increase and spreading of 
knowledge and culture throughout the world.  Culture, in these early times, was 
understood in the sense of intellectual and artistic activity comprising mainly works of 
                                                   
49  See, for example, Uerpmann, International Law as an Element of European Constitutional Law: 
International Supplementary Constitutions (2003) 25. 
50  In Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen GmbH v Federal Republic of Germany, Case C-70/94 [1995] ECR 
I–3189 (ECJ, 17 October 1995) para 23 and in Criminal Proceedings against Peter Leifer, Reinhold Otto 
Krauskopf and Otto Holzer, Case C-83/94 [1995] ECR I–3231 (ECJ, 17 October 1995) para 24 the 
Court interpreted a Community provision in light of a GATT provision. In Hermès International v 
FHT Marketing Choice BV, Case C-53/96 [1998] ECR I–3603 (ECJ, 16 June 1998) para 28 and in 
Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm 
Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV, Joint Cases C-300/98 and 392/98 [2000] ECR I–11307 
(ECJ, 14 December 2000) para 47 the Court endorsed an interpretation in light of a provision in the 
TRIPS agreement.  A more detailed overview of how the Court of Justice incorporates international 
human rights law, WTO law, and UN Security Council Resolutions is given by Petersen, The 
Reception of International Law by Constitutional Courts through the Prism of Legitimacy (2009) 12–21. 
51  Ress and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, para 44. 
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art and monuments of history.52  Soon, however, this narrow understanding gave way 
to a more anthropological definition of culture.53  A broader understanding of culture 
underpins, for example, the 1966 Declaration of Principles of International Cultural 
Co-operation, which sees cultural co-operation as a means to mitigate ‘ignorance of the 
way of life and custom of peoples’ (Paragraph 4 of the Preamble).54  In 1982, a 
definition of culture in anthropological terms was included in an international, albeit 
non-binding, instrument.  The Preamble of the Mexico City Declaration on Cultural 
Policies defines culture in its widest sense as: 
‘the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and 
emotional features that characterize a society or social group.  It includes 
not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights 
of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs’.55 
To date this remains, with slight variations, the way in which UNESCO and its 
member states see culture.56  It also underpins the 2005 UNESCO Convention on the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions.57  In that binding instrument, cultural content 
‘refers to the symbolic meaning, artistic dimension and cultural values that originate 
from or express cultural identities’ (Article 4(2)) and the focus is on the cultural 
identities of individuals, groups and societies (Article 4(1) and (3)). 
A very similar development can be traced can be traced within the CoE.  
Although the Statute of the CoE lists ‘cultural matters’ amongst the fields of 
                                                   
52  Stenou, UNESCO and the Question of Cultural Diversity (2007) 81–82. 
53  Ibid 76–77. 
54  Declaration of the Principles of International Cooperation in UNESCO (ed), Records of the General 
Conference, 14th session, Paris, 1966 (1967) 86.  Article I proclaims: ‘1. Each culture has a dignity 
and value which must be respected and preserved.  2. Every people has the right and the duty to 
develop its culture.  3. In their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal influences they exert 
on one another, all cultures form part of the common heritage belonging to all mankind’. 
55  Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies in UNESCO (ed), World Conference on Cultural Politics, 
Mexico City, 26 July - 6 August 1982 (1982) 41. 
56  The definition was, for example, re-iterated in the Action Plan adopted by the Intergovernmental 
Conference on Cultural Policies for Development in 1998 and in the Preamble of the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in UNESCO (ed), Records of the General 
Conference, 31st session (2002) 62. 
57  Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 2440 UNTS, 311.  For 
a more detailed analysis, see below at 6.3.3.4, on page 60, and in chapter 7, on page 84. 
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agreements and common action in Article 1(b), it does not define the term.58  Since 
1955, cultural co-operation within the CoE has been governed by the European 
Cultural Convention; with the aim to ‘safeguard and encourage the development of 
European culture’.59  Two objectives are stipulated: the promotion of the common 
cultural heritage of Europe (Articles 1 and 3) and the promotion of mutual 
understanding amongst the CoE member states (Articles 2 and 4).  Although the 
convention does not offer any definition, a fairly narrow, evaluative view of culture is 
implicit.60  For once, cultural heritage, at the time, was understood in the restricted 
sense of objects of art.61  Moreover, the means by which mutual understanding was to 
be fostered had a confined outlook, namely ‘the study of the languages, history and 
civilisation’ of the other members (Para 4 of the Preamble and Article 2).  Over time, 
however, a broader anthropological view of culture also gained momentum in the 
CoE.  This is already obvious in the fact that during the last 50 years five broader sub-
areas of cultural co-operation have emerged under the framework of the European 
Cultural Convention: culture, heritage, education, sport and youth.62  But also in the 
cultural field proper, the notion of culture was widened in the early 1970s to 
accommodate the concepts of cultural democracy and cultural development.63  The 
shift towards a more anthropological conception of culture is also visible in the 
declarations and resolutions of the conferences of the member states’ ministers 
responsible for culture, which have taken place on an ad hoc basis since 1976.  At the 
time of the first conference, the Secretary General described culture as  
                                                   
58  Notwithstanding this explicit mention of cultural matters, cultural co-operation remained on a ‘very 
sporadic and one-off basis’ until the entry into force of the European Cultural Convention; 
Grosjean, Forty Years of Cultural Co-operation at the CoE 1954-94 (1997) 2. 
59  European Cultural Convention, 18 ETS, Para 4 of the Preamble. 
60  The CoE Secretariat itself describes the convention’s understanding of culture as ‘traditional, an 
artistic and intellectual heritage that should be transmitted, interpreted, enriched and enjoyed by as 
many as possible’; CoE, The Secretary General's Report on 50 Years of the European Cultural Convention 
(2004) 6. 
61  Ibid 3. 
62  A detailed overview of the actions taken in all of these areas is offered by Grosjean, Forty Years of 
Cultural Co-operation 9–94.  A more recent review is presented in CoE, Report on European Cultural 
Convention. 
63  Grosjean, Forty Years of Cultural Co-operation, 38–40, and CoE, Report on European Cultural Convention, 
6–7.  The concepts are described in more detail below at 6.3.1, on pages 38-39. 
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‘everything which enables the individual to situate him or herself vis-à-vis 
his environment, his society and his heritage; all those factors which 
contribute to a better understanding of man’s position and destiny and 
make it possible for him in given circumstances to modify them’.64  
The ministers for culture themselves declared in Article III of Resolution No. 1 
on the Challenge to Cultural Policy in our Changing Society that  
‘cultural policy can no longer limit itself exclusively to taking measures for 
the development, promotion and popularisation of the arts; an additional 
dimension is now needed which by recognising the plurality of our 
societies, reinforces respect for individual dignity, spiritual values and the 
rights of minority groups and their cultural expressions’.65  
In 2004, the CoE Secretariat summarised that the idea of culture within the 
CoE had been broadened to include ‘all of the values that give human beings their 
reasons for living and doing’.66  This broad understanding of culture also underpins 
recent CoE standard-setting instruments.  One example can be found in the 
Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention, adopted by the 
European ministers responsible for cultural affairs in 2003, when defining culture in 
the context of intercultural dialogue in the appendix: ‘Intercultural dialogue must 
extend to every possible element of culture, without exception, whether these be 
cultural in the strict sense or have a political, economical, social, philosophical or 
religious dimension’.67 
In conclusion, the understanding of culture, as displayed in UNESCO and 
CoE legal instruments and policy documents, has gradually broadened to embrace the 
anthropological view of culture. 
                                                   
64  CoE, Ad Hoc Conference of European Ministers with Responsibility for Cultural Affairs Oslo 1976 (1976) 15. 
65  Resolution No. 1 on the Challenge to Cultural Policy in Our Changing Society in CoE (ed), Ad Hoc 
Conference of European Ministers with Responsibility for Cultural Affairs Oslo 1976 (1976) 151.  
On a similar note, it was later highlighted that ‘all human and social activity should take place 
within a cultural framework’ in the Preamble of the Declaration on the Economics and Funding of 
Culture in CoE (ed), 5th Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Cultural Affairs – 
Sintra, 15-17 September 1987 (1988) 41. 
66  CoE, Report on European Cultural Convention, 6. 
67  Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention in CoE (ed), Conference of European 
Ministers Responsible for Cultural Affairs on ‘The New Role and New Responsibilities of Ministers 
of Culture in Initiating Intercultural Dialogue, with Due Regard for Cultural Diversity’ 
(Opatija/Croatia, 20-22 October 2003) (2004) 5, Appendix Definition of Intercultural Dialogue. 
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5.4 The Concept of ‘Culture’ in EU Practice 
The tendency to understand culture in an anthropological sense can also be observed 
in the political practices of the EU. 
The Commission, for its part, has taken care not to limit the notion of culture 
in any way.  Sometimes, it explicitly abstained from substantiating the term arguing 
that ‘no one expects the Community to become involved in academic argument over 
the definition, purpose and substance of culture, or to arrogate any executive powers 
or even the slightest guiding function’68 or that it is ‘not for an institution to define 
the content of the concept of culture’.69  
In its very first communication on culture, however, it had already understood 
culture in a broad anthropological sense as comprising  
‘in addition to the aesthetic side, i.e. literature, music, plastic arts, a 
scientific side (sciences, technology), a physical side (sports, open-air life) 
and a social side: man in his working environment, in the context of 
everyday living, the economy and politics’.70  
Also, in recent times, the Commission has stressed the anthropological view of culture 
continuously.  In 2003, the Commission formulated that  
‘the concept of culture which constitutes the basis for the Community 
action … is understood in the anthropologic and social sense, embracing 
all of which concurs to the identity and dignity of people.  Such concept 
enables one to fully grasp cultural diversity in a dynamic way in its relation 
to the Other’.71 
                                                   
68  Commission of the European Communities, Stronger Community Action in the Cultural Sector - 
Communication to Parliament and the Council (1982) 3.  In the same vein, there is no definition of 
culture in Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication to the Council and 
Parliament - A Fresh Boost for Culture in the European Community [1987] Bulletin of the European 
Communities Supplement 4/1, or Commission of the European Communities, Communication from 
the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee - New 
Prospects for Community Cultural Action (1992). 
69  European Commission, 1st Report on the Consideration of Cultural Aspects in European Community 
Action (1996) 3. 
70  Commission of the European Communities, Community Action in the Cultural Sector - Commission 
Communication to the Council [1977] Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 6/1, 24–25. 
71  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
- Towards an International Instrument on Cultural Diversity (2003) 6. 
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In 2007, it argued – very much along the lines of the definition of culture in 
the Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Politics in 198272 – that  
‘culture should be regarded as a set of distinctive spiritual and material 
traits that characterize a society and social group.  It embraces literature 
and arts as well as ways of life, value systems, traditions and beliefs’.73 
5.5 Assessment of the EU Concept of Culture 
This review has contrasted the evaluative sense of culture with the broader 
anthropological understanding of the term.  It has become clear that the former view 
cherishes works and practices of what could be called highbrow culture, while mass or 
everyday culture is disregarded.  Culture in the latter sense, on the other hand, is 
considerably broader and, in its extreme form, leads to an ‘everything is culture’ 
stance.74  To a third, more pragmatic view, culture is the sum of the products and 
processes of intellectual creation.  But which of these understandings underpins the 
concept of culture under EU law and, more specifically, TFEU Article 167(4)? 
Clearly, to endorse any one of these views on culture also predetermines 
certain elements of a larger concept of cultural diversity.  If one adopts the pragmatic 
approach to culture, cultural diversity designates the spectrum of different intellectual 
and artistic works and their production processes in a given society or group.  If the 
concept of cultural diversity is based on an understanding of culture in the 
anthropological sense, it describes the spectrum of different ways of life of societies or 
groups.  Developing an interpretation of cultural diversity based on the evaluative 
perspective on culture is a more difficult task.  Arguably, cultural diversity would be 
seen as the spectrum of different degrees of culture of all the people within one 
society; the different levels they have reached on the evolutionary scale to human 
perfection.  In notable contrast to the other two views, which are not inherently partial 
                                                   
72  See above at 5.3, on page 22. 
73  European Commission, Commission Report to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Implementation of the European 
Agenda for Culture (2010) 2. 
74  See above n 40. 
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as to whether cultural diversity has a positive or negative value, from the evaluative 
perspective, culture diversity would not be seen as something positive: after all it is the 
goal for all members of society to reach the highest standards of human existence.75  
Moreover, cultural diversity would be highly subjective, depending on the cultural 
elite’s interpretation of what these higher standards of culture are. 
Our initial difficulty in conceptualising cultural diversity based on the 
evaluative view of culture might be seen as a first indication that the two concepts do 
not make a good match.  More importantly, a review of relevant international 
standard-setting instruments and both EU and international political practice has 
revealed a clear trend to embrace the broader, anthropological view of culture, which 
could be understood as suggesting the anthropological view as the basis for the 
interpretation of cultural diversity in TFEU Article 167(4) and EU law in general. 
This might appear inconsistent with the sometimes articulated view that the 
cultural concept in the EU is to be interpreted restrictively.  One argument in favour 
of a restrictive interpretation is systematic in nature and highlights that the areas of 
education and science, which, from a broader view could also be seen as elements of 
culture, are governed by specific provisions of their own in Titles XII and XIX of the 
TFEU.76  In addition, one could argue that only a restrictive interpretation reflects the 
vision of shared competences of TFEU Article 167 in which EU member states retain 
the cultural prerogative and the EU is only called upon to support and supplement 
member state activity.  From this perspective, the scope of the EU concept of culture 
should be based on a comparison of the existing domestic concepts of culture.  While 
the autonomy of the European legal order prohibits interpreting the concept of 
‘culture’ in the EU treaties by simply resorting to national standards, the ECJ uses a 
form of normative comparison as a method of interpretation.77  Some have therefore 
                                                   
75  Quite on the contrary, in these intellectual environment cultural institutions flourished from the 
middle of the 19th century onwards with the goal of diffusing the higher standards of culture 
through broader society; see Bennett, Culture, 66. 
76  Berggreen-Merkel, Die rechtlichen Aspekte der Kulturpolitik nach dem Maastrichter Vertrag (1995) 3; Ress 
and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, para 85. 
77  Poiares Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional 
Pluralism’ (2007) 1 European Journal of Legal Studies, 5–7. 
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suggested that the European concept of culture should encompass all the areas that 
traditionally have been the object of the EU member states’ national cultural 
policies.78  Culture would then be interpreted to cover areas such as literature, music, 
visual art, performing art, film, audiovisual art, monument preservation, customs, 
radio, television and Internet.79  Others have proposed to define the concept of culture 
in accordance with the specific fields of action mentioned by TFEU Article 167(2).80 
Yet, there are also good reasons to oppose any restrictive interpretation of the 
EU cultural concept.  Not only is the language of TFEU Article 167(1) fairly broad, 
but also the list of specific areas of action enumerated in TFEU Article 167(2) could be 
seen as indicative only.  A restrictive interpretation becomes all the more doubtful in 
the particular context of TFEU Article 167(4).  Even if, in principle, one were to agree 
on a restrictive EU cultural concept in TFEU Article 167(1) and (2), this would not 
necessarily mean that the same restrictive view of culture should apply when 
interpreting the mainstreaming clause of Paragraph 4.  Would the EU be obliged to 
take into account cultural aspects only in so far as they relate to the traditional areas of 
national cultural policy when adopting a measure that is based on a non-cultural treaty 
provision but has incidental cultural objectives?  Or would a broader view of culture be 
appropriate here?  The nature of Paragraph 4 as a safeguard against cultural blindness 
on the part of the EU legislator would probably militate in favour of the latter.  The 
explicit use of the term ‘cultural diversity’ in TFEU Article 167(4) can also be seen as 
pointing in the same direction.  For since cultural diversity is now also mentioned in 
TEU Article 3(3) and CFREU Article 22, it could be argued that it has become a 
general principle of EU law that transcends the restrictions allegedly inherent in 
TFEU Articles 167(1) and (2).  Its inclusion in TFEU Article 167(4) could, therefore, 
be understood to command a broader interpretation of culture for the purposes of 
that Paragraph. 
                                                   
78  Ress and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, para 86; see also Loman and others, Culture and Community Law: 
Before and after Maastricht (1992) 3. 
79  Ress and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, para 86. 
80  Frenz para 4089.  Somewhat inconsistently with this premise, he then goes on to equally include 
mass and everyday culture.  Yet this, it could be argued, eventually results in a not particularly 
restrictive scope. 
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But even if one were to endorse a restrictive vision of the EU cultural concept, 
this, it is submitted, would only at first glance seem in contradiction with an 
anthropological underpinning.  This becomes clearer if one realises that the two pairs 
of antipodes, namely, on the one hand, the evaluative and the anthropological 
theoretical paradigms of culture and, on the other, the restrictive and the extensive 
practical implementation of culture, belong to two different and distinct categories.  
Both the evaluative and the anthropological theories of culture are simplified 
archetypes, which, in reality, allow for a multitude of different embodiments, all of 
which are restrictive or extensive to a variable degree. The converse question of 
whether a restrictive interpretation of the EU concept of culture implies an evaluative 
justification would be more telling in our view.  That this cannot be the case is 
evidenced by the fundamental importance of the principles of equality and pluralism 
in EU law.  TEU Article 4(2) postulates that the ‘Union shall respect the equality of 
member states before the Treaties as well as their national identities’ and Paragraph 3 
of the Preamble of the CFREU mentions the respect of national identities of member 
states alongside the respect for the diversity of cultures.  These ideals, however, could 
not be reconciled with the judgmental element inherent in the evaluative view of 
culture, according to which some cultural products and practices are more valued than 
others. 
It can, therefore, be concluded that the EU cultural concept is principally 
infused by an anthropological view of culture as encompassing everything that 
embodies the particular identity or way of life of a society or group.   
 - 34 - 
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6 The Notion of ‘Cultural Diversity’ under EU Law 
The present chapter seeks to establish how the notion of cultural diversity is to 
be understood under EU law and, more specifically, TFEU Article 167(4). 
The analysis starts with a review of the instances in which cultural diversity is 
mentioned in the EU legal framework (6.1).  While the concept of cultural diversity 
has steadily gained importance for the EU, this is only of limited help in our quest to 
substantiate the term.  In fact, EU statutory texts do not contain any legal definition of 
the term ‘cultural diversity’ or any indication of how it should be interpreted.  It is, 
therefore, necessary to explore its contours from different angles. 
Based upon the EU understanding of the term ‘culture’81, we can establish a 
first definition of cultural diversity that highlights the descriptive dimension of the 
concept (6.2). 
It is clear, however, that the term is seldom used in such a strictly analytical 
sense but very often with various normative connotations.  To track these additional 
dimensions of cultural diversity, we review the ways in which the concept has been 
applied in international law and the political practice of UNESCO and the CoE (6.3).  
The resulting analysis is extensive, deliberately going beyond binding law and even 
transcending the legal sphere.  First, this approach is motivated by the recognition that 
the concept of cultural diversity has developed in sociology rather than law.  In 
addition, however, there is a broader point to make: because of the variety of meanings 
that continue to be ascribed to the term cultural diversity, it is prone to 
misunderstanding and can easily be used to cloud rather than enlighten discussions.  It 
is, therefore, all the more important to be transparent about the assumptions that 
underlie its use.   
                                                   
81  Chapter 5, on page 13. 
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It will then be determined whether the normative dimensions of cultural 
diversity found in international law and intergovernmental practice will have to be 
taken into account when interpreting the term under EU law (6.4). 
Finally, the concluding remarks highlight some of the pitfalls in interpreting 
the concept of cultural diversity that may explain why the use of the term so often 
proves ambiguous and vague (6.5). 
6.1 Cultural Diversity in the EU Legal Framework 
6.1.1 The Mainstreaming Requirement in TFEU Article 167(4)  
The so-called mainstreaming clause of TFEU Article 167(4) provides that the EU ‘shall 
take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaties, 
in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures’.  EU 
action may affect culture.  While this is self-evident in cases of measures with primarily 
cultural objectives, the provision also recognises that measures that have the explicit 
goal of serving non-cultural purposes and are therefore adopted under one of the other 
areas of EU competence82 may also affect culture.   
In light of the impact that EU measures, even where not enacted under TFEU 
Article 167, may have on the cultural sphere in general and on the member states’ 
cultural prerogative in particular, member states felt the necessity to include TFEU 
Article 167(4) in order to prevent undue damage to their cultural objectives.83  Its 
                                                   
82  The Court of Justice in European Parliament v Council of the EU has confirmed the legitimacy of such 
measures.  Deciding on the right legal basis for a council decision that pursued both economic and 
cultural objectives, the Court noted that ‘not every description of the cultural aspects of Community 
action necessarily implies that recourse must be had to Article 128 [now TFEU Article 167] as a legal 
basis, where culture does not constitute an essential and indissociable component of the other 
component on which the action in question is based but is merely incidental or secondary to it’; 
European Parliament v Council of the European Union, Case C-42/97 [1999] ECR I–869 (ECJ) para 24.  
With a view to the Court’s subsequent decisions in the Tobacco cases, it has been suggested that 
TFEU Article 167(4) even allows the adoption of harmonising legislation primarily intended to 
attain cultural policy goals; see Psychogiopoulou, The Integration of Cultural Considerations in EU Law 
and Policies (2008) 73. 
83  Cunningham, ‘In Defense of Member State Culture: The Unrealized Potential of Article 151(4) of 
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purpose is to alert the European legislator already in the planning stage of any given 
measure to the possible cultural implications that its adoption might entail.84  The EU 
is therefore required to take into account ‘cultural aspects … in order to respect and to 
promote the diversity of its cultures’.  Given that the EU is addressed in its entirety, 
one has to conclude that this obligation is incumbent on all EU organs and 
institutions.85   
Despite this explicit mention of cultural diversity in TFEU Article 167(4), the norm 
does not contain any definition of the term. 
6.1.2 The Increased Importance of Cultural Diversity in EU Law 
In the last twenty years, the use of the term ‘cultural diversity’ has proliferated in the 
EU legal order.  The earliest references were introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht 
(entered into force on 1 November 1993) in order to limit the newly created 
Community competences in the areas of education and culture.  TFEU Article 165(1) 
[then EC Article 126(1)] guarantees that when exercising its educational competences, 
the Union fully respects its member states’ ‘linguistic and cultural diversity’.  Similarly, 
TFEU Article 167(1) [then EC Article 128(1)] asserts that the Union must respect the 
national and regional diversity of the cultures of its member states when acting in the 
area of culture.  With the Treaty of Amsterdam (entered into force on 1 May 1999), 
the mainstreaming clause of TFEU Article 167(4) [then EC Article 128(4)] was 
specifically amended to include the respect and promotion of cultural diversity.  While 
prior to the amendment, Paragraph 4 had only stipulated that the EU shall take 
‘cultural aspects’ into account, this was now supplemented by the inclusion of the sub-
phrase ‘in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures’.  
Proclaimed in 2000, the CFREU mentions cultural diversity twice.  First, its Preamble 
contains the postulate for the EU to contribute ‘to the preservation and to the 
development of (its) common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and 
                                                                                                                                                
the EC Treaty and the Consequences for EC Cultural Policy’ (2001) 34 Cornell International Law 
Journal 119, 137. 
84  Psychogiopoulou 129. 
85  See also Ress and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, para 141. 
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traditions of the peoples of Europe’.  Second, according to CFREU Article 22, ‘the 
Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’.86  With the Lisbon 
Treaty, these provisions have come into full legal effect (see TEU Article 6(1)) on 1 
December 2009.  That Treaty also made the latest inclusion of cultural diversity in EU 
law; in a prominent position, the fourth Sub-paragraph of TEU Article 3(3) now 
contains the general principle that the EU ‘shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic 
diversity’. 
Remarkably, in spite of the increased attention that the concept of ‘cultural 
diversity’ seems to have been given at the EU level in recent years, none of the 
mentioned norms attempt to define the term. 
6.2  The Descriptive Dimension of Cultural Diversity 
The enquiry into the meaning of ‘culture’ under EU law evinced an anthropological 
understanding of the term as everything that characterised the identity or the way of 
life of a group or an individual.  Upon this basis, a first approximation to the concept 
of cultural diversity may be formulated.  Cultural diversity would then determine the 
spectrum of different cultural identities or ways of life in society.  Given that a cultural 
identity may express itself through virtually limitless forms, the notion has a very broad 
outlook. 
In debates on a particular marker of identity, it would, therefore, appear 
sensible to narrow down this understanding of cultural diversity.  Serving as a vehicle 
for the cultural identity of its authors, music is a good case in point.  Musical diversity 
would thus be the spectrum of different cultural identities as they are conveyed in a 
given society through music.  More specifically still, diversity in online music would 
then denote the spectrum of different cultural identities as conveyed through music 
distributed online. 
                                                   
86  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/389. 
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Irrespective of whether the focus is on cultural identities in the abstract or a 
concrete maker of identity, this understanding of cultural diversity is a simple 
statement of fact:  a given society, or online music in a given society, may be more or 
less diverse.  However, the term is seldom applied in this descriptive sense.  On the 
contrary, where cultural diversity is used as an argument in societal or political 
discourse, it usually serves to convey a broader political idea or objective. 
6.3 The Normative Dimensions of Cultural Diversity under 
International Law and in Intergovernmental Practice 
To analyse the dimensions of cultural diversity that go beyond mere factual 
description, research into how the concept has been politicised in various 
international initiatives, both binding and non-binding, is proposed, illustrating how 
ideas of cultural pluralism and exchange permeate the interpretation of cultural 
diversity at the international level. 
We find that as early as 1945, UNESCO prescribed in its constitution ‘the 
fruitful diversity of cultures’.87  Although this would generally be seen as a mere obiter 
dictum, already in 1947 the then Director-General Julian Huxley listed cultural 
diversity as a working principle of great importance for UNESCO.88  Since then, one 
can discern commitment to cultural diversity as a continuous thread in the activities of 
the organisation.89 
Another early example can be found in the co-operation between CoE member 
states, which started with the adoption of the European Cultural Convention in 1954.  
Mindful of the differences between European nations, it obliges each party to 
‘encourage the study by its own nationals of the languages, history and civilisation of 
the other Contracting Parties’ (Article 2(a)).  Although the term ‘cultural diversity’ is 
                                                   
87  Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Article I(3).  It reads: 
‘With a view to preserving the independence, integrity and fruitful diversity of the cultures and 
educational systems of the States Members of the Organization, the Organization is prohibited from 
intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction’. 
88  Huxley, Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organization in 1947 (1947) 12–13. 
89  Stenou 75. 
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not used, this provision contains the seeds of one of the main characteristics of the 
principle of cultural diversity, namely the respect for different cultural practices in 
order to foster mutual understanding.90  In contrast to today’s understanding, 
however, it saw each member state as an entity with its own proper cultural identity, 
thus disregarding intra-state cultural diversity.  Later, the respect for cultural diversity 
was increasingly recognised and established itself as an important principle,91 as 
demonstrated by numerous declarations and resolutions of the European ministers for 
cultural affairs.  Naturally, the growing recognition of the importance of cultural 
diversity has not developed at a constant pace.  There are times at which the 
organisations’ commitment to cultural diversity has been expressed more strongly than 
at others.  Today, the protection and promotion of cultural diversity are apprehended 
as a transversal theme that runs through virtually all of the two organisations’ 
activities.92 
The evolution of the concept of cultural diversity can be presented across four 
different axes: its underpinning as cultural pluralism (6.3.1); its intercultural aspect 
(6.3.2); its conceptualisation as a means to counter free trade in cultural goods and 
services (6.3.3); and finally the justification and limits it finds in cultural rights (6.3.4). 
6.3.1 Cultural Diversity and Its Changing Connotations: 
From Cultural Plurality to Cultural Pluralism 
The first phase in the development of the concept of cultural diversity in the 
international arena is characterised by a growing awareness of its importance in the 
work of UNESCO and the CoE.  Until the early 1990s, the notion has been invoked 
in different contexts and as an argument for different political goals, depending on the 
circumstances of the times.  All these initiatives, however, have a common starting 
                                                   
90  Along the same lines, the European ministers responsible for cultural, education, youth and sport 
declared, in 2004, that the goal of the Convention was the ‘peaceful harmony of diverse cultures’; 
Wroclaw Declaration on Fifty Years of European Cultural Cooperation (2004). 
91  See for an overview Grosjean, Forty Years of Cultural Co-operation, 117–123, and CoE, Report on 
European Cultural Convention, 8–9. 
92  See, in particular as to its own work, UNESCO, Investing in Cultural Diversity, 187–250. 
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point in that cultural diversity is understood as the existence of different cultures in 
the sense of what we would today call cultural pluralism.93  Over time, the focus 
changed: the pluralistic co-existence of different states, strongly emphasised in the early 
times, gradually gave way to the recognition of different cultural groups within states. 
Political Liberation 
In the forum of UNESCO, cultural diversity began to be seen in the context of 
political liberation during the period of decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s as an 
argument to support independence and self-determination on an international scale.  
Cultural rights, as well as the notion of cultural diversity, were used as arguments for 
societies to assert their distinct cultural identity, which in turn became a strong 
political justification for independence movements, resistance to colonialism and 
liberation or, for newly established states, a guarantee of their very existence.94 
Cultural Cooperation 
Towards the end of this period, cultural diversity first appeared in a UNESCO 
standard-setting instrument.  The 1966 Declaration on the Principles of International 
Cultural Cooperation stressed the importance of cultural diversity as a guiding 
principle in cooperation ‘on all aspects of intellectual and creative activities relating to 
education, science and culture’.95  The cornerstone of cultural cooperation was seen in 
the fact that ‘each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and 
preserved’ and that ‘every people has the right and the duty to develop its culture’.96  
In line with the prevalent view at the time, culture, a concept of national uniqueness 
across international variety, was equated with that of the nation-state.  Cultural 
diversity was thus one of the principles upon which cultural co-operation between 
                                                   
93  The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘pluralism’ as: ‘the presence or tolerance of a diversity of 
ethnic or cultural groups within a society or state; (the advocacy of) toleration or acceptance of the 
coexistence of differing views, values, cultures, etc.’; Simpson, The Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edn) 
‘pluralism’ <http://oed.com/view/Entry/146193>. 
94  UNESCO, Medium-Term Plan, 1977-1982, para 1201; Stenou 87, 90. 
95  Declaration of the Principles of International Cooperation Article II. 
96  Ibid Article I(1) and (2). 
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nations was to be based; it was used in the sense of cultural pluralism implying that – 
although nations are different – they are all equal and have to be respected. 
The view that cultural co-operation must be guided by considerations of 
cultural diversity has been equally prevalent in the work of the CoE, as exemplified by 
the 1981 Resolution on European Cultural Co-operation:  
‘European cultural co-operation must be conducted on as broad as 
possible a basis, serving the objectives of cultural development and 
consistent with the principles of freedom of expression, cultural diversity 
and recognition of the rights of the individual’.97  
Here, however, cultural diversity connotes more than international equality.  
The position of cultural diversity in this list alongside the principle of freedom of 
expression and the rights of the individual suggest that the term relates to the diversity 
also within and not only amongst nations.  Its mention serves as a reminder that 
cultural co-operation in the CoE should also be mindful of intrastate cultural 
pluralism. 
Endogenous and Integrated Development 
With the emphasis on cultural cooperation, the notion of cultural diversity started to 
be used in a different context in the arena of UNESCO in the 1970s.  By that time it 
had become clear that the newly independent countries were in need of international 
solidarity in order to develop.  Against this backdrop, cultural diversity justified calls 
for endogenous and integrated development.  These notions stood for strategies which 
allowed developing countries to determine their own development path based on their 
distinctive cultural identity; with the aim of reaching not only economic but also 
cultural growth.98  Again, cultural diversity underlined the equality of and the respect 
for all nations. 
                                                   
97  Resolution No I on European Cultural Co-operation in CoE (ed), 3rd Conference of Ministers with 
Responsibility for Cultural Affairs; Luxembourg, 5-7 May 1981 (1983) 185. 
98  Stenou 88; UNESCO, Medium-Term Plan, 1977-1982, paras 1203-1204. 
 - 43 - 
Cultural Democracy and Cultural Development 
The CoE, at the same time, emphasised the related concepts of cultural democracy 
and cultural development, for the creation of which cultural diversity, again 
understood in the sense of intrastate pluralism, was regarded indispensable.  The 
notion of cultural democracy is based on a broad, anthropological understanding of 
culture and aims at enabling everybody to participate actively in cultural life.  It goes 
beyond the mere democratisation of culture, the process of making the traditional 
forms of culture accessible to as many people as possible and as equally as possible.99  
An active participation of everybody in the sense of cultural democracy, however, can 
only be attained if a society respects and encourages expressions of cultural identities 
even if they diverge from the cultural identity of the majority.100  
In the following years, the CoE was concerned with the broadening of the 
concept of cultural democracy into that of cultural development.  This was born out of 
the recognition that cultural considerations should not only be a complementary or 
even optional activity to economic development,101 and that cultural values and 
objectives should be taken into account in all sectors of national or regional policy.102  
In 1984, the European Declaration on Cultural Objectives proposed the 
mainstreaming of 18 cultural objectives into broader policies.103  Several objectives are 
concerned with cultural diversity: objective 7, for example, asserts the need to ‘develop 
opportunities for creative activity and self expression … so that everyone may utilize 
their abilities and make their contribution to the development of society by realizing 
their full potential’ whereas objective 12 states the need to ‘promote recognition of the 
cultures of regions, migrants and minorities and their participation in the community, 
                                                   
99  Grosjean, Forty Years of Cultural Co-operation, 100. 
100  Resolution No. 1 on the Challenge to Cultural Policy in Our Changing Society Articles III and IV note that 
‘an additional dimension is now needed which, by recognising the plurality of our societies, 
reinforces respect for individual dignity, spiritual values and the rights of minority groups and their 
cultural expressions’. 
101  Grosjean, Forty Years of Cultural Co-operation, 103. 
102  Resolution No II on The European Declaration on Cultural Objectives in CoE (ed), 4th Conference of 
European Ministers Responsible for Cultural Affairs -- Berlin, 23-25 May 1984, 98. 
103  European Declaration on Cultural Objectives in CoE (ed), 4th Conference of European Ministers 
Responsible for Cultural Affairs -- Berlin, 23-25 May 1984, 93. 
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so that our society – mindful of such diversity – will allow the emergence of new forms 
of social cohesion’.  Further, the role of communities such as family, the local 
community and voluntary groups is emphasised (objective 13).  Cultural pluralism 
within states was thus seen as necessary in order to attain both cultural democracy and 
cultural development. 
From the Protection of Migrants, National and Other Cultural Minorities …  
Thus, while the connotation of cultural diversity as the intrastate co-existence of 
different cultural groups was largely recognised within the CoE even in the 1970s, it 
started to be acknowledged within UNESCO from the 1980s onwards.  At this time, 
efforts were undertaken to stimulate a debate on the cultural policies within individual 
states in order to foster plurality and, ultimately, democracy.  This is evident from the 
Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies, which was adopted by the 1982 World 
Conference on Cultural Policies (MONDIACULT) and emphasised the connection 
between cultural diversity and democracy (Paragraphs 17-22).104  The Conference 
called for the elimination of inequalities in the participation of all individuals in 
cultural life (Paragraph 22) and the establishment of ‘absolute respect for and 
appreciation of cultural minorities and the other cultures of the world’ (Paragraph 8).  
The recognition of the respect for cultural minorities shifted the focus: from cultural 
diversity between nations to that within individual nations.105  During the course of 
the 1980s and 90s, the concept of cultural diversity as an argument to enhance 
intrastate democracy was to become even stronger to the benefit of cultural minorities.  
Recognising that societies or nation-states could no longer be viewed as monolithic 
                                                   
104  Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies.  In addition, the Declaration also picks up a number of 
already familiar themes.  It understands cultural diversity as inseparable from cultural identities 
(Paragraph 5) and emphasises the ‘equality and dignity of all cultures’ (Paragraph 9), from which 
follows the ‘duty to ensure that the cultural identity of each people is preserved and protected’ 
(Paragraph 7).  Another major concern of the Declaration is the cultural dimension of development 
(Paragraphs 10-16). 
105  The Declaration was equally progressive in the area of cultural heritage, where the Conference 
proposes a wide definition, which includes ‘both the tangible and intangible works through which 
the creativity of [a] people finds expression’ (Paragraph 23).  Before, the preservation of cultural 
heritage was mostly centred on places and monuments.  As to the relationship between cultural 
diversity and cultural heritage, see below, on page 62. 
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blocs but rather were made up of culturally different groups, UNESCO’s efforts 
moved towards the prevention of conflicts and the implementation of constructive 
pluralism within states.106 
At the European level, the CoE continued to address questions of intrastate 
diversity and adopted several instruments specifically concerned with migrants and 
national minorities.  Long before objective 12 of the 1984 European Declaration on 
Cultural Objectives proclaimed the promotion of the culture of migrants,107 the 
European ministers of education had already acknowledged, in 1975, the need to give 
‘migrants and their children, through the necessary incentives, an opportunity to 
acquire an adequate knowledge of the language and culture of both the host country 
and the country or origin with a view to developing their personalities’.108  Although 
the 1992 Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level109 
does not refer to the principle of cultural diversity, it foresees consultative bodies to 
represent foreigners at the local level, which may be seen as a step to the recognition of 
the foreign cultures and thus towards cultural pluralism.110 
Two specific CoE treaties are concerned with the cultural aspects of national 
minorities.111  The 1992 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages 
                                                   
106  Stenou 113–118. 
107  See above, on page 38. 
108  Resolution No 2 on Migrants' Education in CoE Parliamentary Assembly (ed), Information Document 
on the Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education, Ninth Session (Stockholm, 9-12 
June 1975) (1975) 16.  This principle was later enshrined in European Convention on the Legal Status of 
Migrant Workers, 93 ETS, Article 14(2), and in European Social Charter (revised) 163 ETS, 
Article 19(11)-(12).  These instruments, however, are not predominantly concerned with the cultural 
life of migrants.   
109  Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level, 144 ETS. 
110  Creating links between local authorities and foreign residents, these bodies aim to provide a forum 
for discussion and to foster the general integration of foreign residents into the life of the 
community (Article 5(1)(a)). 
111  In international law, the term ‘national minority’ is predominantly understood as covering 
autochthonous minorities only, ie minorities that are native to a particular region once independent 
or belonging to a neighbouring state.  Immigrants, however, have decided to leave their home 
territory and are therefore not protected as national but ethical minorities.  Malloy provides a 
detailed explanation in National Minority Rights in Europe (2005) 18-14.  Note, however, that the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 157 ETS, does not define the term 
‘national minority’ as it was deemed that ‘it is impossible to arrive at a definition capable of 
mustering general support of all CoE member States’; see CoE, Explanatory Report to the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) para 12. 
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obliges the parties to the charter to protect and promote the use of regional and 
minority languages.112  The 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities provides for the promotion of  
‘the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to 
maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements 
of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural 
heritage’  
and condemns ‘policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging 
to national minorities against their will’. 
… To the Safeguarding of the Cultural Identities of All Groups within Society 
Accompanying these treaties that catered for the needs of particular parts of society 
was an initiative to foster cultural diversity in a less confined but more open-ended 
way.  In 1990, the Declaration on Multicultural Society and European Cultural 
Identity113 marked the transition to both the coming emphasis of cultural products114 
as well as the aspect of intercultural dialogue115 within the cultural diversity debate.  
Most importantly, it called for the preservation and promotion of cultural diversity.  
First, the importance of cultural pluralism is emphasised when it affirms that the 
‘richness of European culture stems from the diversity and vitality of its national, 
regional and local cultures’ (Paragraph 2 of the Preamble).  The Declaration then 
argues for the ‘scope for all individuals, all communities to have a way of life, of self-
expression that gives free rein to their own identities’ (Paragraph 13).  This 
opportunity of each and every one to express his difference does not only cover ‘his 
spiritual, religious, political or philosophical opinions’ but also ‘his way of life and 
                                                   
112  European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 148 ETS.  In 1981, the Committee of Ministers 
had already considered that ‘the rich heritage of diverse languages and cultures in Europe is a 
valuable common resource to be protected and developed, and that a major educational effort is 
needed to convert that diversity from a barrier to communication into a source of mutual 
enrichment and understanding’; Recommendation No. R (82) 18 of the Committee of Ministers to Member 
States Concerning Modern Languages (1982). 
113  Declaration on Multicultural Society and European Cultural Identity in CoE (ed), 6th Conference of 
European Ministers Responsible for Cultural Affairs – Palermo, 25-26 April 1990 (1990) 60. 
114  See below at 6.3.3, on page 50. 
115  See below at 6.3.2, on page 43. 
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mode of expression’ (Paragraph 6).  Such opportunity corresponds, as Paragraph 7 
clarifies, to a duty on the part of the people of Europe ‘to preserve and promote what 
makes them different one from the other’.  This illustrates very clearly how the focus 
during the previous decades has changed in relation to the object of cultural diversity: 
from nations to regional and local cultures down to the individual.  It also underlines 
that cultural groups must have the opportunity to freely express their cultural identity. 
Conclusions 
Some conclusions can be drawn from this overview of initiatives on cultural diversity 
undertaken by UNESCO and the CoE. 
First, the inclusion of cultural diversity was not proclaimed as a goal of its own 
but an argument for a particular political objective: within UNESCO, for example, the 
political liberation of suppressed nations, the attainment of cultural co-operation or 
the realisation of endogenous and integrated development; at the CoE, one could 
name the goals of cultural co-operation, cultural democracy and cultural development.  
Common to all of these objectives, however, is an understanding of cultural diversity 
as cultural pluralism that recognises the differences between cultures: first cultures 
understood as different nations, then as different cultural groups within nations.  
Later, the protection of minorities gained wide support and eventually first fragments 
of a more comprehensive framework for ‘all individuals, all communities’ were 
formulated.116 
From very early the interdependence of cultural diversity and cultural identity 
was emphasised and legal commentary has suggested that it is this connection that 
differentiates cultural diversity, understood as cultural pluralism, from related 
                                                   
116 Declaration on Multicultural Society and European Cultural Identity. 
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concepts.117  Its theoretical justification was found in the assumption that although 
cultures were different they were all of equal dignity and value.118 
Once cultural diversity is appreciated as cultural pluralism, its significance 
transcends the simple stating of a fact and becomes a value to be aspired to on its own, 
a claim for the recognition of differentness.119  To implement cultural diversity then 
postulates that every group in a given society should able to assert, express and practise 
its cultural identity and that this should be accepted by the other cultural groups. 
Using the term musical diversity in this normative sense therefore not only 
describes the spectrum of different identities that are conveyed through music in a 
given society but also implies that all cultural identities should be able to be conveyed 
through music.  Accordingly, diversity in online music would call for these identities 
to be conveyed through music that is available online. 
6.3.2 Intercultural Dialogue as the Preferred Means to Manage Cultural Diversity 
To acknowledge the existence of different cultural groups does not yet say anything 
about their relationship and the way in which they interact in a given country or 
society.  The management of diverse groups, however, is important to avoid alienation, 
to limit conflict and to secure a smooth functioning of society.120  Three theories can 
be distinguished broadly: assimilationism, multiculturalism and interculturalism.  At 
the height of the nation-state, where nations were seen as monolithic cultural entities, 
it was assumed that all those who lived within a state boundary should assimilate to its 
predominant ethos.121  Given that the declared aim of assimilationism is homogeneity, 
it is in opposition to the idea of cultural pluralism.  With growing awareness of human 
                                                   
117  Von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as Situation, Executive, and Promoter of the International 
Law of Cultural Diversity - Elements of a Beautiful Friendship’ (2008) 19 The European Journal of 
International Law 241, 246. 
118  This also shows that cultural diversity – if understood in the sense of cultural pluralism – is built on 
an anthropological view of culture; see above 5.2.3, on page 18. 
119  Isar 373. 
120  Vertovec, ‘Towards Post-multiculturalism? Changing Communities, Conditions and Contexts of 
Diversity’ (2010) 61 International Social Science Journal 83, 84. 
121  CoE, White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue - “Living Together as Equals in Dignity” (2008) para 52. 
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rights and, particularly, equality, western democracies, from the mid-1970s until the 
mid-1990s, sought to accommodate cultural differences more strongly.  Collectively 
termed multiculturalism, such initiatives aimed at cultural recognition, economic 
redistribution and political participation.122  The objective was to construct public 
spaces in which diversity was made apparent and visible.123  From the end of the 1990s 
onwards, however, a turn against multiculturalism formed.  In particular, the view was 
widely endorsed that the mainstreaming of cultural difference had neither been able to 
create sufficient respect or tolerance for minorities, nor to avoid segregation and 
communalism.124  It was argued that multiculturalism was nothing more than a 
superficial ‘feel-good celebration of ethno-cultural diversity’125 that failed to achieve 
real comprehension amongst different cultural groups.  Although commentators argue 
that the critique of multiculturalism is overstated,126 it led to a serious retreat from the 
concept.  Today, the term multiculturalism appears politically burnt, as is witnessed 
from a wide-ranging CoE consultation in 2007, which revealed that member states 
believed that the policy approach of multiculturalism was no longer adequate.127  One 
concept to fill the gap of post-multiculturalism is that of interculturalism,128 also often 
called intercultural dialogue.  
Intercultural dialogue inflates the understanding of cultural diversity as the 
‘differences between and within cultural groups’129 through the ideology that these 
                                                   
122  Kymlicka, ‘The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation 
in Diverse Societies’ (2010) 61 International Social Science Journal 97, 100–102.  Kymlicka 
distinguishes three waves of multiculturalism: the empowerment of indigenous people, new forms of 
autonomy and power-sharing for sub-state national groups, and new forms of multicultural 
citizenship for immigrant groups.  It should be noted that the term multiculturalism is an over-
simplification and, in reality, encompasses very divergent measures.  Hall provides a nuanced 
classification in The Multicultural Question (2001) 3–4. 
123  Robins, The Challenge of Transcultural Diversities: Transversal Study on the Theme of Cultural Policy and 
Cultural Diversity (2006) 35. 
124  Ang, ‘Multiculturalism’ in Bennett and others (eds) New Keywords (2005) 226, 27; Vertovec 85–86; 
CoE, White Paper para 55. 
125  Kymlicka 98. 
126  Kymlicka; Vertovec 94. 
127  CoE, White Paper, para 15. 
128  Bouchard provides an overview of the concept in ‘What Is Interculturalism?’ (2011) 56 McGill Law 
Journal 435. 
129  Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention, definition of ‘cultural diversity’ in the 
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differences must be taken into account and the otherness be respected.130  Perceiving 
cultures not as static wholes but as dynamic constructs that evolve constantly,131 
intercultural dialogue is claimed to incorporate the best of assimilation and 
multiculturalism: 
‘It takes from assimilation the focus on the individual; it takes from 
multiculturalism the recognition of cultural diversity.  And it adds the new 
element, critical to integration and social cohesion, of dialogue on the 
basis of equal dignity and shared values’.132 
The need for a new strategy for managing cultural diversity had emerged with 
some of the effects of globalisation.133  Already in 1990, it had been recognised that 
the increased fluxes of migrants, either from non-European countries into Europe or 
those within Europe, needed a targeted political response and that migration trends 
would only exacerbate in the years to come.134  The Yugoslav dissolution and the 
associated wars put the spotlight on the importance of the protection of minorities 
and the prevention of conflicts.  Finally, the urgent need for strategies of conflict 
prevention was again evidenced by the global acts of Islamist-legitimised terrorism on 
11 September 2001 and thereafter.  Against this background, the CoE promotes the 
concept of intercultural dialogue as an explicit counter model to Huntington’s theory 
of a clash of civilisations:135  
‘We reject the idea of a clash of civilisations and firmly believe that, on the 
contrary, increased commitment to cultural cooperation – in the broad 
sense of the term – and intercultural dialogue will benefit peace and 
                                                                                                                                                
Appendix. 
130  Ibid, explanation of the principle of ‘cultural diversity’ in the Appendix. 
131  See above, on page 19. 
132  CoE, White Paper, para 56.  The white paper elaborates further: ‘Unlike assimilation, it recognised 
that public authorities must be impartial, rather than accepting a majority ethos only, if 
communalist tensions are to be avoided.  Unlike multiculturalism, however, it vindicates a common 
core which leaves no room for moral relativism.  Unlike both, it recognises a key role for the 
associational sphere of civic society where, premised on reciprocal recognition, intercultural dialogue 
can resolve the problems of daily life in a way that governments alone cannot’ (para 63). 
133  For a more detailed overview of the real-world challenges that triggered the popularity of 
intercultural dialogue see Endres, Das Konzept des «interkulturellen Dialogs» bei Europarat, Europäischer 
Union und UNESCO (2010) 17–22. 
134  CoE, 6th Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Cultural Affairs – Palermo, 25-26 April 1990 
(1990) 59. 
135 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1997). 
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international stability in the long term, including with respect to the threat 
of terrorism.’136 
A review of the development of the concept of interculturalism at the CoE 
illustrates that multiculturalism and interculturalism both strive for the realisation of 
cultural pluralism, but differ in degree and accentuation.137  That the concepts are 
highly related (and that the critique of multiculturalism might indeed be overstated) 
could already be seen from a 1990 CoE Declaration.  In line with contemporary 
political fashion, the document is entitled Declaration on Multicultural Society and 
European Cultural Identity, yet the promulgated values are cornerstones of what from 
the early 2000s onwards would be called ‘intercultural dialogue’: ‘cooperation and 
reciprocal enrichment between cultures’ (Paragraph 14) based on an ‘openness to 
spiritual, intellectual and artistic trends from other parts of the world’ (Paragraph 3) 
and a ‘positive dialogue and fruitful exchange of ideas’ (Paragraph 9).138  While 
previous instruments on cultural diversity had only set the target in that cultural 
diversity was to be understood in the sense of cultural pluralism without specifying the 
means by which to achieve such pluralism, the 1990 Declaration started a trend of 
ascribing more specific forms to manage cultural diversity.   
Subsequently, a coherent vision of intercultural dialogue was offered by the 
2003 CoE Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention139 and 
                                                   
136  Faro Declaration on the CoE's Strategy for Developing Intercultural Dialogue (2005) para 1 of Part 1. 
137  The main points of differences, although very strongly situated in the context of Quebec, are listed 
by Bouchard 463–465. 
138  The Resolution itself does not explicitly mention the term intercultural dialogue.  In the same year, 
however, ‘intercultural dialogue’ between the majority culture and ethnic or linguistic minorities was 
encouraged in Resolution No. 1 on Initiatives, Ways and Means Likely to Promote a Dialogue between 
Cultures in CoE (ed), 6th Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Cultural Affairs – 
Palermo, 25-26 April 1990 (1990) 63, para 8.  Further, intercultural dialogue was seen as one of the 
means to protect national minorities in Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
Article 6(1). 
139  Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention.  The commitment to intercultural dialogue 
was reassured by the European ministers responsible for cultural affairs in their 2004 Wroclaw 
Declaration, their 2005 Faro Declaration, as well as their 2008 Baku Declaration for the Promotion of 
Intercultural Dialogue and confirmed by the Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the 
CoE in their 2005 Warsaw Declaration in CoE (ed), Third Summit of Heads of State and 
Government of the CoE (Warsaw, 16–17 May 2005) 10. 
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further refined in the 2008 CoE White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue.140  The 
concept is understood as the ‘open and respectful exchange of views between 
individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic 
backgrounds and heritage, on the basis of mutual understanding and respect’,141 as a 
tool to promote cultural democracy and all the tangible and intangible elements of 
cultural diversity.142  This requires ‘free expression’, the creation of conditions to allow 
‘cultural identities to flourish and reach out to other communities’143 and the 
condemnation of all forms of violent or forced assimilation.144  ‘Synonymous with 
exchange’ and ‘new forms of cultural expressions’, cultural diversity is understood as a 
source of mutual enrichment.145  From a subjective perspective, to promote cultural 
diversity is thus to create the necessary conditions so that ‘each person can develop 
from his or her own heritage and that of others’.146  Objectively, stopping cultural 
diversity from becoming a source of tension and conflict, intercultural dialogue is 
intended to establish a balance between cultural diversity and social cohesion.147  The 
ultimate goal is to create harmonious relations between all groups in society, prevent 
conflicts, control conflicts and foster post-conflict reconciliation.148  
                                                   
140 The 2008 CoE White Paper lists five policy approaches to foster cultural diversity (sections 4.1 – 4.5): 
democratic governance of cultural diversity; democratic citizenship and participation; learning and 
teaching of intercultural competences; establishment of physical and virtual spaces for intercultural 
dialogue; and strengthening of intercultural dialogue in international relations in order to facilitate 
mutual understanding between Europe and its neighbouring regions and the rest of the world. 
141  Ibid 17. 
142  See the definition of ‘intercultural dialogue’ in Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict 
Prevention, Appendix. 
143  Ibid Articles 1.1 and 1.2.  Both objectives had, albeit in different wording, already been included in 
the Declaration on Multicultural Society and European Cultural Identity paras 13-14. 
144  Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Article 1.4.  In the context of minority 
protection, this had already been proclaimed in Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities Article 5(2). 
145  The aspect of mutual enrichment is also taken up in Faro Declaration para 3 of Part 1 and Warsaw 
Declaration para 6, which affirms to foster ‘European identity and unity, based on shared 
fundamental values, respect for our common heritage and cultural diversity.  We are resolved to 
ensure that our diversity becomes a source of mutual enrichment’. 
146  Wroclaw Declaration 4. 
147  Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention under heading ‘Diversity and dialogue’ and 
Action Plan in CoE (ed), Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the CoE (Warsaw, 16–
17 May 2005) 13, section III.5. 
148  Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention under heading ‘Diversity and dialogue’ and 
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At the global level, the year 2001 was declared the ‘United Nations Year of 
Dialogue among Civilizations’149 and in November 2001 the UN General Assembly 
adopted a Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations.150  Within this process, 
UNESCO was assigned a lead role and adopted a number of projects to further the 
aims of the Agenda.151  A particular form of intercultural dialogue, namely that 
between the Western and the Muslim societies, was promoted through the United 
Nations Alliance of Civilizations programme, launched in 2005.152  Likewise, the 
international instruments addressing the global imbalances of the flow of cultural 
goods and services equally affirm intercultural dialogue.153   
The concept of intercultural dialogue is likely to remain at the centre of 
international attention.  In the realm of the CoE, the so-called Group of Eminent 
Persons released its report ‘Living together: Combining diversity and freedom in 21st-
century Europe’ in May 2011 and suggested a ‘regular process of follow-up or 
assessment of the development of intercultural dialogue in CoE Member States’.154  
Moreover, the 2009 UNESCO World Report recommended that ‘support should be 
given to networks and initiatives for intercultural and interfaith dialogue at all 
levels’.155  Likewise, intercultural dialogue is included in UNESCO’s mission statement 
for the medium-term strategy for 2008-2013.156  The UN General Assembly embraced 
                                                                                                                                                
the definition of ‘intercultural dialogue’ in the Appendix. 
149  Resolution 53/22 on the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations (1998). 
150  Resolution 56/6 on the Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations (2001).  Cultural diversity was 
seen as a pre-requisite (Article 2) and, at the same time, one of the aims of that dialogue (Article 1).  
See, more generally, on the Dialogue among Civilizations Stamatopoulou, Cultural Rights in 
International Law: Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Beyond (2007) 34–35. 
151  UNESCO, Investing in Cultural Diversity, 58. 
152  See for more detail <http://www.unaoc.org>. 
153  See below at 6.3.3, on page 50. 
154  CoE, Living Together (2011) 62 (para 35). 
155  UNESCO, Investing in Cultural Diversity, 55. 
156  UNESCO, Medium-Term Strategy, 2008-2013, 7.  UNESCO’s mission is stated as follows: ‘As a 
specialized agency of the United Nations, UNESCO contributes to the building of peace, the 
eradication of poverty, sustainable development and intercultural dialogue through education, the 
sciences, culture, communication and information’.  Further, strategic programme objective 10 reads 
‘demonstrating the importance of exchange and dialogue among cultures to social cohesion and 
reconciliation in order to develop a culture of peace’. 
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intercultural dialogue in 2010 as a means to promote cultural diversity,157 and 
discussions are ongoing on the proclamation of a United Nations decade for 
interreligious and intercultural dialogue.158 
In conclusion, two aspects of intercultural dialogue in particular add to the 
understanding of cultural diversity.  First, the concept further stresses the focus of 
cultural diversity on the individual.  This is motivated by the recognition that the 
classification of a society in different cultural groups all sharing a common cultural 
identity no longer fits the reality of our times.  The 2003 CoE Declaration on 
Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention had already acknowledged that 
cultural diversity manifested itself in ‘multiple identities, whether individual or 
collective’.159  The 2008 CoE White Paper reiterates this perspective when it states that 
‘in contemporary modern democracies everyone can enrich his or her own identity by 
integrating different cultural affiliations’.160  In 2010, UN Independent Expert for 
Cultural Rights Farida Shaheed remarked that ‘each individual is the bearer of a 
multiple and complex identity, making her or him a unique being and, at the same 
time, enabling her or him to be part of communities of shared culture’.161 
The most important trait of the concept of intercultural dialogue, however, 
seems to be the intended enrichment of all groups and individuals of society, be they 
in the cultural majority or minority.  Yet, this benefit pre-supposes a readiness to 
embrace differences.   
                                                   
157  In Resolution 64/174 on Human Rights and Cultural Diversity (2010) the General Assembly expresses its 
determination ‘to prevent and mitigate cultural homogenization in the context of globalization, 
through increased intercultural exchange guided by the promotion and protection of cultural 
diversity’ (Paragraph 5). 
158  Resolution 65/138 on the Promotion of Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, Understanding and 
Cooperation for Peace (2011) para 13. 
159  Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention, definition of 'cultural diversity' in the 
Appendix. 
160  CoE, White Paper, para 50.  The paper concludes: ‘intercultural dialogue is therefore important in 
managing multiple cultural affiliations in a multicultural environment’ (para 51). 
161  Shaheed para 23.  She goes on to explain that ‘individuals identify themselves in numerous ways, 
simultaneously participating in several cultural communities, on the basis of grounds such as 
ethnicity, descent, religion, beliefs and convictions, language, gender, age, class affiliation, 
profession, ways of life and geographical location’. 
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If one applies this connotation to the area of music, musical diversity would 
not only argue for enabling all cultural identities within society to express themselves 
through music but also advocate intercultural exchange.  To elaborate on this, the 
engagement with music that does not convey one’s own cultural identity has the 
potential to inspire the creation of new and innovative music.  In addition to the 
individual readiness to engage in intercultural dialogue, such engagement would also 
require that music expressing the cultural identity of others was readily available.  To 
realise this goal in the realm of online music, it would appear necessary to provide a 
licensing framework that allows online music providers to easily obtain licences 
covering as broad a repertoire as possible. 
It is the characteristic of openness of cultural diversity in the sense of 
intercultural dialogue that may appear to be in contradiction with the way in which 
cultural diversity has been used as an argument in the context of trade liberalisation 
and the next section analyses this seeming contradiction. 
6.3.3 Cultural Diversity and Free Trade 
In the context of international trade law, it was a novel reading of cultural diversity, 
which, accentuated since the late 1990s, has sparked a hitherto unknown degree of 
interest, debate and criticism.  According to this narrative, the processes of 
globalisation endanger cultural diversity.  Increasingly, the view that the augmented 
worldwide interconnectedness – to use a common anthropological definition of 
globalisation162 – not only had a bearing on economics but also radically changed the 
cultural sphere, has gained momentum.  Diverging views on how this change should 
be managed culminated in the culture and trade debate.  In this context, cultural 
diversity often carries a repressive connotation in that it has usually been evoked to 
justify domestic limitations to the import of foreign cultural goods and services.  In 
what follows we look deeper into how well the focus on cultural products and trade 
                                                   
162  Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange (2nd edn, 2009) 16–18, who also lists 
other definitions of globalisation.  The different conceptions are also laid out by Guillén, ‘Is 
Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble?’ (2001) 27 Annual Review of Sociology 235, 236–
237. 
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liberalisation in this new narrative of cultural diversity sits with the longer established 
dimensions of pluralism and intercultural dialogue. 
After exploring the background of the ‘trade vs culture’ debate (6.3.3.1), we 
examine the three most important international instruments on the topic (6.3.3.2 - 
6.3.3.4).  The question will be how they balance the new trade-motivated recourse to 
cultural diversity with the understanding of cultural diversity as intercultural pluralism.  
Eventually, it will be argued that cultural diversity is better able to reconcile both 
aspects than it may appear at first glance, but that the appropriation of the notion of 
cultural diversity by the advocates of a preferential trade regime for cultural products 
has had ambivalent effects (6.3.3.5). 
6.3.3.1 Background to the Debate: Conflicts about Trade in Cultural Goods and 
Services 
Concerns regarding the imbalances in the global flow of mass media had already 
spurred the New World Information and Communication Order movement in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.  In this movement, a number of non-aligned developing 
countries promoted a more equitable exchange of information between rich and poor 
nations in the forum of UNESCO.163  The discussions led to the installation of the 
International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems.  Although the 
Commission finally endorsed many of the movement’s ideas,164 their political 
realisation failed due to the strong resistance displayed by the United States and the 
UK.165  In contrast to the New World Information and Communication Order 
                                                   
163  Craufurd Smith, ‘The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions: Building a New World Information and Communication Order?’ (2007) 1 
International Journal of Communication 24, 25.  For a more complete picture of the movement’s 
goals see Masmoudi, The New Information Order (1978). 
164  International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, Many Voices One World 
(1980) 253–272.  An overview of the work of the Commission is provided by Bogdan Osolnik who 
himself was one of the Commission’s members; Osolnik, ‘The MacBride Report – 25 Years Later: 
An Introduction’ (2005) 12 Javnost -The Public 5. 
165  This rejection was also an important factor in these countries’ decision to leave UNESCO in 1984 
(USA) and 1985 (UK); Craufurd Smith (n 163) 25.  The UK re-joined UNESCO in 1997 and the 
USA in 2003. 
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movement, in the current ‘trade vs. culture’ debate, industrial countries have been 
instrumental in claiming the need for protection from cultural imperialism. 
Trade conflicts regarding cultural products have been a recurring phenomenon 
since the 1920s when several European countries imposed screen quotas to stop the 
influx of American films.166  At the heart of these conflicts has always been the 
question of whether international trade liberalisation should encompass cultural goods 
and services just as any other, or whether they required a different treatment.  
Underlying the view that cultural goods and services should be treated differently is 
the belief that an uncontrolled influx of foreign cultural goods and services could 
negatively affect domestic culture in states with less powerful cultural industries or 
even lead to cultural hegemony by the most successful exporters of cultural goods and 
services, ie the United States of America.  From the proponents of free trade, on the 
other hand, a different treatment for cultural goods and services is nothing more than 
a detrimental protectionist measure. 
When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) entered into force 
in 1948,167 Article IV authorised, and under GATT 1994 continues to do so,168 screen 
quotas for cinematographic films though constraining them to negotiations.169  
Beyond this, cultural goods are subject to all the usual GATT disciplines.170  The 
GATT system contains some flexibilities in that general exceptions are provided for 
national measures that are ‘necessary to protect public morals’ (Article XX(a)), 
necessary to secure compliance with national law (Article XX(d)), or that are ‘imposed 
for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value’.171  
                                                   
166  For an overview see Bernier, ‘Trade and Culture’ in Macrory and others (eds) The World Trade 
Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis (2005) 748, 748–753. 
167  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 UNTS, 188. 
168  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, 1867 UNTS, 190. 
169  More detailed information on the rationale and history of GATT Article IV is provided by 
Neuwirth, ‘“United in Divergency”: A Commentary on the UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions’ (2006) 66 Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 819, 826–827, and Bernier, Trade and Culture, 
753–755. 
170  Bernier, Trade and Culture, 756. 
171  Tania Voon also highlights that ‘GATT 1994 offers additional leeway for Members imposing cultural 
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Yet, these exceptions have proved too limited to be able to accommodate some WTO 
members’ cultural concerns.172  In the 1960s, the question of whether television 
broadcasting fell under GATT sparked heated discussions.  The debate reignited when 
the European Community provided for quotas in favour of European TV 
programming in Article 4 of the Television Without Frontiers Directive.173  The US 
claimed that TV broadcasting was a product and argued that the quotas violated 
GATT.  The European Community, on the other hand, contended that it was a 
service falling outwith the ambit of GATT.174  Although GATT consultations 
addressed this topic, the matter was ultimately dropped and it was agreed that the 
question should become part of the wider debate on services in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations (1986-1994).175  
During these negotiations, the battle to establish the right balance between 
culture and trade was fiercely fought.  The high intensity of the debate can be 
explained by the special mandate of the Uruguay Round to create the new 
institutional structure of the WTO.176  The dividing lines were clear: while the 
European Community and Canada advocated a cultural exception that would exempt 
all cultural goods and services from the rules of the WTO agreement, the US strongly 
                                                                                                                                                
policy measures on these products through generally applicable provisions, such as the allowance for 
emergency safeguard measures under Article XIX and the exemption from the national treatment 
requirement of certain kinds of subsidies under Article III:8(b)’; Voon, ‘A New Approach to 
Audiovisual Products in the WTO: Rebalancing GATT and GATS’ (2007) 14 UCLA Entertainment 
Law Review 1, 5. 
172  Graber, ‘Trade and Culture’ in Wolfrum (ed) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
para 14; Cahn and Schimmel, ‘The Cultural Exception: Does It Exist in GATT and GATS 
Frameworks? How Does It Affect or Is It Affected by the Agreement on TRIPS?’ (1997) 15 Cardozo 
Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 281, 284–289. 
173  Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by 
Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting 
Activities [1989] OJ L 298/23 (now replaced by Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 10 March 2010 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid down by Law, Regulation or 
Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Provision of Audiovisual Media Services (Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive) [2010] OJ L 95/1). 
174  See, in more detail, Voon 6–10. 
175  Bernier, Trade and Culture, 748–749 with further references to more detailed analyses. 
176  Burri, ‘Cultural Diversity as a Concept of Global Law: Origins, Evolution and Prospects’ (2010) 2 
Diversity 1059, 1061. 
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opposed this.177  The discussions came to a deadlock and the creation of the WTO was 
only made possible by an ‘agreement to disagree’.178  Although this did not change the 
treatment of cultural goods under GATT, proponents of the exception culturelle were 
successful in shaping the General Agreement on Tariffs and Services (GATS)179 in a 
way that, to a large extent, allowed cultural services to be shielded from international 
trade liberalisation.  GATS Articles XVI:1 and XVII:1 provide for a positive list 
approach in that a contracting party is only under market access and national 
treatment obligations to the extent of what it has inscribed in its schedule of 
commitments.  In relation to the most-favoured-nation clause, GATS Article II:2 
follows a negative list approach, allowing contracting parties to specify exemptions 
from that obligation.  In addition, the provisions on domestic legislation also only 
apply insofar as commitments have been undertaken (GATS Article VI:1), and no 
multilateral instrument on subsidies has yet been developed in the GATS context that 
is comparable to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures180 applying 
to GATT 1994.181  WTO members wary of the special nature of cultural products have 
largely made use of these flexibilities: the EU and its member states, Canada and 
Switzerland, amongst others, did not make commitments in cultural sectors and 
approximately 50 WTO members have listed exemption from the most-favoured-
nation treatment in the field of audiovisual media.182  Yet, there is also a flipside to 
                                                   
177  Bernier, Trade and Culture, 749; Burri 1061.  Between these extreme positions, several mediating 
proposals were made.  A more detailed account of the debate is provided by Cahn and Schimmel 
293–297; Footer and Graber, ‘Trade Liberalization and Cultural Policy’ (2000) 3 Journal of 
International Economic Law 115, 119–122. 
178  Neuwirth 828.  More details are provided by Cahn and Schimmel 297–304. 
179  General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1B to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, 1869 UNTS, 183. 
180  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex 1B to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, 1869 UNTS, 14. 
181  See, however, Tania Voon, who highlights that at the same time GATS is less flexible than GATT 
1994 in some regards; Voon 5–6. 
182  Graber, Trade and Culture, para 10.  A more thorough overview of some of the typical measures 
listed as exemptions from the most-favoured-nation treatment is given by Footer and Graber 122–
126. 
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this solution, notably the principle of progressive liberalisation, which meant that the 
liberalisation of cultural markets would become a recurring theme in trade talks.183 
The debate resurfaced in 1997, when the WTO Dispute Settlement Body held 
Canada responsible for measures in favour of its domestic magazine industry, although 
some saw these measures as protecting Canada’s cultural identity.184  At that time, the 
proponents of a culture-sensitive trade policy started to look for solutions in political 
fora other than the WTO and the debate changed direction.  It was no longer only 
about how cultural goods and services should be treated in trade agreements, but – 
taking the conflict to a higher level – the impact of trade liberalisation on cultural 
identity in general,185 as voices that demanded a strengthening of the principle of 
cultural diversity became stronger.186  The new battle call for ‘cultural diversity’ had the 
advantage of being more conceptually neutral in that it avoided the ‘negativism and 
latent “anti-Americanism” of the “cultural exception” rhetoric’.187 In the following 
years, the idea to counterbalance trade under the buzzword of ‘cultural diversity’ was 
increasingly embraced in international policy and standard-setting instruments.  In 
2000, for example, the final Communiqué of the G8 Summit in Okinawa dedicated a 
section to cultural diversity that it saw as having the ‘potential to enrich human life in 
the 21st century, as it inspires creativity and stimulates innovation’.188  In its Cotonou 
Declaration of 2001, the International Organisation of La Francophonie underlined 
that cultural goods and services needed to be treated differently and that policies that 
promoted cultural diversity were as legitimate and necessary as ever (Article 6).189  The 
most influential instruments were adopted under the aegis of the CoE and, to a larger 
                                                   
183  Graber, Trade and Culture para 4. 
184  Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (Complaint by the United States) (1997), 
WT/DS31/R; confirmed by the Appellate Body, WT/DS31/AB/R. 
185  Bernier, Trade and Culture, 780. 
186  Neuwirth 829–830. 
187  Graber, ‘The New UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity’ (2006) 9 Journal of International 
Economic Law 553, 555.  He goes on to state that ‘diversity in audiovisual trade is something that 
can be analysed statistically – free from ideology and protectionist ulterior motives’.  This conclusion 
should be met with caution in light of the difficulties and inherent limits of any attempt to measure 
diversity; see below at 8.3, on page 113. 
188  Para 39 of the G8 Communiqué Okinawa, 23 July 2000 <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/
2000okinawa/finalcom.htm>. 
189  Organisation de la Francophonie, Déclaration de Cotonou, 14/15 June 2001. 
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extent, UNESCO, and culminated in the adoption of the 2005 Convention on the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions.190 
6.3.3.2 The 2000 CoE Declaration on Cultural Diversity 
In December 2000 the CoE Committee of Ministers devoted its attention to the ‘free 
trade vs. culture’ debate and adopted the Declaration on Cultural Diversity.  Although 
the title suggests otherwise, it is not a comprehensive instrument that addresses 
cultural diversity in its many forms.  It is only concerned, as the Preamble explains, 
with the challenges to cultural diversity posed by the new information technologies, 
globalisation and multilateral trade policies (Paragraph 3).191  Article 1.3 proclaims that 
these developments, even if they  
‘occur to meet the needs of the present, [must] not compromise the ability 
of future generations to meet their needs with respect to the production, 
provision and exchange of culturally diverse services, products and 
practices’. 
The Preamble eloquently expounds the new challenge for states in the context 
of a global market to develop ‘policies for assuring the recognition and expression of 
forms of cultural diversity coexisting within their jurisdictions’ (Paragraph 8) and 
affirms that it is a legitimate objective of states to develop international agreements in 
favour of cultural diversity (Paragraph 11).  Article 2.1 then goes further by stating that 
‘cultural and audiovisual policies, which promote and respect cultural diversity, are a 
necessary complement to trade policies’.  Moreover, Article 2.2 provides a supporting 
argument presenting a counter vision to that of cultural uniformity feared from global 
free trade when it emphasises that cultural diversity itself must be viewed as an 
‘essential economic factor’ in that strong cultural industries, ‘when reflecting genuine 
diversity, have a positive impact on pluralism, innovation, competitiveness and 
employment’.  The Committee of Ministers’ scepticism as to the application of free 
                                                   
190  Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 
191  Declaration on Cultural Diversity.  In relation to information technologies, it merely states that 
‘culturally diverse forms of production and practices should not be limited but enhanced by 
technological developments’ (Article 2.3), suggesting that a ‘wide distribution of diverse cultural 
products and services, and exchange of cultural practices in general, can stimulate creativity, enhance 
access to and widen the provision of such products and services’ (Article 2.4). 
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trade rules to cultural goods finally also finds expression in Article 3.3, which urges 
CoE member states not to make commitments in other international fora that 
prejudice cultural diversity. 
The CoE Declaration can, therefore, be seen as a self-affirmation on the part of 
European states not to make further trade liberalising concessions when it comes to 
cultural goods and services.  Although a declaration is not legally binding, it 
nevertheless carries authority.  To express such self-affirmation in a declaration might 
therefore also have been hoped to alleviate some of the pressure to liberalise the influx 
of non-European audiovisual products and services that European states were 
confronted with during international trade negotiations.  Furthermore, it adds to the 
momentum that emerged at that time in favour of an international agreement on 
cultural diversity in order to counterbalance the free trade movement. 
Of more importance here is the exact definition of ‘cultural diversity’ that 
underpins the Declaration.  The Declaration offers a palpable approximation to the 
term ‘cultural diversity’, stating that ‘cultural diversity is expressed in the co-existence 
and exchange of culturally different practices and in the provision and consumption of 
culturally different services and products’ (Article 1.1).  The use of the wording 
‘cultural diversity is expressed in’ implies that what follows is not to be understood as 
an exhaustive definition but rather as examples of particular aspects of cultural 
diversity.  On the one hand, the definition re-iterates the idea of inner-state cultural 
pluralism already familiar from earlier UNESCO and CoE initiatives.  ‘Co-existence’ 
implies that different cultural groups can freely express their cultural identity and the 
term ‘exchange’ indicates that a segregated side-by-side existence of culturally diverse 
groups is not sufficient to achieve social cohesion and peace, but that co-existence 
must be accompanied by intercultural engagement.  On the other hand, the 
declaration mentions, as a secondary aspect of cultural diversity, the ‘provision and 
consumption of culturally different services and products’.  Cultural products and 
services express different cultural identities and their ready availability is, therefore, 
one example of the co-existence and exchange of different cultural practices.  By 
pairing this particular element (and not others) with the broad understanding of 
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cultural diversity as cultural pluralism, the Committee of Ministers stresses its 
particular importance. 
6.3.3.3 The 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 
The growing concerns about the effects of globalisation on cultural diversity also led to 
the adoption of the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity by the 
UNESCO General Conference on 2 November 2001.192  Compared to the 2000 CoE 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity, the UNESCO instrument offers a much more 
comprehensive framework.  It sets forth the main principles for the preservation and 
promotion of cultural diversity, while also dealing with national cultural policies on 
cultural goods or practices.  Amongst the issues addressed are the need to understand 
development in cultural terms (Article 3), the guarantee of human and cultural rights 
(Articles 4-6), the development of new information and communication technologies 
to the benefit of all cultures (Article 6),193 and the preservation of cultural heritage 
(Article 7).194  
In relation to the increasing economic integration, the Declaration shows 
concerns about new imbalances bound to arise if the free circulation of ideas and 
works benefits some more than others.  In particular, Article 8 underlines that there 
must be diversity of the supply of cultural works.195  With respect to national policies 
on cultural goods and services, the Declaration shows some ambivalence.  On the one 
hand, it emphasises the ‘specificity of cultural goods and services which, as vectors of 
                                                   
192  UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 
193  Notably, Article 6 calls for ‘access for all to cultural diversity’ and lists inter alia as a necessary 
precondition ‘equal access to art and to scientific and technological knowledge, including in digital 
form’ as well as the ‘possibility for all cultures to have access to the means of expression and 
dissemination’; see also Main Lines of an Action Plan for the Implementation of the UNESCO Universal 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity in UNESCO (ed), Records of the General Conference, 31st session 
(2002) 64, paras 9-11. 
194  In this regard, the Declaration was accompanied by the (non-binding) commitment of UNESCO 
member states to formulate policies for ‘oral and intangible cultural heritage’; ibid para 13.  This, in 
turn, provided the necessary impetus for the adoption of the Convention for the Safeguarding of the 
Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2368 UNTS, 3. 
195  A precondition for such diversity is seen in the existence of viable and competitive cultural industries 
in particular in developing countries and countries in transition, which is to be established through 
international co-operation and solidarity; UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity Article 
10. 
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identity, values and meaning, must not be treated as mere commodities or consumer 
goods’ (Article 8),196 which implies that market forces alone will not be able to 
sufficiently cater for the necessary diversity of supply.  Article 9 reinforces this position 
by specifying that each state should put in place cultural policies that create 
‘conditions conducive to the production and dissemination of diversified cultural 
goods and services through cultural industries that have the means to assert themselves 
at the local and global level’.  In doing so, states may act through ‘operational support 
or appropriate regulations’.  On the other hand, however, all such policies must ensure 
the ‘free circulation of ideas and works’ as well as ‘regard for international obligations’. 
This ambivalence can also be discerned in the underlying concept of cultural 
diversity, which is generally hailed as ‘the common heritage of humanity’197 that 
‘should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations’ 
(Article 1).198  Although the Declaration at several instances underlines the importance 
of diversified cultural goods and services the connection to intercultural pluralism is 
equally highlighted.  Article 2, for example, argues in favour of cultural pluralism that 
fosters cultural exchange and harmonious interaction, and Paragraph 9 of the 
Preamble refers to ‘cultural exchange’ and expresses the hope for ‘renewed dialogue 
among cultures and civilizations’.  Moreover, the Declaration particularly underscores 
cultural diversity as a driver for creativity.199 
                                                   
196  The Action Plan on Cultural Policies for Development in UNESCO (ed), Final Report (1998) 12, had 
already promoted the idea ‘that cultural goods and services should be fully recognized and treated as 
being not like other forms of merchandise’ (para 3 of Objective 3). 
197  On the related notions of ‘common heritage of mankind’ and ‘common concern of humankind’, see 
Blake, ‘On Defining the Cultural Heritage’ (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
61, 70–71. 
198  Culture is understood in an anthropological sense; Paragraph 5 of the Preamble states that ‘culture 
should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of 
society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of 
living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs’.  This is, in fact, a slightly modernised wording 
of the definition in the Mexico Declaration (as to the latter see above, on page 22). 
199  Article 1 refers to cultural diversity as ‘a source of exchange, innovation and creativity’.  The link 
between cultural diversity and artistic creation is equally underlined by the fact that Articles 7-9 bear 
the heading ‘Cultural Diversity and Creativity’. 
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Although lacking legally binding value,200 the Declaration sets out an 
international consensus as to the main features and characteristics of cultural diversity, 
which adds to the understanding of the concept and paved the way for the adoption of 
the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions.201 
6.3.3.4 The 2005 UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions (2005 Convention)202 was adopted on 20 October 2005.  With 
the US and Israel opposing the Convention, it was voted for by 148 countries, while 
four countries abstained.203  Entering into force on 18 March 2007,204 it had 125 
contracting parties at the time of submission. 
Underlying the Convention are the same concerns that had already informed 
the 2001 Universal Declaration, as Paragraph 19 of the Preamble clarifies:  
‘while the processes of globalization, which have been facilitated by the 
rapid development of information and communication technologies, 
afford unprecedented conditions for enhanced interaction between 
cultures, they also represent a challenge for cultural diversity, namely in 
view of risks of imbalances between rich and poor countries’.   
Yet although the two instruments share the same rationale, they differ in 
several respects.  Whereas the 2001 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity is of 
purely exhortatory character, it sets out a comprehensive overview of all aspects of 
                                                   
200  The Resolution which adopted the Declaration nevertheless urges member states to ‘take 
appropriate measures to promote the principles set forth in this Declaration together with the main 
lines of an action plan, and to facilitate their application’; UNESCO, Records of the General 
Conference, 31st session (2002) 61. 
201  In particular the fact that it was adopted by consensus shows the UNESCO member states’ 
favourable attitude towards the adoption of a legally binding instrument; see Obuljen, ‘From Our 
Creative Diversity to the Convention on Cultural Diversity: Introduction to the Debate’ in Obuljen 
and Smiers (eds) UNESCO's Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions: Making It Work (2006) 19, 28. 
202  Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 
203  A detailed account of the drafting history of the Convention is provided by Obuljen, Introduction 
to the Debate. 
204  Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions Article 29(1). 
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cultural diversity.  The 2005 Convention, for its part, focuses on only some of these 
aspects and fleshes them out in a legally binding manner.  In particular, it seeks to 
nurture the creation and dissemination of cultural expressions on a global level, to 
reinforce the dual economic and cultural nature of cultural goods and services, and to 
strengthen international solidarity, specifically for the benefit of developing countries.  
To achieve these goals it calls for new partnerships with the private sector and civil 
society.  It is not the aim of this study to provide a detailed overview of the 2005 
Convention by analysing its strengths and weaknesses; such accounts have been given 
elsewhere.205  The aim, for the purposes of this section, is to determine the 
understanding of cultural diversity that it is based upon.206  
The 2005 Convention frequently uses the term ‘cultural diversity’ and 
Article 4(1) states that, for the purposes of the 2005 Convention 
‘“cultural diversity” refers to the manifold ways in which the cultures of 
groups and societies find expression.  These expressions are passed on 
within and among groups and societies.  Cultural diversity is made 
manifest not only through the varied ways in which the cultural heritage of 
humanity is expressed, augmented and transmitted through the variety of 
cultural expressions, but also through diverse modes of artistic creation, 
production, dissemination, distribution and enjoyment, whatever the 
means and technologies used’. 
Yet, the key concept is that of the ‘diversity of cultural expressions’.  It 
determines the scope of application of the Convention, which, according to Article 3, 
covers ‘policies and measures adopted by the Parties related to the protection and 
promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions’.  Article 4(3) defines ‘cultural 
expressions’ as those ‘that result from the creativity of individuals, groups and 
societies, and that have cultural content’.  Cultural content, according to Article 4(2) 
                                                   
205  See, for example, Graber; Neuwirth; Ruiz Fabri, ‘Reflections on Possible Future Implications of the 
Convention’ in Obuljen and Smiers (eds) UNESCO's Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions: Making It Work (2006) 73.  In light of these weaknesses, Rachael 
Craufurd Smith offers a sobering conclusion: ‘even an autocratic state that does nothing to support 
cultural diversity might consequently consider signing up to the Convention a relatively 
unproblematic exercise’; Craufurd Smith (n 163) 39. 
206  The 2005 Convention will be under further scrutiny in chapter 7, on page 84, where we examine the 
rights and obligations it establishes. 
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‘refers to the symbolic meaning, artistic dimension and cultural values that originate 
from or express cultural identities’. 
These definitions raise a number of questions, in particular with regard to the 
exact scope of the notions of ‘cultural expressions’ and ‘cultural diversity’ as they are 
defined in Article 4 of the 2005 Convention and how they relate to the concept of 
‘cultural diversity’ established by the 2001 Universal Declaration. 
The first thing that one notices in analysing the given definitions is that 
Article 4(1) and (3) are self-referential in the sense that the conception of ‘cultural 
diversity’ in Paragraph 1 is developed by drawing on the notion of ‘cultural 
expressions’.  In other words, cultural diversity is construed as the sum of cultural 
expressions.207 
If one attempts to distil the exact meaning of ‘cultural expression’, one finds 
that the term picks up aspects that previous international instruments on cultural 
diversity had underlined.  In particular, cultural expressions convey the cultural 
identity of individuals, groups and societies.  Further, the reference to ‘individuals, 
groups and societies’ affirms the importance of achieving cultural pluralism within 
UNESCO member states.208  From the statement, contained in Article 4(1), that 
cultural expressions are passed on within and among groups and societies, one can 
draw two additional conclusions.  First, in order to be able to be passed on, a cultural 
expression must have been externalised, must be perceptible to the members of the 
relevant cultural group of society; mere internal reflections of an individual’s cultural 
identity do not appear to qualify as cultural expressions.  Second, the emphasis on the 
transmittance of cultural expressions among groups and society bears testimony of the 
Convention’s aim to create an intercultural environment. 
The concept of cultural expression, however, is more restrictive than the 
common understanding of cultural diversity in that it appears to exclude cultural 
                                                   
207  The definitions, therefore, have sometimes been criticised to be circular; Burri, Keeping Promises: 
Implementing the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity into EU's Internal Policies (2010) 15. 
208  Likewise, the Preamble declares that cultural diversity ‘is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality 
of the identities … of the peoples and societies making up humanity’.  
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heritage.  Article 4(3) focuses on the creative origin of cultural expressions, the fact 
that they ‘result from the creativity of individuals, groups and societies’.  Emphasising 
the creation of new cultural expressions, it seems to delimit the scope of application of 
the convention from cultural heritage.209  Moreover, the conception of cultural 
diversity in Article 4(1) does not encompass cultural heritage as such, but only ‘the 
varied ways in which the cultural heritage of humanity is expressed, augmented and 
transmitted through the variety of cultural expressions’.  Accordingly, cultural heritage 
may be a possible source of inspiration for cultural expressions but not a cultural 
expression in itself.210  
Whether the distinction between cultural expressions and cultural heritage is 
practicable appears doubtful.  The concept of cultural heritage itself is in a process of 
transition.  Since its first mention in international law in 1907,211 the notion has 
gradually broadened in the arenas of UNESCO212 and the CoE.213  In the beginning, 
                                                   
209  This, at least, is the understanding of UNESCO itself when it states that the 2005 Convention only 
deals with certain aspects of cultural diversity and that cultural diversity today rests on three pillars: 
the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the 
2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage and the 2005 
Convention under review here; see UNESCO, ‘Ten Keys to the Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions’ in UNESCO, Information Kit Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2006) Key 4; UNESCO, ‘30 Frequently 
Asked Questions Concerning the Convention on the Promotion and Protection of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions’ in UNESCO, Information Kit Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2006) Question 5.  This view would be in line with the Operational 
Guidelines, which suggests that measures to protect the diversity of cultural expressions can only be 
taken if the parties are able to ‘determine that the situation cannot be subject to action under other 
UNESCO Conventions’;  ‘Operational Guidelines for Articles 7, 8 and 17 of the Convention’ in 
UNESCO (ed) Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions; Second Session, Paris, 15-16 June 2009 (2009) 17, Articles 8 and 17, para 5.1. 
210  Such a view is not without precedence.  Within the CoE, this distinction has been applied, for 
example, in the Wroclaw Declaration which, under the heading ‘Promoting Cultural Diversity and 
Building up Shared Values’, lists ‘diversity of our heritages and artistic creations’ side by side. 
211  In Article 23, the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) provide that ‘in sieges and bombardments all 
necessary steps must be taken to spare … historic monuments’. 
212  Within UNESCO, relevant standard-setting instruments dealing with the protection of cultural 
heritage include the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 249 
UNTS, 240, the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 823 UNTS, 232, the Convention for the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1037 UNTS, 151, the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage in UNESCO (ed), Records of the General Conference, 31st session (2002) 50, and 
the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. 
213  Within the CoE, relevant standard-setting instruments dealing with the protection of cultural 
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only physical objects were considered as cultural heritage:214 at first only monuments 
and ‘elements of “high culture”’, but later also ‘often mundane cultural artefacts’.215  
Furthermore, the dynamic interaction between cultural heritage of the past and its 
reception in the present is increasingly understood as a process of constant renewal.  
Notably, the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage specifies that  
‘intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is 
constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to their 
environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides 
them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for 
cultural diversity and human creativity’.216 
This could be seen as an ongoing tendency towards convergence of the 
concepts of cultural diversity and cultural heritage. 
But even if one wanted to delineate the creations of present-day individuals, 
groups and societies from what was inherited by them as a given,217 in practice, it 
would be difficult to draw the line.  Much of what today is perceived as cultural 
heritage has been created at some point in time.  According to which criteria should 
conveyors of cultural identity that predominantly have been inherited be distinguished 
from those that have been created?  Conversely, would it not be a consequence of this 
                                                                                                                                                
heritage include the European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, 66 ETS, the 
Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe, 121 ETS, the European Convention on 
the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (Revised) 143 ETS, the European Landscape Convention, 176 
ETS, and the CoE Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society, 199 ETS. 
214  See, for example, the definition of cultural property in Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict Article 1. 
215  Blake 72. 
216  Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage Article 2(1) (emphasis added).  The 
Convention has enlarged the concept of cultural heritage to equally encompass intangible elements.  
Intangible cultural heritage is defined as ‘the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, 
skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith – that 
communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage’.  
Within the CoE, the notion of cultural heritage has even further expanded with the adoption of 
CoE Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society Article 2(a).   
217  UNESCO itself apparently sustains this view; see UNESCO, Investing in Cultural Diversity, 30.  After 
having explained the scope of the UNESCO conventions on cultural heritage, the report goes on to 
state that ‘the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, adopted in 2005, deals more specifically with cultural expressions produced, circulated 
and shared by contemporary means’ (emphasis added). 
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logic that what qualifies as a cultural expression today might be seen as cultural 
heritage in the future, therefore falling outside the field of application of the 2005 
Convention?218 
By excluding cultural heritage from the definition of cultural diversity, the 
language of the 2005 Convention departs somewhat from the general cultural diversity 
discourse, which encompasses cultural heritage.219  This raises the question of whether, 
in concluding the 2005 Convention, the contracting parties wanted to change the 
notion of cultural diversity as such and steer the debate on cultural diversity as it has 
developed in the preceding decades into a new and more narrowly defined direction. 
The more appropriate view, however, is that the scope of the concepts of 
cultural diversity and cultural expressions in Article 4(1) and (3) merely determines the 
extent to which the 2005 Convention deals with cultural diversity.  Support for this 
view is provided by Article 4(1), which does not purport to offer a generally valid 
definition of cultural diversity but only explains what cultural diversity ‘refers’ to ‘for 
the purposes of this Convention’.  Likewise, the concepts of cultural diversity and 
cultural expressions are explained in Article 4 after Article 3 limits the scope of 
application of the Convention to ‘policies and measures adopted by the Parties related 
to the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions’.  Arguably, 
Article 4 then describes the term ‘cultural diversity’ only insofar as it applies within the 
‘protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions’.  Regard should also 
be had to Paragraph 7 of the Preamble.  This provision recalls that ‘culture takes 
diverse forms across time and space and that this diversity is embodied in the 
uniqueness and plurality of the identities and cultural expressions of the peoples and 
societies of humanity’.  This, in essence, re-iterates the description of cultural diversity 
contained in Article 1 of the 2001 Universal Declaration.  In particular, the notion of 
cultural diversity as ‘diverse forms of culture across time and space’ is broader than the 
concept of cultural diversity described in Article 4(1) and can comfortably embrace the 
concept of cultural heritage.  The main difference between Paragraph 7 of the 
                                                   
218  Arguably, this would be difficult to reconcile with Article 8, which aims to safeguard cultural 
expressions from extinction. 
219  See, for example, UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity Article 7. 
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Preamble of the 2005 Convention and Article 1 of the 2001 Universal Declaration is 
that the words ‘and cultural expressions’ are inserted as another form of embodiment 
of cultural diversity, after the reference to the uniqueness and plurality of identities.  
This makes it clear that, rather than aiming to change the international concept of 
cultural diversity, the 2005 Convention sees itself in the tradition of this debate and 
simply introduces a new subcategory, namely cultural expressions resulting from 
creativity.220 
Already in the way in which cultural diversity has been termed in the 2001 
Universal Declaration, the concept was multi-faceted and complicated.  The 
definitions of ‘cultural expressions’ and ‘cultural diversity’ in the 2005 Convention do 
little to mitigate this; on the contrary, given the ambiguity and vagueness that has been 
demonstrated in this section, they are likely to cause further confusion.  This seems to 
be supported by a 2010 study, which, based on questionnaires responded to by 15 
UNESCO member states, found that ‘the diversity of cultural expressions’ is 
interpreted differently.221  It is, therefore, all the more regrettable that the Conference 
of the Parties to the 2005 Convention so far has not made a decision as to whether 
operational guidelines should be developed for Article 4. 
6.3.3.5 The Effects of Employing Cultural Diversity in the ‘Trade vs Culture’ 
Debate  
Its frequent use in the course of the ‘trade vs culture’ debate led to several refinements 
in the international understanding of cultural diversity. 
The Re-contextualisation of Cultural Diversity as a Counter Argument to Trade 
Liberalisation 
One has to acknowledge that a new element has been introduced to the concept by 
emphasising cultural diversity as the diversity of cultural goods and services (in the case 
                                                   
220  Paragraph 21 of the Preamble, which makes explicit reference to the 2001 Universal Declaration, 
equally confirms this. 
221  Schramme and van der Auwera, ‘The UNESCO Convention in EU's Internal Policies’ in Germann 
Avocats, Implementing the UNESCO Convention of 2005 in the European Union (2010) 259, 276. 
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of the two Declarations) or rather as the diversity of cultural creations (in the case of 
the 2005 Convention).  This clearly mirrors the political will to establish a legal 
framework which counters what is perceived as an imbalance in the global flow of 
cultural products bound to arise under the sole reign of international trade 
liberalisation. 
Yet, this new dimension was an addition to, and not a replacement of, the 
established one.  In fact, all three instruments explicitly aspire to the realisation of 
intercultural pluralism.  This is expressed most pointedly by the statement that 
‘cultural pluralism gives policy expression to the reality of cultural diversity’ and 
secures ‘harmonious interaction among people and groups with plural, varied and 
dynamic cultural identities’.222  
While the idea to support cultural products under the topos of cultural diversity 
has thus been embraced by international law, concomitantly the latter remains true to 
the traditional interpretation of cultural diversity.  Therefore, the two dimensions are 
not in contradiction with each other.  On the contrary, if cultural diversity is 
understood in the sense of intercultural pluralism it appears to also include the 
diversity of cultural products and creations.  Intercultural pluralism not only 
acknowledges the existence of different cultures in a given society but also aspires to 
enable them all to freely express their cultural identity.  As cultural products and 
services are conveyers of cultural identities, their assured production and 
dissemination will help groups and individuals to actively take part in cultural life, 
which in turn implements the postulate of cultural pluralism.  If the ability of groups 
to express their cultural identity in cultural goods and services is imbalanced, there 
may be situations in which it appears appropriate to restrict the way one group 
expresses its cultural identity in order to make it possible for the other groups to assert 
their cultures.223 
                                                   
222  UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity Article 2. 
223  The 2005 Convention expressly recognized this in its Article 8(2), which allows parties to the 
Convention to take all appropriate measure to protect and preserve cultural expressions in special 
situations where on the territory of that party they are at risk of extinction, under serious threat, or 
otherwise in need of urgent safeguarding. 
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At the same time, however, to deduce an understanding of cultural diversity as 
the spectrum of different cultural creations from the broader notion of cultural 
pluralism, also means to have to accept the limits inherent in the latter concept.  The 
aim for all groups to freely express their identity also sets limits to restricting particular 
cultural expressions.  Moreover, the continually emphasised intercultural aspect calls 
for dialogue among the different groups and openness to other cultures.  In practical 
terms, this means that those who use cultural diversity as an argument to claim 
preferential legal treatment for a particular type of cultural product, may legitimately 
only do so if they accept that such preferential treatment is limited by the requirement 
that products embodying other cultural identities must also be readily available.  This 
is the inevitable consequence of exchanging the rhetoric of exception culturelle for that 
of diversité culturelle and the price that one has to pay for exploiting the ‘apple pie 
connotations’224 of cultural diversity.  It is also a price that proponents of a special 
trade regime for cultural products should be happy to pay, as it rebuts the other side’s 
allegations of plain protectionism. 
The mediating function of cultural diversity can also be understood as a result 
of the fact that there was no clear agreement in the international community as to the 
direction that the instruments on cultural diversity and free trade should take.  
Already the 2000 CoE Declaration on Cultural Diversity was a political compromise.  
For example, the statement that ‘the legitimate objectives of Member States to develop 
international agreements for cultural co-operation, which promote cultural diversity, 
must be respected’225 could easily be interpreted as a claim that local and national 
audiovisual products and services must be protected from the uncontrolled influx of 
foreign competing products and services.  But those who wished to see the concept of 
cultural diversity recognised at the international level in order to foster the 
development of intercultural societies and who would not, necessarily, have agreed to a 
plain statement in favour of protectionist measures could also endorse it.  In relation 
to the 2001 Universal Declaration and the 2005 Convention, it is well documented 
                                                   
224 See, in the context of diversity generally, Stirling, ‘A General Framework for Analysing Diversity in 
Science, Technology and Society’ (2007) 4 Journal of the Royal Society Interface 707, 708. 
225  CoE, Declaration on Cultural Diversity, para 11 of the Preamble. 
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that UNESCO member states were primarily split into two camps over the question of 
why an international instrument was needed.226  The 2005 Convention, for example, 
was seen by some as a further step to affirm cultural rights and as a possibility to attain 
a new level in the debate on cultural development and intercultural dialogue.  On the 
other hand, however, there was the vision of the Convention as a countermeasure to 
free trade and international economic law, as a ‘culture-friendly trade treaty’.227  While 
the economic rationale was widely shared and certainly explains the extraordinarily 
short elaboration process, the final version of the Convention is a political 
compromise that addresses both motifs.  The scope of the 2005 Convention is 
therefore not confined to cultural expressions as commodities but protects the 
diversity of cultural expressions irrespective of their commercial value.228  Obuljen 
therefore rightly argues that it would be  
‘a mistake to look at the Convention as an instrument whose only goal is 
to ensure special treatment of culture in trade negotiations or to confirm 
the sovereign right of states to adopt cultural policies.  While these aspects 
are important, in assessing the possible impact of the Convention it is 
important to look at the broader debates that have been taking place over 
the past decade or more, which go well beyond trade concerns’.229 
If we relay the present analysis to the field of music, the first thing that is 
obvious is that music may be both a cultural activity as well as a cultural product.  One 
may think of situations in which the influx of musical goods that embody foreign 
cultural identities may be restricted to the benefit of local musical genres, for example 
                                                   
226  UNESCO, Report by the Director-General on the Progress of the UNESCO Draft Declaration on Cultural 
Diversity (2011) 3. 
227  Obuljen, Introduction to the Debate, 19; Schramme and van der Auwera, The UNESCO 
Convention, 260.  In the early stages of the discussions on the future Convention, two other options 
had been discussed: an instrument to strengthen the status of creators and artists and an additional 
Protocol to the Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials to 
govern the circulation of cultural goods and services; UNESCO, Preliminary Study on the Technical and 
Legal Aspects Relating to the Desirability of a Standard-setting Instrument on Cultural Diversity (2003) 5–6.  
Craufurd Smith (n 163) 30–32 provides a more nuanced description of the different UNESCO 
member states’ interests in a legally binding instrument on cultural diversity. 
228  See, in particular, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
Article 4(4). 
229  Obuljen, Introduction to the Debate, 20.  Compare also Ferri, ‘Legal Aspects of the Implementation 
of the UNESCO Convention in EU Policies’ in Germann Avocats, Implementing the UNESCO 
Convention of 2005 in the European Union (2010) 209, 215–218. 
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through radio quotas for music in the national language.  It would be more difficult to 
conceive of instances of such restrictions in the area of online music.  Unlike any form 
of offline exploitation, online music typically does not have the problem that shelf 
space is limited.  Most importantly, however, as has been shown, the concept of 
cultural diversity cannot justify imbalanced restrictions that would not result in a state 
of musical pluralism and exchange. 
As a concluding thought, one may wonder whether it was fortunate that the 
notion of ‘cultural diversity’ was appropriated by the ‘trade vs culture’ debate.  The 
assessment must be ambivalent.  From one point of view, it seems that the combined 
force of proponents of cultural diversity from both camps, whether harking from the 
cultural rights or the ‘trade vs culture’ context, has made it possible to adopt the 2005 
Convention as a binding legal instrument on cultural diversity.  From another 
standpoint, there are certain downsides.  First, as has emerged from the discussion of 
the concept of cultural diversity in the 2005 Convention, this treaty has added more 
complexity and even inconsistencies to the already tortuous task of defining or 
interpreting the notion.  Second, the review of the literature on the 2005 Convention 
has revealed a certain lack of understanding on both camps of proponents of cultural 
diversity for the respective other co-ally’s sensitivities.  Accordingly, legal commentators 
of international economic pedigree usually fail to acknowledge the wider human rights 
aspects of the concept of cultural diversity, while authors with a background in the 
cultural rights movement struggle with the intricacies of WTO law.  Given that the use 
of cultural diversity as a battle call against Anglo-American mainstream culture has 
created a hitherto unknown level of attention in the wider public, there is also a 
danger that the public reduces the concept of ‘cultural diversity’ to this single aspect. 
The Diversity of Cultural Expressions as a Subset of Cultural Diversity 
The ‘trade vs culture’ debate, and more specifically the 2005 Convention, has also 
introduced a new dimension of cultural diversity, namely the diversity of cultural 
expressions.  As a subset of the broader notion of cultural diversity, it encompasses 
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creations that express cultural identity and distinguish themselves, perhaps not entirely 
convincingly, from cultural heritage.   
The new category does not alter the established theoretical underpinning in 
the sense of intercultural pluralism but blends with it somewhat symbiotically: in one 
sense, the availability of cultural creations enhances the possibilities for interaction 
between different cultures and, concurrently, such interaction influences the future 
development of the cultures interacting in that dialogue and so incites new cultural 
creations.  This interplay is sometimes characterised as ‘creative diversity’ – this is, as 
has been explained somewhat esoterically, the ‘dynamic vision of a culture endlessly 
recreated and renewed, one which invents and reinvents itself following the rhythm of 
the life of the societies to which it belongs’.230  In this sense, a large spectrum of 
different available cultural creations is conducive to innovation and creativity. 
Music, and thus also online music, is both; a result of creativity and an 
expression of its authors’ cultural identity and thus cultural expression falling within 
the scope of the 2005 Convention.  An assessment of how the diversity of online 
music may be promoted will therefore also need to accommodate the principles and 
boundaries of that instrument.231   
6.3.4 The Relationship between Cultural Diversity and Cultural Rights 
Finally, to fully understand the normative dimensions of cultural diversity, it is useful 
to briefly examine the relationship between cultural diversity and cultural rights.  The 
latter is of fundamental importance for cultural diversity as they underpin but also 
concurrently limit the scope of the concept. 
                                                   
230  Stenou 136. 
231  Given that the 2005 Convention distinguishes cultural expressions and cultural heritage, one might 
wonder whether music could not also be seen as a form of the latter and thus fall outside of the 
scope of the Convention.  It seems, however, that at least the type of music relevant for the present 
argument cannot.  More precisely, this study aims to explore the extent to which the EU is bound to 
take into account the diversity of online music when adopting measures altering the legal framework 
for the licensing of musical works.  This means, however, that only those musical works are relevant 
for this endeavour for which the authors’ rights have not expired.  Across the EU the copyright term 
has been harmonised and set at 70 years after the author’s death.  Arguably, these works are too 
young to be reasonably considered cultural heritage. 
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Cultural Rights as the Justification of Cultural Diversity 
In the cultural diversity discourse, the relationship between cultural diversity and 
cultural rights is not always clear.  A number of recognised human rights indeed deal 
with culture.  UDHR Article 27(1) provides that ‘everyone has the right freely to 
participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits’.232  Cultural rights were also addressed when 
the Declaration was supplemented by the two international covenants on human 
rights.  Article 15(1) of the ICESCR233 repeats the right of everyone ‘to take part in 
cultural life’ and Article 27 of the ICCPR234 provides that ‘in States in which ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not 
be denied the right … to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language’.  In addition, many of the fundamental 
freedoms and other human rights have cultural content or a cultural dimension.235  
Given that the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms does not explicitly include a right to take part in cultural life, 
cultural rights are less clearly articulated at the European level.236  This 
notwithstanding, the European Court of Human Rights has gradually recognised what 
substantially are cultural rights through a dynamic interpretation of the Convention.237 
Cultural diversity is not a cultural right itself.  In particular, it is suggested, 
there are functional differences between the two concepts.  As human right 
instruments, cultural rights are subjective rights that every human being is endowed 
with.  Cultural diversity, on the other hand, is not a subjective right but rather a 
programmatic goal intended to guide a state’s cultural policy.  Cultural diversity is 
                                                   
232  Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
233  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS, 3, 3. 
234  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS, 171, 171. 
235  Meyer-Bisch, The Realisation of Cultural Rights, a New Challenge for Europe (2011) para 8.  A much more 
detailed account of the various forms of cultural rights is provided by Stamatopoulou 107–162, 
Donders, ‘Do Cultural Diversity and Human Rights make a Good Match?’ (2010) 61 International 
Social Science Journal 15, 18–21; Shaheed paras 11-20. 
236  Meyer-Bisch paras 35 and 60. 
237  European Court of Human Rights, Cultural Rights in the Case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (2011). 
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concerned with the sum of particular cultural rights of all groups and individuals 
within a state’s territory. 
This notwithstanding, cultural rights and human rights more generally provide 
the ‘moral and legal framework’ for cultural diversity.238  Today, it is widely 
acknowledged that cultural diversity and cultural rights are mutually supportive.239  On 
the one hand, as confirmed by Articles 4 and 5 of the 2001 Universal Declaration, this 
means that the full implementation of cultural rights is a prerequisite for and, at the 
same time, a guarantee of cultural diversity.  Furthermore, Article 2(1) of the 2005 
Convention asserts that ‘cultural diversity can be protected and promoted only if 
human rights and fundamental freedoms … are guaranteed’.  On the other hand, the 
respect, protection and promotion of cultural diversity are essential for ensuring the 
full respect of cultural rights.240  As a consequence of this mutual supportiveness, a 
state’s obligation to guarantee cultural rights and protect cultural diversity is 
interconnected.241 
The Limits of Cultural Diversity 
Cultural rights are not only the theoretical justification for cultural diversity; they also 
set limits to the concept.  In the realm of cultural rights, there have sometimes been 
claims for cultural relativism.  According to this theory, cultural rights do not apply 
universally but need to be interpreted differently according to the values prevalent in 
different cultures.242  To a certain extent, this is a radical consequence of the 
anthropological view that cultures cannot be judged from an evaluative perspective but 
that each culture is worthwhile in its own way.243  Given that cultural diversity implies 
that every group be able to practice their cultural identity, the question arises how 
                                                   
238  Donders 31. 
239  Human Rights and Cultural Diversity Resolution para 10.  See also Shaheed paras 24-31; Meyer-Bisch 
para 8. 
240  Shaheed para 26. 
241  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 21 on the Right of 
Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life, para 50. 
242  Donders 16.  For a broader explanation on the alleged relativism of cultural rights, see 
Stamatopoulou 18–28. 
243 See above, on page 18. 
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much tolerance the concept affords to cultural practices which are not necessarily 
consistent with cultural and human rights; the practice of female genital mutilation, 
for example, would be an extreme but pertinent case in point.  International 
instruments of cultural diversity have responded to these questions unambiguously.  
Article 4 of the 2001 Universal Declaration asserts that ‘no one may invoke cultural 
diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit 
their scope’; a principle that was reiterated in Article 2(1) of the 2005 Convention.244  
As a first result, the respect for cultural and human rights thus establishes 
absolute boundaries to the accommodation of particular cultural practices within the 
concept of cultural diversity.  One might, however, wonder whether there are not 
additional limits, maybe below the threshold of cultural and human rights.  In fact, 
the place and importance of common values within the concept of cultural diversity 
are as old as the concept itself.  It is sometimes described as the dialectic between the 
particular and the universal, meaning that although different cultures should be 
promoted (the particular) all different cultures must share some common values (the 
universal) in order to prevent conflict.  Already in 1947, the problem was pointedly 
described by then UNESCO Director-General Julian Huxley.  He argued that 
‘we must not merely recognize this cultural diversity as a fact, but welcome 
it as making for a greater richness of human achievement and enjoyment; 
thus we must not endeavour to impose any standardized uniformity of 
culture, but on the contrary should aim at encouraging the free 
development of divergent and characteristic cultural expressions in 
different regions and countries.  On the other hand, this cultural diversity 
must obviously not be allowed to become a source of incomprehension 
between the nations, still less of friction.  Accordingly we must try to 
ensure mutual understanding of the cultural tendencies and achievements 
of different peoples, and indeed to aim at an eventual integration or 
orchestration of separate cultures, not into uniformity, but into a unity-in-
diversity, so that human beings are not imprisoned in their separate 
cultures, but can share in the riches of a single diversified world culture’.245 
                                                   
244  It provides that ‘no one may invoke the provisions of the Convention in order to infringe human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or 
guaranteed by international law, or to limit the scope thereof’.  It should be noted, however, that this 
does not imply that cultural and human rights may not be limited where such limitation is provided 
for in international law; see Shaheed para 35. 
245  Huxley 12–13. 
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The quote also introduces the ‘unity-in-diversity’ parlance, nowadays 
ubiquitous in fora concerned with cultural diversity.  Often in this context, diversity is 
highlighted as a valuable asset, a ‘cultural richness’.246  Where ‘unity-in-diversity’ is 
evoked, it is not always clear to what ends.  Usually, the notion signifies a compromise 
between the two antipodes unity and diversity.  In its extreme form, unity would 
describe a society sharing a uniform culture intolerant of deviances and diversity in a 
society made up of different and separate cultures.  Arguably, ‘unity-in-diversity’ 
implies more than merely accepting the differences of cultural groups.  Given that the 
two terms seem to be given the same weight, such ‘unity-in-diversity’ also needs a 
common core in the sense of shared values.  One might even argue that it is the 
common values that only make it possible to tolerate different cultures. 
With the emphasis on intercultural dialogue as the preferred strategy to achieve 
cultural pluralism, there has also been a more pronounced stress on the necessity of 
common values, most particularly in the CoE.  The 2003 CoE Declaration on 
Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention stated that cultural practices must 
comply with the ‘fundamental principles upheld by the CoE’.247  The 2008 CoE White 
Paper on Intercultural Dialogue enumerates human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law as the universal values upheld by the Council and Europe,248 but notes that 
successful intercultural dialogue also depends on equality and mutual respect.249  Most 
recently, it has been highlighted that, in addition to human rights standards, further 
elements, such as mutual respect, need to exist in people’s hearts and minds.250  The 
enforcement of these desired elements, however, cannot be a matter of law.251 
                                                   
246  European Declaration on Cultural Objectives: ‘diversity provides the cultural richness which is the basis 
of progress towards European unity’. 
247  Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Article 1.1. 
248  CoE, White Paper, paras 57-61. 
249  Ibid paras 62-64.  Note that already the Declaration on Multicultural Society and European Cultural 
Identity had emphasised that where difference is expressed, this must be done ‘in a way that accords 
with a society based on respect for the individual, tolerance and solidarity’ (para 6) and that the 
expression of everyone’s identity must observe ‘respect for others’ (para 13). 
250  CoE, Living Together Report, 34. 
251  Ibid: ‘It goes without saying that respect should also be reflected in [people’s] outward behaviour, but 
it is not practicable, and may be counterproductive to treat it as a right which can be claimed and 
enforced by law.  People should show respect for each other, but failure to do so is a subjective 
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6.4 The Normative Dimensions of Cultural Diversity under EU Law 
Having determined the scope of the concept of cultural diversity in international law 
and intergovernmental practice, we now have to address the question of whether 
cultural diversity in EU law and, more specifically, the notion of ‘diversity of [the 
EU’s] cultures’ in TFEU Article 167(4) should be interpreted accordingly.  Thus, can it 
be understood in the normative sense of intercultural pluralism that argues for all 
cultural groups to express their different identity and engage in intercultural dialogue? 
The Relevance of the Normative Dimensions of Cultural Diversity in International Law and 
Practice 
First, the arguments in favour of the prevalent view in international law and 
intergovernmental practice that culture should be understood in an anthropological 
sense apply mutatis mutandis.252  More precisely, the EU, being a party to the 2005 
Convention, would act inconsistently if it interpreted cultural diversity in that 
instrument and the EU legal order differently.  Furthermore, the 2001 Universal 
Declaration was adopted unanimously and the 2005 Convention ratified by all EU 
member states.  All EU member states have thus demonstrated their common 
understanding of cultural diversity in the sense of intercultural pluralism.  Arguably, 
such a common position must be taken into account when interpreting the notion in 
EU law as an exercise of the prerogative that EU member states have in cultural 
matters. 
In addition, there is much to suggest that, since the concept of cultural 
diversity was introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the notion has been 
understood in the sense of cultural pluralism.  At that time, cultural diversity was 
already widely perceived in the sense of intercultural pluralism in international law 
and politics253 and, within the forum of the CoE, the EU member states were working 
                                                                                                                                                
matter, except when it goes so far as to infringe clearly defined rights, violations of which can be 
objectively determined’. 
252  See above, on page 20. 
253  In this context, the Declaration on Multicultural Society and European Cultural Identity should be 
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together towards an enhanced protection of minorities.  It is, therefore, no 
coincidence that (then) EC Article 126(1) was amended to guarantee respect for the 
member states’ ‘linguistic and cultural diversity’ only some months before the CoE 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was adopted 
Beyond the drafting history, the term ‘linguistic diversity’ in itself implies an 
intrastate protection of linguistic minorities.  Likewise, the fact that the diversity of 
regions within a state is specifically highlighted alongside national diversity in (then) 
EC Article 128(1) equally implies the underlying goal to achieve intrastate pluralism. 
Cultural Diversity in the Political Practice of the EU 
A final albeit less forceful argument to interpret cultural diversity in TFEU 
Article 167(4) in the sense of intercultural pluralism can be drawn from the fact that 
the EU in its political practice adopts this interpretation and embraces the concepts of 
cultural pluralism and intercultural dialogue. 
Even before cultural diversity was enshrined in the EU legal order it was an 
important factor in the European Communities’ policy practice.254  In fact, the 
European Commission even considers that the ‘preservation and promotion of 
cultural diversity are among the founding principles of the European model’.255  
Without any explicit reference to culture in the Treaty of Rome,256 such claims appear 
exaggerated.  What is commonly accepted, however, is that culture as a factor in 
European integration started to be recognised in the early 1970s257 and with it the 
                                                                                                                                                
recalled.  In this instrument, the European ministers for culture strongly asserted both the view of 
cultural diversity as cultural pluralism as well as the enrichment between cultures through dialogue 
and exchange.  See, in detail, above on page 41. 
254  Langen provides a detailed overview of the broader – indirect and direct – cultural policy in the EU 
from 1974 until 2007. 
255  European Commission, 2003 Communication on an International Instrument on Cultural Diversity, 3. 
256  Mere allusions to culture were contained in the references to ‘non-discrimination’ and to the 
‘protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historical, or archaeological value’ in EC 
Articles 7 and 36; see also Shore, ‘“In uno plures” (?) EU Cultural Policy and the Governance of 
Europe’ (2006) 5 Cultural Analysis 7, 12.  In addition, EC Article 131 specified that the association 
of third countries should serve their ‘economic, social and cultural development’. 
257  Shore 14; Barnett, ‘Culture, Policy, and Subsidiarity in the European Union: From Symbolic 
Identity to the Governmentalisation of Culture’ (2001) 20 Political Geography 405, 409.  
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concept of cultural diversity.  At the Copenhagen European Summit in 1973, for 
example, the heads of state of the then nine member states adopted the Declaration 
on European Identity with the aim of ‘reviewing the common heritage’ and the ‘degree 
of unity so far achieved within the Community’.  They also expressed their wish to 
‘preserve the rich variety of their national cultures’ and the belief that ‘the diversity of 
cultures within the framework of a common European civilization … give(s) the 
European Identity its originality and its own dynamism’.258  Later in the mid-1980s, 
the European institutions aimed for a ‘People’s Europe’ in order to mitigate the 
Community’s democratic deficit.  At that time, the emphasis was on symbolic 
initiatives to foster a common European identity rather than on cultural diversity.259  
With the explicit inclusion of cultural diversity in the EC, the use of the term ‘cultural 
diversity’ in policy papers multiplied.260  From the late 1980s onwards,261 the EU has 
actively endorsed the motto ‘unity in diversity’ to describe itself.  The Commission 
explains as follows: 
‘The originality and success of the EU is in its ability to respect Member 
States’ varied and intertwined history, languages and cultures, while 
forging common understanding and rules which have guaranteed peace, 
stability, prosperity and solidarity – and with them, a huge richness of 
                                                   
258  Declaration on European Identity [1973] Bulletin of the European Communities 12/118.  The idea that 
the European languages and cultures constitute the common heritage was also taken up in the 
Tindemans Report as an argument to foster ‘a citizen’s Europe’; see Tindemans, Report on European 
Union [1975] Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 1/11, 28.  In its 1977 
Communication on Community Action in the Cultural Sector, the Commission did not use the 
term ‘cultural diversity’ but proposes the preservation of architectural heritage and cultural 
exchange, both of which specific forms of expression of cultural diversity; see Commission of the 
European Communities, Community Action in the Cultural Sector, 21–25.  The preservation of 
architectural heritage is also a concern in the 1982 follow-up Communication.  In addition, the 
Commission invokes the member states’ ‘wide cultural and linguistic diversity’ when arguing in 
favour of enhancing the conditions of cultural workers in the regions; see Commission of the 
European Communities, Stronger Community Action, 13, 18-22. 
259  For example, neither the two Adonnino Reports nor the ensuing Commission communication 
mention cultural diversity; see Ad hoc Committee ‘on a People's Europe’, Report from the ad hoc 
Committee on a People's Europe [1985] Bulletin of the European Communities 3/111; Ad hoc 
Committee ‘on a People's Europe’, Report to the European Council (1985).  See also Collins, ‘Unity in 
Diversity? The European Single Market in Broadcasting and the Audiovisual, 1982–92’ (1994) 32 
Journal of Common Market Studies 89, 95. 
260  The Commission’s 1992 communication, for example, does not only make four references to 
cultural and linguistic diversity but explicitly includes ‘national, regional and local diversity’; see 
Commission of the European Communities, New Prospects for Community Cultural Action, 4. 
261  Collins 99. 
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cultural heritage and creativity to which successive enlargements have 
added more and more.  Through this unity in diversity, respect for cultural 
and linguistic diversity and promotion of a common cultural heritage lies 
at the very heart of the European project’.262 
Encapsulating the notion of cultural pluralism, the slogan has gained wide 
recognition not only within the Commission but also across the different European 
institutions.263  Equally, the concept of intercultural dialogue has been firmly 
embraced in the political practice of the EU.264 
In light of these aspects, one can thus safely conclude that also at the level of 
the EU, cultural diversity is more than a mere factual statement, but also contains the 
normative goals of cultural pluralism and intercultural dialogue. 
6.5 Conclusion 
It has become apparent that cultural diversity is a concept of many meanings that can 
be ‘used in different, even diametrically opposed, senses’.265  It is an umbrella term, 
which is used to convey what – in reality – are largely distinct concepts.  This causes 
difficulties when, as often is the case, the term is employed with the underlying 
distinctions being made in an only implicit or, even worse, unconscious way.  The 
conclusion to be drawn, from the survey of diverging ideas on cultural diversity, is that 
                                                   
262  Commission of the European Communities, European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World, 2.  
This interpretation has been re-iterated in European Commission, Commission Report to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
the Implementation of the European Agenda for Culture (2010) 2.  The idea of Europe being united 
through its cultural diversity is also a cornerstone of the ‘Europe for Citizens’ programme 2007-2013; 
Decision No 1904/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 
Establishing for the Period 2007 to 2013 the Programme 'Europe for Citizens' to Promote Active European 
Citizenship [2006] OJ L 378/32, Article 1(2)(a). 
263  It has, for example, been embraced by the European Parliament and the Council as a cornerstone of 
the 2007-2013 programme ‘Europe for Citizens’; ibid. 
264  For example, 2008 had been declared the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue.  For an 
assessment of all activities in this context, see European Commission, Report from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions - Evaluation of the 2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (2010).  For a thorough 
analysis of the importance of intercultural dialogue in the political practice of the EU, see Endres 
23–29. 
265  Von Bogdandy 247. 
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any attempt to formulate a theory of cultural diversity must, in order to avoid 
ambiguity, openly address and disclaim two key points. 
First, when speaking of cultural diversity, one must be clear whether one means 
cultural diversity at large or only the diversity of a particular cultural marker.  While 
the former paints an overall picture of the spectrum of different cultures in a given 
society the latter addresses the different cultures conveyed through this particular 
marker only, such as, in our case, online music.  Such a clarification, however, is 
seldom made.  On the contrary, the notion of ‘cultural diversity’ is often used as totum 
pro parte.  Yet, such malpractice may be deceiving as it suggests that it was possible to 
make predictions as to cultural diversity at large based on an analysis of the diversity of 
a particular cultural marker only.  The example of music may illustrate that such a 
conclusion would be inaccurate: even if a society displays a large spectrum of different 
musical creations, its cultural diversity at large would probably still be low if other forms 
of cultural creations, such as cinema, literature or theatre, shared largely uniform 
characteristics.  Even under these circumstances, this would only probably be so; one 
could not be certain because culture is even more than just cultural creation.  We 
might, for example, imagine a society where all forms of cultural creation are largely 
uniform but which possesses highly diverse cultural heritage. 
Things are further complicated by the various normative connotations with 
which cultural diversity may be used.  Any theory of cultural diversity, be it concerned 
with culture at large or only a particular cultural marker, must, therefore, be clear 
whether it uses the notion of cultural diversity as a statement of fact or in one of its 
normative guises.  Arguably, whenever cultural diversity is used in order to express 
more than just a simple statement of fact, this should be made explicit. 
Any reliable argument based on cultural diversity, therefore, needs to be clear 
about the exact extent of the concept that it relies upon.  This finding, however, is in 
stark contrast to the way the term is used in political or academic debate without 
making such distinctions.  One explanation for this may be found in the obvious 
temptation to deliberately remain vague and derive benefit from the positive aura with 
which the term cultural diversity is surrounded.  Who, after all, would state opposition 
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to cultural diversity?  Ultimately, such sleight of hand is only possible because of the 
prevalent anthropologic view of culture.  If culture is determined by virtually anything, 
it is easy to focus on one specific aspect and use the result of that analysis as an 
argument for a less visible agenda. 
That this is potentially harmful to the further development of the concept can 
be seen from the way in which cultural diversity was appropriated by the ‘trade vs 
culture’ debate.  When, suddenly, the concept is widely used in only one of its 
particular connotations, there is a clear danger that the public at large will associate 
the concept with this aspect only and lose sight of its overarching determinants. 
The analysis carried out in this chapter has evidenced an overarching 
perception of cultural diversity in the sense of what in shorthand could be termed 
intercultural pluralism that pervades international law and intergovernmental practice 
and is equally discernible in the use of the term at EU level.  Cultural Diversity then 
determines the extent to which groups or individuals in society are able to express 
their way of life or cultural identity.  Implicit in this concept is the conviction that 
there is an optimal degree of diversity; notably that every group or individual in society 
should be able to freely practice their culture.  In addition, the aspect of intercultural 
dialogue stresses the need for cultures to be able to interact with each other in the 
interest of mutual enrichment. 
Applying our findings to online music allows us to define diversity in this field.  
Conscious of the normative underpinning, it would call for all groups or individuals in 
society to be able to express their cultural identities through online music and to be 
able to engage with online music that expressing other cultures. 
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Part 3:  Diversity in Online Music as a Guideline to Direct or Assess Policy 
Choices in the Design of the EU Framework for the Licensing of 
Authors’ Rights in Online Music 
Based on the working concept of cultural diversity formulated in the previous section, 
part 3 seeks to develop the concept into a workable guideline to direct or assess policy 
choices in relation to the licensing of authors’ rights in online music.  It may be 
recalled that part 4 will focus on the way in which authors’ societies operate and, more 
specifically, their dedicated cultural functions, while part 5 will address the 
consequences of two specific EU interventions that changed the dynamics of the 
licensing of authors’ rights in online music.  This part aims to develop more tangible 
criteria to assess whether these practical characteristics of and changes in the system of 
licensing authors’ rights in online music promote the diversity of online music.  It thus 
seeks to link the abstract and theoretic concept of diversity in online music to the 
concrete and practical area of multi-territorial licensing of online music. 
In chapter 7 we approach this task by analysing the cultural mainstreaming 
clause of TFEU Article 167(4) with a view to determining the exact scope of that 
obligation and its application to online music.    
We first assess the scope of the terms ‘to take cultural aspects into account’ 
(7.1) and ‘to respect and promote the diversity of [the EU’s] cultures’ (7.2).  Given that 
the ordinary meaning of the latter is not sufficiently conclusive (7.2.1), it is proposed 
to apply a harmonious interpretation in light of Article 7 of the 2005 Convention 
whenever an EU measure may affect the diversity of cultural expressions.  In order to 
substantiate this proposal the conceptual advantages of the promotion of the diversity 
of cultural expressions, as envisaged in Article 7 of the 2005 Convention, are 
demonstrated; notably, the latter did not develop in isolation but placed itself into a 
broader framework of coherent guidelines, principles and values (7.2.2).  After 
presenting additional arguments in favour of the proposed harmonious interpretation 
(7.2.3) the effects of such an approach are highlighted (7.2.4).  More specifically, it is 
argued that a harmonious interpretation will lead to a uniform approach cultural 
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diversity in the EU and a more systematic implementation of the 2007 Convention on 
the part of the EU. 
Analysing the various stages in the value chain of online music, chapter 8 
explores the extent to which the framework for the licensing of authors’ rights in 
music may influence diversity in online music.  We submit that the framework for the 
licensing of authors’ rights in music would promote diversity in online music if it 
allowed the diversity of created music to be carried over to the online distribution 
stage and if online music services could clear, in an easy and efficient manner, the 
necessary authors’ rights in online music in the entire EU repertoire as well as a 
diverse foreign, ideally the entire worldwide repertoire (8.1).  Contrariwise, legal as 
well as practical reasons argue against the use of licensing regulation to balance out any 
disadvantages that some cultural groups might experience in the upstream creation of 
music (8.2). 
We then explore several of the suggestions that have been made outside of the 
legal sphere with a view to statistically measuring diversity (9).  These theories provide 
useful suggestions as to how diversity can be conceptualised and contribute to 
determining whether a certain measure is appropriate to promote the diversity in 
online music. 
 - 89 - 
7 The Obligation to Respect and Promote the Diversity of the EU’s 
Cultures (TFEU Article 167(4)) 
7.1 The Scope of the Term ‘to Take Cultural Aspects into Account’ in 
TFEU Article 167(4)  
TFEU Article 167(4) requires the EU to ‘take cultural aspects into account in its 
action under other provisions of the Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to 
promote the diversity of its cultures’.  But which concerns exactly do the EU organs 
and institutions have to take into account?  What particular steps must be taken for 
such concerns to be taken into account? 
Shortly after the cultural mainstreaming clause came into existence through the 
Maastricht Treaty, some commentators argued that it was no more than a declaratory 
statement, a merely political appeal to consider culture.266  This view, however, appears 
difficult to reconcile with the strong wording that the EU shall take cultural aspects 
into account.  The same language is employed in the other sections of the provision: 
‘shall contribute’ (Paragraph 1), ‘action shall be aimed’ (Paragraph 2), ‘shall foster’ 
(Paragraph 3) and ‘shall adopt’ (Paragraph 5).  In all of these instances, there is no 
doubt that legally binding rules are established and nothing in Paragraph 4 suggests 
that the same was not intended for the mainstreaming clause. The recent 
reinforcement of the protection of cultural diversity by the Lisbon Treaty provides an 
additional argument against the interpretation of TFEU Article 167(4) as a merely 
political statement.  As a principle of EU law, it is now legally binding and enshrined 
not only in TEU Article 3(3) but also in the Preamble and Article 22 of the CFREU.  
All of this suggests that TFEU Article 167(4) contains a binding legal obligation and, 
as far as can be seen, claims to the contrary have not been re-iterated in recent times. 
                                                   
266  Berggreen-Merkel 19; Lane, ‘New Community Competences under the Maastricht Treaty’ (1993) 30 
Common Market Law Review 939, 978. 
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The term ‘aspects’ is relatively open in comparison with the term 
‘requirements’, which is used in other mainstreaming clauses.267  This suggests that 
considerations must be taken into account not only if they are necessary for but also if 
they are merely conducive to the protection and improvement of the cultural field.268  
While it has sometimes been argued that the cultural aspects to be taken into account 
should be interpreted as the distinct national cultural policy objectives of the member 
states so that they are protected from overflowing EU intervention,269 nothing in the 
mainstreaming clause suggests that EU cultural policies and objectives should not be 
seen as necessary considerations.270  On the contrary, if the EU has explicit, albeit 
limited, cultural competences then there might be situations in which the secondary 
effects of EU action not only conflict the objectives of domestic but also EU cultural 
objectives.  In those cases, a balancing of the competing cultural and non-cultural 
objectives at the EU level is equally needed. 
Turning to the exact scope of the term ‘to take into account’, the natural 
meaning of the words suggests that the EU is required to include cultural 
considerations in the assessment of proposed action and to balance it with all other 
applicable objectives.  It does not, however, prescribe a particular outcome of such 
assessment.271  TFEU Article 167 proclaims no abstract supremacy of culture over 
other objectives.  Likewise, no minimum level of protection of culture is prescribed.  
Such precisions are sometimes made in other mainstreaming clauses.  For example, 
the EU is bound to take into account requirements linked to a high level of education 
(TFEU Articles 9 and 147(2)), a high level of education and training (TFEU Article 9) 
or a high level of human health protection (TFEU Articles 9 and 168(1)).  Yet, TFEU 
                                                   
267  TEU Article 9 speaks of the ‘requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, 
the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of 
education, training and protection of human health’, TEU Article 11 of ‘environmental protection 
requirements’, TEU Article 12 of ‘consumer protection requirements’, and Article 13 of the ‘welfare 
requirements of animals’. 
268  Ress and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, para 142. 
269  Schmid, ‘Diagonal Competence Conflicts between European Competition Law and National 
Regulation - A Conflict of Laws Reconstruction of the Dispute on Book Price Fixing’ (2000) 8 
European Review of Private Law 155, 163–164; Ress and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, para 145. 
270  Psychogiopoulou 57. 
271  Ibid 76. 
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Article 167(4) does not contain any such prescription.  In fact, it does not even oblige 
the EU to always accommodate cultural concerns in any given action.272  
But although the EU thus has a wide margin of discretion when assessing 
cultural aspects in relation to actions based on non-cultural treaty provisions, there are 
certain minimum standards that such an assessment must follow.  This is in line with 
the general view in legal literature that the application of Article 167(4) is amenable to 
judicial review.273  Usually, this minimum threshold is said to require the EU to attain 
the goals in the various fields of EU policy ‘in the most culturally-friendly way’.274  In 
practical terms, this would mean that if a certain measure could be implemented in 
two different ways, both of which reach its non-cultural objectives equally effectively, 
the EU has to choose the implementation with the least negative effect on culture.  
Further, if between two possible implementations the one with more negative effects 
on cultural objectives is chosen, this must be proportionate to the non-cultural aim 
pursued.275  In addition to such relative limits, the principle of culturally-friendly 
implementation is understood by some in a more restrictive sense as to equally 
encompass absolute limits.  These commentators envisage situations in which the 
adoption of a given measure would seriously impair the development of the cultures in 
the member states and argue that such a measure could only legitimately be adopted if 
either the measure itself addressed cultural concerns or if the measure was 
accompanied by flanking measures aimed at mitigating the foreseeable damage to 
cultural goals.276 
Whatever the correct standard may be, it can be reasoned that TFEU 
Article 167(4) imposes a legal obligation on all EU organs and institutions.  Applied to 
the object of our study this means that the European Commission, when regulating 
the legal framework for the licensing of online music, must be guided by concerns 
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273  Ress and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, para 147; Frenz para 4097. 
274  Psychogiopoulou 59; Ress and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, para 147; Frenz para 4094. 
275  See Christianos, ‘The Effective Judicial Protection of Culture in EC Law’ in Rodriguez Iglesias (ed) 
Problèmes d'interprétation (2004) 21, 43. 
276  Ress and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, para 147. 
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about cultural diversity and that, even if these concerns have no precedence over any 
other objectives, the Commission must balance all applicable interests in the most 
culturally-friendly way. 
7.2 The Scope of the Terms ‘to Respect and to Promote the Diversity of 
[the EU’s] cultures’ in TFEU Article 167(4) 
Linking the analysis of the scope of the obligation ‘to take into account’ to the 
supplementary clause ‘in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of 
[the EU’s] cultures’, one can conclude that the EU, when adopting a predominantly 
non-cultural measures, must respect and promote cultural diversity to the largest 
extent possible while attaining the non-cultural objective.   
This, however, does not say much about the concrete ways in which cultural 
diversity is to be respected and promoted.  In order to determine the scope of these 
terms more adequately, the ordinary meaning of the terms ‘to respect’ and ‘to 
promote’ will first be assessed (7.2.1).  Given that this only leads to very limited 
substantiation, a harmonious interpretation will be drawn from what Article 7 of the 
2005 Convention prescribes for promoting the diversity of cultural expressions.  Such 
a harmonious interpretation is suggested for all cases in which a non-culturally 
motivated EU measure would affect the diversity of cultural expressions (7.2.2-7.2.4).  
As music is a cultural expression,277 the harmonious interpretation would be relevant 
for any EU measure that would affect musical diversity or, more specifically, the 
diversity in online music.  
7.2.1 The Ordinary Meaning of the Terms ‘to Respect’ and ‘to Promote’ in 
TFEU Article 167(4) 
Our search for the appropriate interpretation of ‘to respect’ and ‘to promote’ starts 
with a look at the ordinary meaning of the terms.  According to the Oxford English 
                                                   
277  See above, on page 71. 
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Dictionary, ‘to respect’ is to be understood as to treat or regard with deference, esteem, 
or honour and to uphold, maintain, refrain from violating.278  ‘To promote’ means to 
further the growth, development, progress, or establishment of (a thing); to advance or 
actively support (a process, cause, result, etc.); to encourage.279  The first conclusion 
that can be drawn from these definitions is the contrast between the passive character 
of ‘to respect’ and the term ‘to promote’, which implies progressive action. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the scope of the obligations depends largely on 
what it is that should be respected and promoted, namely the diversity of the EU’s 
cultures.  It has already been shown that cultural diversity has both a descriptive as well 
as a normative dimension.280  Applying the former sense, to promote cultural diversity 
would be to further the spectrum of different cultural identities.  Given that in its 
descriptive sense, cultural diversity is a mere statement of fact; it is unclear how it 
could be furthered.  This contradiction, however, may be solved if the normative 
dimensions of cultural diversity in the sense of cultural pluralism and intercultural 
dialogue are consulted.  Then, cultural diversity would be promoted if a situation were 
furthered in which every group in society should be able to assert, express and practise 
its cultural identity and in which there was an exchange between the different groups.  
Accordingly, to promote diversity in online music would be to further a situation in 
which every group is able to express its cultural identity through music distributed 
through online means and in which online music was a means of dialogue between 
the groups.   
To respect cultural diversity could then be understood as to take care that the 
already existing level of cultural pluralism and intercultural dialogue is not undercut.  
Correspondingly, respect for diversity in online music would show in preserving the 
extent to which groups express their culture and interact with each other through 
online music. 
                                                   
278  Simpson (ed) ‘respect’ <http://oed.com/view/Entry/163780>. 
279  Simpson (ed) ‘promote’ <http://oed.com/view/Entry/152468>. 
280  See above 6.2, on page 33, and 6.3, on page 34. 
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TFEU Article 167 does not provide any further details how the obligation to 
promote and respect cultural diversity should be implemented.281  It is thus left to the 
EU institution or organ to decide, on a case-by-case basis, how these goals should best 
be achieved.  This has the unfortunate consequence of defying the purpose of TFEU 
Article 167(4).  Although the norm was designed to mainstream cultural diversity into 
all EU policies, the lack of guidance prevents a uniform and consistent application.   
Arguably, a harmonious interpretation of this obligation in light of Article 7 of the 
2005 Convention would remedy this shortcoming.  To further demonstrate the need 
for the proposed harmonious interpretation, we analyse the exact scope of the 
obligation to promote the diversity of cultural expressions (7.2.2), lay out the grounds 
arguing in favour of such interpretation (7.2.3), and determine its practical effects 
(7.2.4). 
7.2.2 The Scope of the Obligation to Promote the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions (Article 7 of the 2005 Convention) 
Article 7 of the 2005 Convention reads: 
‘1. Parties shall endeavour to create in their territory an environment 
which encourages individuals and social groups: 
a)  to create, produce, disseminate, distribute and have access to their 
own cultural expressions, paying due attention to the special 
circumstances and needs of women as well as various social groups, 
including persons belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples; 
b)  to have access to diverse cultural expressions from within their 
territory as well as from other countries of the world. 
2. Parties shall also endeavour to recognize the important contribution 
of artists, others involved in the creative process, cultural 
communities, and organizations that support their work, and their 
central role in nurturing the diversity of cultural expressions’. 
                                                   
281  Neither do those provisions that mention cultural diversity elsewhere in the EU treaties; see, as to 
these norms, above at 6.1.2, on page 32. 
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Guidelines for the Interpretation of the 2005 Convention 
Before analysing the provision more closely, it is important to note that Article 7 
cannot be seen in isolation.  Rather, there are certain general constraints that 
contracting parties need to observe when implementing the 2005 Convention.   
The first of these constraints can be found in Article 5(1), according to which 
the contracting parties must act in conformity with ‘universally recognized human 
rights instruments’ when implementing cultural policies and adopting measures to 
protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions.  As one of the guiding 
principles of the Convention, Article 2(1) further specifies that ‘cultural diversity can 
be protected and promoted only if human rights and fundamental freedoms ... are 
guaranteed’ and adds that ‘no one may invoke the provisions of this Convention in 
order to infringe human rights or fundamental freedoms’.282 
Second, Article 5(2) stipulates that 
‘when a Party implements policies and takes measures to protect and 
promote the diversity of cultural expressions within its territory, its policies 
and measures shall be consistent with the provisions of this Convention’. 
All measures taken by the parties, therefore, must conform to the letter and the 
spirit of the Convention.  Most relevant in this regard are Articles 1 and 2.  The 
former enumerates the Convention’s nine objectives, and the latter contains eight 
guiding principles, which may be seen as limitations to the rights established in the 
Convention.283  Beyond the already mentioned respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (Article 2(1)), four other principles are particularly relevant in 
the context of the parties’ internal measures.  First, the principle of equal dignity of 
and respect for all cultures (Article 2(3)) calls for an equal treatment by the parties of 
                                                   
282  See also above at 6.3.4, on page 71.  Most human rights are not absolute but allow for restrictions 
under strict conditions.  Often one such condition is the principle of proportionality.  Where this is 
the case, Article 5(1) therefore makes sure that the contracting parties’ measures are necessary and 
proportionate; see Craufurd Smith (n 163) 44. 
283  Neil, ‘The Convention as a Response to the Cultural Challenges of Economic Globalisation’ in 
Obuljen and Smiers (eds) UNESCO's Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions: Making It Work (2006) 39, 53.  The exact way in which the principles limit these 
rights, however, is not entirely clear. 
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all cultures, which aims for cultural pluralism in that the expressions of all cultures in 
a party’s territory are to the promoted and protected.  Second, the principle of 
equitable access (Article 2(4)) asserts a two-fold access right for cultures: access to the 
means to express culture as well as access to diversified cultural expressions ‘from all 
over the world’.  This latter aspect gives life to the principle of openness (Article 2(8)).  
According to this third principle, states ‘should seek to promote ... openness to other 
cultures of the world’.  Such openness is a prerequisite for the dialogue amongst 
cultures and interculturalism, both of which figure amongst the objectives of the 
Convention (Article 1(d)-(e)).  Lastly, Article 2(8) also provides that ‘parties should 
seek to ... ensure that [their] measures are geared to the objectives pursued under the 
present Convention’.284 
Finally, the parties’ discretion to act under the Convention is also constrained 
by Article 20(2) which provides that the 2005 Convention does not modify the rights 
and obligations of the parties under any other international treaties. 
The Three Objectives Listed in Article 7 of the 2005 Convention 
Examining the scope of measures to promote the diversity of cultural expressions, the 
first thing that one notices is that Article 7 lists three specific objectives for such 
measures to serve.  The first objective is contained in Article 7(1)(a), which calls on the 
parties to create an environment that encourages cultural groups to engage in 
expressions of their cultural identity and thus stresses the link between cultural 
diversity and cultural pluralism.  Such an engagement can take the form of the active 
provision of cultural expressions (creation, dissemination) or their passive reception 
(access to provided cultural expressions).  As cultural groups and societies can only do 
                                                   
284  The exact scope of this remains opaque, in particular as the cited wording does not add anything 
more than is expressed in Article 5(2).  From the fact that the Convention itself entitles this the 
‘principle of balance’, however, one might infer that a party’s measure should ideally satisfy all 
guiding principles.  Yet, this might not always be possible if principles conflict with each other or 
further provisions in the Convention.  In such situations, it is submitted that a party is not free to 
arbitrarily choose one over the other but must strive for a balanced solution.  See also Neil 53, who 
notices that ‘the concept of “balance” in an international instrument normally prevents states from 
introducing a measure wildly disproportionate to the scope of the problem they are addressing, using 
the instrument as a justification’. 
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so if they have the possibility to freely express themselves, the provision presupposes 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 2(1)). 
Article 7(1)(b) proclaims the second objective.  The norm extends the call for 
access to cultural expressions: while Sub-paragraph (a) only requires for cultural groups 
to have access to their own cultural expressions, Sub-paragraph (b) goes further and 
proclaims that they should equally have access to expressions of other cultural groups, 
whether these are located within or outside of the territory of the relevant party.  This 
implements the notion of openness (Article 2(8)) and shows that equal dignity and 
respect for all cultures (Article 2(3)) are of potentially global reach.285  Taken together, 
both Article 7(1)(a) and (b) implement one of the two aspects of the principle of 
equitable access (Article 2(7)) in so far as they advocate access to cultural expressions. 
Third and finally, Article 7(2) underlines the importance of creators of cultural 
expressions and demands that their contribution be recognised by the contracting 
parties.  At first sight, the additional emphasis on the importance of the creative 
process appears somewhat redundant as this aspect is already mentioned in 
Article 7(1).  However, Article 7(2) is broader in that it is not only concerned with 
individuals and social groups but – in addition to artists – enumerates inter alia ‘others 
involved in the creative process’.  This can be seen as a reference to the cultural 
industries, those producing and distributing cultural goods and services.286  In 
addition, Article (7)2 also mentions organizations that support the work of artists, 
which is to be seen as including collecting societies;  after all, these are associations of 
authors with the aim of furthering the authors’ interests.  Given its open formulation, 
the obligation established by Article 7(2) appears quite broad; in particular because ‘to 
recognize’ in its ordinary meaning often denotes a merely internal process.  It is only in 
                                                   
285  With the emphasis on the principle of openness it is also made clear that trade and culture are no 
natural enemies but that culture, quite on the contrary, needs trade to flourish; see Germann, 
‘Towards a Global Cultural Contract to Counter Trade Related Cultural Discrimination’ in Obuljen 
and Smiers (eds) UNESCO's Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions: Making It Work (2006) 277, 287–288.  Being one of the eight guiding principles, the 
requirement of openness is thus one of the safeguards against unduly broad protectionist measures 
under the 2005 Convention. 
286  Wiedemann, ‘Empowering Audiovisual Services for the Future’ in Obuljen and Smiers (eds) 
UNESCO's Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions: Making It 
Work (2006) 89, 104. 
 - 98 - 
its sense of ‘to show appreciation’ or ‘to reward’287 that the act of recognising has 
external effects.288  Article 7(2) is, therefore, best understood as encompassing all 
measures that aim at supporting those involved with cultural creation.  In practice, 
Article 7(2) enlarges the scope of the beneficiaries of the measures that are foreseen by 
Article 7(1) to encourage the creation of cultural expression to more indirectly 
involved players, such as the creative industries and collecting societies. 
Guidance for Putting the Objectives into Practice 
When more closely analysing Article 7, the first thing that one notices is the 
indirectness that it prescribes to state measures to promote the diversity of cultural 
expressions.  The main focus of Article 7 is on ‘individuals and social groups’ as those 
who, by creating or having access to cultural expressions, directly influence the 
diversity of cultural expressions.  In contrast, promotive state measures are to establish 
conditions that ‘encourage’ such behaviour and thus play a rather contributory role.  
The decision whether to create or have access to cultural expressions remains for the 
various cultural groups to make. 
Moreover, Article 7 stipulates that promotive measures must pay ‘due attention 
to the special circumstances and needs of women as well as various social groups, 
including persons belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples’.  The groups 
mentioned have a common trait that their cultural rights are not fully guaranteed in 
many territories of the world; where this is the case, they are prevented from 
expressing their cultural identity.  If measures to encourage cultural expression are 
intended to accommodate these specific circumstances, this suggests that a broad 
understanding be given to the term ‘encourage’.  In its ordinary meaning, to encourage 
is understood as to inspire someone with the courage or confidence to do something 
or to stimulate someone to do something by approval or help.289  Where women, 
                                                   
287  Simpson (ed) ‘recognize’ <http://oed.com/view/Entry/159656>. 
288  Given that action under Article 7 must have an impact on the diversity of cultural expressions, it is 
submitted that it must have such external effect.  See, in this regard, the interpretation of the notion 
of ‘cultural expression’ above, on page 62. 
289  Collins English Dictionary, ‘encourage’ <http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/
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minorities, or indigenous peoples are prevented from expressing their cultural identity, 
any encouragement would be moot if it was limited to stimulation or inspiration.  In 
such situations measures to promote the diversity of cultural expressions would rather 
need to be directed at removing the legal or factual obstacles.  The express reference to 
the mentioned groups, therefore, clarifies that ‘to encourage’ must be understood as 
encompassing ‘to enable’. 
Importantly, this enabling effect of promotive measures is not limited to the 
three specified groups.  Notably, minorities and indigenous peoples are not mentioned 
in isolation but as examples of ‘various cultural groups’ that may be in ‘special 
circumstances’.  This can only be understood as a more general commitment to 
cultural pluralism290 and a reminder of one of the guiding principles for achieving the 
objectives of the Convention, namely the equal dignity of and respect for all cultures 
(Article 2(3)).  Article 2(3) stipulates that the recognition of equal dignity of and 
respect for all cultures is a precondition of the protection and promotion of the 
diversity of cultural expressions.  Consequently, one would have to conclude that 
wherever social groups face obstacles in expressing their cultural identity, promotive 
measures must be targeted at removing such obstacles.  At the same time, this 
illustrates that although promotive state measures may only be of a contributory 
character, such contribution is crucial where social groups would otherwise be unable 
to express their identities.   
Furthermore, Article 2(3) reveals another important element of promotive 
measures to observe.  If all cultural groups have equal dignity and are to be shown 
equal respect, states are not free in deciding which cultural groups to support.  On the 
contrary, state measures could only promote the diversity of cultural expressions if they 
enabled and encouraged all groups in society to express their cultural identities.  This, 
in turn, implies that no particular cultural group may be unduly favoured and clarifies 
                                                                                                                                                
encourage>. 
290  See also Recital 7 of the Preamble of the 2005 Convention highlighting that ‘diversity is embodied 
in the uniqueness and plurality of the identities and cultural expressions of the peoples and 
societies’. 
 - 100 - 
that it is not a particular cultural expression that is to be promoted but the diversity of 
cultural expressions.291   
This assertion for equal treatment of all cultural groups requires a number of 
precisions.  First, a cultural group may face special circumstances that promotive 
measures must be directed at.  It would be inaccurate to assume that equal treatment 
required that each cultural group be provided with the same quantitative and 
qualitative support.  On the contrary, if the goal is to encourage all social groups to 
express their cultural identity through cultural activities, products and services, then 
measures aimed at a particular group have to be carefully tailored to its individual 
situation and needs.  As a result, cultural support can differ considerably depending 
on the social group targeted.  This, however, does not constitute an infringement of 
the equal dignity of all cultural groups but is rather a practical aspect of its 
implementation.  An environment that encouraged cultural expressions by all social 
groups would put the principle of equal dignity into practice; it would then be the free 
decision of each group whether and by which means to express its cultural identity.  
Where the goal is to create such level playing field, measures necessarily have to 
consider the level of cultural pluralism already achieved amongst the various groups.  
If a group, for example, receives more cultural support than others, this could still 
promote the diversity of cultural expressions if that group faced particular difficulties 
in expressing its cultural identity.  Where, on the other hand, a one-sided cultural 
policy is implemented simply to consolidate an already existing hegemony of the 
cultural majority, that policy could not be justified under the goals of cultural 
pluralism and equal dignity of and respect for all cultures. 
Second, the principle of equal dignity of and respect for all cultures would also 
be misinterpreted if it were construed as suggesting that the cultural expressions of 
various social groups had to attain equal importance in society as a whole.  Such 
                                                   
291  In this regard, it is unfortunate that Article 7 is entitled ‘measures to promote cultural expressions’.  
Given, however, that Articles 5 and 6 speak of measures that promote and protect ‘the diversity of 
cultural expressions’, the title must be seen as a simple short-hand for the same concept.  That this is 
the only possible interpretation is apparent from Article 3, according to which the 2005 Convention 
‘shall apply to policies and measures adopted by the Parties related to the protection and promotion 
of the diversity of cultural expressions’. 
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consolidation tendencies would disregard the indirect effect that Article 7 lays down 
for promotive measures; while such measures should create an environment that 
encourages all social groups to express their cultural identity, each social group must 
be free to decide if and how to express its cultural identity.   
Third, the emphasis on equal treatment is less pronounced in the context of 
foreign cultural expressions.  Article 7(1)(b) argues in favour of access to cultural 
expressions ‘from other countries in the world’ only and does not use the wording 
‘from all other countries’ which would have demonstrated a strict equal treatment of 
foreign cultural groups.  From a practical point of view, the sheer unlimited number of 
diverse worldwide cultural expressions would make it impossible to treat them strictly 
equally.  Rather than a prohibition to favour some foreign cultural expressions over 
others, the postulate of equal treatment should, therefore, be understood as a 
programmatic goal that requires states to aim for access to foreign cultural expressions 
on a scale as diverse as possible and, ideally, of worldwide coverage. 
In conclusion, the analysis has shown that the diversity of cultural expressions 
is promoted through measures that encourage all groups and individuals in society to 
create expressions of their cultural identity.  It is also promoted through measures 
enhancing access to the expressions of these groups and individuals as well as those of 
others irrespective of their location.  Such encouragement may also be promoted 
indirectly through the support of those who facilitate cultural creation or organizations 
that support the work of the creators, such as collecting societies. 
At the same time, it has also become clear that Article 7 does not take a neutral 
stance towards the diversity of cultural expressions but rather shows the normative 
conviction that there is a desirable degree of diversity, pre-determined by an 
understanding of cultural diversity in the sense of intercultural pluralism.  If all groups 
in society are free to express their cultural identity, the resulting body of cultural 
expressions will be diverse.  It is for this objective that Article 7 strives and states that 
measures need to be implemented in order to promote the diversity of cultural 
expressions. 
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7.2.3 The Need for a Harmonious Interpretation of TFEU Article 167(4) in Light 
of Article 7 of the 2005 Convention 
A number of arguments can be made in order to advocate the type of harmonious 
interpretation proposed.  From the perspective of international law, Article 20(1)(b) of 
the 2005 Convention asserts that the contracting parties shall take the Convention 
into account when interpreting and applying other treaties to which they are a party.292  
Moreover, in legal commentary, there is the view that agreements to which the EU is a 
party have to be taken into account when interpreting TFEU Article 167.293 
But good reasons can also be based on internal EU legal considerations.  Most 
importantly, only a harmonious interpretation guarantees consistency between the 
different legal instruments.  By adopting the 2005 Convention, the EU accepted a 
theoretical framework for dealing with the diversity of cultural expressions.  It would 
put itself in contradiction to this decision if the underpinning normative values did 
not apply in the context of TFEU Article 167(4) to cases where the diversity of cultural 
expressions was an issue. 
On the other hand, some might raise the objection that a harmonious 
interpretation could impinge upon the autonomy of the EU legal order.  This 
argument might be based on two points, more specifically the hierarchy of EU norms 
and the particular context and objective of Article 167(4). 
As far as the hierarchy of EU norms is concerned, it might be seen as 
problematic that Article 167(4) is a norm of primary EU law whereas the 2005 
Convention as an international agreement ranks lower, notably, as is generally 
accepted,294 between primary and secondary norms.  Furthermore, it is a well-
                                                   
292  In Unión de Televisiones Comerciales Asociadas (UTECA) v Administración General del Estado, Case C-
222/07, Opinion of AG Kokott [2009] ECR I-1407 (ECJ, 4 September 2008) paras 95-102, AG 
Kokott clarified that this also applied when interpreting the EC.  In the case at hands, she used the 
guidance of the 2005 Convention as one argument to conclude that a national measure that 
restricted the fundamental freedoms pursued a legitimate aim when its objective was linguistic 
diversity.  In the final decision, the ECJ referred to the 2005 Convention in its interpretation of the 
proportionality of the measure; Unión de Televisiones Comerciales Asociadas (UTECA) v Administración 
General del Estado, Case C-222/07 [2009] ECR I-1407 (ECJ, 5 March 2009) paras 32-33. 
293  Ress and Ukrow, Art. 151 EGV, para 44. 
294  Tiedje, ‘The Status of International Law in the European Legal Order: The Case of International 
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established principle that norms of primary law, in general, cannot be interpreted by 
reference to secondary law norms, as indeed it would be circular to determine the 
compatibility of a secondary law norm with higher primary law by interpreting the 
latter in view of the former.295  In analogy to this principle, one might be tempted to 
argue that interpreting TFEU Article 167(4) in light of the 2005 Convention would 
equally violate the hierarchy of EU norms.  Yet, in the present context, the argument 
is not convincing.  First, where primacy between norms is an issue usually this 
concerns questions as to which one of two provisions prevails if they are inconsistent 
and cannot be reconciled.  There are no indications, however, that the 2005 
Convention was not consistent with EU primary law.  Second, the aim of our 
harmonious interpretation is not to determine the scope of application of TFEU 
Article 167(4), which is broader than that of the 2005 Convention, but only to help 
implement it by shaping certain aspects wherever a measure would fall under the 
ambit of both TFEU Article 167(4) and the 2005 Convention.  This, however, does 
not jeopardise the autonomy of the EU legal order but rather accommodates the fact 
that the EU legislator is concurrently faced with two different legal rules.  Both apply 
                                                                                                                                                
Treaties and Non-binding International Instruments’ in Wouters and others (eds) The 
Europeanisation of International Law (2008) 55, 57–58; European Central Bank v Federal Republic of 
Germany, Case C-220/03, Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl [2005] ECR I-10595 (ECJ, 13 September 2005) 
para 71.  That norms of primary EU law have primacy over international norms can be inferred from 
the fact that according to TFEU Article 218(11) the ECJ may be called upon to issue an opinion 
whether an envisaged international agreement is compatible with the treaties and that, where the 
answer is in the negative, the agreement may not be concluded unless either the agreement or the 
treaties are amended; see Wouters and De Meester, The Implementation by the European Community of 
the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity (2008) 3–4; Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, 
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P ECR I-6351 (ECJ, 3 September 2008) para 307.  That 
international agreements have primacy over secondary EU law, on the other hand, can be derived 
from the fact that TFEU Article 216(2) provides that agreements concluded by the EU are binding 
on the EU institutions; International Dairy Arrangement, Case C-61/94 [1996] ECR I-03989 (ECJ, 
10 September 1996) para 52; Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council 
of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities para 306-307.  As a consequence, 
there are several ways to challenge the validity of a secondary norm that is incompatible with a 
binding international agreement; see Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and 
Constitutional Foundations (2004) 274–324. 
295  Leible and Domröse, ‘Die primärrechtskonforme Auslegung’ in Riesenhuber (ed) Europäische 
Methodenlehre (2nd edn, 2006) 184, para 66.  Note, however, that notwithstanding these 
methodological reservations the ECJ sometimes uses such an interpretation to confirm a result 
arrived at by resort to other methods of interpretation; see for an overview Nettesheim, 
‘Normenhierarchien im EU-Recht’ (2006) 41 Europarecht 737, 753–757. 
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to measures affecting diversity of cultural expressions and both bind EU institutions in 
their policy or legislative action.  In this case, however, the coherence of the EU 
internal order dictates that they be interpreted as far as possible in light of each other. 
What is more, the harmonious interpretation proposed here finds 
confirmation in the European Commission’s view on the matter.  In 2007, on behalf 
of the Commission, (then) Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and 
Multilingualism Ján Figeľ stated in response to a parliamentary question on the 
relationship between (then) EC Article 151 and the 2005 Convention that ‘the 
Convention is pertinent for any Community activity launched with a view to 
implementing Article 151(4) of the EC Treaty’.296  In the same vein, Xavier Troussard, 
Head of the Culture Policy, Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue Unit at the 
Directorate-General for Education and Culture of the European Commission, noted 
in 2010 that 
‘concerned to ensure a broader consideration of cultural diversity in the 
development of state policies, it could be argued that in effect, the 
Convention replicates the cultural mainstreaming obligation of 
Article 167(4) at the international level.  From this perspective, it 
strengthens the need to make more explicit and visible the 
implementation of Article 167(4)’.297 
Compared to this, the proposed interpretation seems even less ambitious as it 
is not argued that the principles of the 2005 Convention should always be taken into 
account when interpreting TFEU Article 167(4).  The aim is not to enlarge the field of 
application of the 2005 Convention through the back door of Article 167(4), but 
rather to ensure that the normative guidelines for dealing with cultural expressions are 
                                                   
296  Answer to Parliamentary Written Question P-5554/07 (DE) by Ruth Hieronymi (PPE-DE) to the Commission 
(8 November 2007) on the Unesco Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions (2007).  The uniformity of the two obligations ‘to promote’ is also highlighted in Council 
of the European Union, Council Decision of 18 May 2006 on the Conclusion of the Convention for the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions [2006] OJ L 201/15, Recital 3: ‘The 
UNESCO Convention constitutes a relevant and effective pillar for promoting cultural diversity and 
cultural exchanges, to which both the Community, as reflected in Article 151(4) of the Treaty, and 
its Member States, attach the greatest importance’. 
297  European Commission, Questionnaire for Study IP/B/CULT/IC/2009_057 Commissioned by the 
European Parliament (2010) 3. 
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always taken into account under Article 167(4) when the measure under review affects 
cultural expressions. 
In light of the foregoing, the coherence of EU action requires an interpretation 
of TFEU Article 167(4) in light of Article 7 of the 2005 Convention. 
7.2.4 The Effects of a Harmonious Interpretation 
The effects of the proposed harmonious interpretation are two-fold.  On the one 
hand, it offers a uniform approach in the implementation of TFEU Article 167(4).  
On the other hand, it more strongly favours reaching the objectives of the 2005 
Convention than would otherwise be the case. 
The Appropriate Standard for Promoting the Diversity of Cultural Expressions under TFEU 
Article 167(4) 
Using the 2005 Convention as a tool to interpret TFEU Article 167(4) offers the EU 
recourse to a coherently developed and internationally accepted system of values, 
principles and objectives.  Its application makes the somewhat opaque mainstreaming 
clause not only more workable but also enhances its visibility as an instrument of 
checks and balances in European policy making.298  
In more concrete terms, wherever a predominantly non-cultural measure may affect 
the diversity of cultural expressions, the EU would ‘promote the diversity of its 
cultures’ if it created an environment that enabled and encouraged all groups and 
individuals 
 to create expressions of their cultural identities; and 
 to have access to their own cultural expressions and the expressions of 
cultural identities of other groups and individuals, irrespective of their 
location. 
                                                   
298  See also ibid. 
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 Moreover, it could equally build such environment by supporting 
intermediaries that help groups and individuals to express their cultural identity. 
Arguably, it would ‘respect’ cultural diversity if the measure in question did not 
make it more difficult for cultural groups and individuals to assert their identity 
through cultural expressions or to access cultural expressions of their own or other 
groups. 
Applied to the specific area of online music, one would have to conclude that 
wherever a predominantly non-cultural measure may affect the diversity of online 
music, the EU would ‘promote the diversity of its cultures’ if it created an 
environment that enabled and encouraged all groups and individuals to express their 
cultural identities through online music and to have access to online music expressing 
their cultural identities of those as well as those of others, irrespective of their location.  
It would ‘respect’ cultural diversity if the measure in question did not make it more 
difficult for cultural groups and individuals to assert their identity through online 
music or to access online music expressing their own cultural identities or those of 
other groups or individuals. 
The Broader Consequences for Attaining the Goals of the 2005 Convention 
A harmonious interpretation would also considerably strengthen the implementation 
of the 2005 Convention.  This is a result of the fact that TFEU Article 167(4) and 
Article 7 of the 2005 Conventions are of different binding value. 
Article 7 is only loosely binding in that the parties ‘shall endeavour’ the 
implementation of measures to promote the diversity of cultural expressions.  This 
type of best-endeavour obligation has rightly been described to disguise a soft law 
obligation in a hard law form.299  While the word ‘shall’ implies binding force, the 
obligation only extends to endeavour to achieve the prescribed objective.  Although 
the parties must, therefore, attempt to implement Article 7, the 2005 Convention 
does not offer any guidance as to the scope of such attempts, and the precise extent of 
                                                   
299  Jiang, An Evaluation of Soft Law as a Method for Regulating Public Procurement from a Trade Perspective 
(2009) 63–64. 
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the ‘shall endeavour’ obligation remains unclear.  Yet, it has to be assumed that it 
leaves the ultimate decision as to whether or not to adopt promotive measures to the 
contracting parties.  TFEU Article 167(4), on the other hand, obliges the EU to assess 
all its envisaged measures as to their impact on cultural diversity and to choose the one 
which best promotes cultural diversity, from several options all equally able to achieve 
the non-cultural objective. 
Under the harmonious interpretation, the EU would thus be obliged to 
mainstream the goals of the 2005 Convention into all measures affecting the diversity 
of cultural expressions.  In practice, this changes the dynamics that underpin the 
promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions.  The degree to which the EU is 
bound to implement increases from a best-endeavour obligation to a requirement to 
take into account.  Arguably, this is even exacerbated by the fact that the concept of 
diversity in cultural expressions, as has been seen, is very broad.  Under a best-
endeavour obligation such a broad definition in effect increases a contracting party’s 
discretion:  not only is it obliged merely to endeavour to promote the diversity of 
cultural expressions, but it would also be free how to do that.  It could, for example, 
implement Article 7 of the 2005 Convention by promoting the diversity of any chosen 
marker of cultural identity.  If, however, the diversity of cultural expressions is 
mainstreamed into the adoption of non-cultural measures, the broad notion of the 
concept of diversity of cultural expressions rather increases the instances in which the 
goals of the 2005 Convention have to be considered.  Notably, they would have to be 
taken into account where the diversity of every possible marker of cultural identity may 
be affected. 
 - 108 - 
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8 Regulating the EU Framework for the Licensing of Authors’ Rights as 
a Means to Promote Diversity in Online Music 
In practice, measures under Article 7 of the 2005 Convention take manifold forms; 
useful examples have been collected by Danielle Cliche based on a survey of already 
existing cultural measures in Europe.300  In this chapter, however, we explore the 
connection between the diversity of cultural expressions and the licensing regime for 
authors’ rights.  More particularly, we aim to establish how diversity in online music 
may be affected by changes in the licensing framework. 
This assumes that the licensing of authors’ rights has an influence on the 
diversity of cultural expressions at all.  Music is an archetypal form in which cultural 
groups express their identity and the particular object of our study, online music, is a 
subset thereof; namely recorded music which is distributed through digital networks.  
Further, the licensing of authors’ rights is able to exert an influence on online music 
because the law provides musical authors with exclusive rights in their works; during 
the term of protection, any restricted use of their music thus depends on obtaining a 
licence.  Without such a licence, no recorded music can be made, distributed or 
accessed.  The licensing system can, therefore, be seen as a gatekeeper at every point in 
the value chain where a licence is needed: any efforts to promote the diversity of 
online music are therefore doomed to fail if the necessary licences cannot be obtained.  
As a general interim conclusion it seems plausible that, depending on the specific 
design, the legal framework for the licensing of authors’ rights may be more or less 
conducive to the diversity of online music. 
But how exactly would the licensing system need to be designed to achieve the 
objectives identified in TFEU Article 167(4) interpreted in light of Article 7 of the 
2005 Convention?301   
                                                   
300  Cliche, Article 7: Measures to Promote the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2008). 
301  See above, on page 100. 
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8.1 Potential Points of Impact between the EU Framework for the 
Licensing of Authors’ Rights and the Diversity in Online Music 
The EU framework for the licensing of authors’ rights can help contribute to the 
creation of an enabling environment, as envisaged by TFEU Article 167(4) interpreted 
in light of Article 7 of the 2005 Convention, at each of the steps in the value chain of 
online music where authors’ rights are affected and thus need to be cleared. 
8.1.1 The Creation of Music 
The first step in the value chain of online music is the creation.  Two distinct creative 
acts determine the existence of recorded music: (1) the writing of the musical 
composition and the lyrics and (2) the performing of these for recording purposes.302  
However, these creative acts usually do not affect any pre-existing authors’ rights.  As 
far as the musical composition and the lyrics are concerned, it is only with their 
creation that authors’ rights spring into life.  Moreover, the performance of the 
composition and the lyrics for the purposes of making a recording, for its part, is not 
an act restricted by the authors’ rights.303  
This is not to say that copyright may not have a bearing on the creation; after 
all its economic function is to incentivise creation through monetary reward.304  Yet, 
this reward is accorded irrespectively of the cultural affiliation of the musical author.  
As copyright offers the same incentive to all, it is inapt to encourage a particular 
cultural group to express themselves through music more vigorously than other 
cultural groups.  As measures to promote the diversity of cultural expressions need to 
be tailored to the particular context of the targeted social group, copyright as such does 
                                                   
302  It is suggested not to regard the recording itself as a creative act, but rather as part of the production 
stage.  This is in line with the generally held view that copyright in sound recordings is not accorded 
in order to reward creativity but rather entrepreneurial efforts; see Suthersanen, ‘Copyright Law: A 
Stakeholders' Palimpsest’ in Macmillan (ed) New Directions in Copyright Law (2007) 119, 130. 
303  Only performances in public are acts that a musical author may prohibit; see CDPA 1988 s 19(1) 
and UrhG § 19(2). 
304  MacQueen and others, Contemporary Intellectual Property: Law and Policy (2nd edn, 2010) para 2.18. 
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not promote musical diversity.305  On the contrary, there is much to conclude that 
where authors are primarily motivated by the promise of monetary gains from royalties 
they will tend to create music that is likely to best realise this promise and thus 
concentrate on music that appeals to the majority. 
The collective management of authors’ rights may nevertheless have an indirect 
effect on the diversity of musical compositions and lyrics.  Notably, it is a widespread 
practice amongst authors’ societies to use part of the royalties they collect to fulfil 
cultural goals and, in particular, to promote the creation of culturally important works.  
Using the example of the German collecting society GEMA, chapter 11 will explore in 
greater detail whether these practices are able to promote musical diversity.  Although 
authors’ societies are not state entities and thus not the addressees of the 2005 
Convention, states would indirectly promote the creation of diverse music if they 
acknowledged and supported the authors’ societies’ cultural functions, provided that 
the latter indeed prove to achieve the objective of Article 7. 
Beyond copyright and the licensing of authors’ rights, a state also has 
numerous other instruments to stimulate a diverse musical creation through more 
targeted measures such as, for example, artists’ grants, awards and prizes or artists-in-
residency programmes.306  
8.1.2 Producing and Disseminating / Distributing Sound Recordings 
The creation of the musical composition and lyrics is followed by the production stage.  
At this step, record companies or independent production companies contracted by 
them use a performance of the musical composition and lyrics to produce a sound 
recording.  Given that to copy is defined as a reproduction in any material form 
(CDPA 1988 s 17(2) and UrhG § 16(1)) the underlying musical and literary works are 
                                                   
305  As to the relationship of copyright and diverse musical creation, see also below at 11.1.4.3, on page 
166, as well as at 11.5, on page 200. 
306  Cliche 5. 
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reproduced when a performance thereof is recorded and thus the authors’ 
authorisation needs to be sought by the producer of the sound recording.307 
Once a sound recording has been produced, the next step in the value chain 
would be for them to be disseminated and distributed.308  In the case of online music, 
typically there are digital music retailers that distribute the recorded music to the end 
user.309  Where they distribute recorded music in the form of downloading or 
streaming, the digital music retailer must clear what in a non-technical form is called 
the authors’ ‘online rights’.  In reality, two distinct branches of the authors’ exclusive 
rights are affected: the reproduction right to the extent that the recording is copied 
when it is uploaded to the retailer’s servers and downloaded to the end user’s 
computer as well as the making available right.  That the necessary authors’ rights must 
be cleared in addition to the rights controlled by the record companies (the rights in 
the sound recordings and the performers’ rights) is due to the fact that the holder(s) of 
the authors’ rights only grant the record companies non-exclusive licences that are 
                                                   
307  Parker, Music Business: Infrastructure, Practice and Law (2004) para 28–23.  In addition to the authors’ 
rights, the producer of the sound recording must equally clear the performers’ right to make a 
recording of their performance; CDPA 1988 s 182(1)(a) and UrhG § 77(1). 
308  It is not entirely clear in what way Article 7(1)(a) the 2005 Convention distinguishes between these 
two largely overlapping terms.  While ‘to disseminate’ is not defined, Article 4(5) uses the term ‘to 
distribute’ to describe the activities of the cultural industries.  Given that the notion is a commonly 
used technical term in the area of trade, one could conclude that ‘to distribute’ designates activities 
of the cultural industries related to cultural goods and services and that it covers all steps in the 
value chain between the others specifically mentioned, namely the production of a cultural good and 
its enjoyment by the end user.  Correspondingly, ‘to disseminate’, would be the activities of 
individuals to further publicise cultural activities that are not exploited commercially. 
309  While these entities may focus entirely on the provision of digital music, more and more digital 
music is also offered by Internet service providers, telecom operators, mobile handset or portable 
music device manufacturers as part of their core business.  There have also been cases where brands 
that are already well known for their services in other areas have broadened their offerings to include 
digital music.  In parallel to these structures, record companies increasingly market digital music to 
end users directly.  In practice, there are also content aggregators which bundle the catalogues of 
different record companies and offer these packages to the various digital music retailers, who, in 
turn, do not need to negotiate individual licences with the respective record companies.  Sometimes, 
content aggregators also offer digital music directly to end users.  Note, however, that these content 
aggregators are only able to bundle the rights that are controlled by the record companies (the rights 
in the sound recording as well as the performers’ rights).  Their offering does not include the 
authors’ rights which, in addition, must be cleared by the digital music retailer (or by the record 
companies or content aggregators respectively where they distribute music directly to the end user).  
As to the value chain of digital music in general, see Wunsch-Vincent and Vickery, Digital Broadband 
Content: Music (2005) 45–72 and Business Insights, The Digital Music Industry Outlook (2011) 103–
120. 
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limited to the production of the respective recording and do not include the 
subsequent digital distribution.  As a consequence, every time the sound recording is 
exploited, the underlying rights in the composition and the lyrics must also be cleared. 
Both the production as well as the distribution of online music depends on 
clearing the authors’ rights in the musical composition and lyrics for the respective 
uses.  Article 7 proclaims that the production and distribution of cultural expressions 
are to be encouraged.  If licences could not or only with difficulty be obtained, 
however, these activities would be discouraged, or even worse, prevented.  In order to 
promote the diversity of online music, a state must, therefore, make sure that the 
licences necessary to produce a sound recording and to distribute it online can be 
obtained in a simple and effective way. 
Yet, this postulate needs to be further refined in light of the crucial element of 
equal treatment that permeates all objectives to promote the diversity of cultural 
expressions.310  Article 7(1)(a) is guided by the vision that all groups in a contracting 
party’s territory may assert their culture at every step in the value chain of cultural 
expressions.  In this regard, it is important to realise that such assertion at each of the 
different stages in the value chain of online music is absolutely limited by the degree to 
which the different cultural identities have expressed themselves at the preceding stage.  
Simply put, if the written music lacks diversity, so will the recorded and finally the 
online distributed music.  In order to encourage all cultural groups to produce and 
distribute online music, a contracting party must, therefore, make sure that the system 
under which authors’ rights are licensed is designed in a way that helps to achieve the 
highest possible degree of diversity at all (intermediate) steps; ideally the music 
distributed online would be as diverse as the music that is created.  Thus it is not 
sufficient if authors’ rights in only some of the repertoire of domestically written music 
are readily available; rather the authors’ rights in the entire repertoire, irrespective of 
the cultural values and identities expressed in the individual musical pieces, have to be 
available for clearance with the same ease and efficiency.  
                                                   
310  See above, on page 94. 
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8.1.3 Access to Online Music 
The final step in the value chain of a cultural product foreseen by Article 7 is its being 
accessed.  This stage differs from the others in that Article 7(1)(b) provides that all 
cultural groups within a contracting party’s territory should be able to access 
expressions of their own and other cultural groups, irrespective of whether the latter 
are located within or outside of that state’s territory.  In the context of online music, 
access would mean the possibility to listen to that music.  In order to fully achieve the 
broad access envisaged, a contracting party’s population would ideally be able to listen 
to the entire worldwide repertoire online.  The licensing regime, however, does not 
have any direct bearing on the access of online music as there is no additional use in 
that stage that would need to be licensed.  The making available of online music and 
its reproduction on the provider’s server and the end user’s computer are acts that are 
covered by the licence granted to the online music service and listening to music alone 
is not an act that needs to be licensed.311  In an indirect way, however, the diversity of 
the music that can be accessed online is dependent on the diversity of the recorded 
music that is available to digital music retailers at the distribution stage.  Only where 
the latter are able to obtain licences for a diverse repertoire, can diverse music be 
accessed by the public at large.  This is why we concluded in the previous paragraphs 
that the entire domestic repertoire should be licensed with equal ease and efficiency 
irrespective of the cultural identity it expresses.  In light of the claim for access to the 
music that, ideally, represents all the different foreign cultures the word, this postulate 
must be broadened.  Accordingly, a state would promote the diversity in online music 
if its licensing framework made it possible for digital music retailers to obtain licences 
that do not only cover the domestic repertoire in all its diversity but, in addition, a 
diverse foreign repertoire or, under the best circumstances, the worldwide repertoire. 
It is another matter, however, whether the repertoire offered by an online 
music service is actually accessed in all its diversity by the end user.  To foster this, a 
contracting state would have to resort to other measures that more directly incentivise 
the actual use of the diversity of music available online.  It could, for example, make 
                                                   
311  Parker paras 5-02 and 5-04. 
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sure that all its inhabitants have the technical capacities to engage with online music 
or enhance its efforts to stimulate the interest of the general public in intercultural 
dialogue.312  An enquiry into these options that are more directly geared towards the 
participation of end users, however, lies beyond the remit of our study.  
8.2 Regulating the EU Legal Framework for the Licensing of Authors’ 
Rights as an Unsuitable Means to Promote the Diversity of Online 
Music through Positive Discrimination 
In all examples discussed so far, we have argued that a state should prevent the 
licensing system from becoming an obstacle in carrying forward the diversity achieved 
at the stage when music is created up to its being recorded, its online distribution and 
access to it.  It would be another question, however, whether the licensing system 
could also be used to balance out potential disadvantages experienced by some cultural 
groups.  One may, for example, imagine a situation in which some groups are less able 
than others to assert their cultural diversity through the creation of music.  Could the 
legal framework for music licensing be designed in a way that it more vigorously 
promotes the licensing of these authors’ rights when it comes to the production of 
sound recordings and their online distribution?  While we have concluded that 
promotive measures, in general, may take the form of such positive discrimination,313 
there are practical as well as legal grounds to conclude that the licensing regime would 
not be an appropriate tool to achieve this. 
On the practical side, one needs to take into account that culture is flexible 
and constantly evolving.  Consequently, the dynamics of how well the different 
cultural groups may assert themselves through music might be subject to frequent 
change.  Such change, however, could only be accommodated by the licensing 
framework with difficulties.  Rather, on the contrary, the system of the licensing of 
authors’ rights can only fully serve its purpose if it endows authors as well as users with 
                                                   
312  See also the examples provided by Cliche 8–10. 
313  See above, on page 93. 
 - 116 - 
legal certainty.  Yet, such legal certainty, in turn, presupposes stability and durability.  
Influencing the rules that govern the licensing of authors’ right, therefore, does not 
seem to be appropriate. 
This result is confirmed by some legal considerations.  In fact, a legal 
framework for the licensing of authors’ rights that is geared towards facilitating the 
recording and the online distribution of the music of groups that struggle with 
asserting their cultural identity to the detriment of the music of better-established 
cultural groups would make it more difficult for the latter to exercise their copyright.  
Whether such voluntary creation of an obstacle for some musical authors in the 
exercise of their exclusive rights would be legitimate appears rather doubtful and raises 
the question of compatibility not only with international intellectual property treaties 
but also the applicable human rights instruments. 
With respect to the protection of intellectual property at the international 
level, Article 36(1) of the Berne Convention stipulates that ‘any country party to this 
Convention undertakes to adopt, in accordance with its constitution, the measures 
necessary to ensure the application of this Convention’.314  In light of this provision it 
has been argued that a state does not fulfil its obligation to grant certain rights to 
authors if it merely states the existence of these rights; rather, it must also guarantee 
that the owners can actually enjoy their rights where this can be done through 
adequate governmental measures.315  If a party does not take such appropriate 
measures this may be problematic insofar as states are not granted the possibility to 
impose conditions on the exercise of the right of making available to the public in 
Article 8 WCT316 and must conform to the three-step test in Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention when allowing for exceptions to the reproduction right.317  
                                                   
314  The parallel provision in the WCT is Article 14(1): ‘Contracting Parties undertake to adopt, in 
accordance with their legal systems, the measures necessary to ensure the application of this Treaty’. 
315  Ficsor, ‘Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights from the Viewpoint of 
International Norms and the Acquis Communautaire’ in Gervais (ed) Collective Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights (2nd edn, 2010) 29, 66–67. 
316  Ficsor, ‘Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital, Networked 
Environment: Voluntary, Presumption-Based, Extended, Mandatory, Possible, Inevitable?’ in Gervais 
(ed) Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (2006) 37, 57–58.  In contrast, in relation to 
the broadcasting right, for example, states may subject its exercise to certain conditions 
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Moreover, the fundamental rights justification of intellectual property rights at 
different levels is increasingly highlighted.318  In this respect, both the 1948 UDHR319 
and the 1966 ICESCR320 protect the moral and material interests of creators.  At the 
European level, Article 1 of Protocol I to the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms protects property321 and extends to 
                                                                                                                                                
(Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention).  Note, however, that the scope of such permitted 
exceptions is contested.  Silke von Lewinski argues that these only concern the relationship between 
right holders and commercial users and not right holders and their rights managers; see von 
Lewinski, ‘Mandatory Collective Administration of Exclusive Rights - A Case Study on Its 
Compatibility with International and EC Copyright Law’ [2004] UNESCO e-Copyright Bulletin, 5–
6.  From this, she deduces that the mandatory collective administration of exclusive rights is beyond 
the concern of the Berne Convention and thus allowed even if not expressly permitted through the 
framework of international treaties.  Possibly, the favouring of disadvantaged cultural groups affects 
the free exercise of the exclusive rights in a less intrusive way than a system of mandatory collective 
administration; a maiore ad minus one could, therefore, argue that the legitimacy of such measures 
does not depend either on their specific permission in the international legal framework.  On the 
other hand, however, Mihály Ficsor, relying on a textual and contextual interpretation, makes the 
argument that the scope of such permitted exceptions is broader and that it covers any conditions 
determined or imposed by states under which exclusive rights may be exercised; see Ficsor, 
Viewpoint of International Norms, 48–59.  Consequently, states could not impose conditions for 
the exercise of rights where they are not expressly permitted to do such, as is the case with the right 
of making available to the public. 
317  It should be noted, however, that Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention concerns situations in which 
states determine that certain reproductions are permitted.  This is a much more intrusive measure 
than those envisaged here, which leave the authors’ exclusive right untouched and only influence the 
way in which this right can be licensed.  What can be said with certainty, therefore, is that a maiore 
ad minus such measures are permitted at least in such cases where they conform to the three 
requirements established in Article 9(2).  Where they would not, one would have to ask whether the 
existence of Article 9(2) precludes the establishment of measures that influence the licensing of the 
reproduction right.  As to the interpretation of Article 9(2) in general and in the specific context of 
the WCT, see Ricketson and Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne 
Convention and Beyond 2 (2006) paras 13.10-13.37, 13.116-13.129. 
318  A general overview of human right approaches to intellectual property is provided by Gervais, 
‘Intellectual Property and Human Rights.  Learning to Live Together’ in Torremans (ed) Intellectual 
Property and Human Rights (2008) 3. 
319  Article 27(2) reads: ‘everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author’. 
320  Article 15(1) reads: ‘the States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: ... (c) 
To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which he is the author’.  For more details on the scope of protection 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and its interpretation by the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights see Helfer, ‘Collective Management of 
Copyright and Human Rights.  An Uneasy Alliance Revisited’ in Gervais (ed) Collective Management 
of Copyright and Related Rights (2nd edn, 2010) 75. 
321  Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 9 ETS, 
Article 1(1) reads: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law’.  The approach 
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copyrighted works.322  CFREU Article 17(2) determines that ‘intellectual property shall 
be protected’.323  In Germany, the protection of intellectual property rights falls within 
the basic right to property as guaranteed by Article 14(1) of the German Basic Law.324  
Creating a legislative framework for the licensing of authors’ rights that hinders some 
holders from monetising their rights in the most effective way, appears to be, at least a 
priori, at odds with the afore-mentioned fundamental rights.  It is true that at all the 
different levels, the protection of copyright – be it in the guise of specific creators’ 
rights or as part of the broader right to property – is not limitless; rather on the 
contrary, states retain a broad discretion to further regulate the scope of protection in 
the public interest.325  Ultimately, however, it would remain a matter of a case-by-case 
analysis whether the particular measure to provide the legal framework for the 
licensing system falls within the scope of the permissible derogations of the mentioned 
rights. 
Therefore, what seems to be inappropriate from a practical perspective also 
raises serious legal doubts.  Thus, to influence the legal framework for music licensing 
in a way that it favours the recording or online distribution of music that expresses an 
under-represented cultural identity cannot be seen as an appropriate way to promote 
the diversity of online music. 
Yet, this is not to say that a state’s legal framework on licensing may not 
support mechanisms that have been established by the authors themselves and are 
                                                                                                                                                
of the European Court of Human Rights towards the protection of creators’ rights is described by 
Helfer, ‘The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal. 
322  Victor Dima v Romania, 58472/00, Admissability Decision (European Court of Human Rights 
16 November 2005) section B 2 b). 
323  See also Walter, ‘Fundamental Rights’ in Walter and von Lewinski (eds) European Copyright Law 
(2010) 71, paras 4.0.9-4.0.13 and Geiger, ‘Intellectual Property Shall Be Protected!? Article 17(2) of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ (2009) 31 European Intellectual 
Property Review 113. 
324  Article 14(1) reads: ‘property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed.  Their content and 
limits shall be defined by the laws’ (translation provided in Deutscher Bundestag, Basic Law for the 
Federal Republic of Germany (2010)).  More precisely, the German legislator must provide authors with 
exclusive rights to the extent that they may lead a self-determined life without governmental benefits; 
see Peukert, ‘Güterzuordnung und Freiheitsschutz’ in Hilty and others (eds) Geistiges Eigentum (2008) 
47, 63. 
325  As to the respective derogations see the commentaries referenced in n 320, 321, 323 and 324 above. 
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intended to add more justice to the licensing system by introducing elements of 
solidarity between successful and less successful authors.  More specifically, the 
collective system of managing copyright is marked by many of such traits of 
solidarity.326  In this scenario, the legal and practical arguments that militate against 
any form of direct positive discrimination through the legal framework for the 
licensing of authors’ rights lose their weight.  As these are voluntary measures to which 
also the potentially disadvantages authors agree, there are no problems from the point 
of view of international law or fundamental rights.  On a similar note, these solidarity 
elements can be changed through collecting societies’ competent bodies in order to 
keep track with the evolving nature of culture.327  It is therefore submitted that a 
contracting party promotes the diversity of online music where it encourages and 
supports such efforts; on condition, however, that the effects of the solidarity elements 
of collective rights management conform to the objectives enumerated by Article 7. 
Beyond this, a state has other support mechanisms at its disposal which may be 
targeted at balancing out potential disadvantages: at the production stage these include 
inter alia loans, subsidies or quotas in support of particular productions and at the 
distribution stage one might think of subsidies for independent distribution 
companies or support for festivals.328 
8.3 Conclusion 
Several conclusions can be drawn from applying the objectives of TFEU Article 167(4) 
interpreted in light of Article 7 of the 2005 Convention to the area of the licensing of 
authors’ rights in music.  While the diversity at the stage of the creation of the musical 
works and lyrics may be indirectly influenced by the way in which authors’ rights are 
collectively managed through authors’ societies, the licensing conditions have the most 
                                                   
326  Most importantly, these are the cultural contributions that most continental European collecting 
societies apply. 
327  The cultural contributions of GEMA, for example, are allocated by a particular committee applying 
flexible rules. 
328  Cliche 6–8. 
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direct impact on the diversity of online music where a licence is needed to clear the 
authors’ rights; notably (1) when music is recorded and (2) that recorded music is 
distributed by digital means.  The conditions under which the licensing of authors’ 
rights takes place promote the diversity of online music if they facilitate to ‘carry over’ 
the diversity of created music to the production and distribution stage to the broadest 
extent possible.  In practical terms, to promote diversity in online music, the licensing 
system should make it possible for producers of sound recordings and digital music 
retailers to clear the rights in the entire domestic repertoire in an easy and efficient 
manner, regardless of the cultural identity expressed.  In order to allow for the access 
of diverse online music from other countries of the world, the authors’ rights in a 
diverse foreign repertoire, ideally the worldwide repertoire, should be available for 
licensing to digital music retailers.  To respect the diversity of online music, the 
licensing system must not be changed in such a way as to make it more difficult for 
producers of sound recordings and digital music retailers to clear the just mentioned 
rights.  
Regulating the EU legal framework for music licensing is not an appropriate 
policy tool to balance out disadvantages that certain cultural groups may experience at 
these stages by way of positive discrimination.  The EU legislator could, however, 
support solutions established by collective societies in as much as those solutions 
achieve the objectives of TFEU Article 167(4) interpreted in light of Article 7 of the 
2005 Convention. 
 - 121 - 
9 The Impossibility of Statistically Measuring Diversity in Online Music 
Up to this point our discussion of the concept of cultural diversity has very much 
centred on the cultural aspect.  A sound understanding of the notion of diversity as 
such, however, would also make it easier to assess whether a measure is appropriate 
and effective in the promotion of cultural diversity, in particular if there were 
statistical indicators capable of measuring whether a practical or legal change to how 
authors’ rights in music are licensed affects cultural diversity to the negative or 
positive.  The present chapter reviews the available economic literature on the 
measuring of diversity to determine the extent to which they can be made useful in 
developing the diversity of online music as a guideline for policy choices.  
9.1 Diversity as the Interplay of Variety, Balance and Disparity 
Andrew Stirling first presented his concept of diversity as the interplay of variety, 
balance and disparity in 1994329 and developed it fully in his 1998 working paper ‘On 
the Economics and Analysis of Diversity’.330  
9.1.1 The Properties of Variety, Balance and Disparity 
Stirling’s interest in the subject was spurred by the recognition that diversity was very 
much in discussion in a wide range of different disciplines but that only very little 
attention was devoted to define or analyse the concept.  Motivated to develop a 
general framework for diversity in science, technology and society,331 he reviewed the 
broad literature on diversity in various fields.332  While sharing the view that the 
                                                   
329  Stirling, ‘Diversity and Ignorance in Electricity Supply Investment: Addressing the Solution Rather 
than the Problem’ (1994) 22 Energy Policy 195. 
330  Stirling, ‘On the Economics and Analysis of Diversity’ (1998). 
331  Stirling (n 224). 
332  The disciplines identified included: mathematical ecology, conservation biology, palaeontology, 
taxonomy, pharmacology, psychology, archaeology, artificial intelligence, financial management, 
complexity theory, environmental economics, evolutionary economics, mainstream economics, 
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concept of diversity related to the nature or degree of apportionment of a quantity to a 
set of well-defined categories,333 he was wary of the fact that such a general definition 
opened up more questions than it resolved.  In order to refine this definition he 
concluded that diversity could be described by distinguishing just three different 
general properties: variety, balance and disparity.334  We will now look at each of these 
properties in turn, before analysing their interplay. 
Variety is the number of categories into which the elements of a system can be 
apportioned.  It answers the question: ‘how many types of things do we have?’  All else 
being equal, the greater the variety, the greater the diversity.335  In the context of 
music, variety could, for example, relate to the numbers of titles336 or number of 
different genres. 
Balance refers to the evenness with which the elements of a system are 
apportioned into the different categories.  It is the answer to the question: ‘how much 
of each type of things do we have?’  All else being equal, the more equal are the 
fractions of each category, the more even is the balance, the greater is the diversity.337  
In the context of cultural diversity, it has been argued that imbalance leads 
mechanically to lesser visibility of the goods corresponding to the least produced 
genres.  The less visible these genres are, the more difficult will consumers find it to 
access them and the more threatened is their viability in the long run.338  To illustrate 
the importance of balance in the field of music one might invoke as an example the 
repertoire that is played by a radio station during 24 hours.  If we regard variety as the 
number of different genres, a station that broadcasts 80 per cent classical music, 15 per 
                                                                                                                                                
sociology, bibliometrics and information management; see Stirling (n 330) 37. 
333  Ibid 38, citing Jones and Leonard, ‘The Concept of Diversity: An Introduction’ in Leonard and 
Jones (eds) Quantifying Diversity in Archaeology (1989) 1, 2, who themselves refer to Patil and Taillie, 
‘Diversity as a Concept and its Measurement’ (1982) 77 Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 548, 548. 
334  Stirling (n 330) 39; Stirling (n 224) 709.  This however does not mean that all three properties are 
equally articulated in every discipline; sometimes some properties are more pronounced than others.  
Likewise, the terminology employed in the different fields is highly diverging. 
335  Stirling (n 330) 39; Stirling (n 224) 709. 
336  Benhamou, The Justification and Methodology for Measuring the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2010) 6. 
337  Stirling (n 330) 39; Stirling (n 224) 709. 
338  Benhamou 7–8. 
 - 123 - 
cent jazz and 5 per cent folk offers a less diverse programme then a station where these 
three genres are played evenly.  If we regard variety as the number of titles, we can 
imagine a radio station with a programme made up of 100 different titles.  A station 
that plays all 100 titles twice is more diverse than a station that plays 25 songs five 
times a day and the remaining 75 songs only once. 
Disparity refers to the manner in which the various categories may be 
distinguished and is the answer to the question: ‘how different from each other are the 
types of things that we have?’339 In the context of cultural products, it has been argued 
that disparity expresses originality.  Accordingly, it could be thought of as the degree of 
innovation or artistic development or, if one wanted to define it in the negative, the 
degree of standardisation between the categories.340  In our example, it would refer to 
the degree that the genres or titles are different from one another. 
The contributions of each of these properties to diversity are summarised in 
figure 1. 
                                                   
339  Stirling (n 330) 40; Stirling (n 224) 709. 
340  Benhamou 7–8. 
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Figure 1: taken from Stirling, The Social Appraisal, 9. 
One of the benefits of Stirling’s model is that it makes the existence of the three 
properties explicit.  While Stirling’s broad review of the literature has shown that all 
discussion on diversity deals with essentially only three properties, not all three 
properties are dealt with in each and every discipline.  His comparative view thus 
highlights the importance to recognise all of them and so helps re-think and challenge 
conventional patterns of explanation.  Stirling’s model, therefore, enriches the 
discussion of diversity across the boundaries of singular specialist domains. 
Beyond highlighting the mere existence of the three different properties of 
diversity, the model also illustrates their interdependence.  In particular, Stirling 
stresses that 
‘each of the three properties may be held to constitute a necessary but 
individually insufficient condition for recognising the presence of the 
overarching property of diversity as a whole.  Collectively, identification of 
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the entire set of properties is sufficient condition for recognition of 
diversity’.341 
Consequently, it would be deceptive to regard either variety, balance or 
disparity alone as a suitable proxy for diversity.342 
At the same time, this is also one of the challenges of the Stirling model.  More 
precisely, at several points in the application of the model, developing an appropriate 
taxonomy may become an obstacle.  The first of these difficulties concerns the 
determination of the category against which the properties ‘variety’, ‘balance’ and 
‘disparity’ are to be tested.  As we have seen, there might be several ways to apportion 
the elements of a given system; the variety of music, for example, could be categorised 
according to the number of different songs or number of different genres.  If musical 
diversity as a factual statement is considered, it appears plausible that no one 
categorisation is a priori correct and trumps over the other.343  The chosen 
categorisation, however, changes the rest of the matrix; in our case, the balance 
amongst the different songs may be different from the balance of the different genres 
and the disparity amongst the songs will not match the disparity amongst the genres.  
It adds to the complexity that the choice of categorisation also makes it necessary to 
consider disparity.  In a study on TV programmes, assuming that programmes in the 
same category were more similar to each other than to any other programme, the 
authors observed that the chosen categorisation may model implicit views on the 
disparity between programmes.344  Categorisation may, therefore, turn out to be no 
easy task. 
                                                   
341  Stirling (n 330) 39.  As a result, ‘this in turn highlights difficulties with diversity concepts and 
associated indices – in whatever discipline – that focus exclusively on subsets of these properties’; 
Stirling (n 224) 709–710. 
342  Stirling (n 330) 42–44. 
343  The decision on the appropriate categorisation is, however, influenced by the underpinning 
understanding of diversity.  If the prevalent view sees cultural diversity largely in the sense of cultural 
pluralism, arguably it would make more sense to look at the different genres rather than at the 
different songs. 
344  Farchy and Ranaivoson, The Influence of Funding by Advertising on the Diversity of Television Channels 
(2010) 5; see also Stirling (n 224) 710. 
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Once the system under review has been categorised, a second difficulty lies in 
finding appropriate indicators of disparity.  As much as the property of disparity is key 
to understanding diversity, it also limits any attempt to quantify it in an objective 
manner.  Stirling highlights that disparity is ‘intrinsically qualitative, subjective and 
context-dependent’345 and that, as a result, there might be different ways to interpret 
disparity which all depend on perspective.346  Ultimately, this requires a subjective 
assessment, which – due to its very nature of not being amenable to objective 
justification – is prone to criticism of being biased and arbitrary.347  In the context of 
the diversity of cultural expressions, Benhamou observes that  
‘while certain aspects of the diversity of cultural expressions readily lend 
themselves to quantitative analysis, others defy measurement; they can 
only be described and studied in qualitative terms.  Indicators can shed 
some light on the nature of yet others but only to a limited extent’.348 
The application of the Stirling model, therefore, raises certain difficulties.  
These, however, are much less a consequence of the focus on variety, balance and 
disparity than a result of the complexities of the notion of diversity itself.  Rather, on 
the contrary, Stirling’s criteria have the benefit of shedding light on these intricacies.349  
A number of studies have applied the model in the context of the diversity of cultural 
expressions.  It is to them that the discussion now turns with a particular emphasis on 
how they have met the highlighted challenges. 
                                                   
345  Stirling (n 330) 40. 
346  Stirling (n 224) 710–711.  He argues that while in some disciplines well-established criteria exist, 
‘disparities in science and technology reflect complex webs of relationships, and so cannot readily be 
reduced to discrete branching taxonomies’. 
347  See, for example, Moreau and Peltier, ‘Cultural Diversity in the Movie Industry: A Cross-National 
Study’ (2004) 17 The Journal of Media Economics 123, 127: ‘our position is that any attempt to 
quantitatively assess disparity between cultural products would be far too controversial and would 
only weaken the proposed tool’. 
348  Benhamou 3. 
349  Farchy and Ranaivoson, ‘An International Comparison of the Ability of Television Channels to 
Provide Diverse Programme. Testing the Stirling Model in France, Turkey and the United Kingdom’ 
in UNESCO Institute for Statistics (ed) Measuring the Diversity of Cultural Expressions: Applying the 
Stirling Model of Diversity in Culture (2011) 77, 89, 131. 
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9.1.2 The Application of Stirling’s Indicators to the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions 
After the adoption of the 2005 Convention, there was a growing awareness of the 
need to measure diversity.  Such measuring is envisaged in the Convention itself: 
Article 9 calls for information sharing and transparency, Article 14, inter alia, requires 
capacity-building through the exchange of information, experience and expertise, and 
Article 19 contains the parties’ specific agreement to exchange and share expertise 
concerning the data collection and statistics on the diversity of cultural expressions 
and best practices.  In order to advance the methods to measure the diversity of 
cultural expressions, the UNESCO’s culture sector and the UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics convened two expert meetings in 2007 and 2008.350  At the first meeting, 
Stirling’s methodology was accepted as the basic theoretical model and, at the second, it 
was agreed to commission research to test the application of that model in the realm 
of the diversity of cultural expressions.351 
Partly as a consequence of this endorsement, a number of studies have applied 
Stirling’s parameters to different areas of culture, such as book publishing,352 book 
                                                   
350  The UNESCO Institute for Statistics provides general information about its activities in this area at 
<http://www.uis.unesco.org/Culture/Pages/cultural-diversity.aspx>.  See also Flôres Jr., Expert Group 
Meeting on the Statistical Measurement of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions; Montreal, 27-28 September 
2007 (2007); UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Second Expert Group Meeting on the Statistical 
Measurement of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions; Benhamou.  An overview of existing worldwide 
attempts to collect information, data and best practices on the diversity of cultural expressions is 
provided by UNESCO, Collecting Information, Data, Best Practices: Existing Mechanisms and Tools 
(2010). 
351  Flôres Jr. 6; UNESCO Institute for Statistics 5. 
352  Benhamou and Peltier, ‘How Should Cultural Diversity Be Measured?’ (2007) 31 Journal of Cultural 
Economics 85. 
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translations,353 music recordings,354 cinema,355 TV programmes,356 and live 
performances.357 
As we have seen, the initial difficulty facing any application of the Stirling 
model to a particular context consists in finding an appropriate taxonomy.  In a first 
instance, this concerns the choice of category, which most obviously influences 
‘variety’, but also has a direct bearing on ‘balance’ and ‘disparity’.  In their study, 
Farchy and Ranaivoson chose to focus on the variable ‘genre’ in order to assess the 
diversity of TV programmes and developed a set of 27 different programme types into 
which all TV programmes could be apportioned.358  Most studies, however, found it 
insufficient to rely on only one aspect to describe the diversity in a particular area of 
culture; they tested the properties of variety, balance and disparity on several variables: 
 in the film industry, the variables ‘title’, ‘country of origin’ and 
‘language’ were analysed;359 
 for an analysis of the French publishing industry, the variables ‘title’, 
‘genre’ and ‘original language’ were addressed;360 and 
 the diversity of supplied music records was scrutinised by focussing on 
‘title’ (total number of available titles, number of novelties) and 
‘geographic origin’.361 
                                                   
353  Benhamou and others, Diversity Analysis in Cultural Economics: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations. 
354  Ranaivoson, Diversité de la production et structure de marché (2008); Ranaivoson, ‘The Determinants of 
the Diversity of Cultural Expressions’ (2010) 4 Observatorio (OBS*) Journal 215. 
355  Moreau and Peltier; Benhamou and Peltier, Application of the Stirling Model to Assess Diversity Using 
UIS Cinema Data. 
356  Farchy and Ranaivoson, The Influence of Funding; Farchy and Ranaivoson, An International 
Comparison. 
357  Study mentioned without further reference by Benhamou 13–14. 
358  Farchy and Ranaivoson, An International Comparison 89. 
359  Moreau and Peltier 126–127 examine the number of titles and the country of origin; Benhamou and 
Peltier (n 355) 19–22 include, in addition to these two, language.  Both studies explicitly discard the 
criterion of ‘genre’ for the intrinsically subjective choices that any categorisation based thereon 
would entail. 
360  Benhamou and Peltier (n 352) 90–93. 
361  Ranaivoson, Diversité, 196–198.  In reality, however, his analysis of the diversity of recorded music is 
much more elaborate as it also accommodates the diversity of consumed music records and the 
diversity of the producers; in total Ranaivoson uses 21 different indicators.  In a follow-up study the 
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Furthermore, the difficulty to measure disparity is also apparent in the 
applications of the Stirling model to cultural expressions.  While numerous indices are 
proposed to measure variety and balance, only a few attempts are made to measure 
disparity, if that property is addressed at all.362  Farchy and Ranaivoson select seven 
attributes to distinguish amongst the chosen categories of TV programmes and assign 
them values.363  In those other studies where the language of the cultural goods in 
question was an issue, the authors assessed disparity with the help of the Dyen matrix 
of linguistic distances, a method based on lexicographical considerations.364  Beyond 
this, proposed indicators of disparity are very coarse.  In relation to cinematographic 
diversity, it has been proposed to measure disparity by the similarity of a domestic 
yearly top ten list of feature films to the global top ten list.365  In an analysis of the 
diversity of the French publishing sector, disparity was expressed through the 
concentration of authors in bestseller lists; the more authors there were, the higher 
was the disparity.366 
So far, our discussion has only focussed on the diversity of cultural products 
themselves.  Yet, as we have seen, the notions of cultural diversity and diversity of 
cultural expressions have a very strong connotation in the sense of cultural pluralism 
and intercultural dialogue.  To equally take this dimension of diversity into account 
variables would have to be developed that allow for assumptions as to the extent to 
which cultural groups can assert their identity through cultural expressions.  This is, 
for example, recognised in the working definition of ‘cultural diversity’ of the 
                                                                                                                                                
statistical model was enlarged in order to also include social, economic and demographic conditions; 
see Ranaivoson, The Determinant.  In both instances, however, the category ‘genre’ is again 
explicitly excluded; for an explanation see Ranaivoson, Diversité, 183–189. 
362  Moreau and Peltier do not measure disparity.  Likewise, no attempt to address disparity in the 
product diversity of recorded music is made by Ranaivoson, Diversité, 190–191.  He does, however, 
use the percentage of records distributed by independent labels as an indicator of disparity when 
assessing the diversity of the producers of recorded music; ibid 195. 
363  Farchy and Ranaivoson, An International Comparison 91–94.  These attributes are: age; specificity; 
information; heritage; cost; risk; and story. 
364  Benhamou and Peltier (n 352) 92; Benhamou and others 3; Benhamou and Peltier (n 355) 19–21. 
365  Benhamou and Peltier (n 355) 17.  Note, however, that this index only measures the disparity of 
consumed films. 
366  Benhamou and Peltier (n 352) 92.  Again, this is only capable of measuring the consumed disparity; 
see above, n 365. 
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Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe compiled by the CoE and 
ERICarts.  Alongside the diversity of cultural content, the definition highlights ‘the 
pluralistic ethno-cultural or linguistic identity and origin of cultural creators, 
producers, distributors and audiences’.367  Devising an appropriate methodology for 
the measurement of this dimension of cultural diversity, however, falls outwith the 
remit of the Compendium project.  In the literature on the measuring of the diversity 
of cultural expressions, the pluralistic dimension has sometimes also been recognised.  
Thus, Benhamou highlights the fact that the diversity of cultural expressions is ‘also the 
diversity of men and women, of audiences and authors and all those actively involved 
in cultural life’.368  Small scale attempts to accommodate this aspect have sometimes 
been made when studies explicitly included indices to measure the diversity of the 
producers or distributers of the cultural goods in question.369  Yet, such a methodology 
would need to be further refined in order also to encompass the diversity of creators 
and their audience. 
Apart from these taxonomic intricacies, economic literature is mostly 
concerned with developing statistical methods and searches for indices and heuristics 
to appropriately measure diversity, which – for present purposes – is of little 
importance.  More interesting, however, are the general observations on the measuring 
of the diversity of cultural expressions that have emerged from this area of research; 
observations that are helpful for the understanding of diversity even beyond the realm 
of cultural economics.  As a first and most important result, it has been realised that, 
within cultural diversity, internal trade-offs exist.  This becomes apparent in those 
studies that test more than one variable against the properties of variety, balance and 
disparity.  In these cases, the authors observed that there is not necessarily harmony 
between these variables370 and that ‘diversity may increase in one dimension while 
                                                   
367  This working definition also raises an important additional dimension, notably ‘the diversity of 
actors which are responsible for or involved in decision-making and regulating in different fields of 
the arts, the media and heritage(s), particularly as regards funding artists and their works’; see 
<http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/cultural-diversity.php>. 
368  Benhamou 2. 
369  Ranaivoson, Diversité, 193–196; Benhamou and Peltier (n 355) 15–22. 
370  Ranaivoson, Diversité 242. 
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decreasing in another’.371  As a consequence, if a policy measure privileges only one 
dimension, this leads to ‘debatable results with respect to the state and the evolution 
of cultural diversity’.372 
A second insight that has emerged is that it is impossible to devise a single 
indicator that would be able to reliably describe the state of cultural diversity.  In this 
regard, Stirling himself speaks of the ‘futility of seeking to derive a single definitive 
diversity index’ to ‘measure diversity in some unconditional objective fashion’.373  The 
reasons for this judgment are numerous and transcend the complexities involved in 
aggregating the three properties in a statistically sound fashion.  The first explanation 
is profanely factual in nature in that there is simply not sufficient reliable data 
available that would allow for a thoroughly comprehensive assessment.  This is partly 
due to the difficulties in obtaining sufficient quantitative empirical data on the one 
hand and of developing sound qualitative methodologies for the measuring of 
disparity on the other.  More importantly, however, a single indicator is generally 
considered unhelpful because it would conceal the internal trade-offs of cultural 
diversity that may occur if the diversity of a cultural field is analysed under more than 
one perspective.  Whether there is an increase or decrease of diversity in these finer 
layers could not be expressed by a general index.374  A more finely tuned set of 
indicators is therefore needed. 
Overall, research on the measuring of the diversity of cultural expressions 
generally concludes that while statistical indicators would not be able to describe 
cultural landscapes in their entirety, they are nevertheless indispensible to judge the 
suitability and effectiveness of political measures.375  In addition, such indicators also 
allow for international comparisons of cultural diversity, but must never be interpreted 
                                                   
371  Benhamou and Peltier (n 352) 104. 
372  Ibid. 
373  Stirling (n 224) 711. 
374  Benhamou 9: ‘a synoptic indicator cannot summarize all dimensions of diversity, especially as it is 
not possible to increase the quantity of all aspects of diversity simultaneously’. 
375  Ibid 3, 14. 
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in a mechanical fashion.  Rather, ‘context is essential to understanding the scope of 
diversity.  Assessing criteria alone does not always convey the reality of a situation’.376 
9.2 Literature on Musical Diversity beyond the Stirling Model 
In parallel to the work achieved on the application of the concept of diversity as the 
interplay of variety, balance and disparity to cultural expressions, other areas of 
research have explored the measuring of, more specifically, musical diversity without 
resorting to the Stirling model.  The question has mainly been addressed by economic 
on the one and musicological literature on the other hand.  Finally, we present the 
initiatives of the French Observatoire de la musique. 
Starting in the mid-1970s, one stream of academic debate has sought to 
establish whether there was a relationship between market concentration and musical 
diversity.  Different studies yielded different results.  Some asserted that there was an 
inverse relationship between concentration and diversity with the effect that the more 
the ownership of the record industry was concentrated, the lesser was the musical 
diversity.377  Others suggested that even in oligopolistic markets music diversity could 
be high and explained this by the organisational strategy of the international major 
music companies to co-opt independent producers and labels in order to incorporate 
new artists and styles at a quick pace.378  Then again, it was asserted that maximum 
diversity resulted from a moderately concentrated market structure.379 
                                                   
376  Benhamou and Peltier (n 355) 43–44.  In this particular study, a strong diversity of feature films 
within a country correlated to a low degree of openness to diverse foreign content. 
377  Peterson and Berger, ‘Cycles in Symbol Production: The Case of Popular Music’ (1975) 40 American 
Sociological Review 158; Peterson and Berger, ‘Measuring Industry Concentration, Diversity, and 
Innovation in Popular Music’ (1996) 61 American Sociological Review 175.  For the US recording 
industry between 1974 and 1980 the same result has been evinced by the work of Rothenbuhler and 
Dimmick, ‘Popular Music’ (1982) 32 Journal of Communication 143.  The general assumption of an 
inverse relationship is also shared by Christianen, ‘Cycles in Symbol Production? A New Model to 
Explain Concentration, Diversity and Innovation in the Music Industry’ (1995) 14 Popular Music 
55, 89–92, who, in addition, emphasises that ‘demand controls the size and the nature of the supply 
of music’ (p 89).  See also Ross, ‘Cycles in Symbol Production Research: Foundations, Applications, 
and Future Directions’ (2005) 28 Popular Music and Society 473, who argues that the early methods 
and measures must be amended to be able to cope with the modern recorded music industry. 
378  Lopes, ‘Innovation and Diversity in the Popular Music Industry, 1969 to 1990’ (1992) 57 American 
 
 - 133 - 
The studies employ differing variables to measure musical diversity.380  Peterson 
and Berger, for example, use two criteria: first, the share between new and established 
artists in the number of different top 10 and number one singles in each year between 
1948 and 1973 and, second, the lyrical content of the songs.381  Lopes enhances this 
methodological framework by extending the focus to albums.  He considers, in 
addition to the number of top ten and number one hits, the percentage of new artists 
in the top 100 album and single charts between 1969 and 1990.382 
Anderson and others look at the number one hit singles between 1940 and 1977 
and use the categories of musical genre, artist type and lyrical content as descriptors.383  
The musical genre is also taken up as the relevant indicator by Christianen, who 
analyses how the total number of albums released in The Netherlands from 1975 to 
1992 spread over 27 musical genres and, in addition, identifies the respective 
percentages of new and debut albums.384 
In contrast to these approaches, Alexander focuses on the particular 
characteristics of each song.  For the period from 1955 to 1988, he looks at 30 top 40 
songs per year and analyses them, based on their sheet notation, according to the 
criteria time, meter, form, accent, harmonic structure and melody.385  Equally, looking 
                                                                                                                                                
Sociological Review 56; Burnett, ‘The Implications of Ownership Changes on Concentration and 
Diversity in the Phonogram Industry’ (1992) 19 Communication Research 749 finds that the 
negative market concentration and diversity has broken down since the 1980s.  Dowd, Musical 
Diversity and the U.S. Mainstream Recording Market, 1955 - 1990 (2000) and ‘Concentration and 
Diversity Revisited: Production Logics and the U.S. Mainstream Recording Market, 1940-1990’ 
(2004) 82 Social Forces 1411 argues that musical diversity rose because a decentralised production 
strategy ‘allowed majors to co-opt the raw prototypes of emergent styles’ and thus to ‘commodify 
musical genres that were once on the periphery of the market’ (p 1445). 
379  Alexander, ‘Entropy and Popular Culture: Product Diversity in the Popular Music Recording 
Industry’ (1996) 61 American Sociological Review 171, 171. 
380  In all cases, the musical diversity is related to the market concentration in the recording industry. 
381  Peterson and Berger 163–164; Rothenbuhler and Dimmick equally use the number of top ten and 
number one hits as indicators of diversity for the period of 1974-1980. 
382  Lopes 57–59. 
383  Anderson and others, ‘Hit Record Trends, 1940-1977’ (1980) 30 Journal of Communication 31, 31. 
384  Christianen 57–58.  The difficulty that musical genres are prone to change and therefore do not 
lend themselves to long-term observations has been pointed out by Hesmondhalgh, The Cultural 
Industries (2nd edn, 2007) 273: ‘Genres mutate, hybridise, disappear and appear so rapidly that no 
genre classification would work over any historical period greater than three or four years’. 
385  Alexander 172.  The qualitative measurement of each attribute, however, is limited as he treats these 
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at the characteristics of songs, Dowd chooses a similar, yet more developed approach 
when examining a sample of 110 number one songs from the period of 1955 to 1990.  
Having transcribed the original recordings into written music, he assesses each song in 
terms of its melodic structure, its rhythmic structure, its chordal structure, its key 
structure and its verse structure.386  This allows him to determine a ‘dissimilarity score’ 
for each song that indicates the extent to which that song is dissimilar from other 
songs in the same period.387 
Two observations emerge from the review of the existing economic literature 
on market concentration and musical diversity.  A first critique could be formulated 
with regard to the choice of samples used.  In fact, all studies solely rely on hit 
recordings and disregard less successful songs.388  The obvious explanation for this 
focus is the fact that data on the bestselling titles can be derived quite easily from 
widely available music charts, whereas empirical information on recorded music in its 
entirety does either not exist or is only accessible with much more difficulty.  Some 
authors, however, have also explained the choice of bestselling titles in methodological 
terms.  The argument would then be that hit recordings represent a ‘gold standard’ 
that is influential for ‘the range of and types of musical elements that will be pursued 
in subsequent recordings’.389  Besides the fact that there are ‘cult artists’ that are highly 
influential although they are not commercially successful on the mass market,390 such a 
stress on mainstream recordings does no justice to the aspect of cultural pluralism that 
underpins the concept of the diversity of cultural expressions, as it completely 
disregards the ability of minorities to express their identity through the creation and 
consumption of music.  As a further consequence of relying on data from hit lists, 
                                                                                                                                                
attributes as binary variables.  For example, if the traditional, popular ABACB form was used, this 
was assigned a 0 while for all other forms the variable was assigned a value of 1 (p 172). 
386  Dowd, Musical Diversity 30–32.  In contrast to Alexander, he uses continuous variables.  To assess 
the melody he uses 5 indices, for rhythm 12, for the chordal structure 8, for the key structure 2 and 
for the verse structure 2. 
387  In a follow-up study, Dowd also relies on the share of new performers; Dowd, Concentration and 
Diversity Revisited, 1448. 
388  The shortcomings of only looking at the bestselling titles have been described by Ranaivoson, 
Diversité, 51–52. 
389  Dowd, Musical Diversity, 20. 
390  Ranaivoson, Diversité, 52. 
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most studies only analyse the diversity of the music that is consumed and neglect the 
diversity of the available supply.391 
A second point that deserves attention regards the question of how the 
economic literature has dealt with the particular problems that have become apparent 
in the application of the Stirling model to cultural expressions.392  When it comes to 
categorisation, the large majority of studies choose to analyse single songs rather than 
musical genres.  Moreover, the difficulty to accommodate what Stirling calls ‘disparity’ 
is also perceptible here; in fact, Dowd is the only author who offers an appropriate 
methodology in this regard.393 
Beyond the work done in cultural economics, a second stream of research on 
musical diversity, sparked by the 2005 Convention, comes from authors in the 
musicological field.  In 2006, the International Music Council completed a study 
commissioned by UNESCO on the protection and promotion of musical diversity.  
While musical diversity was seen as part of cultural diversity, as promulgated by the 
2005 Convention,394 there was no concerted effort amongst the researchers involved to 
develop a common definition and interpretation of the term ‘musical diversity’.  
Rather, as the principal investigator observes, ‘there seems to be a tacit agreement, 
                                                   
391  The sole exception to this trend is Christanen’s study, which is based on data of all albums released; 
see Christianen 58. 
392  Most studies address one or two of the three properties of variety, balance and disparity; Ranaivoson, 
Diversité, 44–55 offers a detailed account from the perspective of the Stirling model. 
393  Note that Alexander also analyses the characteristics of songs.  These, however, are only expressed by 
two different possible values; see n 385.  What is more, Ranaivoson shows that the statistical method 
used fails to express disparity; Ranaivoson, Diversité, 48. 
394  International Music Council, The Protection and Promotion of Musical Diversity (2006) 9.  That musical 
diversity was to be deduced from the bigger concept of diversity of cultural expressions is also 
obvious from the terms of reference of the study.  They called for an analysis of ‘cultural experiences 
marked by musical diversity, which may serve as models of integration in the context of a space for 
dialogue between the different components of a particular society while encouraging exchanges with 
the rest of the world’.  In particular, the study was to analyse: the complementarity or reciprocity 
between the protection of musical diversity and that of human rights; the links between musical 
diversity, sustainable development and peace; the standards regulating musical diversity; the 
tendency to favour a uniform and non-pluralistic interpretation of the notion of identity hindering 
the manifold and free expression of cultural diversity; the manner in which diversity is addressed by 
cultural actors and expressed in various forms of musical creation, and its relationship to identity; 
the obstacles or challenges to be overcome in order to ensure better protection and promotion of 
musical diversity; and good practices and actions that need to be strengthened and widely practiced 
in this field. 
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roughly around diversity as a diversity of traditions or genres’.395  In general, the study 
was less concerned with the measuring of diversity than with providing examples of 
best practices from all over the world. 
This report, however, motivated researchers at the University of Music and 
Performing Arts Vienna to work on an Austrian Report on Musical Diversity.  While 
the final report has not yet been delivered, the project is to analyse musical diversity in 
terms of so-called ‘stylistic fields’, a notion related to those of musical genres.396  The 
development of these stylistic fields is to be depicted along the variables ‘share in 
musical life’ (increase / decrease), ‘social status’ (increase / decrease of the reputation 
of the relevant stylistic field in society), ‘aesthetic prototypes’ (changes, preservation 
and renewal of cultural expressions) and ‘configuration’ (emergence of new stylistic 
fields).  From this basis, the state of the promotion and protection in Austria is to be 
examined.397  While the ‘share in musical life’ will be measured quantitatively through 
an assessment of the top 75 singles in Austria in each year, the question of ‘aesthetic 
prototypes’ will be analysed in qualitative terms.398  This research is promising in 
several regards.  First, the notion of stylistic fields is more than the musical genre and 
also incorporates actors and audiences, thus possibly contains an element to describe 
the pluralistic aspect.  Second, the methodology is conscious of the fact that the 
chosen categorisation might evolve over time, which takes into account the ever-
changing nature of culture and might serve as an indicator of intercultural 
enrichment.  While it still remains to be seen whether the Austrian Report on Musical 
Diversity will hold its promises, these two points could prove useful for further 
research. 
                                                   
395  Ibid. 
396  These stylistic fields are intended to describe more than simply musical genres in that they 
encompass the artistic scene that is associated with these genres, such as relevant institutions, actors 
and audiences.  Six such stylistic fields are distinguished: electronic dance music, jazz & improvised 
music, classical & contemporary music, rock & pop music, Schlager & folkloristic popular music, 
folk & world music; see Huber and Leitich, Forschungsprojekt „Musical Diversity/Musikalische Vielfalt“, 
8. 
397  This analysis is to be guided by the terms of reference that were the basis for the 2006 International 
Music Council report (above, n 394); see Huber and Leitich (n 396) 20–23. 
398  Ibid 24.  Surprisingly, the quantitative analysis is only to take account of albums with references to 
Austria.  This approach seems to neglect the aspect of openness and to limit that of intercultural 
dialogue.  As to the qualitative assessment, no further details on methodology are provided. 
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Finally, another noteworthy contribution to the research into musical diversity 
comes from the Paris based Observatoire de la musique which, since 2003, has compiled 
annual reports on musical diversity on French radios.399  It does not have a particular 
focus either on the interaction of diversity and market structure or the element of 
cultural pluralism.  Rather, the institution was born out of the will of the music 
industry to be able to measure musical programming in the media and to stimulate 
dialogue between the industry and public institutions.400  What distinguishes the work 
of the Observatory from the other approaches is the fact that it is able to rely on a 
broad pool of empirical data; in fact, an associated private company automatically 
monitors radio stations that cover 92.5 % of the total audience of music stations on a 
24/7 basis.401  This has allowed the Observatory to develop a comprehensive 
methodology that enables a more robust and thorough measuring of musical diversity.  
Currently, musical diversity on French radio is analysed according to the following 
criteria: 
 number of different titles (share of French language titles, share of 
international titles, share of instrumental titles); 
 number of different artists (share of French language artists); 
 overall number of played songs and the respective reach of audience 
according to musical genres (8 genres are distinguished: French 
mainstream, international mainstream, pop / rock, groove, dance, rap, 
reggae / world and jazz / blues / classic); 
 share of new titles in the overall broadcasting; 
                                                   
399  Since 2009, the Observatoire de la musique also compiles annual reports on indicators of musical 
diversity in television, see Nicolas, Indicateurs de la diversité musicale dans le paysage audiovisuel (2011).  
Due to their less refined methodology, these are not specifically treated here.  See on these activities 
in general Ranaivoson, ‘Accessing the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.  The French Observatory of 
Music Diversity of Television’ in Sekhar and Steinkamp (eds) Mapping Cultural Diversity - Good 
Practices from around the Globe (2010), who highlights that this area is funded entirely by public money 
which allows the Observatoire neutrality and the accommodation of a plurality of views. 
400  The analysis of the data, for example, is overseen by both representatives of the music industry and 
the relevant public institutions; see Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel, Installation de l'Observatoire de 
la diversité musicale en télévision (2009) 1. 
401  Nicolas, Indicateurs de la diversité musicale dans le paysage radiophonique (2011) 4–5. 
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 distribution of new titles by label; 
 share of the top 40 hits in the overall broadcasting of music; 
 average weekly rotation of a title; 
 share of titles played more than 400 / 200 / 100 times in the total 
number of songs and the overall broadcasting; 
 share of new entrants to regular playlists in the overall broadcasting; 
 classification of radio stations by number of times they were the first to 
broadcast a song / include it in the rotation / include it in the heavy 
rotation; 
 classification of radio stations by degree of exclusivity (being the only 
station playing a particular song). 
The Observatory thus surmounts some of the obstacles that the research on 
musical diversity and market concentration has encountered.  Notably, the analysis 
comprises all music that is broadcast and not just a sample of popular hits.  Due to the 
extensive data available, it would appear that the annual reports provide an accurate 
image of variety and balance in radio music.  The already familiar difficulties, however, 
remain.  The first problem is the subjectivity of applying any categorisation.  One 
might, for example, ask why only three categories are used for the variable ‘language’ 
(French, international, instrumental)402 or just why these particular eight categories are 
used to assess the variable ‘genre’.  As a second point, no attempt is made to measure 
or explain the disparity between different categories; in this regard, even exhaustive 
empirical data does not help, as this would necessitate a qualitative assessment.  
Accordingly, there is no set definition of musical diversity. 
Furthermore, although some data about the size of the radio audience is 
available, the methodology does not aim to incorporate the broader pluralistic 
                                                   
402  A pertinent critique, albeit voiced in the context of the Observatory’s reports on musical diversity on 
television, is formulated by Ranaivoson, Accessing the Diversity, 118: ‘it is not clear why there are 
only three categories in terms of the language used for the song … There are very different songs 
within the category “International” and some of them might clearly add in terms of diversity if they 
correspond to languages and cultures rarely visible on French television’. 
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dimension.  Rather, the Observatory only analyses musical diversity as a factual 
statement of the diversity of the songs that are played; the degree to which this 
diversity matches the desire of cultural groups to express their identity remains 
unknown. 
Admittedly, any call for a refined methodology to measure disparity or the state 
of pluralism would go beyond the actual remit of the Observatory.  The point 
illustrates, however, that even under almost perfect empirical conditions the 
measuring of musical diversity in all its elements remains a difficult if not illusionary 
task.  This is well illustrated by Dowd’s research, which appears to be the most refined 
approach to assess ‘disparity’ in music so far.  It shows that any sound qualitative 
assessment requires a lot of effort; a disproportionate amount of effort, as some argue: 
‘it may be that the very concept of musical diversity within a particular nation over an 
extended time is simply not measurable quantifiably, without impossible resources of 
time and energy’.403 
9.3 Assessment 
Having reviewed the existing literature on the measuring of the diversity of cultural 
expressions and, more precisely, music, the discussion now aims to show the extent to 
which the findings may help develop our argument.  In a first step, we determine what 
would be necessary to measure the diversity in online music and whether or not such 
an enterprise is feasible.  In the second part of this section, we determine how else the 
findings can usefully feed into our task of determining whether the framework for the 
licensing of authors’ rights in music promotes the diversity of online music. 
Obstacles to Measuring the Diversity in Online Music 
If the diversity of online music is understood as a subset of the broader 
concepts of cultural diversity and diversity of cultural expressions, measuring it is 
certainly not an easy endeavour.  We do not aim here to provide for a detailed 
                                                   
403  Hesmondhalgh 274. 
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methodology; not only do we lack the necessary expertise in statistical economics but 
this would also take us too far away from our main concern, the bearing that the 
licensing of authors’ rights has on the diversity of online music. 
This notwithstanding, it is useful to conceptualise the broad lines along which 
a method to measure the diversity of online music should be constructed; this allows 
us to apply the most important insight gained from the research of the measuring of 
diversity to the diversity of online music, the subject of our analysis.  In order to do 
this, we use the diversity model developed by Stirling as a conceptual starting point. 
Just like the bigger concept of cultural diversity, the diversity of online music 
has a factual as well as normative dimension.  In a factual sense, it describes the 
diversity of the music that is available online; an aspect that, borrowing from economic 
literature, could be called product diversity.  The normative side, however, contains an 
ideological statement in that such diversity is not to be fostered as an end it itself but 
in such a way that all groups in society be able to express their cultural identity.  In 
order to measure the diversity in online music appropriately, it is therefore not 
sufficient to solely determine the factual diversity of online music, but also the degree 
to which online music reflects cultural pluralism must equally be established.  The 
methodological framework must, therefore, find a way to correlate the factual diversity 
of online music with this aspect of cultural pluralism. 
As far as the factual diversity is concerned, the first question that one needs to 
answer is that of the appropriate categorisation.  In the context of music, two main 
variables have been proposed: the particular songs or the musical genres they form.  
Although from a strictly factual point of view both criteria appear equally well suited, 
the normative aspect of cultural pluralism rather argues in favour of musical genres.  
Obviously, to devise a taxonomy of musical genres available online would be 
challenging.  Whatever the categories finally chosen, the methodology should be 
conscious of the evolving nature of culture and, thus, the fact that, if diversity in 
online music were to be measured over a longer period of time, it would be necessary 
to adjust the categories. 
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Having successfully steered around the question of categorisation, the next 
difficulty would lie in developing quantitative and qualitative indicators to describe the 
variety, the balance and the disparity of online music.  In comparison with the case of 
music on French radio, it would be considerably more difficult to obtain suitable date.  
The distribution of recorded music through the Internet is non-linear in that the 
consumer initiates it; that impedes any effort to monitor such distribution.  In 
addition, the consumer is, unlike the situation when music is broadcast on the radio, 
clearly identifiable, which may mean that steps would have to be taken to guarantee 
the protection of the consumers’ personal data.  Moreover, even where data could be 
obtained through monitoring techniques, this would only be revealing in relation to 
the diversity of online music that is actually consumed.  If one wanted to focus on, or 
at least also include the supplied diversity of online music, relevant data could only be 
sourced from the providers of online music services themselves, who, for business 
reasons, might be reluctant to reveal information about the breadth of their offerings. 
But even if a sound quantitative analysis could be carried out, it would still be 
necessary to develop a qualitative strategy to measure the disparity between the 
different musical genres.  Inspired by Dowd’s methodology, it is suggested that one 
should compare certain musical properties of the different genres in order to assess the 
disparity between them.  An additional factor of the analysis should equally be the 
disparity of the lyrics.  Lacking an extensive qualitative assessment such as Dowd’s, 
some studies have used more coarse criteria such as the number of different 
performers on a bestseller list or the share of new performers.  Perhaps such broad 
criteria could offer an approximation to disparity.  It would appear, however, that 
instead of, or at least in addition to, focussing on performers, one should rather pay 
attention to the authors of the songs.  Arguably, it is the musical author who gives the 
songs their fundamental musical characteristics, which performers may only change in 
nuances through their interpretation.  This is not to say that performers may not 
express their cultural identity through their performances, yet any such expression is 
limited by the boundaries established by the author. 
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If we assume that it was possible to measure the product diversity of online 
music, one would still be faced with the problem as to how the normative side of 
diversity in online music, the element of intercultural pluralism, could be assessed and 
correlated with that factual state of diversity.  A suitable methodology would have to 
be newly developed, as research on that point is quasi non-existent.  While studies on 
the measuring of cultural diversity have sometimes acknowledged that it would be 
important to include the diversity of authors and audiences, no attempts have been 
made to put this into practice.404  Moreover, it seems to us that what would be 
required in order to accommodate the pluralistic aspect is, in fact, not entirely the 
same as to assess the diversity of creators and audiences.  More specifically, it would 
not be sufficient to establish the extent to which cultural groups within a certain 
territory are different from each other or what their respective size is, thus questions of 
disparity and balance.  The reason that these aspects are of only secondary importance 
lies in the understanding of cultural pluralism itself that underpins the 2005 
Convention.  In fact, what Article 7 of the 2005 Convention requires to be promoted 
is the ability of all groups to express their cultural identity.  It does not, as an end in 
itself, call for a given society to become more culturally pluralistic than it currently is 
but rather that the different existing groups may assert their cultural identity.405  
Hence, the only property of real significance in this regard is the variety of cultural 
groups.  In the context of the diversity of online music, this would mean that, in a first 
step, one would have to establish how many different cultural groups there are in a 
given society that would like to express their identity through music.  Second, this 
would have to be compared to the factual diversity of online music with a view to 
being able to answer the following questions: are the musical expressions of all groups 
that would like to express their identity through music available for online 
                                                   
404  Some studies have addressed the diversity of producers; see above, n 369.  For an assessment of the 
pluralistic element, such approaches, however, can only add a supplemental element once the ability 
of groups to express their culture has been characterised.  One could then ask whether the diversity 
of producers is an impediment to the distribution of the diverse music that has been created.  Put 
differently, the question would then be whether a particular structure of record companies has a 
bearing on how much of the diverse created musical expressions are available as recorded music. 
405  If a society became more culturally pluralistic because of enhanced intercultural exchange between 
the different groups, this, however, would certainly be a welcomed by-product. 
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distribution?  Can all those who would like to access these expressions do so?  
Whether this pluralistic element can, in reality, be measured in any reliable way is 
open for debate.  Any taxonomy of cultural groups in a given society would raise 
difficult questions: what defines a cultural group?  How can one take into account that 
cultural affiliations are dynamic and open to change? 
If one reflects upon this still incomplete approximation of an ideal model to 
measure the diversity or online music, it becomes obvious that it would be a Herculean 
task to put the measuring of the diversity of online music into practice and certainly 
one that could, and indeed should not be endeavoured in this study. 
Contribution of the Economic Literature on Diversity to Assessing Whether the EU Legal 
Framework Promotes Diversity in Online Music 
While it would be impossible for our study to fully develop a concept to measure the 
diversity of online music, it is, however, useful to determine where, in the further 
analysis of whether specific elements in the framework for music licensing promote 
diversity in online music, the findings of the literature on the measuring of diversity 
can make a helpful contribution.  We will first look at the cultural functions of 
collecting societies before analysing the recent changes in the licensing mechanisms 
induced by EU intervention.   
In this regard, the criteria and findings derived from the study of the 
measuring of cultural diversity would be directly relevant if they helped us in the 
assessment of whether or not particular elements of the licensing system promote the 
diversity in online music.  Any statistical measurement to that effect, however, would 
prove to be very difficult.  In the first place, to measure the existing state of musical 
diversity in a given territory alone appears, as we have already established in the 
preceding section, to be a nearly impossible task.  Any approach that tried to devise a 
taxonomy of cultural groups and the respective musical genres that mirror their 
cultural identity would be too controversial, any sound development of qualitative 
criteria for disparity would be too resource-intensive, and, finally, any sound empirical 
quantitative data on the creation of music would be too scarce.   
 - 144 - 
Assuming for a moment that these difficulties could be overcome, one would 
need to be cautious as to how to interpret the results of any such measurement.  As 
regards the cultural functions of collecting societies, one approach could be to 
compare the given state of musical diversity under the cultural intervention of 
collecting societies to the state of musical diversity that would exist if there were no 
such involvement.  A second approach with regard to the collecting societies’ cultural 
functions could be to compare the given state of musical diversity in a country where 
the local collecting society fulfils cultural functions with that of a country where such 
intervention is absent; a comparison between the UK and Germany, for example, 
could be appropriate.  Arguably, however, both approaches could not deliver reliable 
results.  The first case is a hypothetical question that could only be answered by 
making numerous assumptions.  But the flaw in both types of comparison is even at a 
more fundamental level; notably, one must be aware of the fact that collecting 
societies’ cultural functions are only one way to promote musical diversity.  Even in 
countries where collecting societies deploy such cultural activities, these only represent 
one of numerous cultural policies pursued by state and private actors alike in an 
attempt to stimulate creativity and diversity.  This means that even if musical diversity 
in a given territory is high this can have many reasons – a monocausal effect, in any 
case, could not be attributed to the collecting societies’ cultural functions.  The same 
caveat would apply to any attempt to compare the musical diversity in the EU before 
and after EU intervention.  An exact statistical measurement of the efficiency of the 
collecting societies’ cultural functions or the EU interventions thus appears 
impossible.   
This notwithstanding, less ambitious approaches may hold better promises.  
Notably, it will be useful to scrutinise their modi operandi; for only if the cultural 
functions or the EU interventions are designed in a way that is conducive to the 
promotion of cultural diversity, may there be any such effect at all.  Put differently, our 
analysis of the collecting societies’ cultural functions and the EU’s past intervention 
will ask whether they are appropriate for attaining the objective of promoting musical 
diversity.  For this test of appropriateness, the Stirling model and the existing attempts 
to quantify musical diversity provide helpful guidelines. 
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Part 4:  The Contributions of Authors’ Societies’ Cultural Functions to 
the Diversity of Online Music 
This part of the thesis seeks to assess the contributions of collecting societies to the 
diversity in online music and examines, more specifically, the extent to which, if any, 
collecting societies, in exercising their cultural functions, promote diversity in online 
music.  In other words: how well do these activities sit with the parameters that our 
interpretation of TFEU Article 167(4) in light of the 2005 UNESCO Convention on 
the Diversity of Cultural Expressions has brought to the fore?  
In asking this question, we do not overlook that the addressees of TFEU 
Article 167(4) are the EU institutions.  Clearly, the provision does not bind collecting 
societies; as private associations of authors they remain free to pursue different cultural 
aims.  Even without any legal obligation it may, however, still have important political 
and practical ramifications whether or not collecting societies’ cultural activities 
promote the diversity of online music.  In fact, collecting societies would be well-
advised to align their cultural schemes with the notion of cultural diversity under EU 
law.  After all, if they did, an argument in their favour could be made, considering that 
they usually spend considerable parts of the receipts generated by the online 
exploitation of music to fund their cultural activities.  One could thus argue that the 
role of collecting societies in the online exploitation of authors’ rights must be 
reinforced so that their online receipts continue to flow and, as a further consequence, 
their activities towards the promotion of diversity of online music can be carried on.  
Therefore, if the collecting societies’ activities indeed supported diversity in online 
music, this would advocate for EU regulation to strengthen the collective management 
of copyright instead of dismantling it. 
In that case, TFEU Article 167(4) interpreted in light of Article 7(2) of the 
2005 Convention could even provide a legal basis for the EU to consolidate the 
collective management of authors’ rights in the online realm: according to the latter 
provision, a party to the 2005 Convention may not only promote the diversity of 
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cultural expressions by creating an enabling environment itself but also, in a more 
indirect way, by supporting cultural communities or organisations to act as 
intermediaries in facilitating the creation of diverse cultural expressions.406  Since there 
is no reason why collecting societies should not qualify as intermediaries in the sense 
of Article 7(2) of the 2005 Convention, the EU could implement the 2005 
Convention by delegating to them the promotion of diversity of online music; 
provided, however, that their cultural schemes indeed promoted the diversity of 
cultural expressions.  From this perspective, the analysis of collecting societies’ cultural 
functions could also make a useful contribution to the larger debate on the 
appropriate EU legal framework to facilitate multi-territorial licensing. 
Chapter 10.2 assesses the contribution of collecting societies’ cultural functions 
to the diversity of online music through a detailed analysis using as an example what 
German collecting society GEMA regards itself as its cultural activities.  In a first step, 
however, chapter 10 offers a short introduction to the role and functions of collecting 
societies. 
                                                   
406  See above at 7.2.2, on page 92. 
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10 Introduction to the Collective Management of Authors’ Rights 
through Collecting Societies 
The main actors in the system of collective rights management are collecting societies 
who authors entrust with the (typically exclusive) administration of their rights.  Their 
main rationale is economic in nature, yet they also advocate authors’ rights more 
broadly.  In order to emphasis the latter aspects of their work, they are often also 
referred to as authors’ (rights) societies.407  
10.1 Rationale and Functions of Collecting Societies 
10.1.1 The Economic Rationale of Collecting Societies 
The primary function of collecting societies is of economic nature: they negotiate with 
and license users against appropriate remuneration on the basis of a tariff system and 
equitable conditions.  Societies are also charged with monitoring the uses, collecting 
the remuneration, and distributing it among the owners of rights.408 
Over the last more than 150 years,409 the formula to the enormous success of 
collective rights management has been its ability to overcome market failure.  Due to 
the sheer number of market participants on the sides of both right holders and users, 
transaction costs associated with identifying potential licensing partners, negotiating 
licences and monitoring uses would be prohibitively high if rights were administered 
on an individual basis.410  An illustrative case in point is the mass use of copyrighted 
                                                   
407  The two terms are used synonymously throughout this thesis.  The more specific notions of 
performing rights societies and mechanical rights societies are equally used. 
408  Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (2002) 17; Gervais, Collective Management 
of Copyright and Related Rights (2nd edn, 2010) 6–10. 
409  Ficsor, Collective Management, 18–19. 
410  See Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen, ‘Ökonomische Funktionen von 
Verwertungsgesellschaften - Kollektive Wahrnehmung im Lichte von Transaktionskosten- und 
Informationsökonomik’ [2007] Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil 
461, 469–472 for a detailed analysis of the transaction cost argument. 
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works, in particular where such works, individually, are of only small value.  By using 
economies of scale and scope, collecting societies reduce the costs of copyright 
administration and thus allow for the development of an otherwise non-existing 
market.411  Without acting collectively, the countless mass of only averagely successful 
right holders could not monetise their rights.  Commercial users, on the other hand, 
appreciate the one-stop shop solution that copyright collectives traditionally offer.  
Collective rights management is therefore beneficial for both the holders as well as the 
users of copyrighted material.  When right holders assign their rights to collecting 
societies they voluntarily restrict the broad scope of the individual exclusivity rights 
that they enjoy by law and accept that their administration is henceforth governed by 
established principles that apply to all works managed by a society and that the 
individual author may influence only indirectly through the relevant governing bodies 
of the society.  Thus, by collectivising the exercise of their rights, authors accept to give 
up immediate control over any further use of their works.412  In this sense, one may say 
that, although copyright offers them protection through property rules, they choose to 
contract into liability rules.413 
10.1.2 Strengthening the Authors’ Voice through Collectivisation  
In addition to their economic role, collecting societies more generally act as advocates 
for their members’ interests.  In this regard, their activities resemble those of trade 
unions or writers’ guilds and are motivated by cultural or social aims.414   
                                                   
411  Besen and others, ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives’ (1992) 78 Virginia Law Review 
383, 383; Handke and Towse, ‘Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies’ (2007) 38 International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 937, 938–940. 
412  For a more detailed discussion of the various elements of collectivisation in the German context, see 
Hauptmann, Die Vergesellschaftung des Urheberrechts: Das ausschließliche Recht, Entindividualisierung und 
Vergesellschaftung bei Wahrnehmung durch Verwertungsgesellschaften am Beispiel der GEMA und der VG 
Wort (1994) 57–64. 
413  Merges, ‘Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organizations’ (1996) 84 California Law Review 1293, 1302–1303; Schovsbo, The Necessity to 
Collectivize Copyright - and Dangers Thereof (2010) 169.  Both provide more detailed definition of the 
associated concepts. 
414  Schovsbo 171. 
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One important goal is the safeguarding and strengthening of the authors’ 
standing as a group within society, in particular by promoting a high level of 
remuneration for authors.  In negotiations, only collecting societies have the necessary 
bargaining power to confront powerful commercial users at arm’s length and secure 
appropriate royalties.  At a more general level, collecting societies make sure that the 
domestic and/or European legislator hears the voice of authors.  Finally, the mere 
existence of collecting societies can equally be seen as a safeguard of the authors’ 
interests as it creates royalties that could not be generated on an individual basis.415 
10.1.3 Built-in Features of Mutual Solidarity 
Certain elements of solidarity permeate collective rights management with the aim of 
creating more equity amongst their members.  These features incorporate elements 
that redistribute, to a certain extent, the benefits that authors derive from copyright. 
Blanket Licensing 
In particular, the performing rights of their members are typically licensed to 
commercial users by authors’ societies by way of blanket licences that encompass a 
society’s entire repertoire.  Commercial users appreciate such licences as it offers them 
the highest possible degree of choice, flexibility and legal certainty.416  A radio station, 
for example, does not need to determine in advance which songs it will broadcast.  
Moreover, blanket licences replace a bundle of individual licences which otherwise 
would have to be concluded in relation to each musical work to be used.  This reduces 
transaction costs and is thus advantageous for both right holders and commercial 
users. 
Beyond these general characteristics, blanket licensing also incorporates an 
element of solidarity amongst right holders.  In the eyes of commercial users, some 
musical works will be more valuable than others.  If individual licences had to be 
                                                   
415  Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Collecting Society and Cultural Diversity in the 
Music Sector (2009) 17. 
416  Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA, 141. 
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concluded, the fees for much-demanded works would be high and those for little 
demanded works low.  For blanket licences, however, commercial users pay a lump 
sum, based on cooperative tariffs.  Setting the rates for such blanket licence 
cooperatively means that a user pays the same tariff irrespective of the popularity of 
individual works within the repertoire.  This results in a form of redistribution from 
successful to less successful members.417   
Collective Allocation 
Another important aspect that benefits creators of less demanded repertoire is the way 
in which the sums for online uses of music are allocated.  An individual allocation 
means that royalties are strictly allocated according to the level of use of works.  
Collective allocation, however, means that generalisations are made, for example, that 
a certain minimum share of the royalties is allocated to every work.  Such 
generalisations benefit the creators of less demanded repertoire. 
The Pooling of Administrative Costs 
A certain cross-subsidy from successful to less successful authors is also 
inherent in the way that collecting societies pool their administrative costs: while in 
reality, it is more costly to administer less successful repertoires, collecting societies 
charge all authors the same flat percentage of their royalties to cover their costs.418 
10.1.4 Explicit Cultural and Social Functions 
Many collecting societies make so-called ‘cultural and social deduction’; they retain a 
certain share of royalties and, instead of distributing these sums according to the actual 
use of works, use cultural and social criteria to allocate them.  Chapter 11 examines 
whether this practice promotes the diversity of online music, using the example of 
GEMA. 
                                                   
417  Handke and Towse 942–943 and Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA, 141-143, also addressing 
blanket licences from a competition law perspective. 
418  Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 18. 
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10.2 Collecting Societies in the Area of Music 
In each member state of the EU there is at least one society that manages the rights of 
composers and lyricists.419  In Germany, for example, this task is fulfilled by GEMA, 
the German Society for Musical Performing and Mechanical Reproduction Rights.  As 
already visible from its title, GEMA manages both sets of authors’ rights.  In other 
countries, they are administered by two different entities, which, usually, maintain a 
close relationship.  Such is the case in the UK, where the authors’ rights are managed 
by The Performing Right Society (PRS) on the one and the Mechanical Copyright 
Protection Society (MCPS) on the other hand.  While retaining their respective legal 
personalities, the two societies have been trading under the common brand PRS for 
Music since 2009. 
The performing rights that are typically managed collectively encompass the 
right of public performance, the right of broadcasting and the right of communication 
to the public as well as the right of the making available of works to the public in 
interactive networks.420  As far as mechanical rights are concerned, societies manage 
the authors’ right of reproduction of their works in recorded form.421  
Where music is exploited online, this affects both the making available as well 
as the reproduction right.  In countries where the collective management of 
performing and mechanical rights is organised by different entities, the latter usually 
co-operate in order to enable online music services to clear both rights in a single 
transaction.  In the UK, for example, PRS and MCPS have been granting joint online 
licences since 2002.422 
                                                   
419  Often, the membership in these societies is equally open to music publishers; with PRS for Music 
and GEMA this is the case. 
420  Ficsor, Collective Management, 39 with further explanations on the types of works that remain 
managed individually. 
421  Ibid 49.  As the protected reproduction also encompasses the storing of a work in any medium by 
electronic means. 
422 Harrower, ‘Copyright Issues in Internet Music’ (2005) 24 Contemporary Music Review 483, 485.  
The difficulty faced by online music services is thus not so much to obtain online licences covering 
the domestic collecting society’s repertoire for domestic online use but licences that aggregate the 
repertoires of several societies for a broader territorial scope. 
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At the international level, performing right societies set up CISAC, the 
International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers, in 1926.  Its 
counterpart for mechanical right societies is BIEM, the Bureau international des sociétés 
gérant les droits d’enregistrement et de reproduction mécanique, founded in 1929.  Amongst 
each other, national collecting societies maintain a network of reciprocal 
representation agreements, as a result of which they are in a position to license, in 
addition to their own repertoire, the repertoires of all other sister societies. 
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11 Cultural Considerations in the Distribution of Royalties:  
GEMA as an Example of Authors’ Societies’ Explicit Cultural 
Functions 
In 2006, a study commissioned by the European Parliament concluded that in 24 of 
the (then) 25 member states local authors’ societies in the field of music ran cultural 
and social schemes, albeit of largely differing outlook and scope.423  Without a doubt, 
these schemes have the potential to be an important factor in the promotion of 
innovative music; in particular in countries where the state does not provide support 
for musical creation.424  Often the cultural activities of collecting societies are therefore 
judged, by collecting societies themselves and legal commentators alike, as suitable 
means to promote cultural diversity.  The European Parliament, for instance, declared 
that 
‘the practice of certain collective management societies (chiefly in the field 
of music) to use the distribution rules to promote non-commercial but 
culturally important works contributes to the development of culture and 
cultural diversity’.425 
This chapter asks whether the activities that authors’ societies themselves 
regard as specifically conducive to cultural development promote the diversity of 
online music.  In undertaking this enquiry we aim to go beyond often-heard general 
assumptions and vague claims and analyse the practical effects of such activities in 
order to assess them against the earlier developed notions.  This approach, however, 
has its own difficulties in that cultural activities take many forms and are governed by 
rules that differ from society to society.  It is therefore impossible, at least within the 
limits of this study, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the cultural activities of 
                                                   
423  KEA European Affairs, The Collective Management of Rights in Europe (2006) 89. 
424  Notably, in Greece; see ibid 125. 
425  European Parliament, Resolution on a Community Framework for Collective Management Societies in the 
Field of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (2002/2274(INI)) [2004] OJ C 92E/425, para 27. 
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all EU collecting societies.  Rather, we concentrate on a particularly suitable example 
of such cultural activities, notably those undertaken by GEMA.426 
In the case of GEMA, the cultural activities conform to a statutory 
requirement.  The Urheberrechtswahrnehmungsgesetz (UrhWG), the Law on the 
Administration of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights regulates the activities of 
CMOs in Germany.  In its second sentence, UrhWG § 7 specifically mentions cultural 
aspects: ‘the distribution plan shall conform to the principle that culturally important 
works and contributions are to be promoted’.427  The statute, however, does not 
specify what works are culturally important but leaves this determination to the 
addressees of the stipulation, namely the collecting societies.  Furthermore, neither the 
rules nor regulations of GEMA, for their part, provide any definition.     
In order to understand how GEMA ascertains cultural importance, it is 
therefore necessary to analyse the practical ways in which the society implements the 
statutory postulate.  It will then be possible to determine whether the promotion of 
culturally important works, as understood by GEMA, promotes diversity in online 
music. 
Generally speaking, GEMA fulfils its mandate of promoting culturally 
important works through the particular way in which it distributes the performance 
and broadcasting royalties.  The distribution of royalties is a two-stage process 
encompassing the so-called allocation and the evaluation procedure.  The guiding 
distribution criterion is the degree of use that GEMA’s licensees have made of any 
given work; authors of popular works, therefore, receive a larger share than authors of 
less popular works.  However, at both stages cultural considerations also have a role to 
                                                   
426  For an explanation why GEMA cultural functions suggest themselves for a detailed analysis here, see 
above at 4.2, on page 8. 
427  Own translation; emphasis added.  The nature of this provision is contested.  Some see it as 
establishing a legal obligation; Gerlach, ‘§ 7 WahrnG’ in Wandtke and Bullinger (eds) 
Praxiskommentar zum Urheberrecht (3rd edn, 2009) para 6.  According to the majority view, however, 
the norm simply allows CMOs to promote culturally important works; Nordemann, ‘§ 7 
UrhWahrnG’ in Nordemann and Fromm (eds) Urheberrecht: Kommentar zum Urheberrechtsgesetz, 
Verlagsgesetz, Urheberrechtswahrnehmungsgesetz (10th edn, 2008) paras 1-2.  As concerns GEMA, the 
question is without practical implications, as the society has developed and continues to apply rules 
to promote culturally important works. 
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play; notably, culturally important works are treated favourably with the effect that 
their authors receive a higher share of royalties than would otherwise be the case. 
Given that the criteria used to determine cultural importance differ, the 
analysis first examines the allocation procedure (11.1) before then turning to the 
additional payments that authors may receive in the evaluation procedure (11.2).  
Some support for culturally important work is also provided through GEMA’s 
adjustment funds (11.3) as well as other specific projects (11.4). 
In addition to its cultural activities, GEMA also provides certain social benefits 
to its members; notably it offers a pension scheme428 as well as a social security fund.429  
While both schemes are funded through the same sources as the evaluation 
procedure,430 they do not rely on any cultural criteria in the allocation of benefits and, 
therefore, remain beyond the scope of the present study.431 
11.1 The Cultural Redistribution in the Allocation Procedure 
We start our analysis of the practical forms of GEMA’s promotion of culturally 
important works with a closer look at the allocation procedure, the first step of the 
distribution process through which the vast majority of royalties are paid out.432   
Before analysing how GEMA uses cultural criteria in the royalty allocation, it is 
important to point out which royalties exactly are subject to these cultural criteria.  
While all royalties collected by GEMA are distributed on the basis of use, it is only in 
relation to some royalties that the distribution not only depends on use but, in 
addition, cultural considerations.  Any royalty fee that GEMA collects pertains to one 
                                                   
428  Annexes to Rules on the Evaluation Procedure for Composers in Section E in GEMA (ed), GEMA-
Jahrbuch 2012/2013 (2012) 368, Rules on the Evaluation Procedure in Section U in GEMA (ed), GEMA-
Jahrbuch 2012/2013 (2012) 382, and Rules on the Evaluation Procedure for Publishers in Section E in 
GEMA (ed), GEMA-Jahrbuch 2012/2013 (2012) 378; Rules on the Evaluation Procedure for Lyricists in 
Section E in GEMA (ed), GEMA-Jahrbuch 2012/2013 (2012) 377, § 2. 
429  Rules on the Social Security Fund in GEMA (ed), GEMA-Jahrbuch 2012/2013 (2012) 403. 
430  See below at 11.1.1, on page 152. 
431  A critical analysis of the two schemes is provided by Hauptmann 101-104, 108-124. 
432  As to the monies set aside for the evaluation procedure, see below at 11.1.1, on page 152. 
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of GEMA’s three Distribution Plans: Distribution Plan A covers the royalties from 
public performances and broadcasts; Distribution Plan B those from mechanical 
reproductions; and Distribution Plan C those from online exploitation.  Within each 
Distribution Plan, various sections exist – representing different forms of use of 
musical works.  In order to fine-tune the allocation of royalties, each section has 
specific distribution rules.433  Cultural considerations play a role in the allocation of 
the larger portion of public performance and broadcasting royalties, namely those 
sections in Distribution Plan A that are not allocated on an individual basis.434  In 
relation to public live performances, these are: 
 section E (public live performances of serious musical works);435 
 section U in part (public live performances of light music during events for 
which the fees collected do not exceed €500);436 and  
 section KI (public live performances of musical works during religious 
services).437 
In relation to broadcasts, these are: 
 section R (radio broadcasts);438 and 
 section FS (broadcasts of musical works in television operators’ self-
produced or commissioned programmes).439 
                                                   
433  The creation of different sections is a common practice of CMOs and even required by the 
reciprocal representation agreements that CMOs have concluded amongst each other; see Schepens, 
‘Guide to the Collective Administration of Authors' Rights’ (2000) 41–42.  As to reciprocal 
representation agreements in general, see below at 13.3, on page 253. 
434  As to collective and individual allocation, see above at 10.1.3, on page 141.  Where live events are 
allocated individually, the works used typically pertain to only a single or very few authors; in that 
case, however, a differentiation as to the cultural importance of the works would not have any 
practical effects.  See also Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA 255. 
435  E is the acronym for the German term for serious music: ernste Musik. 
436  Implementing Provisions of Distribution Plan A in GEMA (ed), GEMA-Jahrbuch 2012/2013 (2012) 299, 
s IX(2.2).  U is the acronym for the German term for light music: Unterhaltungsmusik. 
437  KI is the acronym for the German term for church music:  Kirchenmusik. 
438  R is the acronym for the German term for radio:  Radio. 
439  FS is the acronym for the German term for television:  Fernsehen.  As far as the allocation of royalties 
within section FS is concerned, cultural considerations only play a role for pre-existing works and 
not specially commissioned music to accompany films; see Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA 
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The general structure of the allocation procedure is the same in all distribution 
sections.  First, it must be determined which royalties pertain to a given section440 and 
which musical works correspond to the uses that have generated these royalties.  
Second and most crucially, the royalties must be allocated to the musical works.  In 
other words, the task is to ascertain how big a share of the available royalties falls upon 
each of the relevant musical works.441  Once a sum for each relevant work has been 
calculated, the third and final step is to distribute this sum between all holders of 
rights in that song. 
It is during the second step – the allocation of the royalties to each relevant 
work – that GEMA, in the mentioned distribution sections, not only takes into 
account how often a work has been used but also whether it is culturally important.  
Both factors – use and cultural importance – are expressed in points; each work 
accumulates performance points and cultural points.  These are multiplied and result 
in an overall number of points for each work.  The value of each point is determined 
by dividing the net distribution sum442 of a given section by the total number of points 
for all works involved in that section.  The final sum allocable to each work is then 
obtained by multiplying its number of points with that point value.  In practice, 
therefore, the more cultural points a work receives, the higher its share in the 
distribution sum.  This promotion of culturally important work thus affects all GEMA 
members.  More specifically, it leads to a certain internal reallocation in that it changes 
the amount of royalties that GEMA members would otherwise receive through a 
strictly usage-based distribution.  In that sense, one may speak of a cultural 
redistribution.  Moreover, where cultural importance influences the amount of 
royalties generated by a member’s musical works, such cultural support takes the form 
                                                                                                                                                
250–251. 
440  See in detail ibid 169–180. 
441  For a detailed description of this step in each section, see ibid 181–226. 
442  The net distribution sum is the actual amount available for distribution for GEMA’s members.  It is 
calculated by deducting from GEMA’s overall earnings its administrative cost as well as the ten per 
cent share used for cultural and social aims; see below at 11.2.1, on page 174. 
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of a monetary ex post reward for creativity and, at the same time, incentivises future 
musical creation.443 
In order to determine how GEMA interprets cultural importance, it will thus 
be necessary to analyse the criteria according to which it grants cultural points.  The 
analysis will start with a brief remark on the funding of cultural redistribution in the 
allocation procedure (11.1.1).  Then, a more detailed account of the way in which 
GEMA promotes culturally important works in the allocation of performance (11.1.2) 
and broadcasting royalties (11.1.3) will allow us to assess the implications for the 
diversity in online music (11.1.4).  More specifically, we will first determine the 
understanding of ‘cultural importance’ that underpins the allocation procedure as a 
whole (11.1.4.1) before concluding that it is inappropriate to reach the goal of diversity 
in online music (11.1.4.2).  Finally, we explore how an element of cultural 
redistribution would need to be designed in order to promote diversity in online 
music (11.1.4.3). 
11.1.1 Provenance of the Funds for the Cultural Redistribution in the Allocation 
Procedure 
In contrast to the evaluation procedure,444 no set amount funds the cultural 
redistribution in the allocation procedure and so the share of royalties distributed 
according to cultural importance cannot be pre-determined in the abstract.  As the 
element of cultural redistribution is an inherent feature of the allocation procedure, it 
varies from year to year depending on which musical works have been used, to what 
extent these works have been used, and to what extent they are considered as culturally 
important.  The cultural redistribution is thus funded by a flexible share of all those 
performance and broadcasting royalties whose allocation also depends on cultural 
importance.   
                                                   
443  As to the incentivising effect of copyright royalties, see in more detail below on page 169. 
444  See below at 11.2, on page 173. 
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This also includes some parts of the online royalties as Distribution Plan C 
provides that either one or two-third of the online receipts,445 depending on the 
particular form of digital exploitation, are allocated according to the rules in 
Distribution Plan A and are thus subject to the cultural redistribution in the allocation 
procedure.446 
11.1.2 Cultural Considerations in the Allocation of the Royalties from Public Live 
Performances 
11.1.2.1 The Usage Element: Performance Points 
In distribution sections E, U and KI (live performances of serious, light and musical works 
during religious services) the performance points of a given work are calculated on a pro 
rata numeris basis.  It is, therefore, crucial to determine how many times a work has 
been performed.  To this end, GEMA relies on the programmes returned by its 
licensees.447  As the society assumes that in the field of serious music these programmes 
reflect almost entirely the actual performances of works, there is no need for any 
further assessment in section E.  In section U, however, the number of performances 
cannot as easily be inferred from programmes since they only exist for approximately 
one-fourth of all light music performances.448  GEMA uses statistical projections in an 
                                                   
445  Two-thirds of the online receipts are allocated through Distribution Plan A for the following forms 
of exploitation: Internet radio and TV, music use on websites, streaming of music and videos on 
demand.  Only one-third is added to Distribution Plan A as far as downloading of music and videos 
on demand and ringtones are concerned.  The remaining sums are distributed according to 
Distribution Plan B for mechanical rights; General Principles of Distribution Plan C in GEMA (ed), 
GEMA-Jahrbuch 2012/2013 (2012) 351, § 2. 
446  Where receipts from Internet radio and television cannot be distributed individually, the shares that 
are to be allocated according to Distribution Plan A are added to the receipts of sections R and FS, 
ie those from radio and television broadcasts; General Principles C § 1(1) para 3.  As the latter are 
subject to the cultural redistribution in the allocation procedure, so are these particular online 
royalties.  Royalties are not allocated on an individual basis where no programming lists exist that 
could show which works have been used or where the costs of individual allocation would be 
disproportionate to the receipts; General Principles C § 1(1) para 2. 
447  Live performances during religious services are assessed according to representative samples; 
Implementing Provisions A s VIII(3)(e).  For further particularities concerning distribution section KI, 
see Müller, ‘Der Verteilungsplan für das Aufführungs- und Senderecht (Verteilungsplan A)’ in Kreile 
and others (eds) Recht und Praxis der GEMA (2nd edn, 2008) 399, paras 220-222. 
448  Ibid para 173. 
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attempt to determine the number of performances of light music as accurately as 
possible.449 
In addition to the number of uses, the particular type of use that has been 
made of a work may equally influence the overall number of performance points in so 
far as some types of uses are weighted more strongly than others.450  
11.1.2.2 The Cultural Element: Cultural Points 
The more culturally important a work is deemed to be, the more cultural points it 
receives.  Ultimately, it will obtain a higher share of royalties than a work that was used 
equally often but is deemed to be culturally less important.  The criteria underlying the 
determination of these points as well as the maximum number of points that can be 
obtained vary in the different distribution sections.  Chapters X-XII of the 
Implementing Provisions of GEMA’s Distribution Plan A contain indices that 
categorise musical works and prescribe a certain number of cultural points to each 
category. 
In section E (live performances of serious musical works) a work may obtain 
between 12 and 2400 cultural points, depending on the type of musical work:  
instrumental works, electro-acoustic works, vocal works and choral works (each starting 
with 12 points); works for string or chamber orchestras (starting with 40 points); and 
works for full-size orchestras (starting with 80 points).451  For instrumental works, vocal 
works and choral works a further refinement is made according to the number of 
voices their composition contains.  Instrumental works with one or two voices, for 
                                                   
449  Until the end of 2012, the so-called PRO procedure was used; see Augenstein, Rechtliche Grundlagen 
des Verteilungsplans urheberrechtlicher Verwertungsgesellschaften (2004) 90–91, and Müller, 
Verteilungsplan A, paras 174-175.  Since 2013 it has been replaced by a collection-based allocation 
method using liner approximation; see <https://www.gema.de/index.php?id=2645>.  Certain 
(historically motivated) adjustments are made with regard to light musical works performed during 
events in spa and health resorts and during variety and cabaret shows; see Implementing Provisions A 
s VIII(3)(b) and (d) as well as Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA 248–249. 
450  This is the case where commercial users pay a lump sum for several types of uses of different value.  
Only one-third of a performance point is accorded where musical works (or fragments of these 
works) are performed live as break or advance music; introduction, interlude or end music; or title 
or theme music; Implementing Provisions A fn 15 for serious and fn 23 for light music.  See, in general, 
Müller, Verteilungsplan A, para 312 and Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA, 227–231. 
451  Implementing Provisions A s X. 
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example, start with 12 points while those containing three to nine voices start with 24 
points.  Finally, within each (sub)group, the number of cultural points of a given work 
depends on its length; the index provides for nine different tranches ranging from up 
to two to over 60 minutes.  Works for full-size orchestras lasting up to two minutes, for 
example, obtain 80 points while 2400 points are accorded to such works if they are 
longer than 60 minutes. 
In distribution section U (live performances of light musical works) a musical work 
will normally obtain between 12 and 480 cultural points.  Light musical works are 
classified according to their musical genre and, in some cases, their length.  Although 
such simplified terminology is not used in the Implementing Provisions of GEMA’s 
Distribution Plan A, the genres could be characterised as popular music (12 points),452 
simple concert works (24-48 points),453 popular chansons (36 points),454 and complex 
concert works (24-480 points).455  If, however, the Works Committee456 – upon 
application – holds that a work of light music is of particular artistic value, its cultural 
importance is assessed according to the criteria laid down for distribution section E.  It 
may then attract up to 2400 cultural points.457  
                                                   
452  This group contains: dance, pop, jazz and rock music; marches and other light music; and chansons 
and copyright-protected lyrics to public domain musical works (ibid s XI(1)).  Chansons only fall 
under this category as long as they have not been recognised as serious chansons or popular 
chansons.  In the former case they obtain between 36 and 960 cultural points according to the index 
of cultural points for serious works (s X(3)); in the latter 36 point (s XI(3)(a)).  GEMA’s Distribution 
Plan does not contain any information as to the criteria according to which a chanson falls into one 
of these three groups. 
453  These are: concertinos; movements of suites; Lieder and musical pieces of staged shows or films that 
have been published for orchestras; works for one or several solo instruments with orchestra; vocal 
music not qualifying as a work of serious music; and contemporary artistic jazz with concert 
character (ibid s XI(2)). 
454  Ibid s XI(3)(a).  See also above n 452. 
455  These are concert works for orchestra, big bands, and large fusion and jazz formations with a 
minimum of 10 independent voices (ibid s XI(6). 
456  The Works Committee is a jury consisting of four composers, two lyricists and one publisher elected 
by the General Assembly.  Its task is to review the classification of musical works within the 
allocation procedure in certain prescribed instances.  See Müller, Verteilungsplan A, paras 140-150, 
as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Works Committee in GEMA (ed), GEMA-Jahrbuch 2012/2013 
(2012) 287. 
457  Implementing Provisions A s XI(7). 
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Musical works that are neither serious nor light obtain, depending on their length, 
between 12 (works of up to two minutes) and 1200 (works of more than 60 minutes) 
cultural points.458  Most commonly, these are works of jazz, world music and 
crossover.459 
Finally, length is also the decisive factor in distribution section KI (live 
performances of musical works during religious services), where musical works of more than 
ten minutes receive three and those of more than 20 minutes six cultural points.460 
11.1.3 Cultural Considerations in the Allocation of the Royalties from 
Broadcasting 
11.1.3.1 The Usage Element: Broadcasting Points 
In distribution sections R (radio broadcasts) and FS (broadcasting in television operators’ self-
produced or commissioned programmes) the frequency of the use of musical works is 
calculated on a pro rata temporis basis and counted in minutes that a musical work has 
been broadcast on the radio or television.  In order to determine these minutes of 
broadcasting GEMA relies on programming lists received from the radio and television 
operators.461  As with the performance points for public live performances,462 some 
uses are particularly weighted, depending on (a) the broadcaster and (b) the 
circumstances of the broadcasting of the musical work.463  As a result, a number of 
weighted minutes of broadcasting are determined for each relevant musical work. 
                                                   
458  Ibid s XII.  The receipts for live performances of these works are allocated in distribution section E; 
Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA, 247.  For a work to fall into this category, it must be classified 
accordingly by GEMA’s Distribution Division; Implementing Provisions A s I(12) para 1.  In case of 
doubt, the Works Committee decides (ibid s I(15)(a)).  As to the Works Committee, see above n 456. 
459  Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA, 247. 
460  Implementing Provisions A s VIII(3)(e). 
461  Ibid s V(3)(a). 
462  See above n 450. 
463  Implementing Provisions A ss V(3)(a)–(i), IX(1), fns 15, 23, 29; s XIV(3), fns 14, 22.  For more details 
see Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA, 204-207 and 231-242.  For example, a song broadcast on a 
local public television station is weighted less strongly (and therefore receives a smaller share of the 
royalties) than the same song broadcast in the countrywide public television station.  A song played 
live during a musical programme is weighted more strongly (and therefore generates a bigger share of 
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11.1.3.2 The Cultural Element: Cultural Points 
Broadcast musical works receive cultural points according to the same principles that 
apply to publicly performed works.  Again, light and serious works are distinguished 
and broken down into the same musical categories using the criteria of genre and 
length; only the spectrum of obtainable points differs.464  Works of serious music receive 
between one and 2.5 cultural points.465  A simple instrumental work of up to two 
minutes, for instance, attracts one cultural point while any full orchestra work above 
five minutes is given 2.5 cultural points. 
The spectrum of obtainable cultural points for works of light music is even 
narrower and ranges between one and two cultural points.466  While, for example, 
popular music receives one point, only complex concert works of more than 30 
minutes obtain the highest possible score of two points.  The Works Committee may, 
however, recognise works of light music as having particularly artistic value.  In that 
case, they attract up to 2.5 cultural points.467 One exception to these rules exists with 
regard to both serious and light music.  If these works (or fragments of these works) are 
used as break or advance music; introduction, interlude or end music; or title or 
theme music in regularly returning programmes, they receive only one cultural point 
and – in effect – no cultural evaluation is made.468  
Where the Works Committee has classified works as works of neither serious nor 
light music, they receive one cultural point, although the Works Committee may – 
upon application – prescribe up to 2.5 cultural points.469   
                                                                                                                                                
royalties) than that song being broadcast to accompany a test card before or after an actual television 
programme on the same station. 
464  Implementing Provisions A ss X – XII. 
465  Ibid s X. 
466  Ibid s XI(1)-(6). 
467  Ibid s XI(7). 
468  Ibid fns 14 and 22: a regularly returning programme is one which returns either on a minimum of 
five consecutive days or once a week during a minimum of seven consecutive weeks.  For such uses, 
different cultural considerations apply.  While they are weighted less strongly in the allocation of 
performance royalties (see above at n 450), they nevertheless obtain the usual number of cultural 
points.  In the allocation of broadcasting royalties, however, they are first weighted less strongly (see 
above at n 463) and, in addition, not given any cultural points.   
469  Implementing Provisions A s XII paras 1 and 3. 
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11.1.4 Implications for the Diversity in Online Music 
Having outlined the main elements of GEMA’s cultural redistribution in the 
allocation procedure, the analysis now turns to the potential implications of such a 
mechanism for the diversity of online music.  First, we determine the concept of 
‘cultural importance’ that underpins GEMA’s cultural redistribution (11.1.4.1) before 
concluding that it is unable to promote diversity in online music (11.1.4.2).  In order 
to broaden the focus, the final remarks provide more general considerations as to 
whether and how it would be possible to promote diversity in online music through a 
mechanism of royalty redistribution (11.1.4.3). 
11.1.4.1 The Concept of ‘Cultural Importance’ in the Allocation Procedure  
In German legal commentary, the way in which GEMA’s cultural redistribution is 
organised is usually interpreted as displaying a general underlying rationale, namely 
that of rewarding the complexity of the musical work in question.470  This is 
particularly obvious with serious music, where the number of cultural points increases 
with the number of instruments and voices featured as well as the length of the works.  
In relation to light music, the number of cultural points does not depend on the 
instrumentation of a work but rather the musical genre to which it belongs.  But even 
so, the way in which the maximum number of obtainable cultural is nuanced from 
genre to genre shows a desire to favour more complex genres.  Given that, in addition, 
length is used as another factor, the goal of rewarding complexity in both serious and 
light music is clearly discernible. 
German commentators have put forward two different justifications for this 
favourable treatment of complex music.  The first rests on the assumption that the 
more complex a musical work the less likely it is to be performed.471  From this 
perspective, the cultural component in the allocation procedure balances out the 
disadvantages that complex musical works may experience due to the increased efforts 
needed to perform them. 
                                                   
470  Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA, 243-244; Augenstein 145. 
471  Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA, 243-244. 
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This understanding could account for some striking characteristics in the 
allocation of cultural points.  First, it clarifies why the range of obtainable cultural 
points is much broader for works performed (up to 2400 for serious and 480 points 
for light music) than broadcast (up to 2.5 for serious and 2 points for light music).  In 
fact, this takes into account that the lack of performance chances of complex works is 
an irrelevant consideration in the case of broadcasting.  Broadcasters typically use 
sound recordings; these, however, are readily available irrespective of the complexity of 
the underlying musical works.472 
The intention of rewarding complex works also explains the noticeable 
difference in the maximum number of cultural points that a musical work may obtain 
in the allocation of performance royalties depending on whether it is of serious (up to 
2400) or light nature (up to 480).  Such differential treatment results from the 
assumption that, typically,473 two works of serious music may, in relation to their 
complexity, diverge to a much stronger extent than two works of light music.474  It 
should be noted, however, that the implications of these diverging scales are less far-
reaching than one might assume at first glance.  From the fact that serious music may 
attract many more cultural points than light music, one might be tempted to conclude 
that serious music generally receives a higher number of overall points and thus a 
bigger share of royalties than light music.  Yet, at least as far as performance royalties 
are concerned, such cross-subsidy is impossible, as two separate distribution sums exist 
for serious and light music.475  The situation is different for royalties from radio and 
TV broadcasts, which form a common distribution sum.476  In contrast to public 
performance royalties, however, the maximum number of cultural points in the 
allocation of broadcasting receipts does not differ strongly: serious music may attract 
up to 2.5 and light music up to two, or even 2.5 cultural points where it is of particular 
                                                   
472  Ibid 252. 
473  Note that atypical cases may still be treated in an equitable way in that the Works Committee may 
determine that a musical work has ‘particular artistic value’ which, in turn, leads to a higher amount 
of cultural points.  See above, ns 457 and 467, and below, on page 162  
474  Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA, 246-247. 
475  Ibid 153–154. 
476  Implementing Provisions A s IX(1) para 2; see also Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA, 202-204, 211-
212, 253-254. 
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artistic value.477  With regard to both performance and broadcasting royalties, a 
systematically favourable treatment of serious music is thus precluded.478   
According to a second view, the somewhat more evaluative consideration of 
complexity is indicative of an author’s achievement and skills.  In particular, it has 
been argued that the more complex a work, the more scope there was for authors to 
express their individuality.  Moreover, complex music has also been judged to be of 
more cultural value as it forced the listener to actively engage with the work.479 
Irrespective of the particular justification given, it has become apparent that 
GEMA’s cultural considerations break with the principle of a strictly usage-based 
royalty allocation and introduce a form of redistribution affecting all musical 
categories.  In simplified but pointed terms, one could say that heavily used but 
culturally unimportant works cross-subsidise those that are little used but culturally 
important.  The decisive criterion for determining whether a musical work is culturally 
important is its complexity.  The question that remains to be addressed is whether this 
practice promotes diversity in online music. 
11.1.4.2 The Inappropriateness of the Cultural Redistribution in the Allocation 
Procedure for Promoting Diversity in Online Music  
The preceding analysis has focused on GEMA’s allocation procedure, in which 
performance and broadcasting royalties are not only allocated on the basis of use but 
moreover in accordance with cultural considerations.  Upon closer examination, it has 
become apparent that these considerations create a mechanism of royalty allocation 
aimed to promote musically complex works. 
                                                   
477  See above, text accompanying ns 465, 466 and 467. 
478  This, however, does not mean that it may not be much more advantageous for an individual work to 
be classified as serious instead of light music.  The distinction between serious and light music is 
therefore criticised by many; see Bergner, Frieder W, ‘Das E und das U in der Musik’ Glarean 
Magazin (10 August 2007) <http://glareanverlag.wordpress.com/category/u-und-e-musik/> accessed 
10 February 2013, on the one and Hagedorn, Volker, ‘Nur der Markt macht die Musik’ Die Zeit 
(2004) <http://www.zeit.de/2004/12/GEMA> accessed 10 February 2013, on the other hand.  The 
distinction between serious and light music also leads to the application of different tariffs for public 
performances; see Risch and Kerst, Eventrecht kompakt: Ein Lehr- und Praxisbuch mit Beispielen aus dem 
Konzert- und Kulturbetrieb (2nd edn, 2011) 321–323. 
479  Augenstein 145. 
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This section seeks to contrast this finding with the postulate to promote the 
creation of a diverse body of music, deduced from TFEU Article 167(4) and Article 7 
of the 2005 Convention.  It may be recalled that diversity in online music can most 
crucially be influenced at two points in the value chain of online music: through the 
creation of a diverse range of music and through licensing mechanisms that allow for 
this musical diversity to be made available online to the broadest extent possible.480  
While the cultural element in GEMA’s allocation procedure has no bearing on the 
latter condition it clearly targets musical creation: through monetary rewards the 
collecting society aims to provide an incentive for authors to produce complex musical 
works.  Whether GEMA’s allocation procedure promotes diversity in online music 
thus hinges on the question of whether this stimulus also promotes the creation of a 
diverse body of musical works.  Such diverse musical creation is promoted in an 
environment that encourages all groups within society to express their cultural identity 
through the creation of music.481  Whether GEMA’s favourable treatment of complex 
musical works helps build such an environment, however, appears doubtful.  More 
precisely, one may question whether it is appropriate to use complexity as the only 
relevant criterion for supporting musical creations and whether GEMA’s cultural 
redistribution possesses the required degree of flexibility. 
Our first critique concerns the standard by which GEMA determines whether, 
and to what extent, it offers cultural support to musical works, which proves hard to 
reconcile with the promotion of diverse musical creation.  The decisive criterion is 
based on musical complexity: complex works receive more cultural points and thus a 
larger share in the allocated royalties than musically less complex works.  The 
problematic aspect is that GEMA thus resorts to an intrinsic feature of musical works.  
To make support dependent on such inherent qualities, however, reveals an 
underlying judgmental conviction that music may be more or less culturally valuable.  
Yet, such evaluative considerations are not only at odds with the anthropological view 
of culture that EU law embraces482 but can neither be aligned with the principle of 
                                                   
480  See above at 8.1, on page 104.  
481  See above at 7, on page 84. 
482  See above at 5.5, on page 26. 
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equal dignity of and respect for all cultural groups (which is explicitly in Article 2(3) of 
the 2005 Convention and following the suggested harmonious interpretation also 
needs to be taken into account for interpreting TFEU Article 167(4)).483 
That the recourse to the intrinsic criterion of complexity is allegedly motivated 
by the desire to balance out the low chances of musical works of being performed does 
not change this assessment.  The assumption that there was a monocausal link 
between the complexity of a musical work and the number of times it is performed is 
too simplistic and lacks being assessed against reality.  In fact, the decision to perform 
a musical work is informed by many factors, amongst which musical complexity is only 
one.  Arguably, a much more influential role is played by market demand.  Works of a 
popular composer, for example, will be performed more often than those of unknown 
authors, even if they share the same degree of complexity.  Conversely, musical works 
expressing the identity of a cultural minority will only see limited market demand and 
thus not be performed much even when they are not particularly complex.  Such cases, 
however, lie beyond the scope of what is assessed during GEMA’s allocation 
procedure. 
This demonstrates a striking conceptual difference between promoting 
complexity on the one hand and musical diversity on the other:  the first lacks the 
normative element of pluralism that is at the core of the latter.  Support for complex 
music only promotes a particular type of music whereas the objective to encourage all 
cultural groups to create music argues in favour of promoting all types of music. 
There is, however, one element in the legal framework of GEMA’s cultural 
redistribution that, at least at first sight, may call this verdict into question.  In fact, the 
Works Committee may increase the cultural points of works of light music if they are 
of ‘particularly artistic value’.484  Since the Distribution Plan itself does not contain any 
                                                   
483  Where cultural support would target all works that lack performances (and not only those which 
supposedly do because of their complexity), this could indeed promote the creation of diverse music; 
see below, on page 168.  As to the consequences of the principle of equal dignity of and respect for 
all cultural groups for the promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions, see above at 7.2.2, on 
page 94. 
484  Implementing Provisions A s XI(7); see above, ns 457 and 467.  Likewise, the Works Committee may 
determine that a work of neither serious nor light nature receives up to 2.5 cultural points in the 
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indication as to how this term is to be interpreted the Works Committee has a 
considerable margin of discretion.  Theoretically, this could thus be a vehicle for 
introducing pluralistic aspects and promoting not only the creation of complex but 
also diverse music.  A look into the practice of the Works Committee, however, reveals 
that in order to determine particular artistic value it assesses a work against criteria 
such as the quality and individual signature of the theme or the compositional 
implementation and instrumentation.485  Hence, it appears that the discretional power 
is not, in practice, used to correct but rather to carry forward GEMA’s evaluative 
approach to works whose extraordinary complexity could not appropriately be 
accommodated by the existing categories.  This reinforces the impression that GEMA’s 
cultural redistribution favours complex and not necessarily diverse music. 
However, even promoting the creation of a diverse body of musical works may, 
under specific circumstances, call for one-sided policies.  Notably, it has already been 
concluded earlier that promotive measures favouring a particular musical genre may be 
legitimate if they intend to offset particular difficulties that authors of that genre 
experienced in expressing their cultural identity through music.486  At first sight, this 
statement may seem broad enough to justify a preferential treatment of complex 
works.  A closer analysis, however, reveals that the necessary conditions are not 
fulfilled.  One may already doubt that it could be shown that authors of complex 
works face more difficulties in creating music than authors of other types of music.  
But at a more fundamental level, it must be recalled that the consideration underlying 
the mentioned exception was that songs expressing the same cultural identity share 
particular features and thus form a common musical genre.  Then, a musical genre can 
be seen as a proxy for a particular cultural group and this is the premise under which 
lending support to a particular genre may still meet the objective of creating an 
enabling environment for all cultural groups.  Yet, this pre-supposes the choice of 
appropriate criteria for categorisation; namely criteria capable of making apparent 
                                                                                                                                                
allocation of royalties from broadcasting, Implementing Provisions A s XII. 
485  Information provided by GEMA on 26 March 2012. 
486  See above at 7.2.2, on page 94. 
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those common features between musical works that determine their ‘symbolic 
meaning, artistic dimension and cultural values’.487  
To categorise works solely according to their musical complexity, however, does 
not meet this standard.  Undoubtedly, a certain degree of complexity is something that 
musical works may or may not share.  Perhaps one could even say that musical works 
of largely differing complexity are unlikely to be expressions of the same cultural 
identity.  A general rule, however, that musical works with a shared degree of 
complexity convey largely similar cultural ideas and thus form a common genre seems 
far-fetched.  One might, for example, easily imagine songs that, in spite of similar 
simplicity as to their musical instrumentation and composition, largely differ in style.  
Again, this demonstrates that the criterion of complexity cannot be employed to 
implement cultural pluralism. 
Moreover, and as a second point of critique, GEMA’s cultural redistribution is 
equally at odds with the concept of intercultural dialogue.  Article 1(b) and (c) 
proclaim as one of the objectives of the 2005 Convention to ‘create the conditions for 
cultures to flourish and to freely interact in a mutually beneficial manner’ and ‘to 
encourage dialogue among cultures with a view to ensuring wider and balanced 
cultural exchanges in the world in favour of intercultural respect and a culture of 
peace’.  Diverse musical creation – as deduced from Article 7 – is a pre-requisite of this 
goal; only where all social groups are free to express their cultural identities can 
dialogue and exchange between them commence.  The incentives created by GEMA’s 
cultural redistribution, however, are more likely to inhibit exchange and mutual 
enrichment between the various genres due to the inflexibility of the mechanism.  
Notably, the chosen categorisation of musical works does not leave much room for 
review; owing to GEMA’s inner democratic structure it would be difficult to change 
and, indeed, it has not evolved significantly in the past.  When a new musical work is 
notified to GEMA, the society assesses – once and for all – into which musical 
category it falls and this classification determines the cultural points it will attract in all 
                                                   
487  See the definition of ‘cultural content’ in Article 4(2) of the 2005 Convention.  Admittedly, this will 
always be a difficult and necessarily subjective choice requiring a more careful analysis than can be 
provided here.  Some possible elements, however, have already been highlighted above, on page 135.  
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future royalty allocations.  To the extent that the cultural element in the allocation 
procedure must be kept at a manageable administrative level it is understandable that 
GEMA strives for stability.  The effects of such inflexibility for future musical creation, 
however, cannot be welcomed.  Monetary rewards based on a set of fixed pre-
established categories may incentivise musical creation but, it is asserted, they set the 
wrong incentives, encouraging authors to create music that fits these categories.  This, 
however, may cement musical structures and fail to encourage the development of 
experimental musical works that cannot easily be described in conventional terms.   
Admittedly, one particular feature in GEMA’s cultural redistribution could – 
at least in theory – mitigate these conservational effects.  Distribution Plan A contains 
a catch clause according to which works that cannot be placed into any of the pre-
defined categories of either serious or light music receive a certain number of cultural 
points:  in the allocation of broadcasting royalties one and in the allocation of 
performance royalties, depending on their length, between 12 and 1200 cultural 
points.488  While this avoids any potential lacunae in GEMA’s cultural redistribution, 
the figures show, once placed into context, that the authors’ society does not deem 
these works culturally important.  In the allocation of broadcast royalties, one cultural 
point is the minimum across all musical categories and in the allocation of 
performance royalties the prescribed range is at the lower end of the cultural points 
that serious music may attract.489  Hence, these works receive less cultural points than 
the categories with which they compete for royalties.490  This, however, does not 
extenuate the incentives for authors to create music that fits GEMA’s pre-determined 
categories but rather reinforces them. 
                                                   
488  Implementing Provisions A s XII. 
489  Ibid ss X-XI. 
490  Certainly, in the allocation of performance royalties, the range of cultural points that works of 
neither serious nor light music receive is higher than the maximum prescribed for categories of light 
music.  This, however, remains without practical effect.  In fact, the royalties from performances of 
serious music are distributed separately from those of light music.  Royalties from performances of 
the works in question, however, are allocated in distribution section E, and thus they only compete 
with serious music; see Müller, Der Verteilungsplan der GEMA, 247.  Hence, the cultural points do not 
lead to any preferential treatment vis-à-vis works of light music. 
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All of this shows that by placing conditions on cultural support based on 
musical complexity, GEMA’s cultural redistribution fails to promote the creation of 
diverse musical works and thus diversity in online music, as it is unable to respond to 
the exigencies of the principles of diversity of cultural expressions, cultural pluralism 
and intercultural dialogue.  It should be added that this result was, by no means, pre-
determined by the statutory obligation ‘to promote culturally important works’ 
(UrhWG § 7).  As the statute leaves it to the collecting societies to define this concept, 
GEMA could well decide to regard those musical works as culturally important that 
make the overall body of created music more diverse. 
11.1.4.3 The Redistribution of Royalties as a Potential Means for Promoting 
Diversity in Online Music 
Beyond this result, a more intriguing question remains to be addressed:  would it be 
possible to incorporate an element of cultural redistribution into the otherwise strictly 
usage-based allocation of royalties that would promote diverse musical creation and 
thus diversity in online music?  If so, how would it need to be designed?  In analysing 
these questions, the aim is to distil some of the parameters that cultural measures 
would have to possess in order to be able to positively influence musical diversity.  It is 
hoped that these parameters will be more generally applicable to cultural measures 
whether put in place by collecting societies or states. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of GEMA’s cultural redistribution in the 
allocation procedure, and thus the start of our analysis, is that it is entirely based on an 
analysis of the body of musical works that have already been created by the society’s 
authors.  Centred on the various social groups and how they express their cultural 
identities, Article 7 of the 2005 Convention has a slightly different perspective.  By 
solely focusing on the results of expressing one’s cultural identity – in this case, the 
musical works created – GEMA short-circuits much of the sociological underpinning 
of the Convention.  But could such a shortcut approach still be appropriate for 
encouraging all cultural groups to create musical works? 
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Clearly, a one-to-one practical implementation of the theoretical approach of 
Article 7 appears impossible.  Applied literally to the area of music, the norm would 
require a sociological exercise that first maps out all groups in society before then 
enquiring whether they express their cultural identity through music.  If a certain 
group did not, additional research would need to show whether the group was 
prevented from or simply did not care for creating music.  However, any such 
assessment would have to confront the difficulties associated with taxonomising 
cultural groups in times of dynamic and permeable cultural affiliations.491  Even if 
these pitfalls could be avoided, to quantify the pluralistic element of musical diversity 
in any reliable way seems an endeavour far too arduous and resource-intensive even for 
states, let alone collecting societies. 
Consequently, practicable ways of encouraging all social groups to express their 
cultural identity through music must be found.  Inevitably, this will lead to certain 
generalisations that, it is suggested, have to be accepted as long as the implementation 
as a whole conforms to Article 7.492  From this perspective, the focus on musical 
output, as the basis for cultural support, may be justified by practical constraints. 
However, that focus has one important drawback that would exclude it as an 
appropriate means to promote diversity in musical creations in specific scenarios.  
Notably, from the available data it is impossible to ascertain whether there are any 
groups wishing, but unable, to express their cultural identity through music.  In 
societies in which social groups are inhibited by law or fact from expressing their 
cultural identity through music, a cultural redistribution mechanism based on already 
existing musical output would be moot because these groups would stay out of reach.  
Instead, the objective of encouraging all groups to express their identity through music 
would call for measures aimed at removing any such legal or factual obstacles.493  A 
                                                   
491  See also the remarks above, on page 136, asking whether and how the normative element of diversity 
in online music could be measured. 
492  See the discussion on the difficulties of categorisation in the application of the Stirling model above, 
on page 119. 
493  Article 2(3) of the 2005 Convention confirms this point by stressing that the equal dignity of and 
respect for all cultures is a precondition for the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions.  See for a more detailed discussion above at 7.2.2, on page 90. 
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system of incentivising musical creation by rewarding music that has been created in 
the past can thus only be an appropriate approach in societies that have reached a 
certain level of cultural pluralism in that everybody wishing to participate in that 
system may do so.494 
As a first intermediate result, we can therefore conclude that cultural 
redistribution built into the distribution of royalties is not a priori inappropriate for 
achieving the promotion of diverse musical creation just because it is construed on 
musical output. 
The decisive question would then be whether criteria for cultural 
redistribution could be found that would promote a diverse musical creation, ie build 
an environment that encourages social groups to express their cultural identities 
through musical creation.  The principle of equal dignity of and equal respect for all 
cultures, enshrined in Article 2(3) of the 2005 Convention, further refines the 
contours of this aspired environment in that its objective must be to enable and 
encourage all social groups to create music.  While the overall goal is that all cultural 
groups should be free to decide whether or not to create music, measures to reach that 
goal are necessarily differential, affecting various cultural groups differently.495  This 
takes into account that cultural groups exist in different realities, in which they are 
more or less able to assert their cultural identity.  The framework of Article 7 of the 
2005 Convention also reveals the desired degree of diversity:  a body of created 
musical works is diverse if all social groups are free to contribute. 
It follows that, in order to promote diverse musical creation, support measures 
would primarily have to be directed against any legal or factual obstacles generally 
impeding on a cultural group’s ability to create music.  Consequently, cultural support 
                                                   
494  In the specific case of GEMA, this is the case:  in Germany, human and fundamental freedoms are 
guaranteed by law and, as far as can be seen, no cultural group faces practical obstacles that would 
prevent it from creating music.  Finally, GEMA membership is open to anybody creating music 
irrespective of his or her cultural affiliations.   
But even in societies without obvious legal or factual obstacles, it would be wise to provide for 
certain safeguards as a once achieved level of cultural pluralism cannot be taken for granted.  If a 
state relied on an authors’ society for promoting musical creation, it must remain alert and create 
some form of early warning system equipped to pick up the signs if and when this level deteriorates. 
495  See above at 7.2.2, on page 94. 
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that is construed on the basis of already created musical works is unable to promote 
diverse musical creation in societies in which the primary ability of all cultural groups 
to create music is not safeguarded.  Under such circumstances incorporating an 
element of cultural redistribution in the allocation of music royalties could not be an 
appropriate instrument.496   
But the principle of equal dignity of and equal respect for all cultures provides 
direction not only for cultural measures aimed at removing such impediments but also 
those seeking to stimulate musical creations through positive incentives.  Notably, no 
particular cultural groups must be unduly favoured.497  This would also determine the 
way in which a cultural redistribution mechanism would have to be shaped.  In 
addition, however, it must be taken into account that such a mechanism would only 
be one element in the bigger scheme of allocating performing royalties.  If the 
allocation of royalties, without an additional cultural element, did not help establish 
an environment that encouraged all cultural groups to create music, such an element 
could serve as a corrective.  The search for a suitable criterion for cultural 
redistribution thus warrants a closer look at the consequences of royalty allocation in 
general. 
It is only because copyright endows authors of music with exclusive rights in 
their works that there are any royalties to be distributed.  Copyright assumes that by 
monetizing the exclusive rights in their works authors will recoup the costs incurred 
during the creative process.  This prospect, it is further expected, incentivises musical 
creation and thus creativity and innovation.  Underlying the whole construction is the 
premise that the public gains in terms of creativity and innovation are greater than or 
equal to the private gains of authors.498 
The whole aim of copyright is thus to prompt cultural creation.  Still, if 
assessed against the objective to encourage all cultural groups to create music, it 
appears problematic that copyright is only able to live up to that objective under 
                                                   
496  See above, on page 167. 
497  See above at 7.2.2, on page 94. 
498  Schovsbo 3. 
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specific circumstances.499  Markedly, authors can only monetize their exclusive rights if 
others wish to use their works.  This direct correlation between the monies generated 
with a specific work and the public demand for that work unveils that copyright 
exclusivity is a rather imprecise tool to incentivise diverse cultural creation.  This may 
be illustrated by looking at two extreme examples.  On the one hand, the mass of 
musical works with low public demand cannot realise the prospect of monetary 
rewards to any noteworthy extent; in these instances, copyright exclusivity fails to serve 
as an incentive.  On the other hand, successful works may generate extremely high 
royalties, arguably surpassing what would be needed to fulfil the incentivising 
function.  In the language of the 2005 Convention, one would therefore have to 
conclude that not all cultural groups are equally encouraged to create music.  On the 
contrary, copyright exclusivity one-sidedly favours the music of the cultural groups in 
the majority. 
The collective management of authors’ rights, to a certain extent, mitigates 
these effects.  Notably, it allows for monetising these rights in situations in which 
individual licences would be impossible to negotiate and thus opens royalty streams 
which otherwise would remain untapped.  Although this benefits all right holders, an 
author’s royalty payments still depend directly on public demand.  There are, however, 
certain elements of collectivisation that aim at closing the gap between the successful 
few and the fortuneless many.  Notably, the practices of blanket licensing and 
collective royalty allocation introduce elements of solidarity amongst right holders.500  
While these effects are to be welcomed, they do not go far enough if musical creation 
of all cultural groups is to be encouraged.  Even where authors’ rights are administered 
collectively, empirical data suggests that the gap remains immense between a few 
highly successful and the many authors whose works are without significant demand.  
In 1994, PRS distributed £20.35 million to 15,000 author members.  The highest-
earning 1.3 per cent of authors received a royalty share of nearly 41 per cent, and the 
highest-earning 19.5 per cent accounted for some 92 per cent.  In absolute terms, 10 
                                                   
499  As to the relationship of copyright and diverse musical creation, see also above at 8.1.1, on page 104, 
as well as below at 11.5, on page 200. 
500  See in more detail below at 10.1.3, on page 143. 
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authors received more than £100,000 while 8,237 authors were allocated less than 
£100.501  In 2000, only five per cent of authors represented by PRS reached the average 
UK wage from copyright earnings alone.502  In 2003, only 2.4 per cent of GEMA’s 
authors could live from their creative output.503  It can therefore safely be concluded 
that even under collective rights management ‘a small number of very high earners 
earn a disproportionate share of total income’.504  Yet this also means that a strictly 
usage-based allocation of royalties fails to encourage all cultural groups to create music. 
These shortcomings could, in fact, be remedied through a form of cultural 
redistribution that levels out the identified pitfalls of a strictly usage-based allocation 
with a view to encouraging all cultural groups to create music.  The obvious criterion 
to achieve this would be the demand for a musical work.  Works should benefit from 
cultural redistribution if they have not been used enough to generate copyright 
royalties sufficiently high to have an incentivising effect.  In order to assess public 
demand, one could rely on the way in which GEMA grants performance points to 
each work in the allocation procedure.  First, a certain number of performance points 
should be determined as the threshold above which a musical work will not receive 
any cultural points.  This takes into account that the incentive function of copyright is 
attained with royalty payment of a certain importance.  Then, however, musical works 
attracting such high payments should not in addition benefit from cultural 
redistribution.  Second, for works below that threshold, the fewer performance points 
they obtain the more cultural points they should be allocated.  Finally, those works 
with the fewest performance points should obtain the highest cultural redistribution.  
It has been argued in cultural economics that the least produced genres are constantly 
                                                   
501  Great Britain Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Performing Rights: A Report on the Supply in the 
UK of the Services of Administering Performing Rights and Film Synchronisation Rights, paras 5.35-5.34.  For 
an analysis of royalty distributions in other areas of collectively administered copyright (literary and 
visual arts works), see Kretschmer and Hardwick, Authors' Earnings from Copyright and Non-copyright 
Sources: A Survey of 25,000 British and German Writers (2007); Kretschmer and others, Copyright 
Contracts and Earnings of Visual Creators: A Survey of 5,800 British Designers, Fine Artists, Illustrators and 
Photographers (2011). 
502  Kretschmer, Does Copyright Law Matter? (2012) 21. 
503  Ibid 22, citing Dümling, Musik hat ihren Wert: 100 Jahre musikalische Verwertungsgesellschaft in 
Deutschland (2003) 313. 
504  Kretschmer 22. 
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at risk of being marginalised.505  On this view, one might even consider not only 
granting the highest but also indeed a disproportionately high share of cultural 
redistribution to the works with the fewest performance points.  To have a particularly 
strong incentive for the least demanded works would encourage cultural groups that 
are not yet able to express their cultural identity through music to do so because they 
would know that even if their music were only of niche interest it would attract 
relatively high cultural payments. 
A system of cultural redistribution as described above would have several 
advantages.  In comparison with GEMA’s current cultural considerations, it would be 
simple to administer.  There would be no need to classify musical works into genres 
because the proposed criterion of lack of public demand can be measured in relation 
to each individual musical work.  Moreover, the system would be much more flexible.  
Cultural payments would not depend on how a work fits into a system of long 
determined categories but how each work has fared commercially in a given year.  If 
the public demand for a work changes, the number of performance points it attracts 
do too, which, as has been proposed, would also impact on the cultural redistribution 
payments.  Finally and most importantly, such a system would be in line with the 
promotion of diverse musical creation and thus the promotion of diversity in online 
music. 
Finally, one should be clear about the effects of changing from a redistribution 
based on complexity to one of diversity.  Works that are musically complex and 
seldom performed would benefit from both regimes while successful complex works 
would be supported to a smaller extent.  In addition, and this is the important 
difference, a redistribution based on diversity would support all musical works whose 
performance royalties alone would be too low to be considered an appropriate 
incentive for musical creation, irrespective of their musical complexity. 
Obviously, the above paragraphs only paint a very sketchy outline of a possible 
cultural redistribution mechanism and many important decisions would still need to 
                                                   
505  Benhamou 8. 
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be made.506  For present purposes, however, suffice it to conclude that it would be 
possible to incorporate an element of cultural redistribution into royalty distribution 
that would promote diverse musical creation. 
11.2 The Promotion of Culturally Important Works through Evaluation 
Payments 
The analysis now turns to the second tier of GEMA’s specifically cultural activities, 
namely the cultural considerations it applies in the evaluation procedure.  In this 
scheme, a specified amount of royalties are distributed.  Independent from the 
allocation procedure, the evaluation procedure is based on specific rules of its own.  
The largest share of the available funds in the evaluation procedure finances the so-
called evaluation payments. 
These are additional payments that every composer, lyricist or publisher of 
both serious and light music may attract if the necessary conditions are fulfilled.507  For 
the majority of the various professional groups, these conditions are based on cultural 
considerations.  Where this is the case, evaluation payments implement GEMA’s 
statutory obligation to ‘promote culturally important works’ (UrhWG § 7). 
Like the cultural redistribution of the allocation procedure, evaluation 
payments affect the royalties of all GEMA members.  While this is obvious for 
                                                   
506  What should the threshold be above which no cultural redistribution is to be paid?  How high 
should the maximum share of cultural redistribution in the overall royalty payments of a musical 
work be?  Should the cultural redistribution increase arithmetically with decreasing performance 
points or would it be more appropriate or practicable to let it increase in steps?  Should the system 
take into account that one author typically receives royalties for several works?  This is not the space 
to contemplate such detailed questions in the abstract.  If a collecting society intended to reform its 
allocation procedure in compliance with the objective to promote the creation of diverse music, it 
would appear important to openly discuss these questions during the internal decision-making 
process. 
507  Evaluation Procedure Composers E; Evaluation Procedure Lyricists E; Evaluation Procedure Publishers E; 
Evaluation Procedure U.  For arrangers and adaptors, GEMA’s statutes provide for an Estimation 
Procedure; see Rules on the Estimation Procedure for Arrangers and Adapters in GEMA (ed), GEMA-
Jahrbuch 2012/2013 (2012) 391.  This procedure, however, is not based on cultural considerations; 
see Riesenhuber, ‘Das Schätzungsverfahren der Bearbeiter (GO Schätzung B)’ in Kreile and others 
(eds) Recht und Praxis der GEMA (2nd edn, 2008) 654, para 1.  It is thus outwith the scope of the 
present analysis. 
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members receiving such payments, there is also an impact on those who do not 
qualify.  If there were no evaluation payments and the used sums were distributed 
according to the normal allocation procedure, the overall amount of royalties would 
be different.  The evaluation payments are thus also a form of redistribution on 
cultural grounds.  Whether these grounds are identical to those prevalent in the 
allocation procedure, however, is still to be seen.  The payments can also be seen as an 
ex post reward for the creation of musical works.  In comparison to the cultural 
elements of the allocation procedure, however, their incentivising effect is even more 
direct because the payments are not internally offset but paid separately. 
Our discussion first explores the provenance of the funds for the evaluation 
procedure (11.2.1).  The cultural considerations that determine the evaluation 
payments for authors of serious (11.2.2) and light music (11.2.3) are then assessed 
before exploring their implications for diversity in online music (11.2.4). 
11.2.1 Provenance of the Funds for the Evaluation Procedure 
The funds distributed in the evaluation procedure come from two different sources.  
The first and most prominent source is a ten per cent deduction from the gross 
distribution sum that GEMA generated through its members’ performing rights; ie the 
receipts paid out through Distribution Plan A.508  First, GEMA deducts from the 
overall earnings its administrative costs.509  From the resulting gross distribution sum, 
the society then deducts ten per cent for cultural and social aims.  In 2011 this 
amounted to €27.5 million.510  The remaining net distribution sum is paid out to right 
holders in the various distribution sections through the allocation procedure.511 
                                                   
508  General Principles of Distribution Plan A in GEMA (ed), GEMA-Jahrbuch 2012/2013 (2012) 293, 
§ 1(4)(a). 
509  Within Distribution Plan A a uniform cost rate applies to all the different sections.  Only the 
royalties that GEMA receives from foreign collecting societies are subjected to a reduced cost rate of 
five per cent.  This is because a deduction to cover the relevant foreign collecting society’s costs has 
already been applied before passing the sums on to GEMA for distribution; see Müller, 
Verteilungsplan A, para 4. 
510  GEMA, GEMA-Jahrbuch 2012/2013 (2012) 51. 
511  Where these sums are to be allocated collectively, they are subject to the analysed element of cultural 
redistribution; see above at 11.1, on page 149. 
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In this regard, online royalties also play an important role in the funding of the 
evaluation procedure.  Notably, as far as they are allocated according to the rules in 
Distribution Plan A512 they are also subject to this ten per cent deduction.513 
Although ten per cent deductions for cultural and social ends are common 
practice amongst continental European collecting societies and also enshrined in the 
CISAC Model Agreement,514 their legality is contested.515  In particular, PRS for Music 
has been highly critical of these deductions in the past.516  Given, however, that the 
question of whether the cultural activities of collecting societies promote diversity in 
online music does not depend on how they are funded, the legality of the ten per cent 
deductions lies beyond the scope of this chapter.517  
                                                   
512  Depending on the particular form of online use that has generated the receipts, either one or two-
thirds of the online royalties are allocated through Distribution Plan A; General Principles C § 2.  See 
above n 445. 
513  Confirmed by GEMA on 26 March 2012. 
514  CISAC Model Reciprocal Representation Agreement for the EU in GEMA (ed), GEMA-Jahrbuch 
2012/2013 (2012) 248, § 8(II); the historic development of the 10 per cent rule is analysed by 
Hauptmann 67–70. 
515  Doubts as to their legitimacy have been nourished by the fact that such deductions are applied on all 
of GEMA’s income without making a distinction whether that income pertains to works created by 
GEMA’s own members or authors of one of GEMA’s sister societies, which is represented by GEMA; 
even where works of another society’s repertoire are exploited, the cultural and social contributions 
are deducted before the corresponding royalties are passed on to that society.  At the same time, the 
cultural and social funds only support GEMA’s own members.  This has the effect that foreign 
creators help finance a system which will never benefit them. 
516  Most of GEMA’s sister societies accept them as they equally make use of cultural and social 
deductions.  In relation to British creators, however, no such element of rough justice exists.  
Generally, PRS applies cultural deductions to a much smaller extent and only to the royalties earned 
from its own repertoire.  In addition, funding is open even to non-members and members of other 
societies.  As to the PRS deductions, see KEA European Affairs 128.  See also Harcourt, ‘The 
Unlawful Deduction Levied upon UK Composers Performing Right Income’ [1996] Copyright 
World 15, contending that cultural and social deductions are a hidden form of discrimination 
prohibited under the law of the (then) European Community.  For the US perspective, see Ladd, ‘To 
Cope with the World Upheaval in Copyright’ (1983) 19 Copyright 289, 299, who – without further 
analysis – denounces them as an abuse of copyright. 
517  The question of legality is assessed by a number of existing contributions which analyse the 
compatibility of these deductions with the principle of national treatment enshrined in Article 5(1) 
of the Berne Convention and Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement as well as the principle of non-
discrimination proclaimed by TFEU Article 18; see, for example, Lerche, ‘Rechtsfragen der 
Verwirklichung kultureller und sozialer Aufgaben bei der kollektiven Wahrnehmung von 
Urheberrechten, insbesondere im Blick auf den sogen. 10 %-Abzug der GEMA’ in GEMA (ed) 
GEMA-Jahrbuch 1997/98 (1997) 80; Melichar, ‘Deductions Made by Collecting Societies for Social 
and Cultural Purposes in the Light of International Copyright Law’ (1991) 22 International Review 
of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 47; Bartels, ‘Die Abzüge der 
Verwertungsgesellschaften für soziale und kulturelle Zwecke’ [2006] Archiv für Urheber- und 
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A second and considerable part of GEMA’s cultural and social funds is made 
up of non-allocable sums.  These monies consist of interest gains on royalties received, 
membership and administration fees as well as contract penalty payments.  
Commentators have pointed out that it is imprecise to purport that these monies 
could not be allocated.  Indeed, they could simply be added to the total amount 
available for distribution and thus increase each member’s royalty receipts.518  Interest 
gains could also be allocated individually to each member.519  These sums are only 
non-allocable insofar as the usual method of allocation cannot be applied.  Normally, 
receipts are distributed according to the use of each member’s works.  The mentioned 
sums, however, do not correspond to any particular use.520  In 2011 the non-allocable 
sums amounted to €14.1 million.521 
The total amount of deductions and non-allocable sums (in 2011 €41.6 
million) is then distributed amongst several cultural and social activities that GEMA 
undertakes.  In a first step, a maximum of 17 per cent is deducted to finance GEMA’s 
social security fund (in 2011 €7.4 million).522  The Executive Board and the Board of 
Supervisors must mutually agree on the splitting of the remaining monies.523  In 
practice, the formula has not changed since 1990: 30.07 per cent go to the evaluation 
procedure for serious music (in 2011 €10.3 million), 58.67 to the evaluation 
procedure for light music (in 2011 €20.1 million), 6.90 to GEMA’s pension scheme524 
(in 2011 €2.4 million) and 4.36 to the estimation procedure for adapters and 
arrangers525 (in 2011 €1.5 million).526  Finally, the sums provided for the evaluation 
                                                                                                                                                
Medienrecht 325; Katzenberger and Nérisson, ‘Kulturförderung, Solidarität und 
Verteilungsgerechtigkeit in Recht und Praxis urheberrechtlicher Verwertungsgesellschaften’ (2011) 
60 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil 283. 
518  Augenstein 108. 
519  Hauptmann 100. 
520  Augenstein 108. 
521  GEMA, Jahrbuch 2012/13, 51 
522  Social Security Fund § 2(1); Müller, Verteilungsplan A, para 13.  As to the social security fund, see 
above, on page 149. 
523  General Principles A § 1(4)(a).  The sums for the evaluation procedure in section E, however, may not 
be lower than 30.07 per cent (§ 1(4)(b)). 
524  As to the pension scheme, see above, on page 149. 
525  As to the estimation procedure, see above n 507. 
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procedure must be distributed between the different professional groups.  In relation 
to serious music, composers receive 57.5, lyricists three and publishers 39.5 per cent 
(in 2011 this amounted to €5.9, €0.3 and €4.1 million respectively).  Regarding light 
music, composers receive 42.5, lyricists 20 and publishers 37.5 per cent (2011: €8.5, 
€4.0 and €7.5 million).  These formulae have been applied constantly since 1957 
(serious music) and 1956 (light music).527  
From the sums provided for the various evaluation procedures, a relatively 
small portion is set aside and not used for evaluation payments but to finance the 
adjustment funds.  Technically part of the evaluation procedure, these funds exist for 
every professional group of both serious and light music and follow different but, at 
least partially, also culturally motivated rules.528  
11.2.2 Evaluation Payments for Authors of Works of Serious Music 
Although the evaluation payments for composers, lyricists and publishers of serious 
music are based on separate rules, the following assessment is limited to those 
applicable to composers of serious music.  In part, this is possible because the 
evaluation payments for publishers of serious music do not depend on any cultural 
criteria.  They are distributed as mere supplements to the publishers’ earnings in the 
allocation procedure529 and are thus without relevance for the purposes of assessing 
GEMA’s cultural activities.  Moreover, still in relation to serious music, the rules on 
the evaluation payments of composers apply mutatis mutandis to lyricists.530 
The amount of the evaluation payment that an individual composer receives 
depends on the use of his works and additional cultural considerations.  While the 
                                                                                                                                                
526  Müller, Verteilungsplan A, para 15.  The figures for 2011 are provided in GEMA, Jahrbuch 2012/13, 
51. 
527  General Principles A fn 1. 
528  See below 11.3, on page 191. 
529  Evaluation Procedure Publishers E § 3(1)-(3).  The only relevant criterion here is the amount of royalties 
from public performances and broadcasts in the allocation procedure. 
530  Evaluation Procedure Lyricists E § 2.  The Evaluation Committee for lyricists in section E consists of 
the same members as the Evaluation Committee for lyricists in section U; ibid § 1. 
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usage element is expressed in the composer’s applicable earnings, the cultural element 
is reflected in so-called evaluation points. 
11.2.2.1 The Usage Element: Applicable Earnings 
The starting point to calculate a composer’s evaluation payments is the determination 
of his applicable earnings.  These are based on the three-year average amount of 
collectively allocated royalties that a composer of serious music generated from public 
performances and broadcasts of his works.531 
There are, however, some refinements.532  Thus, royalties from public live 
performances are fully taken into account up to an amount of €9,000; any exceeding 
amount is only considered if it is less than ten times as high as the royalties the 
composer earned from radio and television broadcasts.533  Royalties from public live 
performances during religious services merely count insofar as they do not exceed one 
fourth of the average royalties from public live performances generally.534  Finally, 
royalties earned from radio and television broadcasts count fully up to an amount of 
€1,500 and with one third up to an amount of €7,700.  Of all royalties exceeding this 
sum, only ten per cent are considered.535  The sum of a composer’s applicable earnings, 
computed in this way, forms the basis of the calculation of his additional evaluation 
payment. 
                                                   
531  Evaluation Procedure Composers E fn 3.  Relevant are sections E (public live performances of works of 
serious music), KI and FKI (public live performances during religious services), R (radio broadcasts), and FS 
(television broadcasts).  As to collective and individual allocation, see below at 10.1.3, on page 143. 
532  Evaluation Procedure Composers E fn 3. 
533  This can only be understood against the background that some composers, in the past, abused the 
system of evaluation payments by artificially increasing their royalties through public live 
performances regardless of public demand.  By tying the number of applicable performance royalties 
to the generated broadcasting royalties, GEMA’s General Assembly rectified this situation insofar as 
it is assumed that radio and TV broadcasts reflect an existing public demand.  See Riesenhuber, ‘Das 
Wertungsverfahren der Komponisten in der Sparte E (GO Wertung KE)’ in Kreile and others (eds) 
Recht und Praxis der GEMA (2nd edn, 2008) 578, paras 94-102, for a detailed description. 
534  This limitation is intended to take account of the particular nature of music for religious services, 
which differs from contemporary serious music in a strict sense; information provided by GEMA on 
26 March 2012. 
535  The mentioned ceilings are an expression of solidarity in that successful composers agree to limit the 
amount of their evaluation payments to the benefit of less successful composers; information 
provided by GEMA on 26 March 2012. 
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11.2.2.2 The Cultural Element: Evaluation Points 
Whether a composer participates in the evaluation procedure at all and – if so – to 
what extent his applicable earnings are taken into account, is decided in the second 
step, where each composer receives a certain number of evaluation points.  Composers 
with less than ten evaluation points do not participate in the evaluation procedure.  
Those with ten or more evaluation points are classified into one of seven groups 
according to the points obtained.536  For each group, a certain percentage (from ten to 
100) is prescribed, which determines the extent to which the applicable earnings of all 
composers in that group are considered in the subsequent calculation of evaluation 
payments.  For composers, for instance, with between ten and 19 evaluation points 
(group VII), only ten per cent of their average royalties are taken into account, while 
for composers with 120 evaluation points or more (group I) the full amount counts.  
To multiply a composer’s applicable earnings with the relevant percentage results in a 
composer’s weighted applicable earnings. 
The amount of a composer’s weighted applicable earnings alone merely serves 
as an accounting unit.  It is the ratio of a single composer’s weighted applicable 
earnings to the total amount of the weighted applicable earnings of all composers, 
eligible for evaluation payments, that determines his share in the overall sum available 
for evaluation payments.  Applying this ratio to the overall amount of sums available 
finally defines the amount of a composer’s evaluation payment. 
The number of evaluation points therefore has an important bearing on the 
payments as they determine a composer’s evaluation group and thus the percentage at 
which his applicable earning are being taken into account to calculate the evaluation 
payment.  Put simply, the more points a composer receives, the higher his evaluation 
payments.   
There are, however, two important exceptions to this principle.  On the one 
hand, once a composer has reached a certain evaluation group, he remains in that 
group even if he does not obtain the necessary amount of evaluation points in future 
                                                   
536  Evaluation Procedure Composers E § 5(1). 
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years.537  On the other hand, no composer may receive more than two per cent of the 
overall sum available for the evaluation procedure.538 
Three factors determine the number of evaluation points of every composer: 
the length of his membership; the revenue generated in the allocation procedure; and 
the evaluation of his artistic personality and creation.   
Length of Membership 
Every member obtains one evaluation point for every year of membership.539  
Membership points may, however, only make up for a maximum of two-third of a 
composer’s total evaluation points.540  This limit finds its rationale in the fact that long 
membership alone cannot justify payments based on cultural importance.541  
One might, however, take the view that the chosen threshold is not sufficiently 
restrictive to put this rationale into practice, in particular if one bears in mind that 
GEMA provides for a separate pension scheme.542  Yet, on the other hand, even an 
exceptionally long membership of between 60 and 80 years could not bring a member 
within category I (in which applicable earnings are fully taken into account) but only 
category IV (in which they are taken into account at 60 per cent). 
Revenue Generated with Serious Music 
The second factor in the determination of the evaluation points is the revenue a 
composer has generated with serious music.  The royalties in all those distribution 
sections of the allocation procedure through which receipts for the use of (at least also 
partly) serious music are distributed are applicable.543  Depending on the section, the 
                                                   
537  Ibid § 5(4). 
538  Ibid § 5(2) para 3. 
539  Ibid § 5(3)(A).  All forms of membership count; Riesenhuber, GO Wertung KE, para 76. 
540  Evaluation Procedure Composers E § 5(2). 
541  Riesenhuber, GO Wertung KE, para 77. 
542  See above, on page 149. 
543  Evaluation Procedure Composers E § 5(3)(B)-(G).  In contrast to the first step of the evaluation 
procedure where a composer’s applicable earnings are determined (see above at n 531), not only 
collectively allocated royalties but also receipts that are distributed on an individual basis are taken 
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relevant bases are the earnings in the year or the average earnings in the three years 
preceding the evaluation.  For each section, a certain amount in Euros represents one 
evaluation point.  If composer gain that amount, they receive one evaluation point; if 
they earn a multiple of that amount, they receive the corresponding multiple of 
evaluation points up to a maximum limit of points obtainable in each section. 
The Rules also contain a minimum threshold of four evaluation points that 
composers must achieve through their share of royalties in order to participate in the 
evaluation procedure.544 
Entire Musical Oeuvre and Artistic Personality 
The third and final factor influencing a composer’s evaluation points is the so-
called evaluation proper, in which his or her entire musical oeuvre and artistic 
personality are assessed.545  A composer may be accorded up to 80 evaluation points546 
by an Evaluation Committee consisting of five composers of serious music and elected 
by the General Assembly.547  GEMA’s statutes do not contain any definition of the 
terms ‘entire musical oeuvre’ and ‘artistic personality’.  Yet, some clarity as to their 
meaning can be derived from the criteria that must be fulfilled for composers to 
receive more than 40 evaluation points in this regard.  Notably, such high numbers 
may only be accorded to composers ‘whose musical oeuvre can be called 
comprehensive’.548  Such composers may fall into four different sub-groups attracting 
45, 50, 60 or 80 evaluation points respectively.  The common determinant of all of 
these groups is that to qualify as comprehensive musical creation a composer’s output 
                                                                                                                                                
into account in the calculation of revenue evaluation points.  As to collective and individual 
allocation, see below at 10.1.3, on page 143. 
544  Evaluation Procedure Composers E § 5(3)(H) para 2.  Two of these points must have been obtained 
through the royalties in sections E, KI and FKI, or R and FS.  In the other sections there is no clear 
separation between serious and light music; thus the revenue does not necessarily pertain to the use 
of serious music.  Accordingly, royalties in these sections alone would not justify payments under the 
evaluation scheme for serious music; Riesenhuber, GO Wertung KE, para 89. 
545  Own translation;  in German, the terms ‘Gesamtschaffen’ and ‘künstlerische Persönlichkeit’ are used. 
546  Evaluation Procedure Composers E § 5(3)(H). 
547  Ibid § 1(1) and (2).  See also Riesenhuber, GO Wertung KE, para 4. 
548  Evaluation Procedure Composers E § 5(3)(H)(a). 
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must comprise ‘the majority of musical genres’ and, in order to attract more than 45 
points, in particular, orchestra works.549  In addition, each group lists further 
qualifications that must be met to obtain the associated number of evaluation points.  
More precisely, a composer must: 
 in order to obtain 50 points:  
(a)  demonstrate performances in Germany and abroad, and 
(b)  TV and radio broadcasts corresponding to a minimum of €450 in  
 royalties on average during the three years preceding the evaluation  
 procedure; 
 in order to obtain 60 points: 
(a) demonstrate continuous performances and broadcasts during one decade  
(b)  of works of different musical genres, comprising orchestra works 
(c) in Germany and abroad; 
 in order to obtain 80 points: 
(a) demonstrate continuous performances and broadcasts during one decade 
(b) of works of different musical genres, comprising orchestra works 
(c) as well as comprising standard or repertoire works, and 
(d) demonstrate international repute expressed through performances of his 
 works by foreign institutions or ensembles at a multitude of prominent 
 music venues. 
Composers whose musical creation does not meet the established criteria may 
still be accorded up to 40 evaluation points at the discretion of the Evaluation 
Committee in recognition of their musical creation and artistic personality.  Yet, even 
in this context, more than 15 points presuppose an ‘appropriate number of 
performances and broadcasts’.550  
                                                   
549  In order to determine the relevant musical genres, reference is made to the indices of cultural points 
in the allocation procedure, provided in Implementing Provisions A ss X and XII; see Evaluation 
Procedure Composers E § 5(3)(H)(a) para 1. 
550  Ibid § 5(3)(H)(b).  Composers of predominantly church music may attract up to 50 (§ 5(3)(H)(c)) and 
those of predominantly choral music up to 40 points (§ 5(3)(H)(d)) without an explicit requirement 
in the rules to demonstrate an appropriate number of performances and broadcasts.  In practice, 
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In light of these more detailed guidelines, it seems that the evaluation of a 
composer’s entire musical oeuvre and his artistic personality entails an assessment of his 
reputation within Germany and beyond.  Objectively measured are the use of a 
composer’s works and the variety of different genres his works comprise, yet always 
with a view to the market’s esteem.  Thus, works of a broad variety of musical genres 
attract most evaluation points if they comprise standard or repertoire works.  Likewise, 
the usage element has particular weight if the works have been performed over a long 
period of time or by highly regarded institutions in prominent venues.  One could 
therefore say that what is assessed here is a particular type of success; not the 
immediate fame that also one-hit wonders may possess, but the ability to leave an 
enduring imprint in the musical field more akin to the overall achievement of an 
author. 
11.2.3 Evaluation Payments for Authors of Works of Light Music 
With regard to light music, uniform rules govern the evaluation payments for all three 
professional categories of GEMA members.  In principle, they provide for the same 
steps as foreseen for composers of serious music.  Thus, whether a member receives an 
evaluation payment depends on his applicable earnings and evaluation points. 
11.2.3.1 The Usage Element: Applicable Earnings 
A member’s application earnings are based on the amount of collectively allocated 
royalties generated with public performances and broadcasts of his works of a light 
nature in the year prior to the evaluation procedure.551 
As GEMA explains, a member’s applicable earnings should ideally be made up 
of equal shares of performance and broadcast royalties.552  Given, however, that with 
                                                                                                                                                
however, this is one criterion that the Evaluation Committee, amongst numerous others, considers 
in assessing the overall artistic picture of a composer; see information provided by GEMA on 26 
March 2012. 
551  Relevant are distribution section U (public live performances of works of light music), VK (public live 
performances during variety, cabaret and circus shows), R (radio broadcasts), FS (TV broadcasts), and T FS 
(TV broadcasts of sound films); Evaluation Procedure U § 5(1) and (2)(para 2).  As to collective and 
individual allocation, see below at 10.1.3, on page 143. 
 - 190 - 
regard to light music broadcasting royalties typically exceed those from performances, 
the broadcasting royalties are only partly taken into account to keep a rough balance: 
for composers at a rate of 50, for lyricists at 54 and for publishers at 53 per cent.553 
11.2.3.2 The Cultural Element: Evaluation Points 
As with composers of serious music, a minimum of ten evaluation points is necessary 
to participate in the evaluation procedure at all.554  The participating members are 
classified into one of six categories depending on the number of evaluation points 
obtained.555  For each group, a certain percentage (from five to 50) is prescribed, which 
determines the rate at which a member’s applicable earnings are further taken into 
account.  For a member with between ten and 19 evaluation points (group VI), for 
instance, only five per cent of his applicable earnings are taken into account, while for 
members with more than 100 evaluation points (group I), they count at a rate of 50 
per cent.  The multiplication of a member’s applicable earnings with the relevant 
percentage results in the weighted applicable earnings. 
Again, it is the ratio of a single composer’s weighted applicable earnings to the 
total amount of the weighted applicable earnings of all composers eligible for 
evaluation payments that determines his share in the overall sum available for 
evaluation payments. 
While, in principle, the amount of a member’s evaluation payment is thus 
determined by the number of evaluation points, the same two exceptions exist that 
also applied in the evaluation of composers of serious music: on the one hand, once a 
member has reached a certain evaluation group he remains in that group even if he 
does no longer obtain the necessary amount of evaluation points in future years.556  
On the other hand, there is a cap on the overall amount of a single member’s 
                                                                                                                                                
552  Information provided by GEMA on 26 March 2012. 
553  Evaluation Procedure U § 5(1).  The percentages differ because the typical ratio between performance 
and broadcast royalties equally differs from profession to profession. 
554  Ibid § 5(2) para 3. 
555  Ibid § 5(1). 
556  Ibid § 8(a). 
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evaluation payment.  For composers and lyricists this is four and for publishers ten per 
cent of the sums available for the evaluation procedure of the respective profession.557 
Evaluation points are granted according to three criteria largely similar to those 
used for the cultural evaluation of serious music: the length of membership; the 
revenues generated by the member with light music; and his global music creation as 
well as his impact as a creator. 
Length of Membership 
Just as in the evaluation procedure for composers of serious music, one evaluation 
point is gained with each year of membership of any kind.558  For publishers, the 
amount of membership points is limited to 50.559 
Revenue Generated with Light Music 
The second relevant factor is the revenue that a member generated in the allocation 
procedure in all sections distributing receipts for the use of (at least partly) light music 
in the year prior to the evaluation procedure.560 
For each section, a certain amount for each of the professional groups 
represents one evaluation point.  Where members earned a multiple of that amount, 
they are granted the relevant multiple of evaluation points up to a prescribed 
maximum. 
A particularity exists, which is not provided for in relation to the evaluation 
payments of composers of serious music, in that there are two instances in which 
specific types of light musical works are treated favourably.  First, there is a possibility 
to supplement the evaluation points obtained for revenues earned in sections U and 
VK by up to ten points in case of so called exalted light music (“gehobene 
                                                   
557  Ibid § 5(2) paras 4 and 5.   
558  Ibid § 5(3)(A). 
559  Ibid. 
560  Ibid § 5(3)(B)–(H).  Here, the receipts from sections in which the collections are allocated on an 
individual basis are also taken into account, although they are not considered when determining the 
applicable royalties.  See also above, n 543. 
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Unterhaltungsmusik”).561  Interestingly, the allocation of additional points does not 
depend on the amount of revenues made with exalted light music but is made at the 
discretion of the Evaluation Committee.562  Second, public live performances or 
broadcasts of light musical works of particularly artistic value563 are treated favourably 
as in these cases the thresholds to receive one evaluation point are lowered.564  A 
composer or lyricist, for example, normally obtains one evaluation point for every 
€510 earned in section U.  However, if his earnings stem from works of particularly 
artistic value, one evaluation point is already granted for every €125. 
Finally, at least one-third of all eligible evaluation points must have been 
accorded because of the member’s revenue in the allocation procedure.565 
Entire Musical Oeuvre and Impact as a Creator 
Third, composers and lyricists of light music may be granted a maximum of 25 
evaluation points in recognition of their entire musical oeuvre and their impact as a 
creator;566 publishers of light music are merely evaluated as to their entire musical 
oeuvre.567  There is no indication as to how the two terms are to be understood in the 
context of light music and the question is left to the discretion of the Evaluation 
Committee. 
                                                   
561  Ibid § 5(3)(B)(aa)-(cc).  The term designates a musical genre which established itself in Germany in 
the 1920s to satisfy the demand of radio broadcasters for more easily accessible orchestra works of up 
to twenty minutes.  The popularity of works of exalted light music has decreased constantly since the 
1970s. 
562  Riesenhuber, ‘Das Wertungsverfahren in der Unterhaltungs- und Tanzmusik (GO Wertung U)’ in 
Kreile and others (eds) Recht und Praxis der GEMA (2nd edn, 2008) 629, para 47. 
563  The term ‘particularly artistic value’ has the same meaning as in the allocation procedure; 
Implementing Provisions A s XI(7).  As to its interpretation, see above, on page 162. 
564  Evaluation Procedure U § 5(3)(B)(dd) and (C)(dd). 
565  Ibid § 5(1). 
566  Own translation;  in German, the terms ‘Gesamtschaffen’ and ‘Bedeutung als Urheber’ are used. 
567  Evaluation Procedure U § 5(3)(I). 
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11.2.4 Implications for the Diversity in Online Music 
The criteria according to which GEMA calculates evaluation payments differ from the 
general principle of strictly usage-based royalty distribution.  Just as with cultural 
considerations in the allocation procedure, evaluation payments can, therefore, be 
understood as a form of redistribution.  Whether they promote diversity in online 
music remains to be assessed. 
As the evaluation payments change the overall amount of royalties of all 
GEMA members they influence the effect of incentivising musical creation that 
copyright assumes these earnings to have.  Evaluation payments would thus promote 
diversity of online music if they promoted the creation of a diverse body of musical 
works.  In order to do that, they would need to establish conditions in which all social 
groups are equally able and encouraged to create music.  Whether this is the case will 
be analysed in turn for each of the three factors that determine a member’s evaluation 
points. 
In order to determine what exactly these payments incentivise, it is necessary to 
look at the criteria that determine whether a member receives more or fewer 
evaluation points and their effects.  Do they mitigate the imbalances of a usage-based 
royalty allocation in such a way that all cultural groups are equally enabled or 
encouraged to create music? 
The first such factor is the length of a member’s membership to GEMA.  
Assessed against the objective to encourage all cultural groups to create music, 
allocating one evaluation point for every year of membership appears neutral.  
Membership to GEMA is open to musical authors irrespective of their cultural 
affiliations and, accordingly, every cultural group is able to collect evaluation points 
based on membership.  On the other hand, the imbalances in incentivising musical 
creation that arise from a strictly usage-based allocation remain unaffected. 
The second important factor that determines a member’s evaluation payments 
is the royalties that were earned in the allocation procedure.  Usage is thus also a 
criterion for evaluation payments.  Sometimes German case law and commentary has 
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argued that a member’s earnings in the allocation procedure indicated the market’s 
appreciation for the member’s works and that such market appreciation was suitable to 
determine which works were culturally important.568  This, however, reveals an 
evaluative understanding of cultural worth that cannot be reconciled with the 2005 
Convention and the principle of equal dignity of and respect for all cultures.  In as 
much as use determines which GEMA members receive evaluation payments and to 
what extent, the incentivising effects of the resulting payments are the same as under a 
strictly usage-based distribution: they would seem to not stimulate the creation of 
diverse music but of music that appeals to a majority audience. 
Third, a member’s evaluation points depend on his entire musical oeuvre and 
his artistic personality (serious music) or his impact as a creator (light music).  In 
relation to composers and lyricists of serious music, GEMA assesses the repute that the 
member and his works enjoy in the musical field.  But do payments in recognition of 
authors’ repute encourage all cultural groups to create music?  Rewarding repute has 
different effects than rewarding commercial success as indicated by use.  Both, 
however, are evaluative criteria, the difference being that everyone consuming music 
secedes the latter, while the first depends on the esteem of the musical elite.  In both 
instances, some music is regarded more valuable than other music, which cannot be 
reconciled with the equal dignity of and respect for all cultural groups and thus is 
inappropriate to promote musical diversity.   
It must not be overlooked, however, that the evaluation proper of composers 
of serious music deems it an indication of repute if an author’s works comprise the 
majority of musical genres.  Is the recognition of such musical variety not an incentive 
for diverse musical creation?  Two aspects suggest that this conclusion would be 
inaccurate.  First, it is not musical variety per se that is decisive but musical variety if it 
contains complex musical works; high evaluation points are thus only accorded to 
works comprising the majority of genres and orchestra works.  Arguably, it is, 
                                                   
568  Case 5 U 5185/00 [2004] ZUM 380 (Kammergericht Berlin, 10 May 2002) 385; Riesenhuber, GO 
Wertung KE, para 79. 
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therefore, the inappropriate criterion of complexity569 that more indirectly resurfaces 
in determining repute.  Second, musical variety is only assessed against GEMA’s pre-
established categories of works; authors creating music not fitting easily into this 
categorisation will thus find it difficult to obtain repute-driven evaluation points. 
Furthermore, the Evaluation Committee has some flexibility in according up to 
40 evaluation points based on an author’s entire musical oeuvre and his artistic 
personality.  As GEMA’s rules do not define these terms, it could be that the 
Committee applies criteria more amenable to promoting diverse music that those 
addressed so far.  In practice, however, this is not the case.  GEMA reports that the 
Committee assesses the overall impression of any author in comparison to all other 
eligible authors.  In so doing, it establishes the cultural impact of that author and his 
oeuvre through diverse aspects.  It considers, for example, the way in which the author 
is covered in the specialised press, the artists that perform the authors’ works, the 
venues in which the works are performed, and whether an author’s works represent a 
range of different genres.570  Even in exercising its discretionary power, the Committee 
thus implements the described notion of repute. 
In relation to composers, lyricists and publishers of light music, the rules in the 
Distribution plan do not provide much information as to how a member’s entire 
musical oeuvre and his impact as a creator is to be assessed and leave this determination 
to the Evaluation Committee.  In practice, the Committee applies exactly the same 
criteria as in relation to serious music.  It establishes the cultural impact of that author 
and his oeuvre and compared this overall impression to that of all other eligible 
authors.571 
There are two additional instances in which certain musical works are treated 
favourably and which thus, in theory, could have the potential to supplement the 
criterion of repute with considerations more suitable for promoting diverse musical 
                                                   
569  See above at 11.1.4.2, on page 160. 
570  Information provided by GEMA on 26 March 2012. 
571  Information provided by GEMA on 26 March 2012.  Again, the relevant aspects are: coverage in 
specialised press, artists performing the authors’ works, venues in which the works are performed, 
and whether an author’s works represent a range of different genres. 
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creation.  First, the Evaluation Committee for light music may, at its discretion, 
allocate additional evaluation points to exalted light music.572  In the current practice 
of the Evaluation Committee, however, this option is used to reward authors whose 
works have seen a popular demand for performances over many years.573  Second, light 
music of particularly artistic value receives higher revenue evaluation points.  In 
determining particular artistic value, however, GEMA resorts to the inappropriate 
criterion of complexity.574  Hence, both particularities do not introduce considerations 
that are more appropriate for promoting the creation of diverse music. 
Being based on a member’s repute in Germany and abroad, the evaluation 
proper for both serious and light music thus uses a criterion that is unable to promote 
diverse musical creation. 
Finally, the impression that the evaluation payments are not a suitable means 
for promoting a diverse musical creation is reinforced if one assesses the rules as a 
whole and the interplay between the three separate criteria.  Then, a conservational 
effect is clearly discernible, protecting those already benefitting from evaluation 
payments and creating entry barriers for newcomers.  Such partitioning perpetuates 
imperfect states of musical pluralism and hampers intercultural dialogue and 
exchange.  In more concrete terms, this effect is caused by four factors: first, requiring 
a minimum of ten points to be eligible for payments at all,575 second, computing the 
revenue-based evaluation points of authors of serious music through the three-year 
average of allocation royalties,576 third, making participation in the evaluation proper 
dependent on a minimum of four (serious music) or two (light music) revenue-based 
evaluation points,577 and finally, keeping members in their evaluation groups even if 
the necessary conditions could no longer be fulfilled.578  With these particular features, 
                                                   
572  Evaluation Procedure U § 5(3)(B)(aa)-(cc);  see above, on page 185. 
573  Information provided by GEMA on 26 March 2012. 
574  See above, on page 162. 
575  Evaluation Procedure Composers E § 5(1); Evaluation Procedure U § 5(2) para 3. 
576  Evaluation Procedure Composers E § 5(3)(B) (E) and (G). 
577  Evaluation Procedure Composers E § 5(3) para 2; Evaluation Procedure U § 5(2) para 3. 
578  Evaluation Procedure Composers E § 5(4); Evaluation Procedure U § 8(a). 
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the evaluation payments maintain the status of a particular group of GEMA members.  
This, however, is likely to prevent diverse musical creation instead of promoting it.579  
In conclusion, evaluation payments favour successful, long-standing members 
with a high repute and fail to encourage all cultural groups to create music. 
11.3 The Promotion of Culturally Important Works through Adjustment 
Funds 
The monies available for the evaluation procedures of composers, lyricists and 
publishers of both serious and light music not only finance the described evaluation 
payments but also the adjustment funds that exist for each of the professional 
groups.580  These funds have mainly two purposes:  to compensate for hardship and to 
promote contemporary music.  In both instances, the support for culturally important 
works plays a certain role. 
11.3.1 Compensation for Hardship 
Where GEMA members endure hardship, they may – under certain conditions – 
receive compensation payments.  Amongst the possible grounds for such payments, 
one is culturally motivated.  It concerns cases in which, although a member and his 
                                                   
579  The general ceilings are inappropriate to mitigate these conservational effects.  Notably, individual 
evaluation payment cannot be higher than two (composers and lyricists of serious music), four 
(composers and lyricists of light music), or ten (publishers of light music) per cent of the overall 
available funds for the evaluation procedure of the professional group concerned; see Evaluation 
Procedure Composers E § 5(2) para 3; Evaluation Procedure U § 5(2) paras 4-5.  This provides for more 
equity amongst all those that receive evaluation payments but does not bridge the gap between all of 
them and those non-eligible for such payments. 
580  For composers and lyricists of serious music these funds are financed by a maximum of three 
(compensation for hardship) and 20 per cent (promotion of contemporary music) of the overall 
sums available for their evaluation procedure; Evaluation Procedure Composers E § 4(1)-(3); Evaluation 
Procedure Lyricists E § 2.  For publishers of serious music, a cumulative ceiling of 20 per cent applies; 
Evaluation Procedure Publishers E § 3(1).  As far as composers, lyricists and publishers of light music 
are concerned, a cumulative maximum of ten per cent of their respective evaluation sums applies; 
Evaluation Procedure U § 4(1) and (2). 
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entire musical works are deemed culturally important, there is so little demand for the 
works that the member does not receive evaluation payments.581 
Such support must be rejected as a suited means to promote the creation of 
diverse music for two reasons.  First, culturally motivated eligibility is determined 
exactly as in the evaluation proper, ie depends on the member’s entire musical oeuvre 
and his artistic personality (serious music) or impact as a creator (light music) and thus 
on criteria inappropriate to reach that objective.  Moreover, support of the discussed 
kind is only granted to compensate for a particular case of hardship582 and therefore 
cannot unfold any incentivising effects. 
11.3.2 Promotion of Contemporary Music 
GEMA may also provide monies from the adjustment funds ‘for the promotion of the 
creation of contemporary music’.  While this type of support already existed for 
publishers of serious music, GEMA’s General Assembly introduced it for composers of 
serious music in 2006583 and for composers, lyricists and publishers of light music in 
2007.584  Initially only adopted for a period of three years, these schemes have been 
prolonged every year thereafter.585 
The rules for the evaluation procedures do not specify how the term 
‘promotion of the creation of contemporary music’ is to be understood.  Therefore the 
Evaluation Committees have a broad margin of discretion,586 the boundaries being 
                                                   
581  It applies to ‘members whose works were artistically successful or particularly eligible for support on 
cultural grounds’; Evaluation Procedure Publishers E § 4(2); Evaluation Procedure U § 4(2).  See also, in 
more detail, Hauptmann 107–108. 
582  Riesenhuber, GO Wertung KE, para 68; Riesenhuber, GO Wertung U, para 23. 
583  Evaluation Procedure Publishers E § 4(3).  Due to the cross reference in Evaluation Procedure Lyricists E 
§ 2 the same applies to lyricists of serious music.  Originally, support for the creation of 
contemporary music was limited to ten per cent of the sums available for the respective evaluation 
procedure.  This limit was raised to twenty per cent in 2008. 
584  Evaluation Procedure U § 4(3). 
585  Currently, the support is limited to the evaluation procedures for in the years 2008 to 2013 
(composers of serious music) and 2007 to 2013 (light music); Evaluation Procedure Publishers E 
§ 4(3) fn 2; Evaluation Procedure U § 4(3) fn 1. 
586  Riesenhuber, GO Wertung KE, para 70a; Riesenhuber, ‘Das Wertungsverfahren der Verleger in der 
Sparte E (GO Wertung VE)’ in Kreile and others (eds) Recht und Praxis der GEMA (2nd edn, 2008) 
 
 - 199 - 
that decisions may not be arbitrary and must be guided by the principle of non-
discrimination.587  In practice, to determine a member’s eligibility for support, the 
Committees conduct a global assessment and compare the member concerned to all 
other members in the same evaluation procedure.588  The use of a member’s works also 
plays a role; while it is not categorically ruled out for a member to receive funding if 
his works are not used, this would be unusual.589  
Given the lack of clear guidelines, it is not an easy task to assess whether this 
mechanism promotes the creation of diverse music.  It is striking, however, that the 
evaluation proper is also characterised by the global assessment of a member.  One 
may thus be inclined to assume that the same criteria underpinning the assessment in 
that context equally determine support for contemporary music.   
With regard to serious music, this conclusion is not far-fetched, as can be seen 
from the explanatory notes that accompanied the motion to create the mechanism in 
2006.  More precisely, the submitters complained that evaluation payments for 
composers of serious music functioned less and less in the intended way of benefitting 
those whose works were commercially successful but at the same time also enjoyed 
artistic reputation.  In 2004, almost half of the evaluation payments for composers of 
serious music were allocated to composers whose works were often performed but 
never broadcast and who did not have a noticeable impact on the public.590  
Consequently, it was proposed that the new support for contemporary serious music 
be based on a composer’s public reputation.591  Apparently, this is current practice.  In 
2012, GEMA presented a motion to the General Assembly to make the support for 
serious contemporary music permanent.  In the explanatory remarks, the society noted 
                                                                                                                                                
620, para 10. 
587  Information provided by GEMA on 26 March 2012. 
588  Information provided by GEMA on 26 March 2012. 
589  Information provided by GEMA on 6 April 2012. 
590  ‘Motion No 31 presented at GEMA General Assembly 2006’ [2006] GEMA-Nachrichten 104. 
591  Originally, the motion suggested that the applicable rules should explicitly contain the following 
criteria:  performances/broadcasts in Germany and abroad through reputed orchestras and 
performers in renowned venues, in well-know concert series of contemporary serous music, impact 
in specialised press and supra-regional publications.  The changed text of the rules as adopted, 
however, did not reproduce these criteria; see ibid. 
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that the grant of support was guided by the principle of solidarity592 and by diverse 
aspects pertaining to the cultural impact of an author’s personality.593  From that 
perspective, the support for contemporary serious music would, in effect, reinforce the 
purpose of the evaluation payments albeit for a more exclusive circle of eligible 
members.  Recompensing authors with a particularly high public reputation, however, 
would be an evaluative consideration unable to encourage all cultural groups to create 
music.594 
In relation to contemporary light music, the allocation of support seems to 
follow more flexible rules.  In 2012, GEMA proposed to extend the validity of the 
mechanism but, in contrast to the motion in relation to contemporary serious music, 
limited to another two years.  It explained that this was necessary to further develop 
the concepts for the individual support of contemporary light music and to observe 
their implementation.595  This suggests that best practices in funding contemporary 
light music are still to be found. 
Moreover, the sums available for the promotion of contemporary music of 
both a serious and light nature also fund GEMA’s European Music Author’s 
Scholarship,596 a scheme designed to promote cross-border cooperation among the 
members of European authors’ societies.  Eligible for grants of up to €5,000 are 
projects in all genres or styles of music and particularly those with creative and 
                                                   
592  The reference to the ‘principle of solidarity’ does not preclude a preferential treatment of reputed 
authors of serious music.  While the term has many dimensions and could, if looked at with an 
open mind, equally be understood as solidarity between successful and unsuccessful members, in 
GEMA parlance it appears to indicate solidarity between successful and reputed members.  As to 
elements of solidarity inherent in the collective administration of copyright, see above at 10.1.3, on 
page 143. 
593  GEMA, Tagesordnung Mitgliederversammlung 2012 (2012) motion 48.  It is further stated that the 
scheme had stood the test of time and become an indispensable targeted instrument of cultural 
support. 
594  This has already been shown in the context of the evaluation payments;  see above on page 188. 
595  GEMA, Tagesordnung Mitgliederversammlung 2012 (2012) motion 51. 
596  Statutes of the European Music Author’s Scholarship of GEMA, s 3; confirmed through information 
provided by GEMA on 26 March 2012.  It should, however, be added that although the scheme was 
intended to be of permanent nature, the Internet address that GEMA specifically communicated 
when launching it, <https://www.gema.de/emas>, nowadays only leads to a general landing page 
which does not hold any information on the status of the scheme, nor currently solicits new 
applications. 
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innovative character.597  This, however, appears broad enough to equally target authors 
who have not yet reached any particular standing as a composer.  It also suggests that 
not all of the monies available for the support of contemporary serious music are used 
according to standards of reputation. 
In so far as contemporary music is promoted through grants and individual, 
targeted measures, such support seems to serve a different purpose than the 
mechanisms aiming to redistribute some of the royalties.  The latter benefit every one 
of GEMA’s members whose works have been used during the year prior to the 
allocation and evaluation procedures.  Because every (prospective) author knows their 
basic functioning, royalty payments have the potential to incentivise musical creation 
in a very general way.  Support for contemporary music, if understood in the second, 
more flexible way, does not display these features.  As this benefit is only granted to 
some members and as its criteria are much less clearly delineated, it cannot be counted 
on by authors in the same way and is therefore unable to produce a comparable 
general stimulus or any redistributive effect.  Its nature is more selective, as 
exemplified by the European Music Author’s Scholarship, through which specific 
projects may be funded.  This does not encourage musical creation through the 
promise of ex post rewards but through very concrete and targeted pre-financing. 
But how would such direct means of support need to be implemented in order 
to promote diverse musical creation?  As a first requirement, support would need to be 
open to all cultural groups and thus all possible musical genres.  This should not only 
be stipulated in relation to particular projects funded by some of the money available 
for the support of contemporary music but be included in the applicable rules.  
Equally important, however, would be how the support is administered in practice and 
whether, on the whole, it satisfies the exigencies established by the principle of equal 
dignity of and respect for all cultural groups.  Given its selective impact, this type of 
support cannot be expected to generally level out the imbalances in the 
encouragement of every cultural group to create music that results from a usage-based 
                                                   
597  Statutes of the European Music Author’s Scholarship of GEMA, ss 1.4 and 2.3. 
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distribution of royalties.598  Arguably, however, the institutional knowledge that 
GEMA has of the large gap between the few authors with high and the many with 
moderate or little royalty revenues must also be taken into account when 
administering such targeted support for contemporary music.  It should therefore 
primarily be targeted at those authors for whom copyright royalties do not have the 
expected incentivising effect. 
In conclusion, it appears as if GEMA’s support for contemporary music could 
be an appropriate tool to promote the creation of diverse music.  Given the lack of 
transparency as to how the measures are implemented, it is uncertain whether GEMA 
employs it to these ends. 
11.4 Other Forms of Cultural Support 
Finally, there are two other major projects that GEMA itself sees within the ambit of 
its cultural vocation: the German Music Authors’ Award and the Initiative Musik. 
11.4.1 The German Music Authors’ Award 
The German Music Authors’ Award took place for the first time in 2009 and has been 
organised by GEMA every year thereafter.  In a total of ten categories the award, 
according to GEMA, aims to honour those members who contribute considerably to 
the cultural diversity in the music industries through their creativity.599  In all but the 
category ‘most successful work’, the winners are chosen by an independent jury of 
musical authors themselves.  Only in the category of ‘best up and coming author’ the 
award carries a value of €10,000; otherwise it bestows non-material recognition upon 
its holders and, at a more general level, raises awareness amongst the general public of 
composers and lyricists who are often side-lined in the broader public perception by 
the artists performing their works. 
                                                   
598  See also above, on page 169. 
599  Information provided by GEMA on 6 April 2012.  See also <http://www.musikautorenpreis.de>. 
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But does the award help build an environment which encourages all cultural 
groups to create music?  Clearly, it serves purposes different from those of general 
incentives in form of royalty payments or direct funding.  First, it financially promotes 
the future work of the award holder in the ‘up and coming author’ category.  Beyond 
that, the prize recognises the achievements of only ten of the more than 64,000 
GEMA members.  Yet, putting the spotlight on a selective number of authors still has 
a potential impact on all GEMA members in the sense that they feel that their work is 
valued and appreciated by society at large.  In a diffuse way, this serves as an 
encouragement to continue their work provided that authors can identify with the 
award holders.  For all cultural groups to feel this way, it would be necessary that 
GEMA also honoured a representative of those smaller genres that neither are 
particularly successful nor benefit from the various instruments in the allocation and 
evaluation procedure rewarding musical complexity and reputation.  That winners are 
chosen irrespective of their commercial success is a declared goal and assured through 
the independent jury.  The criteria according to which this jury recognises outstanding 
artistic quality, however, are not known.  Should the ideal of either complexity or 
reputation also be decisive in this forum, some cultural groups may be left behind; 
then the award as a whole would be unable to promote the creation of diverse music.   
11.4.2 Initiative Musik 
Created as a joint venture between the German Music Council, GEMA and the 
German society of performers and producers of sound recordings GVL, Initiative 
Musik aims to promote newcomers, disseminate German music abroad and foster the 
integration of migrants.  With an amount of more than €2 million, the German 
government provides the main source of funding while GVL on the one and GEMA 
and the GEMA Foundation600 on the other hand, contribute an annual amount of 
€180,000.601  Since 2008, the initiative has provided grants for more than 450 
                                                   
600  The GEMA Foundation is a non-profit organisation whose activities are funded by private 
contributions.   It supports contemporary composers and lyricists in all musical areas through grants; 
see <https://www.gema.de/die-gema/gema-stiftung.html>. 
601  See <http://www.initiative-musik.de/initiative-musik/zielsetzung.html>. 
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infrastructure or artist projects in its main areas of activity:  contemporary music, rock, 
pop and jazz. 
In order to assess whether Initiative Musik promotes the creation of diverse 
music, it would be necessary to take a closer look at the projects that have been funded 
so far.  What can be said with certainty, however, is that amongst the declared goals of 
the initiative is the integration of a particular cultural minority, notably those of 
migrants.  This would seem to be well in line with the aim of building an enabling 
environment that encourages all cultural groups to create music and thus the 
promotion of diversity in online music.  In any case, GEMA’s involvement is limited 
to providing funding; it has no say in deciding which projects to support.602 
11.5 Concluding Remarks and Broader Outlook 
The question of whether GEMA’s cultural activities promote the creation of diverse 
music, for the most part, has to be answered in the negative. 
Those selective measures that allow for targeted support of individual authors 
(the promotion of contemporary light music, the German Music Author’s Award and 
the support of Initiative Musik) at least have the potential to be used in a way that 
encourages diverse musical creation.  This, however, pre-supposes that they are 
allocated in accordance with the principle of equal dignity of and respect for all 
cultural groups.  Arguably, this would require paying particular attention to those 
members whose royalty payments are too low to have an incentivising effect. 
The majority of GEMA’s measures to promote culturally important works 
(favourable treatment in the allocation procedure, the evaluation payments and much 
of the support for contemporary serious music) aim to redistribute the copyright 
royalties of its members.  To that end, GEMA introduces various additional elements 
into the demand-driven, usage-based calculation of the royalties, notably musical 
                                                   
602  These decisions are made by the board of directors which is made up of representatives from politics 
and representatives from the German music industry; see <http://www.initiative-musik.de/initiative-
musik/der-aufsichtsrat.html>. 
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complexity, length of membership and an author’s reputation.  Yet, all these criteria 
are evaluative in that they favour a particular group of existing GEMA members and 
therefore unsuitable to promote the creation of diverse music.  This does not mean, 
however, that a redistribution of royalties could never comply with the promotion of 
diverse musical creation; notably, if it was specifically designed to redress the 
shortcomings of a strictly usage-based royalty distribution.603   
While the criteria upon which GEMA bases its explicitly cultural activities are 
unable to encourage all groups to create music, one may still wonder whether musical 
creation would not be even less diverse without them.  Admittedly, those authors will 
benefit from the redistribution of royalties who do not have much commercial success 
but fit the employed criteria.  As a result, there will be authors who are encouraged to 
create music under these criteria and would not be under a strictly usage-based 
distribution.  Yet such consequences are merely incidental as GEMA’s cultural criteria 
are not targeted to level out the fact that a strictly usage-based distribution encourages 
cultural groups to create music only in an imbalanced way but follows their own 
evaluative agenda.   
In summary, although there are possible ways for collecting societies to 
promote diverse musical creation, most of the measures with which GEMA aims to 
promote culturally important works have proved inappropriate to reach that objective.  
Selective schemes with a more open approach have the potential to promote diverse 
musical creation; whether they do so in practice, however, could not be established. 
To place these findings into proper context, it should not be forgotten that the 
system of collective management of authors’ rights has certain in-built features of 
solidarity that benefit less successful members more strongly than successful ones.604  
While these solidarity elements would therefore a priori appear to be suitable means to 
promote a diverse musical creation, their practical effect would need to be studied in 
more detail.  This analysis, however, lies outside the scope of this chapter.   
                                                   
603  See above at 11.1.4.3 on page 166. 
604  See above at 10.1.3, on page 143. 
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Based on these findings on the relationship of GEMA’s cultural activities and 
the promotion of musical diversity, some broader remarks on copyright, collective 
licensing, support for the arts and cultural diversity can be formulated. 
Copyright, Collective Management of Authors’ Rights and the Creation of Diverse Music 
The rationale and functioning of copyright are increasingly being questioned and 
there is little agreement whether it is a suitable means for promoting the creation of 
diverse cultural works.  More specifically, economic research points out that it remains 
a mere assumption that copyright stimulates the creation of new works and that it is 
still unknown what exactly copyright achieves as an economic incentive.605  More 
precisely, the case is made that many authors and artists seem to be driven by intrinsic 
motivation rather than economic considerations.606  In relation to music, it has been 
pointed out that there is no historical evidence that the mere existence of copyright 
has promoted the creation of artistically satisfactory musical works and that copyright 
can be detrimental to musical diversity if protection becomes the cause of creativity.607  
This has led some to conclude that the relationship between copyright and the 
diversity of cultural expressions was dysfunctional608 or that copyright should be 
abolished all together.609  
Although it may be time to fundamentally re-think copyright and the way it 
works, this is not what the present study seeks to achieve.  Our analysis of GEMA’s 
cultural functions is rather based on the simple truth that copyright provides musical 
authors with economic rights that they usually choose to have collectively administered 
by an authors’ society.  For authors, these rights become tangible in form of royalty 
payments.  Finally, the evidence showing that royalties benefit musical authors in very 
                                                   
605  Towse, ‘What We Know, What We Don't Know and What Policy-makers Would Like Us to Know 
about the Economics of Copyright’ (2011) 8 Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 101, 
117. 
606  Kretschmer 35, citing a number of cultural economics accounts. 
607  Rahmatian, ‘Is copyright good for music?’ (2010) 5 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 
869, 869, 871. 
608  Macmillan, ‘The Dysfunctional Relationship between Copyright and Cultural Diversity’ [2007] 
Quaderns del CAC 101. 
609  Smiers, ‘The Abolition of Copyright’ (2000) 62 International Communication Gazette 379. 
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unbalanced ways cannot be disregarded.610  Assuming, as the law does, that royalty 
payments do have an incentivising effect, a first conclusion must, therefore, be that 
copyright stimulates the creation of music from cultural groups that are already 
commercially successful in much stronger ways than the music of cultural groups less 
asserted in society.  Not equally encouraging all social groups to create music, it is thus 
unable to promote the creation of diverse music.  This, however, defies the often-
raised claim that because copyright stimulates the creation of new works it incentivises 
diversity.  Such a view is too simplistic and disregards that musical diversity is more 
than the sheer number of created musical works.611  This leaves us with an ambiguous 
result.  On the one hand, copyright is too powerful an instrument that its effects on 
the creation of music can be ignored.  On the other hand, these effects are too 
sweeping to accommodate the normative aspect of cultural pluralism and fulfil the 
postulate of diverse musical creation.  The task must, therefore, be to acknowledge the 
role of copyright and find ways to remedy the existing dysfunction from within the 
framework of the existing law.612  It is against this theoretical background that our 
analysis of GEMA’s cultural functions must be seen. 
Promoting Culturally Important Works, the National Arts and the Creation of Diverse 
Music 
To conclude that the cultural activities do not promote a diverse musical 
creation does not imply that GEMA’s cultural support was illegitimate or may not 
have positive effects on the musical development in Germany.  In particular, the 
statutory requirement to ‘promote culturally important works’ (UrhWG § 7) is 
deliberately general.  While musical works could be understood to be culturally 
                                                   
610  As to the relationship of copyright and diverse musical creation, see also above at 8.1.1, on page 104, 
as well as at 11.1.4.3, on page 166. 
611  In Stirling’s terms, such a view only considers variety and neglects the equally important factors of 
balance and disparity; see above 9.1, on page 115. 
612  For Macmillan, the dysfunctional relationship between copyright and cultural diversity shows in 
particular in the domination of cultural output by multinational media and entertainment 
corporations.  Although this is a great source of concern, our starting point is the moment of 
creation of a new work.  Even a pluralistic media landscape could not offer much diversity if the 
body of created works is not diverse. 
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important if they are diverse, this is not prescribed by the broad wording as the only 
possible interpretation.  Equally extensive is the provision in the CISAC Model 
Agreements that allows an authors’ society to deduct ten per cent of the collected 
performing royalties for cultural and social purposes when it speaks of ‘the promotion 
of the national arts’.613  Both formulations are extensive enough that musical support 
may be based on evaluative criteria.  The reason is simple:  § 8(II) of the CISAC Model 
Agreement and UrhWG § 7 date from 1958614 and 1965 respectively and both 
provisions have remained unchanged until today.  At the time of their creation, 
however, pluralism only slowly started to be recognised in international law and 
intergovernmental practice as a value for cultural policies.615  Against this background, 
it is not surprising that the mechanisms used by GEMA have not changed direction 
either. 
The difference between such a traditional, evaluative approach to cultural 
support and the notion of diversity of cultural expressions must also be born in mind 
when assessing whether the allowed percentage of cultural and social deductions under 
the CISAC Model Agreement should be increased.  Adolf Dietz proposed a sliding scale 
of allowed deduction, in which the percentages would be higher the more imbalanced 
the mutual copyright exchanges between the societies are.616  Collecting societies in 
countries in which the large majority of royalties fall upon foreign right holders and 
must, therefore, be paid out to sister societies should be able to retain a higher 
percentage for the promotion of national authors.  Certainly, such a higher percentage 
would have the potential to counter the growing global homogenisation in cultural 
products that is often seen as threatening smaller, local cultures.617  In light of the 
                                                   
613  CISAC Model Agreement § 8(II). 
614  Dittrich, ‘Der Grundsatz der Inländerbehandlung der RBÜ und die sogenannte soziale Hälfte’ in 
Dittrich (ed) Festschrift 50 Jahre Urheberrechtsgesetz (1986) 63, 88, who provides detailed information 
on the preparatory work. 
615  See in detail above 6.3, on page 34. 
616  Dietz, Cultural Functions of Collecting Societies (2010) 67, with more detailed explanations of the 
envisaged scheme and how the law would need to be changed to accommodate it. 
617  Already in 1958, the introduction of the ten per cent rule was justified by considerations of 
solidarity between collecting societies.  The minutes of the CISAC Congress adopting that rule 
characterised the deduction as ‘un abandon volontaire de la part des Sociétés les plus importantes pour 
permettre aux autres Sociétés d’alimenter leurs caisses de pensions, d’assistance, culturelles et autres, ce qu’elles 
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results of the analysis of GEMA’s cultural functions, it would appear doubtful whether 
the diversity of cultural expressions would be able to justify such a redistribution 
mechanism between collecting societies.  Arguably, this could not be the case where 
the promotion of diverse music was not a value treasured by the withholding collecting 
society when it allocates such increased sums for cultural support. 
The Appropriate Guardian of Diverse Musical Creation – A Policy Question 
At the end of our analysis of GEMA’s cultural activities, a final question remains.  In 
as far as collecting societies could promote the creation of diverse music through their 
cultural schemes but do not choose to do so, would it be better if cultural support was 
provided by the state rather than a collecting society?  In many states, governments 
support musical authors through various means; sometimes even in parallel with the 
schemes of authors’ societies.618  
There is a lot to argue in favour of supporting musical creation through 
collecting societies.  Given that their members are authors and publishers themselves, 
one may be inclined to trust that they are better placed to decide what to support than 
a government agency where their executive body acts with democratic legitimation 
from all members.619  Moreover, it could be argued that the submitted proposal of 
cultural reallocation to cushion the imbalanced effects of a strictly usage-based royalty 
distribution could sensibly be put in place only by collecting societies as they control 
the necessary usage data.  Further, if a collecting society introduced such cultural 
redistribution, it would have the benefit of being a voluntary scheme agreed on by all 
its members.  The ability of states to implement a similar mechanism, on the other 
hand, may prove problematic from a constitutional point of view.   
                                                                                                                                                
ne pourraient faire que difficilement sans cela ; ledit abandon constituant en quelque sorte une contrepartie des 
services rendus par ces dernières aux Sociétés des pays grands producteurs de musique’; see Dittrich 88. 
618  For an overview of the manifold form that such cultural support may take, see Cliche; Riklin, Das 
Urheberrecht als individuelles Herrschaftsrecht und seine Stellung im Rahmen der zentralen Wahrnehmung 
urheberrechtlicher Befugnisse sowie der Kunstförderung (1978) 275–289.  In particular in relation to music: 
Liebowitz and Watt, ‘How to Best Ensure Remuneration for Creators in the Market for Music?’ 
(2006) 20 Journal of Economic Surveys 513, 525–536. 
619  Riesenhuber, GO Wertung KE, para 87. 
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Cultural support by a state would have the advantage that it would, unlike 
GEMA’s cultural schemes for example, not make eligibility dependent on whether an 
author is a member of a collecting society.  Although membership to a collecting 
society should be open to all authors, particularly young and (yet) unsuccessful artists 
may be hesitant to join; not only would a membership fee be due but once authors 
have joined a society, they would also have to pay licence fees if they wanted to 
publicly perform their own songs.620  On a different note, public support through 
states would be borne by all tax-payers, whereas the cultural activities of collecting 
societies are financed by its members.621  
In light of these considerations, it is, in the end, a political question of whether 
musical support should be exercised by collecting societies or states themselves and 
thus one that cannot be decided in this study.  As a result of the present assessment, 
however, it can be said that cultural policies would need to follow certain rules.  
Where states do prescribe cultural functions to collecting societies they should, if they 
want to implement the 2005 Convention, make sure that the delegated cultural 
activities serve the objective to promote the diversity of cultural expressions.  In 
Germany, this could be achieved by revising the statutory obligation in UrhWG § 7.  
On the other hand, where states provide support for musical authors themselves, their 
schemes would equally have to fulfil the criteria for the promotion of diverse musical 
creation that have been elaborated upon throughout the assessment of GEMA’s 
cultural schemes.  In addition, it could be maintained that the principle of equal 
dignity of and respect for all cultures required a state to take due account of the 
imbalanced effect of copyright on musical authors.  Arguably, state measures should 
then primarily benefit those whose copyright revenues are not sufficiently substantial 
to incentivise creation. 
                                                   
620  In theory, however, nothing prevents authors’ societies form opening up their support to non-
members. 
621  Depending on the perspective, one may also argue that, in the end, all those who use music fund 
these activities;  after all the necessary monies are taken from the collected royalties; see also Kohn 
and Kohn, Kohn on Music Licensing (4th edn, 2010) 197. 
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Part 5:  The State of Diversity in Online Music after EU Intervention 
The last part of the thesis enquires whether the way in which the EU has shaped the 
framework for the licensing of authors’ rights in online music promotes the diversity 
of that cultural marker.  Relevant in this regard are the 2005 Commission 
Recommendation on Collective Cross-border Management of Copyright and Related 
Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services622 and the 2008 Commission Decision in 
the CISAC case.623   
This part seeks to determine whether the practical effects that these two 
measures have had were conducive to the diversity of online music.  In so doing, the 
analysis is based on the criteria that were developed in part 3 to develop the concept of 
diversity in online music into a workable guideline for policy choices in the licensing 
framework. 
                                                   
622  European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 18 October 2005 on Collective Cross-border 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music Services [2005] OJ L 276/54. 
623  CISAC (COMP/C2/38.698). 
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12 The 2005 European Commission Recommendation 
The 2005 Recommendation presents the first attempt on the side of the European 
Commission to regulate the collective management of copyright through legislative 
means.624  The existing eight Directives on copyright matters had accepted collective 
licensing as a given without introducing any substantive standards.625  
12.1 The Context of the 2005 Recommendation 
Collective rights management was already addressed in the 1995 Green Paper on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society626 and its 1996 Follow-up 
Communication.627  At that time, the main issue was the licensing of multimedia 
works.  On a more general note, the Commission recognised that  
‘there are already indications for the need to define, both under the Single 
Market and the competition rules of the EC Treaty, at Community level 
the rights and obligations of collecting societies, in particular with respect 
                                                   
624  The activities of collecting societies have, however, regularly been subject to ex post scrutiny under 
EU competition law rules; for an extensive overview of the relevant cases during the last more than 
forty years see, for example, Schierholz, ‘Collective Rights Management in Europe - Practice and 
Legal Framework’ in Walter and von Lewinski (eds) European Copyright Law (2010) 1145, 
paras 12.0.23-12.0.37; Lánchidi, Collective Management of Music Rights and Competition Policy in the 
European Union (2010) 135–149; Frabboni, Collective Management of Music Rights: A Test of Competition 
and Industrial Organisation Theories (2009) 134–177. 
625  Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on Rental 
Right and Lending Right and on Certain Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property 
(Codified Version) 2006 OJ, 28, Article 5(3) and (4) stipulate that member states may entrust the 
administration of the right to obtain an equitable remuneration for rental to collecting societies and 
that such administration may also be imposed; Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on 
the Coordination of Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to 
Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission [1993] OJ L 248/15, Article 9(1) provides for a 
mandatory administration of the cable retransmission right through collecting societies; Directive 
2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the Resale Right for 
the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art (2001) Article 6(2) allows member states to provide 
for compulsory or optional collective management of the resale right.  See, for a more detailed 
overview, Schierholz paras 12.0.38-12.0.44. 
626  European Commission, Green Paper Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (1995) 69–
78. 
627  European Commission, Communication from the Commission - Follow-up to the Green Paper on Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Information Society (1996) 24–27. 
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to the methods of collecting, to the calculation of tariffs, to the supervision 
mechanisms, and to the application of the rules on competition to 
collecting societies and collective management’.628 
This notwithstanding, the Commission decided that the development of 
collective licensing ‘should be left, at least for the time being, to the market’.629  
After a long phase of extensively exploring the issue further,630 the European 
Commission announced legislative action in the field of collective management in its 
April 2004 Communication on the Management of Copyright and Related Rights in 
the Internal Market.631  Important for our purposes are the Commission’s remarks 
regarding collective management in general and the establishment of Community-wide 
licences in particular.  In relation to collective management in general, the 
Commission notes broad consensus that an Internal Market in copyright could not be 
achieved without common ground on how the rights are exercised but that significant 
differences existed with respect to both legislation and practice.632  In order to 
safeguard the functioning of the Internal market and to create a level playing field in 
the area of collective management, the Commission deemed it necessary to create 
common standards in relation to: the establishment and status of collecting societies; 
the relation of collecting societies to users; the relation of collecting societies to their 
right holders; and the external control of collecting societies. 
Community action prescribing substantive minimum standards for the 
management of copyright within the internal market had also been called for by the 
European Parliament in its 2004 Resolution on a Community Framework for 
Collective Management Societies in the Field of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, 
                                                   
628  Ibid 26–27. 
629  Ibid 26. 
630  Collective management was an issue at three conferences organised by the European Commission in 
Vienna (1998), Strasbourg (2000) and Santiago de Compostela (2002) as well as the topic of a study 
commissioned in 1998 and published in 2000; Deloitte and Touche, Etude sur la gestion collective des 
droits d'auteur dans l'Union Européenne (2000).  Moreover, a two-day hearing took place in Brussels on 
13-14 November 2000.  See for a more detailed account on all of these activities Lánchidi 90–91. 
631  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and 
the European Economic and Social Committee: The Management of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Internal Market (2004) 19. 
632  Ibid 15. 
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adopted three months earlier.633  The European Parliament had considered such 
standards particularly necessary in the areas of the internal structure of collective 
management societies (para 39); control and arbitration mechanisms (paras 48-50); as 
well as transparency and information obligations in relation to tariffs, distribution 
keys, annual accounts, reciprocal agreements and management costs (paras 51-53).634  
In addition to the implementation of general substantive standards, the 2004 
Communication, at a more specific level, addressed the question of Community-wide 
licences; ie the ‘grant of a licence by a single collecting society in a single transaction 
for exploitation throughout the Community’.635  As the preceding consultations had 
shown, such licences were recurrently called for in the online environment by 
commercial users,636 but had not yet been established to a satisfactory extent.  In the 
view of the Commission, this was due to the great divergences that existed between the 
member states lacking both sufficient transparency and legal certainty.637  To facilitate 
greater Community-wide licensing the Commission enumerated four potential 
options:638 
 A first option was identified in the establishment of a system of 
Community-wide exhaustion of the rights of communication to the public 
and making available.639  This would result in the partial removal of the 
principle of territoriality. 
                                                   
633  European Parliament, 2004 Resolution; see in particular paras 12 and 34.  The resolution was 
preceded by a report prepared by member of the European Parliament Raina A. Mercedes Echerer 
containing an explanatory statement; European Parliament, Report on a Community Framework for 
Collecting Societies for Authors' Rights (2002/2274(INI)) (2003). 
634  For a more detailed overview of the Resolution and its commonalities and differences with the 2004 
Commission Communication see Dietz, ‘Marketing and Enforcing Intellectual Property in Europe - 
European Parliament versus Commission: How to Deal with Collecting Societies?’ (2004) 35 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 807. 
635  European Commission, 2004 Communication on Copyright Management 8. 
636  Ibid. 
637  Ibid 7. 
638  Ibid 9. 
639  The European Commission only mentions the rights of communication to the public and of making 
available; however, later documents also refer to the reproduction right. 
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 Inspired by Article 1(2)(b) of the Satellite and Cable Directive,640 applying 
the country-of-origin principle to the online exploitation of copyright 
material was presented as another option.  As a result, the act of 
communication to the public and making available would occur only once 
and in the country where the material was introduced into the online 
environment. 
 As a third option, the Commission contemplated reducing the necessary 
exclusive rights to mere remuneration rights and subject them to 
mandatory collective management. 
 Finally, the Commission considered that the regime chosen for the 
Simulcasting Agreement641 could become a model to be followed more 
generally in the online exploitation of copyright material.  In that case, the 
existing system of reciprocal representation agreements would be 
strengthened in order to allow commercial users to obtain Community-
wide licences from a collective management society of their choice. 
The Commission did not explicitly endorse any of these options to strengthen 
multi-territorial licensing but showed general support for the system of reciprocal 
representation.642  In relation to the collective management of copyright at large, the 
Communication announced ‘a legislative instrument on certain aspects of collective 
management and good governance of the collecting societies’.643 
In light of the high degree of common ground between the European 
Parliament and the European Commission with regard to the necessity of a European 
initiative in the field of collective copyright management, most commentators expected 
a Directive setting common substantive standards.644  With the first Barroso 
                                                   
640  Satellite and Cable Directive. 
641  As to the Simulcasting Agreement, see below at 13.1.2, on page 241. 
642  European Commission, 2004 Communication on Copyright Management 9. 
643  Ibid 19. 
644  See, for example, the responses to the consultation that followed the adoption of the 2004 
Communication available at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/management/
contributions_en.htm>.  A detailed summary is provided by Lánchidi 98–107. 
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Commission taking office in November 2004, however, there was also a replacement 
of senior management staff in the Copyright Unit within the DG Internal Market & 
Services.  In turn, this change of personnel brought about a change of approach,645 as 
became clear when the Commission tabled its follow-up initiative, the 2005 
Recommendation. 
12.2 The Regulatory Scope of the 2005 Recommendation 
On 18 October 2005, the EU Commission adopted its Recommendation on 
Collective Cross-Border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate 
Online Music Services.646  Already the title indicates a departure from its earlier 
position in terms of both the form as well as the scope of the initiative. 
As far as the form is concerned, the Commission, in 2004, had been of the 
view that ‘to rely on soft law ... appears to be no appropriate option’.647  This, however, 
did not hinder it from adopting, 18 months later, a Recommendation648 – thus an 
instrument without legally binding effect.649  Its lack of legal value notwithstanding, 
the Commission hoped that the Recommendation would not only influence the EU 
                                                   
645  KEA European Affairs 43; Schierholz para 12.0.101. 
646  European Commission, 2005 Recommendation. 
647  European Commission, 2004 Communication on Copyright Management 19. 
648  The competence for the European Commission to adopt Recommendations was contained in (then) 
EC Article 211.  After the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission may now, in 
the area of freedom to provide services, adopt Recommendations to member states pursuant to 
TEU Article 17(1) and TFEU Articles 292 and 60. 
649  See the last sentence of TFEU Article 288.  Notwithstanding the non-binding character, it is often 
argued that the principle of effectiveness, enshrined in TEU Article 4(3) obliges member states to act 
in accordance with Recommendations; Heyde, Die grenzüberschreitende Lizenzierung von Online-
Musikrechten in Europa: eine urheber- und wahrnehmungsrechtliche Studie (2011) 110; Ruffert, ‘Art. 288 
AEUV’ in Calliess and Ruffert (eds) EUV/AEUV.  Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit 
Europäischer Grundrechtecharta: Kommentar (4th edn, 2011) para 95.  Also note that the Commission 
stressed its ‘right to propose legislation should the self-regulatory voluntary approach not foster the 
[intended] policy objective’; European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document - Impact 
Assessment Reforming Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate 
Online Music Services (2005) 29. 
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member states but also all economic operators involved in collective copyright 
management.650 
In relation to the scope of the measure, one equally notices a clear shift of 
emphasis.  In 2004, the Commission had planned a comprehensive set of common 
standards for the collective management of copyright across Europe in general and had 
mentioned the difficulties with the establishment of pan-European licences as one of 
several contested issues.  The 2005 Recommendation, however, focuses almost 
exclusively on pan-European licensing and suggests elements of good governance only 
in as far as these are necessary pre-requisites for the development of cross-border 
licences.651  
This shift in priorities had already been perceptible in two in-house documents 
on cross-border licensing which preceded the 2005 Recommendation and were equally 
confined to cross-border licensing.  First, the Commission released a study on 7 July 
2005652 and then, after having given interested parties the opportunity to comment 
within three weeks,653 an impact assessment on 11 October 2005.654  The documents 
                                                   
650  European Commission, 2005 Recommendation, Article 19. 
651  Ibid Recital 10 illustrates this point: ‘Fostering effective structures for cross-border management of 
rights should also ensure that collective rights managers achieve a higher level of rationalisation and 
transparency’.  This change in emphasis is a result of the Commission’s choice to foster pan-
European licensing for online uses by establishing competition for right holders amongst collecting 
societies.  Thus, in the eyes of the Commission ‘the case that was previously made in the [2004 
Communication] for introducing transparency requirements, rules of good governance and 
accountability would now be achieved by the [collective rights managers] themselves without 
regulatory intervention’; European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document - Study on a 
Community Initiative on the Cross-border Collective Management of Copyright (2005) 37. 
652  European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document - Study on a Community Initiative on the 
Cross-border Collective Management of Copyright. 
653  This unusually short time frame for a consultation in the midst of the holiday season, as well as the 
rushed procedure in general, was strongly criticised.  The European Grouping of Societies of 
Authors and Composers GESAC, for example, highlights that it is inconsistent if the Commission 
deplores a lack of democracy in the internal structures of authors’ societies but, at the same time, 
imposes a deadline too short to allow collecting societies to ‘arrange a democratic procedure in 
which the representatives of various right owner groups would have a chance to comment on the EC 
document and discuss their position towards it’; GESAC, Preliminary Comments on the Working 
Document of 7 July 2005 from the Directorate-General for the Internal Market on a Community Initiative on 
Cross-border Collective Management of Copyright (2005) 4.  All consultation submissions can be retrieved 
at <https://circabc.europa.eu/w/browse/ecbb283a-388f-4e04-a66a-d735f61bdf43A>.  A detailed 
summary of the responses is provided by Lánchidi 113–121. 
654  European Commission, 2005 Impact Assessment. 
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started from the premise that there was a potential for growth in legitimate online 
music services in the EU that, as a result of the lack of cross-border licensing, was 
largely unexploited.  Consequently, the Commission’s attention centred on 
commercial users ‘who need a licensing policy that corresponds to the ubiquity of the 
online environment’.655  Only incidentally would a growth in online services then also 
benefit the right holders by increasing their revenue streams.656  Without any reference 
to the suggestions made in the 2004 Communication,657 the study analysed three 
potential options to achieve a ‘vibrant market for online exploitation of copyright 
across the Community’:658 
 The first option considered was to do nothing. 
 As a second option, the Commission discussed eliminating those clauses in 
the reciprocal representation agreements concluded between collecting 
societies that provided for territorial restriction or customer allocation (as 
had been foreseen by the Santiago and Barcelona Agreements).659  The 
resulting regime of reciprocal representation would allow all collecting 
societies in the EU to offer multi-territorial and multi-repertoire licences.  
They would thus compete for commercial users who, in turn, could 
approach any society for EU-wide rights clearance. 
 The third and final option analysed by the Commission represented a 
radical departure from the system of reciprocal representation agreements 
for the online exploitation of music.  Under this option, right holders 
would choose any collecting society within the EU to manage their online 
rights directly and on an EU-wide basis.  Instead of relying on the mandate 
of its sister societies to offer multi-repertoire but territorially restricted 
online licences, a collecting society would license its own repertoire on a 
                                                   
655  European Commission, 2005 Recommendation, Recital 8. 
656  Ibid. 
657  European Commission, 2004 Communication on Copyright Management. 
658  European Commission, 2005 Study, 32.  As to the three options, see ibid 34–35 and European 
Commission, 2005 Impact Assessment, 17–18. 
659  As to these failed initiatives driven by collecting societies, see below at 13.1.3, on page 245. 
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multi-territorial basis.  As a consequence, collecting societies would 
compete for right holders. 
After both the study and the impact assessment had already favoured the third 
option,660 this objective was confirmed by the 2005 Recommendation.  The main 
characteristic of the new envisaged licensing model for legitimate online music services 
is formulated in Article 3: 
‘Right-holders should have the right to entrust the management of any of 
the online rights necessary to operate legitimate online music services, on a 
territorial scope of their choice, to a collective rights manager of their 
choice, irrespective of the Member State of residence or the nationality of 
either the collective rights manager or the right-holder’. 
Given that, when the 2005 Recommendation was adopted, authors’ online 
rights were administered through the traditional system of reciprocal representation 
agreements, the Recommendation also provided that the right holders ‘should ... have 
the right to withdraw any of the online rights and transfer the multi-territorial 
management of those rights to another collective rights manager’ (Article 5(c)).  Where 
rights are withdrawn, collective rights managers ‘should ensure that those rights are 
withdrawn from any existing reciprocal representation agreement’ (Article 5(d)).  
Apparently, the Commission was aware that such departure from the traditional 
system of reciprocal representation could lead to confusion as to which entity would 
be able to licence which online rights.  To mitigate this risk, it recommended that 
collective rights managers provide comprehensive information about their repertoire, 
the territorial scope of their mandate for that repertoire and the applicable tariffs 
(Article 6). 
Further, the Recommendation encouraged best practices for collective rights 
managers.  In relation to its users, licences should be granted in an objective and non-
discriminatory manner (Article 9).  As far as the right holders are concerned, all 
categories of right holders should be treated equally – in particular with regard to the 
distribution of royalties (Article 10) – and be represented in a fair and balanced 
manner in the internal decision making process of collective rights managers 
                                                   
660  European Commission, 2005 Study, 54–57; European Commission, 2005 Impact Assessment, 36–40. 
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(Article 13).  Still with regard to right holders, the Recommendation called for 
enhanced transparency and accountability: deductions from royalties ‘for purposes 
other than for the management services’ should be clearly identified in payment 
documentation as well as the membership contracts or, where membership is by legal 
mandate, in the respective statutory provisions (Articles 11-12).  Moreover, collective 
rights managers should regularly report on the licences granted, the applicable tariffs 
and the royalties collected and distributed (Article 14).  Finally, the Recommendation 
invited member states to provide for effective dispute resolution mechanisms 
(Article 15). 
After this cursory overview of the objectives and mechanisms advocated by the 
2005 Recommendations, it is apparent that the EU Commission’s change of heart as 
to how to address collective copyright management at the EU level was not confined 
merely to the scope and the form of the initiative but also clearly influenced its 
content.  In 2004, the Commission had concluded that the fact that collecting 
societies provided for a one-stop shop of licensing the world repertoire for their 
territory of operation was ‘a significant advantage for right holders and users alike’ that 
‘should not be jeopardised’.661  With the 2005 Recommendation, however, only one 
year later the Commission consciously and explicitly rejected the approach based on 
reciprocal representation agreements and sought to install a counter model: the direct 
grant of licences which would be multi-territorial but limited in the repertoire covered. 
12.3 The Practical Effects of the 2005 Recommendation 
To assess the impact of the 2005 Recommendation on diversity in online music, this 
section determines its practical consequences and examines how it changed the 
landscape of multi-territorial licensing of online music. 
More than seven years after the adoption of the 2005 Recommendation, there 
has not been the paradigm shift in the management of online rights that the 
Commission had envisaged but clearly there are important changes.  In part, the 
                                                   
661  European Commission, 2004 Communication on Copyright Management, 9. 
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licensing practice has indeed moved towards the objectives of the Recommendation, 
notably with the creation of publisher-controlled central pan-European licensing 
initiatives.662  These newly established players issue licences which are multi-territorial 
but restricted to a specific publisher’s repertoire.  At the same time, these forms of 
direct rights administration co-exist with the traditional collective management of 
online rights based on the system of reciprocal agreements.  What is more, within that 
traditional system another form of multi-territorial licensing has developed in that 
some collecting societies have begun to pool their repertoires in order to enhance the 
territorial scope of their licensing activities.  It is thus fair to say that the licensing of 
authors’ online rights has become a mixed system. 
12.3.1 The Creation of Central Pan-European Licensing Initiatives 
The central pan-European licensing initiatives created since the 2005 
Recommendation fall within two categories.  The first set of initiatives resulted from 
the move by some music publishers to withdraw from the system of collective rights 
administration those online rights that were under their control, notably the 
mechanical rights in their Anglo-American repertoire.663  In a second step, these 
publishers then mandated one or two collecting societies to administer, on their 
behalf, the withdrawn rights on a pan-European basis (12.3.1.1). 
In contrast to these publisher-controlled licensing schemes, a different trend 
towards pan-European licensing has been set by some collecting societies.  They 
reinforced their cooperation to pool their respective repertoires and are now in a 
                                                   
662  As the major publishers had already contemplated such initiatives at the time of the adoption of the 
2005 Recommendation, they cannot be seen as a direct result of that instrument.  Yet, it certainly 
has fuelled these endeavours as it provided the major publishers with the comfort of knowing that 
direct pan-European licensing had the Commission’s blessing.  
663 For a musical work to fall under the term ‘Anglo-American repertoire’, as it is used in this study, two 
conditions must be fulfilled.  First, the authors of the works must have, as is typically the case under 
legal regimes in the tradition of English common law, assigned the mechanical reproduction rights 
in these works to their music publishers.  Second, these authors must either be no members of any 
performing rights society or members of performing rights societies which authorise their European 
sister societies to represent their repertoire for online and mobile forms of exploitation on a pan-
European basis.  In the case of PRS for Music such unrestricted agreements appear to exist with the 
following societies: APRA (AUS), SOCAN (CA), IMRO (IRE), ASCAP (US), BMI (US), SESAC 
(US), SAMRO (ZA); see PRS for Music, IMPEL Publisher FAQs (2012). 
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position to grant online music licences that comprise the whole of their aggregate 
repertoire in a single transaction (12.3.1.2). 
12.3.1.1 Publisher-controlled Initiatives 
The first to withdraw their rights and form pan-European licensing initiatives of their 
own were the four major music publishers (12.3.1.1.1), followed by some large 
independent music publishers (12.3.1.1.2).  In more recent times, pan-European 
licensing initiatives have been created specifically for medium and small-sized 
independent music publishers (12.3.1.1.3). 
12.3.1.1.1 Initiatives of the Four Major Music Publishers 
CELAS 
EMI Music Publishing Europe Ltd. was the first major music publisher to withdraw its 
rights from the collective rights management system.  For the administration of these 
rights, EMI chose to cooperate with both GEMA and PRS for Music.  With the 
specific aim to licence EMI’s repertoire, the two collecting societies announced, on 23 
January 2006, a new entity under the name of CELAS (Central European Licensing 
and Administration Services),664 which was subsequently founded and registered as a 
private limited company under German law (GmbH) on 1 January 2007.665  Jointly 
owned by the two collecting societies, CELAS licenses the Anglo-American repertoire 
of EMI Music Publishing Europe Ltd. for digital and mobile exploitation on a pan-
European scale.666  The first licensing agreement was signed on 12 December 2007667 
and in January 2010 CELAS had licensed approximately 30 digital music services and 
was in negotiations with about 20 further services.668  CELAS operates out of the 
                                                   
664  EMI Group, EMI Music Publishing Reaches Agreement with MCPS-PRS and GEMA to Establish 'one-stop' 
Pan-European Licensing of Mobile and Online Digital Rights in EMI MP's Anglo-American Songs (2006). 
665  Heyde 136. 
666  The geographical reach of CELAS comprises a total of 41 territories; see <http://www.celas.eu/
CelasTabs/Territories.aspx> (last accessed on 3 March 2012). 
667  GEMA, First Licensing Agreements for CELAS GmbH (2007).  Several subsequent licensing deals are 
also publicly known; see Heyde 139. 
668  EMI Music Publishing, Response to the Reflection Document of DG INFSO and DG MARKT (2010) 4.  
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headquarters of GEMA in Munich and of PRS for Music in London and, through 
service agreement, has access to the two societies’ technical infrastructure and 
databases.669 
DEAL 
In January 2008 Universal Music Publishing Group and the French authors’ society 
SACEM announced their agreement to set up a joint framework for licensing 
Universal’s Anglo-American and French repertoire on a pan-European basis for online 
and mobile exploitation in Europe.670  One year later, the initiative, in the meantime 
named DEAL (Direct European Administration and Licensing), reported that it had 
granted its first pan-European licences to Amazon, Spotify and Nokia.671 
PEDL 
Unlike the other major music publishers, Warner/Chappell Music, the publishing 
arm of Warner Music Group, did not choose one or two particular societies to 
administer the mechanical online rights in their Anglo-American repertoire.  Rather, 
right from the start in January 2008, its Pan-European Digital Licensing Initiative 
(PEDL) has been designed to grant non-exclusive rights in its Anglo-American 
repertoire to any collecting society that complied with certain requirements; notably 
the prescription of maximum commission rates and standards on membership, 
accounting, transparency and IT as well as the prohibition of deduction for cultural 
and social purposes.672 
                                                                                                                                                
The licences covered ‘the most significant services such as iTunes, Spotify, Amazon and Nokia as 
well as medium sized and smaller “niche” services such as 7Digital, Beatport and Emusic’. 
669  Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 29. 
670  Universal Music Group, Universal Music Publishing Group and SACEM Sign Agreement for Online and 
Mobile Licensing in Europe (2008).  Technically, the licensing process is handled by SDRM (Société pour 
l’administration du Droit de Reproduction Mécanique des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs), a joint venture 
of five French collecting societies to license their reproduction rights. 
671  SACEM, Universal Music Publishing Group and SACEM Announce Name of Pan-European Licensing 
Model, as well as a Variety of Pan-European Deals with Major Internet Companies (2009). 
672  GESAC, Comments on the Initial Experience of GESAC's Member Societies after the Adoption of the 
Commission Recommendation of 18 October 2005 and the Developments of the Online Music Sector (2007). 
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Today, seven collecting societies are part of PEDL: PRS for Music and Swedish 
performing rights society STIM, which both have been participating in the initiative 
since its inception,673 as well as French SACEM, Spanish SGAE, Dutch 
BUMA/STEMRA674 and Portuguese SPA.675 
PAECOL 
On 16 June 2008, the last of the four major publishers, Sony/ATV Music Publishing, 
announced an alliance with GEMA, which enabled the collecting society to licence the 
rights of Sony/ATV’s Anglo-American repertoire across Europe for mobile and online 
digital use.676  To administer such pan-European licences, PAECOL (Pan-European 
Central Online Licensing), a private company under German law (GmbH) wholly 
owned by GEMA, was founded. 
PEL 
All the publisher-controlled pan-European licensing initiatives presented so far cover 
the relevant publisher’s Anglo-American repertoire.  This is different with SGAE’s 
pan-European Licensing Initiative of Latin American Repertoire (PEL).  The Spanish 
authors’ society has been mandated to licence the Latin American repertoires of large 
                                                   
673  Warner Music Group, GEMA, The MCPS-PRS Alliance and STIM Join Warner/Chappell Music’s Pan-
European Digital Licensing (PEDL) Initiative (2008).  Initially, GEMA had also shown interest in the 
initiative but finally decided not to join; see Müller, ‘Rechtewahrnehmung durch 
Verwertungsgesellschaften bei der Nutzung von Musikwerken im Internet’ [2009] Zeitschrift für 
Urheber- und Medienrecht 121, 128.  It is, however, still able to license Warner Chappell Music’s 
Anglo-American repertoire on an individual basis; Müller, ‘Die Rechteinhaberschaft an 
Musikwerken bei Online-Nutzungen’ (2011) 55 Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 13, 16.  
674  Note that BUMA/STEMRA, in a different context, also licenses the mechanical online rights of the 
Anglo-American repertoire of large independent publisher Imagem; PRS for Music, Imagem Appoint 
BUMA-STEMRA and PRS for Music to Manage European Online Rights (2011). 
675  Warner Music Group, SPA Joins Warner/Chappell Music's Pan-European Digital Licensing (PEDL) 
Initiative (2011). 
676  Brandle, Lars, ‘Sony/ATV, GEMA Team for Euro Licensing Breakthrough’ Billboard (16 June 2008) 
<www.billboard.com/news/sony-atv-gema-team-for-euro-licensing-breakthrough-1003816969.story> 
accessed 08 March 2012. 
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independent publisher Peer Music (January 2008)677 and Sony/ATV (December 
2008)678 for online and mobile uses on a pan-European basis. 
In January and June 2009 SGAE granted pan-European licences to eMusic and 
Nokia’s ‘Comes with music’ service.  These deals not only covered the Latin American 
and Spanish repertoires of Peer Music and Sony/ATV, but also that of EMI Music 
Publishing.679  One may, therefore, assume that SGAE has a similar mandate with that 
publisher.680 
Beyond these deals with music publishers, SGAE has also been mandated by 
the Portuguese authors’ society SPA to represent the latter’s online rights on a pan-
European basis.681 
12.3.1.1.2 Initiatives of Large Independent Music Publishers 
Some large independent music publishers were equally active to forge alliances with 
particular collecting societies to directly administer the rights under their control. 
It would appear that, since January 2008, PRS for Music was particularly 
successful in attracting large independent publishers.  Today, the UK authors’ society 
                                                   
677  MCPS-PRS, Peermusic Announces Pan-European Licensing Partners (2008). 
678  Paine, Andre, ‘Sony/ATV Launches Pan-Euro Latin & Spanish License’ Billboard.biz (23 December 
2008) <http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/news/
e3ie4767e187b7eb184188e03a9f96f9525> accessed 10 March 2012. 
679  Ferguson, Tom, ‘Continental  Drift. Pan-European Licensing Inches Closer’ Billboard (21 November 
2009) 18; Paine, Andre, ‘European Licensing Deals for Comes with Music’ Billboard (14 May 2009) 
<www.billboard.com/news/european-licensing-deals-for-comes-with-1003973217.story> accessed 10 
March 2012. 
680 This is reported by Llewellyn, Howell, ‘SGAE Signs With eMusic’ Billboard (15 June 2009) 
<http://www.billboard.com/news/sgae-signs-with-emusic-1003984404.story> accessed 11 March 
2012, and also suggested in SGAE, Business and Corporate Social Responsibility Report 2008 (2009) 58.  
Perhaps, however, the arrangement between SGAE and EMI Music Publishing is less formalised and 
based on a case-by-case co-operation.  This would explain why the Latin American Repertoire of EMI 
does not figure amongst the catalogue the Armonia, the joint venture between SACEM (France), 
SGAE (Spain), SIAE (Italy) and SPA (Portugal); see below at 224. 
681  AEPO-ARTIS, News Bulletin November 2011 (2011) 5.  While not many details of the deal are known, 
it would appear that the mandate covers both, the mechanical online as well as the making available 
right. 
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grants pan-European licenses for mechanical online rights in the Anglo-American 
repertoires of Peer Music, BMG Chrysalis Music and Imagem.682 
As far as the latest co-operation with Imagem is concerned, it should be noted 
that the publisher not only mandated PRS for Music but equally the Dutch authors’ 
society BUMA/STEMRA to directly license its Anglo-American repertoire to pan-
European online and mobile services, on its behalf.683 
The Spanish authors’ society SGAE, again, is a particular case amongst the 
alliances of large independent publishers with collecting societies.  Like PRS for Music, 
it has been mandated by Peer Music.  Yet, there is no overlap of the two mandates as 
PRS for Music licenses Peer Music’s Anglo-American and SGAE the latter’s Latin 
repertoire.684 
12.3.1.1.3 Initiatives for Small and Medium-sized Independent Music Publishers 
The most recent addition to the different forms of pan-European licensing are 
initiatives of collecting societies specifically designed to allow small and medium-sized 
independent music publishers to directly license their Anglo-American repertoire for 
mobile and online uses on a pan-European basis. 
IMPEL 
The first of these initiatives, operated by PRS for Music since 1 January 2010, is called 
IMPEL (Independent Music Publishers’ European Licensing).685  The network is open 
                                                   
682  See PRS for Music website at <http://www.prsformusic.com/users/broadcastandonline/online
mobile/multiterritorylicensing/Pages/default.aspx>.  While the co-operation with Peer Music started 
on 1 January 2008, PRS for Music has been licensing Chrysalis’ mechanical online rights at least 
from 2009 onwards; see MCPS-PRS and Paine.  The most recent co-operation with Imagem started 
on 1 January 2012; PRS for Music (n 674). 
683  Ibid. 
684  MCPS-PRS. 
685  PRS for Music, Indy Publishers and PRS for Music Launch IMPEL (2010).  Before the launch of IMPEL, 
PRS for Music had worked towards a solution for small and medium-sized music publishers under 
the name ‘Alliance Digital’, for which more than 730 independent music publishers had signed an 
online agency agreement; see Music Publishers Association, Response to Call for Comments Requested by 
the European Commission in the Light of the Commission Recommendation of 18 October 2005 
(2005/737/EC) (2007) 3, 9-34.  While it would appear that the Alliance Digital was never operative, 
PRS maintains that the contracts signed under the scheme will be rolled into the IMPEL initiative; 
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to all independent publishers and, at the time of writing, counts 20 publishers.686  As 
with most other initiatives, IMPEL only covers the publishers’ Anglo-American 
repertoire.687  In January 2012, PRS for Music announced that the amount of royalties 
processed through IMPEL had passed the threshold of £1 million.688 
STIM WOI Portal 
Another platform, the WOI Portal, has been developed by Swedish authors’ society 
STIM and started operations on 30 January 2012.  The initiative is specifically targeted 
at small publishers that have not yet been able to extract benefits from the new system 
of direct licensing endorsed by the 2005 Recommendation.  The small independent 
publishers mandate STIM to license their mechanical online rights across the 
European Economic Area.689  The collective management of their rights, STIM 
promises, would lead to better negotiation leverage.690  As a particular characteristic of 
the new initiative, the publishers retain a voice in the licensing negotiations.  More 
specifically, through access to a web-based application, they can micro-manage their 
rights on a licence-by-licence basis.691  In exchange, STIM deducts a commission of 10 
                                                                                                                                                
see PRS for Music, IMPEL Publisher FAQs, question 15.  That the number of publishers participating 
in IMPEL is so much smaller than those previously enrolled in Alliance Digital might be attributed 
to the fact that PRS for Music only accepts publishers for IMPEL which have fully withdrawn their 
online mechanical rights from the traditional system of collective copyright management; see ibid 
question 10. 
686  <http://www.prsformusic.com/impel/Pages/default.aspx>. 
687  Ibid questions 5 and 6. 
688  Koranteng, Juliana, ‘Spirit Music Group Joins IMPEL, Pan-European Licensing Debate Remains 
Unresolved’ Billboard.biz (26 January 2012) <http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/others/spirit-music-
group-joins-impel-pan-european-1005981152.story>. 
689  There are no clear indications as to whether the WOI Portal is intended to grant licences covering 
more than its publisher members’ Anglo-American repertoires.  This might, however, be assumed; in 
particular, because STIM itself identifies small independent US publishers as the major group of 
potential members when it asserts that STIM ‘has an effective way to satisfy U.S independent 
publishers needs within the EU in the best possible way’; STIM, The WOI Portal (2012) 3. 
690  STIM, New Innovative Swedish Portal Provides Indie Publishing Power (2012). 
691  STIM, WOI Portal, 2. 
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per cent from all licensing revenues generated.692  No further deductions for cultural 
or social purposes are made.693 
12.3.1.2 Pooling Initiatives of Collecting Societies 
Two initiatives of several European collecting societies aim at aggregating their 
repertoire for online and mobile services.  These licensing hubs do not follow the path 
laid by the 2005 Recommendation but, rather, on the contrary, rely on enhanced co-
operation to offer multi-territorial licensing. 
Nordic Model 
The first initiative to become operative was the so-called ‘Nordic Model’.  Licences are 
issued by the Nordisk Copyright Bureau (NCB), an association of the Nordic authors’ 
societies KODA (Denmark), STEF (Iceland), STIM (Sweden), TEOSTO (Finland) and 
TONO (Norway) with cooperation agreements with the Baltic authors’ societies EAÜ 
(Estonia), AKKA/LAA (Latvia) and LATGA-A (Lithuania).  Traditionally, NCB’s core 
task has been the licensing of its affiliated societies’ mechanical rights throughout the 
eight mentioned Nordic and Baltic countries. 
In early 2009, however, NCB started to grant so-called Joint Nordic/Baltic 
Online Licences that combine the mechanical online rights managed by NCB with the 
local societies’ performing online right.694  These licences allow online music services 
to use the aggregate repertoire of all eight societies across all of the eight countries 
concerned.695  In contrast to the publisher-controlled central licensing agencies, the 
                                                   
692  STIM, WOI Portal Q & A (2012), question 4. 
693  STIM, WOI Portal, 3.  It would, however, be interesting to know whether the fixed commission of 
10 per cent is higher than the actual administrative costs.  Given that the negotiation process 
appears to be fully automated, this is well conceivable.  If so, one could wonder to what purposes the 
excess will be used.  As STIM is a not-for-profit organisation (see <http://www.stim.se/en/This-is-
STIM/) one would assume that any surplus would ultimately need to be spent to the benefit of the 
organisation’s members.  Indirectly, the WOI Portal could then also benefit the society’s author 
members. 
694  Music & Copyright's Blog, Is NCB the Model for Future Pan-European Licensing? (2011). 
695  For online music service with only national reach, the eight authors’ societies remain able to grant 
national online licences; ibid. 
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offered Joint Nordic/Baltic Online Licences are therefore not truly pan-European.696  
However, they are not limited to the repertoire of only one publisher.  In summer 
2011, NCB had already granted nine of these licences and was in negotiations for 
another nine.697 
Armonia 
Another pooling initiative has been pursued since 2007 by the three authors’ societies 
SACEM (France), SGAE (Spain) and SIAE (Italy).  As it stands today, Armonia is a 
joint licensing scheme that grants online and mobile licenses for the repertoires 
represented by the three societies on a pan-European basis.  Technically, a commercial 
user obtains a bundle of licences, each of which covering the catalogue of one of the 
three member societies.698 
Given that both, SACEM and SGAE, have been successful in securing 
additional mandates to represent pan-European online rights, the breadth of 
Armonia’s aggregate catalogue is considerable.  As Armonia explains on its website, it 
‘represents the repertoires of SACEM, SGAE, SIAE and SPA in Europe jointly with 
Anglo-American works of Universal Music Publishing and Latin Works of 
SONY/ATV, and Peer Music’.699 
The first joint licences facilitated by Armonia have been granted in January 
2011 to Beatport.700 
                                                   
696  Heyde 146. 
697  Music & Copyright's Blog, Is NCB the Model?  For example, NCB reported that it had processed 
Spotify’s online service for Norway and Finland without having had to make larger changes to its 
systems or processes; NCB, Annual Report 2010 (2011) 8. 
698  Mazziotti, ‘New Licensing Models for Online Music Services in the European Union: From 
Collective to Customized Management’ (2011) 34 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 757, 774. 
699  <http://www.armoniaonline.org/home?request_locale=en> (last accessed on 12 March 2012). 
700  SACEM, Three Authors' Societies (SACEM, SGAE, SIAE) Members of Armonia Signed with Beatport Midem 
2011 (2011). 
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12.3.2 The Undue Preferential Treatment of Some Right Holders 
Time has proven right those critics of the 2005 Recommendation who argued that it 
was too simplistic in not duly distinguishing between the different categories of right 
holders and their respective needs and options.  The way that central pan-European 
licensing initiatives have developed shows that some right holders were better able 
than others to put into practice the proclaimed freedom of withdrawing their online 
rights and entrusting them to a collective rights manager of their choice on a territorial 
basis of their choice.  Very quick to make use of such freedom were the major music 
publishers through their creation of various pan-European initiatives (CELAS, DEAL, 
PEDL, PAECOL, PEL), followed by large independent music publishers like Peer 
Music, Imagem and Chrysalis.  More recently, medium-sized independent publishers 
have been invited to join the IMPEL initiative and, as a fairly new development, small 
independent publishers are now the target group of the WOI Portal.  Authors, 
however, do not appear to have moved their online rights from one collecting society 
to another to any discernible extent. 
It thus seems entirely fitting to compare the 2005 Recommendation, as one 
commentator already aptly did in 2008, to an invitation for a swimming contest 
addressed to both well-trained and non-swimmers: while, of course, it was never too 
late to learn how to swim, until then not only would the contest be over, but perhaps 
some of the participants would already have drowned.701  The present section assesses 
the varying degrees of difficulties and chances facing right holders when implementing 
the 2005 Recommendation.  These inequalities reflect the given legal structures 
underpinning the collective management of music rights as well as the fact that only 
certain categories of right holders have the ability to change these to the extent 
necessary for direct pan-European licensing. 
                                                   
701  Poll, ‘CELAS, PEDL & Co.: Metamorphose oder Anfang vom Ende der kollektiven Wahrnehmung 
von Musik-Online-Rechten in Europa?’ (2008) 52 Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 500, 
504. 
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As far as music publishers are concerned, the establishment of direct pan-
European licensing initiatives depends on legal considerations that can be grouped 
into three themes, each of which will be analysed in turn:  
 the publishers’ control over Anglo-American reproduction rights 
(12.3.2.1); 
 the ease with which they are able to withdraw these rights from the 
system of collective rights management (12.3.2.2); and  
 the ability of their pan-European licensing initiatives to jointly license 
the making available rights (12.3.2.3). 
12.3.2.1 The Publishers’ Control over Anglo-American Online Reproduction 
Rights 
Both the making available as well as the online reproduction right must be cleared 
before music may legally be exploited through the Internet or mobile networks. 
As far as the making available right is concerned, authors typically assign or 
exclusively license this right in any of their present and future works to their 
performing right society upon joining.702  Where authors subsequently enter into 
publishing agreements, their publishers seek to gain control over as many of the 
authors’ rights as possible.  As a consequence of already having transferred their 
making available right to their collecting society, authors, however, are no longer in 
control of that right themselves and thus cannot subsequently transfer it to the 
publishers.  In order to still compensate the publishers for their services to promote 
the authors’ works, the latter, instead of transferring the making available right itself, 
grant their publishers a certain share in the royalties generated through the 
exploitation of that right. 
In continental European traditions, the same principles apply to the 
reproduction right.  Authors transfer it to their mechanical right society when they 
                                                   
702  In relation to existing members, performing rights societies, once the making available right was 
legally recognised, updated their membership agreements in order also to bring that right under the 
umbrella of collectively managed rights. 
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join and their publishers’ influence is restricted to a share of the resulting royalties.  
Crucially, however, this situation is different in countries of Anglo-American legal 
tradition, where authors assign their reproduction right to their publishers.  The 
publishers, in turn, mandate central entities with the exploitation of that right.703  In 
order to manage the reproduction rights internationally, publishers have created a 
network of agreements with sub-publishers in foreign territories. 
These brief considerations reveal a first fundamental difference: while 
publishers with a continental European repertoire simply do not hold any rights that 
they could potentially withdraw from the system of collective rights administration, 
publishers with Anglo-American repertoire at least own part of the necessary online 
rights, notably the online reproduction right.  It was the publishers’ withdrawal from 
the collective management system of this particular right that started the creation of 
publisher-controlled central pan-European licensing initiatives.704 
Where publishers do have power over mechanical online rights, it is by 
financial gains that they are motivated to withdraw and administer directly.  This gives 
them control over prerogatives that, in the traditional system, lay with the collecting 
societies.  Notably, they may determine the licensing conditions and, more 
importantly, the licensing price.705  They also hope for lower administration costs, 
more accurate and efficient reporting and greater transparency.706 
But what obstacles prevent the other categories of right holders from equally 
implementing direct pan-European licensing?  Music publishers with continental 
                                                   
703  For the most important Anglo-American territories these are the US-American Harry Fox Agency, 
the UK Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society (MCPS), now part of PRS for Music, and the Irish 
Mechanical Copyright Protection Society Ireland (MCPSI).  These entities operate as agents to the 
publishers, who remain the holders of the reproduction right. 
704  A particular case is SGAE’s pan-European licensing initiative for Latin repertoire.  While there is no 
explicit information on which party effectively controls the mechanical online rights in music in 
Central and South America, it has been reported that music publishers withdrew their Latin 
repertoire before signing with SGAE; see Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 32.  
It thus has to be assumed that their situation is comparable to that of publishers in Anglo-American 
legal traditions. 
705  Poll 504; Universal/BMG Music Publishing (COMP/M.4404), Decision C(2007) 2160 (European 
Commission 22 May 2007) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4404_
20070522_20600_en.pdf> 51–52. 
706  Kohn and Kohn 194–195. 
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European repertoire, for their part, face considerable, if not insurmountable, 
difficulties if they attempt to establish comparable pan-European licensing initiatives.  
They would have to convince authors of continental European works to modify their 
membership agreements with their respective mechanical rights society;707 although 
perhaps possible in theory, this would appear infeasible in practice, in light of the 
sheer volume of authors concerned and the different notice periods that they would all 
have to respect.  Moreover, the success of direct pan-European licensing depends on 
the publisher’s ability to aggregate a mass of repertoire substantial enough to be 
attractive in the eyes of online music services.  Publishers would, therefore, need to 
motivate virtually all of their contracted authors to withdraw their rights.  Clear 
obstacles to such mass orchestration, however, are the diverging views amongst the 
published authors themselves.  Presumably, they share the same aim of monetising 
their rights to the largest extent possible.  Yet, they will not all agree that pan-European 
direct licensing via their publishers would be the best way to reach that aim.  In 
particular, the substantive mass of writers who do not have large commercial success 
will feel that the elements of solidarity built into the system of collective rights 
administration708 better suit their needs and, for that reason, would probably not feel 
inclined to abandon these benefits. 
Finally, authors without a publisher still control the online rights in their 
creations subject to the collective management of these rights through authors’ 
societies.  From a legal point of view, they would therefore not be hindered to 
withdraw their rights from their current society and henceforth administer them in 
different ways.  Given that they do not have the support of a music publisher, their 
only choice would be to move their online rights to a collecting society that is more 
successfully engaged in offering pan-European online licences for its own repertoire 
than the authors’ current society.  To assess this as well as the question of whether a 
move would be beneficial more generally, however, requires considerable knowledge of 
                                                   
707  Universal/BMG Music Publishing (COMP/M.4404) 38–39.  Once the authors have withdrawn these 
rights, the publishers would equally need to modify their own membership agreements with their 
mechanical rights society; see Heyde 218–220. 
708  See above at 10.1.3, on page 143. 
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the legal issues involved – a degree of knowledge that most unpublished authors will 
lack.  Moreover, substantial notice periods to modify the membership agreements with 
their local society, as well as language barriers in relation to the new society, may 
equally discourage authors to move their online rights.709  Finally, many authors feel 
culturally connected to their local society and are generally happy with its service.  It is 
therefore not surprising that the European grouping of authors’ societies GESAC, in 
2007, reported that none of their member societies had noticed any substantial 
withdrawal activities on the parts of individual authors.710  As far as can be seen, this 
has not changed since then. 
12.3.2.2 The Publishers’ Ability to Amend Their Sub-publisher Agreements 
It has become apparent that right holders must have effective control over exclusive 
rights granted under copyright rules – and not only a share in the royalties generated 
by these rights – before they can withdraw them from the system of collective rights 
management and license them directly on a pan-European basis.  Yet, effective control 
over (at least some) online rights is only one of the preconditions for launching direct 
pan-European licensing.  To an equally crucial extent, any such endeavour also 
depends on the ease with which music publishers may execute the withdrawal of their 
rights from collecting societies.  This, however, might be complicated by the existing 
sub-publishing system. 
Music publishers maintain a network of international sub-publishers to 
promote and administer their rights abroad.  Under the traditional model, an original 
publishing company mandates sub-publishers on an exclusive basis to represent its 
repertoire in their domestic territory.  The sub-publishers would then entrust their 
local mechanical rights societies with the administration of that right.  In order to 
withdraw the mechanical rights from the system of collective rights administration, 
there are two possible procedures.711  
                                                   
709  As to all these potential reasons, see Heyde 246. 
710  GESAC, Comments on Initial Experience, 5. 
711  A much more detailed analysis of this point is provided by Heyde 221–223. 
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On the one hand, a sub-publisher could modify the membership agreements it 
has with its mechanical rights society to the effect that the relevant mechanical online 
rights would henceforth be excluded from collective administration.  In a second step, 
the sub-publisher would need to re-transfer the mechanical online rights to the original 
publisher before the latter is in a position directly to license them on a pan-European 
basis.  For the original publisher, this procedure has certain drawbacks.  First, a sub-
publisher could only withdraw the mechanical online rights after the applicable notice 
period.  Second and even more importantly, the original publisher would depend on 
the sub-publisher’s co-operation to agree to a re-transferral of the rights as sub-
publishing agreements usually do not provide for such obligation. 
On the other hand – and this has been the music publishers’ strategy712 – the 
original publishers may modify their sub-publishing agreements.  If a sub-publisher 
loses the mandate to represent the original publisher’s mechanical online rights, its 
local mechanical rights society may no longer administer them.  In this scenario, the 
mechanical online rights automatically revert to the original publisher without any 
need to amend the membership agreement between the sub-publisher and its 
mechanical rights society.713  
Under both possible scenarios, the ease with which original publishers may 
withdraw their mechanical online rights from the existing collective licensing structure 
hinges decisively on the power that they may exert over their sub-publishers. 
The major music publishers are best placed to swiftly withdraw their 
mechanical online rights.  They are part of world-wide operating music groups with 
affiliations in all noteworthy music markets.  As their local sub-publishers belong to 
the same music group, the major music publishers have no difficulties ensuring their 
sub-publisher’s co-operation to amend the latter’s mandates.  For large independent 
publishers with comparable internationalised structures withdrawal is similarly easy.  
Small and medium-sized music publishers, however, will struggle harder to have their 
                                                   
712  Universal/BMG Music Publishing (COMP/M.4404) 37. 
713  For a dogmatic analysis of this particular effect of the termination of the sub-publishing contract 
under German law, see Heyde 223–229.  He also notes that, as far as can be seen, collecting societies 
have not sought to challenge this interpretation. 
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mechanical online rights re-vested.714  Today, most sub-publishing agreements have a 
term of three to five years; in the past, however, sub-publishing agreements used to be 
concluded for the whole term of copyright protection.715  Where these contracts are 
still in place, original publishers are locked in.  Furthermore, they may not be able to 
change the contractual terms if they lack the necessary bargaining leverage.  Beyond 
legal considerations, it should also be noted that sub-publishers typically do more than 
merely administrating the royalty flows; they actively promote the exploitation of the 
original publishers’ repertoire in their domestic territories.  When considering the 
establishment of central pan-European licensing, the loss of such local support is 
certainly also an element to be assessed carefully by small and medium-sized 
publishers.  Finally, some sub-publishing agreements are built on the principle of 
reciprocity.716  To the extent that this is the case, the withdrawal of the original 
publisher’s repertoire may mean the termination of income stream from its own sub-
publishing services. 
The significantly lower bargaining power of small and medium-sized music 
publishers is also visible in their relationships with their potential partners for a 
central pan-European licensing initiative, the European collecting societies.  When the 
major music publishers started their central pan-European licensing initiatives, several 
collecting societies submitted administration offers amongst which the publishers 
could choose the one with the most favourable terms.717  With the two solutions that 
have until now been put in place for small and medium-sized music publishers (IMPEL 
and the WOI Portal), the collecting societies’ bargaining position has changed: they 
operate their platform on non-negotiable terms that small and medium-sized 
publishers can only reject or accept. 
                                                   
714  As to the different options that may be available to small and medium-sized publishers, see Music 
Publishers Association, Annex 2. 
715  Kohn and Kohn 234–235.  He also notes that in the aftermath of the 2005 Recommendation and 
the 2008 CISAC Decision, there is a new trend to insist on shorter terms, non-exclusive licences or 
the exclusion of online rights upon reasonable notice to the sub-publisher; ibid 216–218.  It should 
not be overlooked, however, that insisting on terms thus favourable to the original publisher changes 
the overall contractual balance; in such a case, for example, a sub-publisher is much less likely to 
agree to the payment of advances. 
716  Ibid 206-207, 237-238. 
717  Universal/BMG Music Publishing (COMP/M.4404) 50. 
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This notwithstanding, the difficulties that small and medium-sized publishers 
face in the withdrawal of their mechanical online rights are, to a certain extent, 
accommodated by IMPEL and the WOI Portal.  While both initiatives aim to provide 
them with a pan-European digital licensing solution, there are differences in the 
underlying legal construction.  Both initiatives emphasise that other European 
collecting societies would continue to be able to license the participating publishers’ 
repertoire for online and mobile services that are limited to their respective domestic 
market.  The means, however, through which this is achieved, differ.  PRS for Music 
insists that IMPEL publishers withdraw all their mechanical online rights from their 
respective sub-publishers and that the mandate for national digital licensing deals is 
directed to the relevant society through PRS for Music and the reciprocal agreement it 
maintains with the relevant society.718  This strongly suggests that the IMPEL 
publishers mandate PRS for Music on an exclusive basis.  As far as the WOI Portal is 
concerned, STIM highlights that the publishers’ mandate is non-exclusive and that it 
only covers multi-territorial online services, purportedly leaving the agreements of the 
Portal members with their sub-publishers largely unaffected.  Another EU collecting 
society could continue to license domestic digital services as it remains to be granted 
the necessary mechanical online rights by the relevant domestic sub-publisher for 
national exploitation. 
A closer look, therefore, reveals that while both initiatives direct themselves at 
independent publishers, they still have distinct target groups.  The different legal 
underpinning thus avoids competition between IMPEL and the WOI Portal:719 only 
independent publishers who have the power to fully withdraw their mechanical online 
rights from their sub-publishers are able to join IMPEL; smaller sub-publishers who 
could not easily achieve this might still join the WOI Portal.  Leaving existing sub-
publishing agreements in place arguably makes it easier for independent publishers to 
join the WOI Portal, even though this assumes that their agreements are non-
                                                   
718  PRS for Music, IMPEL Publisher FAQs, questions 10, 12-13.  Arguably, this is the reason why the 
number of participating independent publishers is still relatively small; see above, n 685. 
719  This, in itself, is not a surprising result as both initiatives use technological backend solutions that 
have been developed by the STIM / PRS for Music joint venture ICE; PRS for Music, IMPEL 
Information Pack 2012 (2012) 2; STIM, WOI Portal, 3. 
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exclusive.720  For the operating society STIM, it has the additional benefit that it avoids 
competition with its own Swedish sub-publisher members.721 
In conclusion, the above discussion revealed a further layer of inequality built 
into the 2005 Recommendation.  Due to existing sub-publishing arrangements, the 
circle of those effectively able to make use of the proclaimed freedom to directly 
license their rights is thus not only restricted to music publishers with mostly722 Anglo-
American repertoire but, significantly more narrowly, to those with sufficiently strong 
market power.  Be it intentionally or not, it is these global players that the 2005 
Recommendation favours distinctly. 
12.3.2.3 The Joint Licensing of the Making Available Right through the Publisher-
Controlled Central Pan-European Licensing Initiatives 
Even where publishers are in the position of directly licensing their rights, the scope of 
such licensing is limited in several ways.  First, they only control rights in some of their 
catalogues, notably their Anglo-American and, to a lesser extent, Latin repertoire.  
Second, and more importantly, even in relation to that repertoire, only the mechanical 
online rights are within the publishers’ reach.  This is a clear disadvantage for online 
music services as all usual forms of online and mobile distribution of music affect both 
the mechanical as well as the performing online rights.  Online music services 
therefore need to clear both sets of rights.  The performing online rights, however, 
continue to be administered by performing right societies through their system of 
reciprocal representation. 
As a remedy and in order to serve as a ‘one-stop shop’ at least with regard to 
the relevant publisher’s Anglo-American or Latin repertoire, the publishers operate 
                                                   
720  However, common current practice appears to be exclusivity; Kohn and Kohn 215–217.  If sub-
publishers have an exclusive mandate for their domestic territory to represent the original publisher, 
this exclusivity would need to be lifted if multi-territorial licensing through the WOI Portal was to 
cover that territory. 
721  According to STIM, sub-publishing arrangements are typically restricted to the relevant sub-
publisher’s domestic territory, so that these sub-publishers would not be able to compete with the 
WOI Portal for multi-territorial music services anyway.  Further, in cases where sub-publishers have 
been given a multi-territorial mandate by the original publishers, they may equally join the WOI 
Portal; STIM, WOI Portal Q & A, question 7. 
722  The only exception is SGAE’s PEL initiative; see above on page 219. 
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their licensing initiatives in co-operation with one or several European collecting 
societies.  The pan-European mechanical online rights provided by the publishers are 
thus supplemented with the matching performing online rights.  This way, an online 
music service may clear all the authors’ rights in a publisher’s Anglo-American or Latin 
repertoire in a single transaction, even if, legally speaking, the mechanical and the 
performing online rights follow different licensing chains. 
This, however, pre-supposes that the co-operating collecting society has a pan-
European mandate to administer the performing online rights of the relevant 
publisher’s Anglo-American or Latin repertoire.  To secure such a comprehensive 
mandate is not necessarily an easy task.  Typically, the authors of that repertoire are 
not members of any European performing right society723 but belong to one of their 
local counterparts abroad.  Whether the co-operating collecting societies may license 
the performing rights of their overseas sister societies on a pan-European basis thus 
depends on the reciprocal representation agreements between them. 
Reciprocal representation agreements categorically used to contain territorial 
restrictions to the effect that a collecting society was only able to license its sister 
societies’ repertoires within its own territory.  As a consequence of the 2008 CISAC 
Decision, however, the prevalence of these territorial restrictions, at least as far as 
online rights are concerned, has crumbled.  Today, the re-negotiated reciprocal 
agreements of EU collecting societies contain mandates of varying territorial reach.724  
In relation to those performing rights societies with Anglo-American and Latin 
repertoires which are located overseas, it appears relatively easy for European collecting 
societies to negotiate agreements that allow for pan-European mandates.  GEMA, for 
example, has agreed on such a mandate with US societies ASCAP and BMI and the 
                                                   
723  Obviously, this is not entirely true for PRS for Music in the UK or IMRO in Ireland, whose 
members’ creations are part of the Anglo-American repertoire.  Yet even so, the two societies’ own 
repertoire only covers music from the UK and Ireland.  In order to be able to license music from 
Anglo-American territories abroad, the two societies are equally dependent on reciprocal agreements 
with the societies in these territories. 
724  See below at 13.3, on page 253.  See also Müller, Rechtsinhaberschaft, 14–16; PRS for Music, 
Contribution to Public Hearing on Governance and Transparency of Collective Management of Rights (2010) 
1–2. 
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other Anglo-American performing rights societies.725  PRS for Music has been granted 
a pan-European mandate by APRA (AUS), SOCAN (CA), IMRO (IRE), ASCAP (US), 
BMI (US), SESAC (US) and SAMRO (ZA).726  It would appear that other European 
collecting societies have similar arrangements with Anglo-American overseas 
societies.727  As far as SGAE’s pan-European licensing initiative for the Latin repertoire 
is concerned, the Spanish collecting society has successfully broadened the scope of its 
mandate to represent Central and South American performing rights societies on a 
pan-European basis.728 
While unrestricted representation agreements with overseas societies thus 
appear to be relatively easy to achieve, PRS for Music is much more hesitant to grant 
the other European societies a pan-European mandate for its own UK repertoire.  For 
GEMA this seems not to have been problematic, as the German authors’ society, by 
2005, had territorially unrestricted agreements with PRS for Music.729  Those societies 
alongside PRS for Music that were partners in Warner Chappell’s PEDL initiative, 
however, struggled to conclude such arrangements.  In 2008, Warner Chappell 
reported that PRS for Music refused to sub-license its repertoire to the other societies 
with the effect that wherever an online music service is interested in Warner 
Chappell’s UK repertoire, PRS for Music must be included.730  The difference in 
attitude between overseas performing rights societies and PRS for Music can be 
explained by the fact that for overseas societies direct online licensing in the EU is not 
a feasible option.  PRS for Music, however, competes with the other PEDL societies 
for the pan-European online licensing of Warner Chappell’s Anglo-American 
repertoire.  Understandably, being the exclusive holder of the online performing rights 
in the UK repertoire is a clear advantage for PRS for Music that the society is 
                                                   
725  Müller, Rechtsinhaberschaft, 127. 
726  PRS for Music, IMPEL Publisher FAQs. 
727  Spanish SGAE, for example, reported the conclusion of an agreement through which the society 
represents US performing rights society BMI’s repertoire; SGAE, Business Report and Corporate 
Responsibility 2006 (2007) 45. 
728  Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 31–32; see also SGAE 45. 
729  Heyde 266. 
730  Warner Music Group, Comments on the DG Competition Issues Paper on Online Goods and Services 
(2008) 11.  Whether this situation has changed since then is unclear. 
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unwilling to give up.  It not only explains the difficulties of the other PEDL societies 
but, looking at the broader picture, also clarifies the large involvement of PRS for 
Music in so many of the current pan-European licensing schemes. 
This reveals a third element of inequality in the model of direct pan-European 
licensing established by the 2005 Recommendation: in practice, only the most 
powerful European collecting societies will be in a position to represent the 
performing online rights in the entire Anglo-American or Latin repertoire.  Only they 
can therefore participate in the publisher-controlled initiatives. 
12.4 Conclusion 
The preceding sections have highlighted the various elements of inequality that 
publishers and collecting societies were faced with and concluded that only some 
actors were able to change their licensing practices in line with the goals pursued by 
the 2005 Recommendation.  A question that still needs to answered, however, is 
whether those practical changes that have occurred had a positive or negative effect on 
the diversity of online music. 
Arguably, this is best approached by comparing the changes with how authors’ 
online music rights were licensed before the EU intervention.  As a first observation, 
one can ascertain that the changes only affect online services that target several EU 
member states.  Where online music is offered in only one EU member state, the 
domestic society, based on the network of reciprocal representation agreements 
amongst collecting societies, continues to be in a position to license the rights 
necessary for the online use of the worldwide repertoire within its territory. 
Yet, for online music providers wishing to offer their services in several EU 
member states, the situation has changed.  Before, they entered into licensing 
agreements with the domestic authors’ rights societies in all of the targeted countries, 
who in turn were able to license the necessary online rights in the worldwide 
repertoire, but restricted in use to the territory of the respective society.  Now, the new 
central pan-European licensing initiatives offer multi-territorial licences, but these 
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licences are limited to the repertoires of specific publishers.  Under the old system, the 
licences that cross-border music services needed to operate in several EU member 
states were automatically of the broadest possible reach in repertoire.  Today, the 
breadth of repertoire a cross-border music service is able to offer depends on the 
number of licences it is willing to conclude.   
There is thus a clear risk that the repertoire offered to end consumers is less 
broad today than was previously the case.  This risk becomes even more tangible if one 
considers that the pan-European licensing initiatives cover primarily Anglo-American 
and thus highly demanded repertoires.  While there is an incentive for music services 
to clear the rights in the most popular music, it is unlikely that they will be equally 
motivated to negotiate additional licenses covering less popular or niche repertoire.  In 
particular, this would concern music originating from EU member states that are in 
less popular demand.  Where online music services do not make an explicit effort to 
additionally clear the rights in these repertoires, their customers will not be able to 
access music that expresses the identities of the cultural groups in those member states.  
It should be added that this risk cannot be mitigated by the fact that licences granted 
by the pan-European licensing initiatives typically include the right to the worldwide 
online exploitation of the domestic repertoire of the collecting society that jointly 
operates the relevant initiative.  Notably, only the commercially dominant societies 
cooperate with publishers in the operation of the pan-European licensing initiatives.  
The fact that online music services receive the rights in their domestic repertoires in 
addition to the rights in the relevant Anglo-American repertoire does not change the 
fact that less popular European repertoires could only be offered if additional licences 
were sought.  On the contrary, the fact that online music service providers are not only 
able to easily clear the Anglo-American repertoire of their choice but additionally 
receive the rights to sell popular European music would only appear to even lower the 
incentives for them to take an interest in less frequently requested other European 
music.  
We concluded earlier that a measure affecting the licensing system would 
promote the diversity of online music if the authors’ rights in a diverse foreign 
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repertoire, ideally the worldwide repertoire, were available for licensing to digital music 
retailers in an easy and efficient manner.  Applied to the factual situation of music 
licensing subsequent to the adoption of the 2005 Recommendation, one would have 
to note that it has become less easy and efficient for digital music retailers to clear the 
authors’ rights in a diverse foreign repertoire.  There is therefore much to conclude 
that the recent changes did not promote but were rather detrimental for the diversity 
of online music.   
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13 The 2008 CISAC Decision 
While the 2005 Recommendation was triggered by internal market concerns, a second 
initiative of the EU Commission with profound impact on online music licensing in 
Europe was taken in the domain of EU competition law.  In its 2008 CISAC Decision, 
the EU Commission held that the system of reciprocal representation, as it was 
practiced at that time by the EU performing rights societies in relation to cable, 
satellite and online distribution, constituted a concerted practice prohibited under 
(then) EC Article 81(1).  Most importantly for present purposes, the EU Commission 
decried that the mandates granted within the framework of these agreements were all 
restricted to the relevant mandated society’s domestic territory.  Although appeals 
against the decision were still pending at the time of submission before the European 
General Court,731 the Decision has already changed the online licensing practice to an 
extent that probably could not be reversed. 
Before looking more closely at the major aspects of the Decision (13.2), we 
place it into the context of the most important prior instances in which EU 
competition law has focused on collecting societies, and more specifically, their co-
operation through reciprocal agreements (13.1).  Finally, it will be necessary to map 
out the way in which the Decision has influenced the current online licensing 
situation (13.3). 
13.1 The Context of the 2008 CISAC Decision 
Since the early 1970s the relationship between collecting societies and their members, 
between collecting societies and their users, and, finally, among collecting societies 
themselves have regularly been scrutinised under EU competition law rules.732  The 
monopoly of collecting societies as such, however, was accepted as an essential feature 
                                                   
731  See below, n 788. 
732  For a more detailed overview, see Nérisson, La légitimité de la gestion collective des droits des auteurs en 
France et en Allemagne (2011) 899–972; Frabboni 134–163; Lánchidi 135–140. 
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of the normal activities and purposes of collective right management that, unless there 
were additional indications of abusive behaviour, would not conflict with EU 
competition law.733  This interpretation was particularly drawn from the fact that both 
the European Commission as well as the ECJ, when asked to decide whether the 
membership agreements of two collecting societies violated competition rules, based 
their judgment on (now) Article 102 and not TFEU Article 101.734 
More specifically, however, the territorial delineation of the reciprocal 
agreements was subject to the scrutiny of both the ECJ and the European Commission 
prior to the 2008 CISAC Decision. 
13.1.1 The 1989 Lucazeau and Tournier Cases before the European Court of Justice 
In the 1989 Lucazeau and Tournier cases, the ECJ was called upon to assess collecting 
societies’ network of reciprocal representation agreements and, more specifically, the 
resulting de facto monopoly for each society within its domestic territory.  In the two 
cases that had triggered references for preliminary ruling, French discothèque owners 
wanted to avoid the comparatively high royalty fees fixed by SACEM.  As they were 
only interested in Anglo-American repertoire they approached another foreign 
collecting societies for a licence.  The latter, however, refused to license due to the 
territorial restrictions of the reciprocal agreements in place with SACEM.  The 
question therefore arose whether the reciprocal representation agreements were anti-
competitive under (now) TFEU Article 101(1). 
The ECJ first pointed out that the reciprocal representation agreements 
pursued two objectives: the implementation of national treatment for all musical 
works irrespective of their origin and the reliance on local societies for the protection 
of repertoires abroad.  As these were legitimate aims, the agreements as such were not 
contrary to (now) TFEU Article 101(1).  The Court went on to point out that ‘the 
                                                   
733  Schierholz para 12.0.23; Nérisson para 912. 
734  Belgische Radio en Televisie v NV Fonior; Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs v NV Fonior; 
Belgische Radio en Televisie v NV Fonior v SV SABAM and NV Fonior, Case 127/73 [1974] ECR 313 
(ECJ, 27 March 1974) para 10; GEMA III (IV/29.971), Decision 82/204/EEC [1982] OJ L 94/12 
(European Commission, 4 December 1981) 54. 
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position might be different’ if they established exclusive mandates to the effect that a 
mandating society could not allow direct access to its repertoire by foreign users 
abroad.735  Yet, in contrast to previous practice, the agreements did not contain any 
such clauses.  Given, however, that collecting societies still refused to directly license 
users abroad, the question arose whether collecting societies retained de facto 
exclusivity by means of a concerted practice prohibited under (now) TFEU 
Article 101(1).  The Court noted that ‘mere parallel behaviour may amount to strong 
evidence of a concerted practice’ but also emphasised that  
‘concerted action of that kind cannot be presumed where the parallel 
behaviour can be accounted for by reasons other than the existence of 
concerted action.  Such a reason might be that the copyright-management 
societies of other Member States would be obliged, in the event of direct 
access to their repertoires, to organize their own management and 
monitoring system in another country’.736 
In the offline environment, the ECJ had therefore accepted that the collecting 
societies’ behaviour to refuse direct licensing was not restrictive of competition under 
TFEU Article 101(1).  That the question remained unsettled as far as the licensing of 
music for online uses was concerned became clear when, in the first years of the new 
millennium, the Commission considered whether several new types of reciprocal 
agreements fell foul of competition rules.  These agreements had been elaborated 
upon by collecting societies in order to allow for both multi-territorial and multi-
repertoire licences and were received rather critically by the European Commission. 
13.1.2 The Simulcasting Agreement and Its Variants 
The first of these new models specifically designed for the licensing of forms of musical 
exploitation through the Internet was the Simulcasting Agreement, originally 
concluded between 40 record producers’ collecting societies from Europe, Asia, 
                                                   
735  François Lucazeau et al v Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) et al, Joined 
cases 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88 [1989] ECR 2811 (ECJ, 13 July 1989) paras 13-14; Ministère public v 
Jean-Louis Tournier, 395/87 [1989] ECR 2521 (ECJ, 13 July 1989) paras 19-20. 
736  François Lucazeau et al v Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) et al para 18; 
Ministère public v Jean-Louis Tournier para 24. 
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Northern and Latin America, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.737  While it 
only applies to the right of the producers of sound recordings and performers it was 
heralded, time and again, as a sensible model for the domain of authors’ rights.  The 
way it was evaluated by the Commission clearly illustrates the latter’s attitude towards 
the role that competition should play in collective rights management. 
The agreement was intended to make it easier for radio and TV broadcasters to 
clear the rights of performers and producers of sound recordings required in order to 
transmit radio or TV broadcasts simultaneously over the Internet.  As it provided that 
the participating societies granted each other, on a non-exclusive and territorially 
unrestricted basis, the right to authorise the use of their repertoires for simulcasts,738 a 
broadcaster could obtain a single licence that covered the necessary broadcasting and 
public performance rights in the repertoires of all participating societies (multi-
repertoire) for all the countries into which the simulcast would be transmitted (multi-
territorial).  In contrast, under the previous system of reciprocal representation a 
record producers’ society could only grant multi-repertoire licences within its local 
territory.  A simulcaster was therefore obliged to seek several licences; one from each 
record producers’ society in each of the countries in which the simulcast would be 
accessible. 
On 16 November 2000 the International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry (henceforth IFPI), which, as a representative of the record producers’ 
societies, had facilitated the agreement’s conclusion and applied to the Commission 
for it to be exempted under (now) TFEU Article 101(3).  Despite the practical 
advantages of the one-stop shop solution established by the Agreement, the 
Commission was reluctant to accept two particular provisions of the model agreement. 
Under the first problematic provision, the power of any participating collecting 
society to grant multi-territorial and multi-repertoire licences was limited to those 
                                                   
737  Mestmäcker, ‘Agreements of Reciprocal Representation of Collecting Societies in the Internal 
Market’ [2005] Revue Internationale du Droit d'Auteur 63. 
738  In territories where record producers and performers are not endowed with exclusive rights but mere 
rights to equitable remuneration, the reciprocal mandate also authorised the mandated society to 
claim such remuneration. 
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simulcasters whose signal originated in its domestic territory.739  After the Commission 
had expressed its reluctance to accept such customer allocation, IFPI amended the 
clause to provide that broadcasters whose signal originated in the EEA could obtain a 
licence from any society within the EEA.740 
The second point of contention concerned the calculation of royalties.  While 
the Commission, in principle, accepted that the overall sum to be charged to 
simulcasters was the aggregate of the national tariffs of all countries covered by the 
licence,741 it was particularly critical of the fact that the overall tariff would not 
distinguish the copyright royalty from the administration fee of the grantor society.  
This, therefore, prevented ‘prospective users from assessing the efficiency of each one 
of the participating societies and from benefiting from the licensing services from the 
society capable of providing them at the lower cost’.742  In order to alleviate the 
Commission’s concerns, IFPI offered to change the agreement so as to separate the 
copyright royalty from the grantor society’s administration fee and to identify them 
separately when charging a licence fee to a user.743 
                                                   
739  European Commission, Notice Pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 Concerning an 
Application for Negative Clearance or Exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty (Case 
COMP/C2/38.014 – IFPI ‘Simulcasting’) [2001] OJ C 231/18, para 17. 
740  Ibid paras 17-19. 
741  IFPI ‘Simulcasting’ (COMP/C2/38.014), Decision 2003/300/EC,  [2003] OJ L 107/58 (European 
Commission, 8 October 2002) Recitals 108-115. 
742  Ibid Recital 71.  It should be noted that the idea of a certain degree of price competition amongst 
collecting societies was not novel when the Simulcasting Agreement was scrutinised by the European 
Commission.  In fact, in the context of central licensing agreements for the reproduction of sound 
recordings of musical works on physical carriers, mechanical rights societies themselves had started 
to grant record companies rebates on the royalties due.  To counteract these tendencies, the 
publishers, threatening the societies with withdrawal, succeeded in establishing the Cannes 
Agreement, in which mechanical rights societies obliged themselves to deduct rebates from their 
administrative costs only and to keep them under a certain level; Gyertyanfy, ‘Collective 
Management of Music Rights in Europe after the CISAC Decision’ (2010) 41 International Review 
of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 59, fn 7.  As to the European Commission’s appraisal 
of the Cannes Extension Agreement – successor of the Cannes Agreement – under competition law, 
see Cannes Extension Agreement (COMP/C2/38.681), Decision 2007/735/EC [2007] OJ L 296/27 
(European Commission, 4 October 2006).  A succinct overview of the forces that led to the central 
licensing agreements and the Cannes (Extension) Agreement is provided by Hardy, ‘National versus 
Regional, Many versus Few: The Dilemma Facing the Collection Societies’ in Pietilä (ed) World 
Music: Roots and Routes (2009) 34. 
743  IFPI ‘Simulcasting’ (COMP/C2/38.014) Recital 103.  Commentators have largely criticised the 
Commission for the separation of copyright royalty and administration fee as this was perceived as a 
cut with the traditional logic according to which collecting societies operate; see Nérisson 
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Satisfied with the offered amendments, the Commission exempted the 
Simulcasting Agreement under (then) EC Article 81(3).744  The substantial economic 
benefit that warranted an exemption was seen in the fact that the agreement gave rise 
to a new product, namely multi-territorial, multi-repertoire simulcasting licences, 
which both promoted technical and economic progress and improved the distribution 
of music in sound recordings.745 
While the Simulcasting Agreement is still in force,746 it appears to be of 
minimal relevance in practice, as the rights necessary for simulcasting are typically 
cleared jointly with and at the same time as the broadcasting rights.747 
After the implementation of the Simulcasting Agreement, IFPI facilitated two 
additional model agreements for the reciprocal representation of phonogram 
producers’ collecting societies, covering further types of online music exploitation.  In 
November 2003, an agreement for certain types of webcasting, ie the streaming of 
music programmes on the Internet, was announced.748  In April 2007, the Webcasting 
Agreement was extended to cover a broader range of streaming services and a new 
reciprocal agreement was launched for catch-up TV and radio by way of streaming and 
podcasts.749  As far as can be seen, all of these agreements are constructed along the 
lines of the Simulcasting Agreement as approved by the European Commission.750 
                                                                                                                                                
paras 1000-1001; Mestmäcker 93–129. 
744  As the notified agreement was only intended to operate for an experimental period until 31 
December 2004 the exemption was granted accordingly until that date; IFPI ‘Simulcasting’ 
(COMP/C2/38.014) Article 1. 
745  Ibid Recitals 84-92. 
746  Schierholz para 12.0.80. 
747  Müller, Rechtsinhaberschaft, 125. 
748  IFPI, Recording Industry Announces New One-stop-shop for Webcasting Licensing (London).  The agreement 
seems to be of more practical relevance than that for simulcasting; Müller, Rechtsinhaberschaft, 125. 
749  IFPI, Response to the Reflection Document of DG INFSO and DG MARKT (2010) 5. 
750  Gerlach 1–2. 
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13.1.3 The Santiago / Barcelona Agreements 
In relation to the online rights of authors, authors’ rights societies put forward a 
solution for multi-territorial licensing when they adopted the Santiago and Barcelona 
Agreements. 
The first of these model agreements owes its name to the fact that it was 
concluded during the 2000 CISAC World Congress in Santiago de Chile.751  Agreed 
upon by initially five performing rights societies,752 it adapted the existing CISAC 
Model Agreement to the online environment.  Every participating society authorised 
the other societies to grant non-exclusive licences for online performing rights in its 
repertoire on a worldwide basis.  As a consequence, any participating society was able 
to grant multi-territorial and multi-repertoire licences to operators of webcasting, 
streaming, as well as music and video downloads on demand.  Importantly, however, 
the Agreement provided for a customer allocation regime, according to which any 
online music service was able to obtain such licence from only one of the participating 
societies.753 
It was this provision that proved to be contentious when BUMA, GEMA, PRS 
and SACEM notified the Santiago Agreement to the European Commission for 
negative clearance on 17 April 2001.754  Three years later, the European Commission 
issued a Statement of Objections in which it invited the notifying parties to delete the 
customer allocation clause.755  From the perspective of the Commission, this customer 
allocation led to a situation in which ‘each national collecting society was given 
                                                   
751  A detailed overview of the different provisions of the agreement is provided by Ficsor, Collective 
Management, 114–120. 
752  BMI (USA), BUMA (NL), GEMA (D), PRS (UK) and SACEM (F).  It was later joined by all other 
performing rights societies in the EEA except for SPA (P); see European Commission, Notice 
Published pursuant to Article 27(4) in Cases COMP/C2/39152 – BUMA and COMP/C2/30151 SABAM 
(Santiago Agreement – COMP/C2/38126) [2005] OJ C 200/11, para 1. 
753  Notably, a participating society’s competence mainly depended on the top-level country domain that 
an online music service used, the primary language of its Internet site, or its country of 
incorporation; Ficsor, Collective Management, 117. 
754  European Commission, Notification of Cooperation Agreements (Case COMP/C2/38.126 - BUMA, 
GEMA, PRS, SACEM) [2001] OJ C 145/2. 
755  European Commission, Commission Opens Proceedings into Collective Licensing of Music Copyrights for 
Online Use (2004); Nérisson para 1010. 
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absolute exclusivity for its territory as regards the possibility of granting multi-
territorial/multi-repertoire licenses for online music rights’.756  Moreover, the resulting 
exclusivity was further reinforced by a ‘most favoured nation’ clause.757  Unlike the 
collecting societies of sound recording producers and performers under the 
Simulcasting Agreement, the performing rights societies were unwilling to agree to a 
removal of the restrictions.758  As a consequence, when the Santiago Agreement 
expired at the end of 2004 it was not renewed759 and performing rights societies then 
returned to the territorial delineated CISAC Model Agreement.760 
While the Santiago Agreement covered online performing rights, a parallel 
model agreement for online reproduction rights was adopted by mechanical rights 
societies at the 2001 BIEM General Assembly in Barcelona.  It functioned in a way 
analogous to the Santiago Agreement and also contained the same type of customer 
allocation.761  After the European Commission’s objection to the Santiago Agreement, 
the Barcelona Agreement also expired at the end of 2004 without being renewed.762 
13.2 The Regulatory Scope of the 2008 CISAC Decision 
Following complaints by European broadcasting group RTL and digital music service 
Music Choice, the European Commission in November 2001 started an investigation 
into the possible anti-competitive effects of the CISAC Model Agreement itself and its 
                                                   
756  European Commission, 2005 Market Test Notice Santiago Agreement, para 6. 
757  Ibid para 7. 
758  The notable exceptions are BUMA (NL) and SABAM (B) which offered to renounce to the criticised 
provisions; ibid paras 8-12. 
759  Woods, ‘Multi-territorial Licensing and the Evolving Role of Collective Management Organizations’ 
in Gervais (ed) Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (2nd edn, 2010) 105, 117. 
760  Alich, ‘Neue Entwicklungen auf dem Gebiet der Lizenzierung von Musikrechten durch 
Verwertungsgesellschaften in Europa’ (2008) 57 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 
Internationaler Teil 996, 997. 
761  European Commission, Notification of Cooperation Agreements (Case COMP/C-2/38.377 – BIEM 
Barcelona Agreements) [2002] OJ C 132/18. 
762  Karbaum and others, ‘Rechtsbeziehungen der GEMA zu ausländischen Verwertungsgesellschaften’ 
in Kreile and others (eds) Recht und Praxis der GEMA (2nd edn, 2008) 792, para 30. 
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application by EEA performing rights societies.  On 16 July 2008 it decided that the 
collecting societies had infringed (then) EC Article 81(1).763  
The Commission identified three distinct restrictions of competition.  A first 
restriction lay in the fact that the reciprocal agreements of some societies contained 
provisions to allocate potential members amongst themselves.  The second and the 
third restriction concerned the scope of the mandates to reciprocal representation that 
performing rights societies granted each other. 
As far as the allocation of potential members is concerned, the Commission 
disapproved of a clause that had been contained in the CISAC Model Agreement 
until 3 June 2004764 and continued to be part of the bilateral agreements of several 
societies.765  According to that clause performing rights societies barred themselves 
from accepting members of another society or right holders that had the nationality of 
any country in which another society operated.766  The Commission considered that 
this membership clause prevented performing rights societies from competing for right 
holders.767  Moreover, it was also deemed to affect competition for commercial users in 
an indirect way in that, as a result, the performing rights societies’ own repertoires 
were purely national and thus more complementary than would otherwise be the 
case.768  The performing rights societies apparently accepted this assessment as, in 
March 2007, CISAC offered not to recommend to EEA societies to include the 
membership clause and the EEA societies themselves offered to delete it from their 
bilateral agreements.769  Moreover, as far as can be seen, none of the appeals lodged 
                                                   
763  CISAC (COMP/C2/38.698).  A Statement of Objection had already been sent to the parties on 31 
January 2006; see European Commission, Competition: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to the 
International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC) and its EEA Members (2006).  
An oral hearing took place on 14-16 June 2006. 
764  CISAC (COMP/C2/38.698) Recital 27. 
765  Ibid Recitals 30-35. 
766  Article 11(II) of the CISAC Model Agreement read: ‘While this contract is in force neither of the 
contracting Societies may, without the consent of the other, accept as a member any member of the 
other society or any natural person, firm or company having the nationality of one of the countries 
in which the other Society operates’, see ibid Recital 18. 
767 Ibid Recitals 132-137. 
768  Ibid Recitals 126 and 137. 
769  European Commission, Notice Published pursuant to Article 27(4) of Council Regulation No 1/2003 in 
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against the CISAC Decision contest the anti-competitive effects of the membership 
clause.770 
The remaining two restrictions identified by the Commission regarded the 
scope of the mandates that the performing rights societies granted each other.  Until 
1996 the CISAC Model Agreement had provided for reciprocal representation on an 
exclusive basis771 and the bilateral agreements of 17 of the 24 EEA performing rights 
societies still maintained such exclusivity.772  As a result, every performing rights society 
held a monopoly as this guaranteed that no other society could license performing 
rights in its territory.  In the eyes of the Commission this unduly restricted 
competition on two levels: competition amongst societies on representation services 
granted to other societies as well as competition on licences granted to commercial 
users.  The latter were forced to seek mono-territorial licences even if their intended 
use covered several countries.773  CISAC and the EEA performing rights societies 
acknowledged the anti-competitive character of explicit exclusivity and, as with the 
membership clause, offered to delete it from their bilateral agreements.774 
The far more contentious issue was the Commission’s second reprimand in 
relation to the scope of the representation mandates.  It concerned the fact that all 
EEA performing rights societies, within their bilateral representation agreements, had 
                                                                                                                                                
Case COMP/38698 — CISAC [2007] OJ C 128/12, para 9. 
770  Only five of the 23 appeals seek to annul the CISAC Decision as far as the membership clause is 
concerned.  None of them challenge the anti-competitive effect of the membership clause; AEPI v 
Commission of the European Communities, Case T-392/08 R, Order on Interim Measures [2008] ECR 
II-281 (CFI, 19 November 2008); AKM v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-432/08, 
Action Brought on 1 October 2008 [2008] OJ C 327/33; KODA v Commission of the European 
Communities, Case T-425/08 R, Order on Interim Measures [2008] ECR II-303 (CFI, 5 December 
2008); SACEM v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-422/08 R, Order on Interim 
Measures [2008] ECR II-271 (CFI, 14 November 2008); TEOSTO v Commission of the European 
Communities, Case T-401/08 R, Order on Interim Measures [2008] ECR II-267 (CFI, 14 November 
2008). 
771  Article 1(I) and (II) of the CISAC Model Agreement; see CISAC (COMP/C2/38.698) Recitals 22-23, 
28.  The exclusive authorisation granted by a performing rights society to its sister society was, 
however, subject to territorial restrictions in that the sister society would only have the right to 
license the represented society’s repertoire in specific territories. 
772  Ibid Recitals 36 and 37. 
773  Ibid Recitals 140-144. 
774  CISAC (COMP/C2/38.698) Recital 143; European Commission, 2007 Market Test Notice CISAC, 
para 10. 
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limited the geographical scope of the mandate that they granted to each of their sister 
societies to the latter’s domestic territory.775  This had the practical effect that, even in 
the absence of explicit exclusivity clauses, some degree of exclusivity was conferred to 
each performing rights society in so much as it was the only society able to grant multi-
repertoire licences for the use of music within its territory.  The territorial limitations 
thus created national markets in which the local collecting society enjoyed a monopoly 
for the multi-repertoire licensing of performing rights.776 
In assessing whether such uniform action amounted to a concerted practice, 
restrictive of competition in such a way as to be caught by (now) TFEU Article 101(1), 
the Commission recalled the guidance offered by the ECJ in the Lucazeau and Tournier 
cases.  Examining the categorical refusal by collecting societies to directly license users 
abroad, the Court had held that ‘mere parallel behaviour may amount to strong 
evidence of a concerted practice’ but that no such presumption can be made ‘where 
the parallel behaviour can be accounted for by reasons other than the existence of 
concerted action’.777  Back in 1989, the ECJ had considered that such a reason might 
be that collecting societies would otherwise be forced to organise their own 
management and monitoring systems abroad.  For its part, the European Commission 
followed the ECJ in so much as it specifically acknowledged that – in the offline world 
– the costs of establishing monitoring structures abroad ‘would simply be excessive’ 
and that this explained the strictly national definition of licensing areas.778  Yet, the 
Commission refused to apply the same reasoning to satellite, Internet and cable 
transmissions of music.779  With specific regard to Internet transmissions, of most 
interest for present purposes, the Commission asserted that remote monitoring could 
be accomplished and noted that existing initiatives for multi-territorial licensing had 
developed apparently without the need for a local presence.780  As the Commission 
                                                   
775  CISAC (COMP/C2/38.698) Recital 38. 
776  Ibid Recitals 203-207. 
777  François Lucazeau et al v Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) et al, para 18; 
Ministère public v Jean-Louis Tournier, para 24.  See above, on page 248. 
778  CISAC (COMP/C2/38.698) Recital 184. 
779  Ibid Recitals 185-199. 
780  Ibid Recitals 189-194.  The Commission referred specifically to the Simulcasting and the Webcasting 
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could not identify any other reason to explain why the uniform territorial delineation 
resulted from autonomous behaviour, it held it to be a concerted practice.781  The 
Commission further assumed that, in the absence of such practice, there would be 
more competition amongst collecting societies both in terms of providing 
representation services to other societies (several societies could be appointed to 
represent the mandating society in the same territory) as well as in terms of licensing 
performing rights to commercial users (all thus appointed societies could license the 
mandating society’s repertoire within the defined territory).  Such competition would 
force the performing rights societies to pursue more efficient forms of rights 
administration.782  The Commission therefore concluded that the identified concerted 
practice restricted competition in such a way as to fall within (then) EC Article 81(1). 
While condemning the performing rights societies’ practice as anti-competitive 
in this way, the Commission took great care to emphasise that it was the coordinated 
nature of their action to geographically limit representation mandates to the mandated 
society’s domestic territory in each and every case that was in violation with (now) 
TFEU Article 101(1).  Reciprocal representation agreements as such were perfectly 
legitimate, just as it was to limit representation mandates in their geographical scope, 
even where the geographical scope of a mandate was limited to the mandated society’s 
domestic territory.  As long as it did not result from the coordinated activity of all 
societies, this would not be automatically anti-competitive,783 nor would there be any 
territorial delineation that ‘is the result of the assessment of the individual capabilities 
of the parties to the bilateral reciprocal representation agreement’.784 
In order to alleviate the Commission’s concerns, the performing rights societies 
had offered to license the online performing rights in their own repertoires directly 
across the EEA and to mandate each performing right society to grant multi-repertoire 
                                                                                                                                                
Agreement, the Santiago Agreement as well as CELAS. 
781  Ibid Recital 199. 
782  Ibid Recitals 208-212. 
783  Ibid Recital 201. 
784  Ibid Recital 183; see also Recital 95: ‘This decision … neither prohibits the reciprocal representation 
system as such, nor the possibility for collecting societies to introduce a certain territorial delineation 
together with certain commercial conditions in their representation contracts’. 
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and multi-territorial licences if it fulfilled qualitative criteria related to tariffs, 
deductions, administrative infrastructure, technical capacities, transparency and 
distribution rules.785  When the commitments were market-tested, however, the 
general tenor throughout the received 80 observations was that almost no society 
would fulfil these qualitative criteria.  The Commission therefore concluded that the 
proposed offers did not appropriately address the identified concerted practice.786 
Without imposing any fine, the European Commission ordered the 
performing rights societies concerned to delete the membership or exclusivity clauses 
in their reciprocal representation agreements.  In addition, it ordered all EEA 
performing rights societies to ‘review bilaterally’ with each other ‘the territorial 
delineation of their mandates for satellite, cable retransmission and Internet use in 
each of their reciprocal representation agreements’.787  The decision was appealed by 
twenty-two of the twenty-four performing rights societies to which it was addressed as 
well as by CISAC.788  Some societies had also sought interim measures; yet the Court 
                                                   
785  European Commission, 2007 Market Test Notice CISAC, paras 11-12. 
786  CISAC (COMP/C2/38.698) Recital 72. 
787  Ibid Article 4. 
788  AEPI v Commission of the European Communities; AKKA/LAA v Commission of the European 
Communities, Case T-414/08, Action Brought on 29 September 2008 [2008] OJ C 313/39; AKM v 
Commission of the European Communities; ARTISJUS v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-
411/08 R, Order on Interim Measures [2008] ECR II-270 (CFI, 14 November 2008); EAÜ v 
Commission of the European Communities, Case T-416/08, Action Brought on 29 September 2008 
[2008] OJ C 313/40; GEMA v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-410/08 R, Order on 
Interim Measures [2008] ECR II-268 (CFI, 14 November 2008); IMRO v Commission of the European 
Communities, Case T-415/08, Action Brought on 29 September 2008 [2008] OJ C 313/40; KODA v 
Commission of the European Communities; LATGA-A v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-
419/08, Action Brought on 29 September 2008 [2008] OJ C 313/42; OSA v Commission of the 
European Communities, Case T-418/08, Action Brought on 29 September 2008 [2008] OJ C 313/41; 
PRS v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-421/08, Action Brought on 29 September 
2008 [2008] OJ C 313/42; SACEM v Commission of the European Communities; SAZAS v Commission of 
the European Communities, Case T-420/08, Action Brought on 29 September 2008 [2008] OJ C 
313/42; SIAE v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-433/08 R, Order on Interim 
Measures [2008] ECR II-282 (CFI, 20 November 2008); SOZA v Commission of the European 
Communities, Case T-413/08, Action Brought on 29 September 2008 [2008] OJ C 301/56; SPA v 
Commission of the European Communities, Case T-417/08, Action Brought on 29 September 2008 
[2008] OJ C 313/41; STEF v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-428/08, Action Brought 
on 30 September 2008 [2008] OJ C 313/44; STIM v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-
451/08, Action Brought on 2 October 2008 [2008] OJ C 313/52; TEOSTO v Commission of the 
European Communities; TONO v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-434/08, Action 
Brought on 1 October 2008 [2008] OJ C 313/47; ZAiKS v Commission of the European Communities, 
Case T-398/08 R, Order on Interim Measures [2008] ECR II-266 (CFI, 14 November 2008); CISAC 
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of First Instance refused to suspend the application of the Decision’s operative part; 
later, this order was confirmed by the ECJ.789  At the time of submission, the General 
Court’s judgments are still pending.790 
In conclusion, the CISAC Decision has been, at least for the time being, the 
culmination of a series of instances in which the European Commission questioned 
the European collecting societies’ monopoly position in online licensing under EU 
competition rules.  Throughout the different cases the Commission has shown 
consistent reasoning in asserting that physical infrastructure was no longer needed to 
control the online uses of music and that monitoring could equally well be done 
remotely from abroad.  As far as online licensing is concerned, the Commission, 
therefore, has taken the stance that the ‘traditional economic justification for 
collecting societies not to compete in cross-border provision of services does not seem 
to apply’.791  In its investigations, the Commission identified different forms by which 
reciprocal representation agreements unduly restricted competition.  The most 
obvious one, perhaps, was addressed in the CISAC Decision where, notably, explicit 
exclusivity was coupled with a geographical restriction of the granted mandates to the 
domestic territory of the mandated society.  Moreover, the CISAC Decision also 
showed that such geographic limitation alone, if applied as part of a coordinated 
approach, is equally deemed to fall foul of TFEU Article 101(1).  In the Simulcasting, 
Santiago and Barcelona Agreements, no such systematic territorial delineation was 
present.  However, the Commission made it clear that a clause allocating potential 
                                                                                                                                                
v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-442/08, Action Brought on 3 October 2008 [2009] 
OJ C 82/25. The appeal lodged by SGAE, however, reached the court too late and was judged 
inadmissible; SGAE v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-456/08, Confirmed on Appeal 
(European CFI, 13 January 2009). 
789  AEPI v Commission of the European Communities; ARTISJUS v Commission of the European Communities; 
GEMA v Commission of the European Communities; KODA v Commission of the European Communities; 
SACEM v Commission of the European Communities; SIAE v Commission of the European Communities; 
TEOSTO v Commission of the European Communities; ZAiKS v Commission of the European Communities.  
The refusal of the Court of First Instance to suspend the application of the CISAC Decision was 
equally unsuccessfully appealed; ARTISJUS v Commission of the European Communities, Case C-32/09 
P(R) (ECJ, 31 August 2010) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
62009CO0032:EN:HTML>. 
790  Oral hearings in all pending cases took place between 28 September and 24 October 2011; Navarro, 
‘Collecting Societies Face the Music - General Court Hearing Underway’ (2011). 
791  IFPI ‘Simulcasting’ (COMP/C2/38.014) Recital 61. 
 - 259 - 
users according to their economic residency would have a similarly restrictive effect.  
Finally, as demonstrated in the Simulcasting Decision, even in the absence of 
territorial restrictions or customer allocation, a system of reciprocal representation 
agreements would not find acceptance in which all forms of price competition were 
excluded. 
Conceding that the European Commission’s decisions apply consistent reason, 
however, is not to say that this reasoning is necessarily correct.  Thus from many 
quarters, the Commission’s approach has been met with distinct reservations.  The 
CISAC Decision, in particular, can be questioned on various grounds, including inter 
alia the following: Is the Commission correct in assuming the feasibility of remote 
monitoring?  Can the systematic territorial delineation not be explained by the 
traditional development of the collective management system or by the fact that the 
laws of some member states prescribe a monopoly position to collecting societies?  Is 
such territorial delineation not simply commercially preferable in the interests of the 
societies’ members?  Even if no other reason for the parallel behaviour can be found, 
does it not reverse the burden of proof if the Commission readily assumes a concerted 
practice?792  Notwithstanding their importance, these and other issues fall beyond the 
terms of reference of our study. 
13.3 The Practical Effects of the 2008 CISAC Decision 
In what may be seen as the most obvious practical effect of the Decision, the European 
performing rights societies complied with the order to bilaterally re-negotiate their 
reciprocal representation agreements.  While the details of all contracts are 
confidential and known only to the Commission, some observations can be made.  In 
the case of GEMA, the rationale in re-negotiations was two-fold: first, it sought to be 
able to license to German online services the world repertoire to the broadest extent 
possible, in particular as far as national services are concerned.  In addition, a second 
                                                   
792  These are some of the issues raised by Gyertyanfy 73–75 and in the pleas of those performing rights 
societies that have appealed the Decision (see above n 788).  
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important aim was to secure that GEMA’s own repertoire was licensed abroad as 
comprehensively and efficiently as possible.793  Yet, while GEMA chose to continue to 
rely on reciprocal representation to guarantee the availability of its own repertoire 
abroad, some societies decided to license their own repertoire directly on a pan-
European basis.794  This led to a certain disruption in the system of reciprocal 
representation that, as a result, has become more complex. 
Although the bilateral agreements obviously differ in their details, one may, as 
far as online uses are concerned, distinguish three basic types: contracts that contain 
mandates allowing the grantee society to represent the grantor society’s repertoire on a 
worldwide basis; contracts that contain mandates limiting the grantee society’s ability 
to license to national online music services; and, finally, contracts that do not contain 
any representation mandate. 
Upon initial examination, the grantee society’s mandate in the first type of 
contracts appears particularly wide.  There are, however, two restrictions of 
considerable limiting effect.  On the one hand, they provide for customer allocation in 
that the mandate is only granted as far as online music services have their economic 
residency in the territory of the grantee society.795  On the other, the mandated society 
may not license important online uses for the mandating society’s territory.796 
Mandates of the second type effectively retain the territorial delineation to the 
mandated society’s territory: the grantee society may only license domestic online 
music services, ie music offers that are exclusively or primarily aimed at end customers 
in the grantee society’s territory.797  Importantly in this regard, some collecting societies 
                                                   
793  Information provided by GEMA on 26 March 2012. 
794  Müller, Rechtsinhaberschaft, 15.  While one would, perhaps, expect these to be most likely those 
societies that are part of ARMONIA (see above at 12.3.1.2, on page 224), no specific information on 
that point is available. 
795  Müller, Rechtsinhaberschaft, 14; Gyertyanfy 81. 
796  Müller, Rechtsinhaberschaft, 14.  These uses comprise, inter alia, ringtones, music and video on 
demand, and user-generated content.  The restriction aims at preventing forum shopping on the side 
of the online music service, who, it is feared, might change its economic residency to another 
country in which copyright is less valued. 
797  Often, this is determined to depend on where the online music service generates the substantial part 
of its income.  As far as catch-up TV or radio is concerned, there is general agreement amongst 
collecting societies that these uses should be licensed by the same society that licenses the 
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have explicitly prescribed that national affiliations of international services are not to 
be regarded as national online services.798  
Finally, those contracts that do not contain any representation mandates 
provide for criteria according to which licensing mandates can be granted on a case-by-
case basis.799 
Some insight into what motivates societies to grant either type of 
representation mandate has been provided by PRS for Music, when it noted that it 
had ‘introduced a new framework agreement to determine the scope of appointments 
for … online mandates … based on service levels, flexibility and transparency between 
us and the contracting society’.800  As a general rule, it might therefore be fair to say 
that the more efficiently the grantee society handles the administration of a foreign 
repertoire, the more likely the grantor society will be inclined to agree to a wide 
representation mandate.  In addition, it may also be assumed that the bargaining 
power of the two societies as well as the attractiveness of their respective repertoires 
would equally be of influence. 
In the re-designed reciprocal representation system, a collecting society’s ability 
to license a repertoire as broadly as possible depends on the scope of the service to be 
licensed.  Where online music services are national, it appears that their domestic 
society is able to grant licences comprising the entire repertoire still subject to 
reciprocal representation,801 even though occasionally the society might be obliged, in 
relation to a particular repertoire, to request case-by-case authorisation.802  Where 
online services cover several territories, the repertoire available through the domestic 
society is more limited and excludes rights of those societies that pursue direct pan-
                                                                                                                                                
corresponding broadcasting rights; see ibid 14–15. 
798  Gyertyanfy fn 85; Müller, Rechtsinhaberschaft, 14. 
799  Müller, Rechtsinhaberschaft, 15.  Apparently, reciprocal representation agreements which do not 
even contain a mandate to license national online music services are concluded only occasionally; 
see Gyertyanfy fn 85. 
800  PRS for Music, Contribution to 2010 Public Hearing, 2. 
801  It should be recalled that the most important Anglo-American or Latin repertoire is licensed outwith 
the system of reciprocal representation after the major music publishers’ withdrawals; see above 
12.3.1.1, starting on page 217. 
802  Gyertyanfy 84; Müller, Rechtsinhaberschaft, 15. 
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European licensing strategies.  Yet, even in these circumstances, there appears to be 
scope for case-by-case authorisations, although the frequency and the conditions of 
such ad hoc mandates remain unclear.803 
As a general conclusion, it can be stated that the reconfigured reciprocal 
representation regime has, for the first time, made available licences of both multi-
territorial and multi-repertoire nature.  One should not forget, however, that societies 
are not equally well placed to grant such licences, in particular since their licensable 
repertoire differs.  As a flipside to the improved availability of multi-territorial / multi-
repertoire licences, a hitherto unknown degree of inequality has thus been introduced 
into the system of reciprocal representation and thereby weakens the international 
solidarity that formerly informed collective rights management. 
Moreover, the in-built customer allocation might become a problematic feature 
of the newly negotiated reciprocal mandates.  In fact, it would appear that collecting 
societies have replaced the systematic geographic delineation of the representation 
mandates to the domestic territory of the grantee society by a mixed system in which 
mandates are either limited by an economic residency requirement or virtually the 
same territorial restriction.  Arguably, this still complies with the letter of the CISAC 
Decision: the territorial delineation is no longer systematic and one may even say that, 
under the new system, several societies can grant multi-repertoire licences for the same 
territory.804  Yet, because of the economic residency requirement users may only obtain 
a license from one particular society.  In practice, therefore, competition amongst 
collecting societies for commercial users at the level of multi-territorial licensing is 
excluded.  Given that, in the context of the Santiago and Barcelona Agreements, the 
European Commission had already disapproved the economic residency clause, one 
might conclude that the present mixed system could only be equally anti-competitive.  
In order to properly analyse whether this is the case, one would, of course, need more 
information as to how frequently reciprocal mandates are granted on condition of 
such customer allocation.  But even if one were to assume that every territorially 
                                                   
803  In the case of GEMA it has been reported that most of its sister societies allow case-by-case 
mandates; see Müller, Rechtsinhaberschaft, 15. 
804  Compare CISAC (COMP/C2/38.698) Recitals 207-212. 
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unlimited mandate did contain this restriction,805 the case would not be as clear-cut as 
might be assumed at first sight.  Primarily, unlike both the Santiago and Barcelona 
Agreements and the CISAC Model Agreement, the restrictions have not been 
systematically prescribed by a model contract but are the result of strictly bilateral 
consultations.  Moreover, as indicated by PRS for Music, the decision as to what type 
of mandate is granted is informed by a commercial assessment of the grantee society’s 
abilities, as was demanded by the EU Commission.  Further, there is an element of 
competition in the new system that was present neither when the Santiago and 
Barcelona Agreements nor the CISAC Model Agreement were applied.  Notably, some 
collecting societies deny reciprocal representation – at least in principle – and choose 
to license their repertoire directly on a pan-European basis.  As a final and related 
point, the eventuality, laid down in some bilateral agreements, of granting case-by-case 
mandates also adds a certain degree of flexibility to the system; even if it might a priori 
appear unlikely that such case-by-case mandates would be broader than those granted 
immediately in the agreements, this remains a possibility.  In light of these 
considerations it may be asserted that, under the newly designed regime, the market is 
less foreclosed.  Be this as it may, in practical terms it would be very unlikely if the EU 
Commission investigated the new system before the EGC has decided the still pending 
appeals in the CISAC case – in particular, because it will be up to the Court to 
determine the more fundamental question of whether the nature of collecting 
societies’ activities does not preclude an application of TFEU Article 101. 
As a more general consequence of the CISAC Decision, one observes a change of 
climate between collecting societies.  On the one hand, collecting societies, having 
been found guilty of an anti-competitive concerted practice, were uncertain to what 
extent they would still be allowed to co-operate without risking any further 
investigation or, possibly, fines.  The Decision has thus created an atmosphere in 
which societies were afraid to talk to each other.806  According to Armonia, this was 
                                                   
805  Such is the description by Müller, Rechtsinhaberschaft, 14. 
806  This has been described by (then) CISAC Director General Eric Baptiste at the Wild West Web 
Conference (Brussels 8 October 2008): ‘Before the decision was published our European members 
were talking amongst each other to try to find a solution.  Unfortunately, when the decision was 
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also the reason why the development of the pooling initiative had been substantially 
delayed.807  On the other hand, tensions between collecting societies have been 
expressed more publicly, as the smaller societies, in particular, feel threatened by the 
erosion of the principle of international solidarity that the changes to the traditional 
licensing model have brought about.  One very pointed example of a small collecting 
society aiming to retain a place in the newly ordered system of online licensing, albeit 
unsuccessfully, is the case of the Dutch Buma/Stemra.  Less than a week after the 
adoption of the CISAC Decision and thus before the re-negotiation of the reciprocal 
agreements, the society issued a pan-European licence to online music retailer Beatport 
covering the world repertoire.  Arguing that this was ‘in line with the European 
Commission’s intentions to end the traditional system of territorially restricted 
collective management’,808 the society apparently interpreted the Decision to render 
the territorial restrictions in its reciprocal representation agreements invalid.  A proper 
reading of TFEU Article 101(2) reveals, however, that the anti-competitiveness of a 
concerted practice does not entail the nullity of that practice.809  Consequently, the 
proceedings brought against that licence by PRS and GEMA were successful.810 
                                                                                                                                                
published all of that stopped because of this kind of injunction to stop talking to each other’. 
807  Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 33.  Initially, a memorandum of 
understanding to establish a joint framework had already been signed in January 2007. 
808  Buma/Stemra, Buma/Stemra Issues Beatport.com a Pan-European License (2008).  The tariffs charged 
were based on the country-of-destination principle; see Guibault and van Gompel, ‘Collective 
Management in the European Union’ in Gervais (ed) Collective Management of Copyright and Related 
Rights (2nd edn, 2010) 135, 163. 
809  This has also been confirmed by the Court of First Instance; see GEMA v Commission of the European 
Communities. 
810  GEMA v Buma/Stemra, Case 7 O 224/08 Kart (Landgericht Mannheim, 7 November 2008) <http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/831856.pdf>; PRS v Buma, Case 148418 / KG 
ZA 08-410 (Rechtbank Haarlem 19.08.2008) <http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=
BE8765>.  The latter case was confirmed in Buma v PRS, Case 200.016.122/01 (Gerechtshof 
Amsterdam 19.01.2010) <http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/detailpage.aspx?ljn=BL4289>.  See also 
Neefs, ‘Collecting Societies Collide over Pan-European Online Music Licensing’ (2008) 3 Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law & Practice 758. 
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13.4 Conclusion 
Having determined the practical effects of the 2008 CISAC Decision, we still need to 
assess whether the increased complexity that results from the re-configuration of the 
network of reciprocal representation agreements can be seen as promoting the 
diversity in online music.   
The concerns to be voiced in this regard are comparable to those that we 
identified in the analysis of the new pan-European licensing initiatives.811  Again, less 
demanded EU repertoires would appear to be at risk of no longer being available to 
the end consumer as securing the necessary right would require negotiating an 
additional licence.  The reason is the inequality of the new system, in which efficient 
societies and those with strong bargaining power (ie those with a highly attractive own 
repertoire) are able to grant licences of the widest reach possible.  Smaller societies 
with a less frequently requested own repertoire, on the other hand, do not even have 
the mandate to represent the attractive repertoires of their sister societies on a pan-
European scale.  As a consequence, the starting point for a cross-border music service 
provider in building an attractive music catalogue will always be a society able to 
represent as many of its sister societies’ domestic repertoires as possible.  In order to 
secure the rights for less popular European repertoires, the online music service would 
have to seek an additional licence.   
As this makes it less easy and efficient for online music providers to clear the 
authors’ rights in a diverse foreign repertoire, the re-configured network of reciprocal 
representation agreements would not be conducive to but rather detrimental for the 
diversity of online music. 
                                                   
811  See above at 12.4, on page 236. 
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Part 6:  Main Research Results  
The starting point of our research was the quest into the meaning of cultural diversity 
and its application in the area of online music (part 2).  Analysing the notion of 
‘culture’ applicable under EU law (chapter 5), we noted: 
 The notion of ‘culture’ is a sociological construct open to diverging 
explanations.    
 The review of relevant legal instruments and policy documents adopted under 
the aegis of UNESCO and the CoE reveals that the understanding of ‘culture’ 
has, since the creation of the organisations, broadened up over time to embrace 
an anthropological view of culture as everything that expresses the particular way 
of life or identity of groups within society.   
 While the concept of culture at the EU level remains sketchy and lacks legal 
definitions, it is equally infused by this anthropological understanding, which is 
not contrary to the fact that the EU’s competencies in the area of culture are of 
merely supplementary nature. 
More specifically focussing on the notion of ‘cultural diversity’ applicable under EU 
law (chapter 6), the following results could be reached:  
 Based on the anthropological view of culture, we were able to deduce an 
understanding of cultural diversity as the spectrum of different cultural identities 
or ways of life in society or, depending on the perspective, of the various forms 
through which the different cultural identities or ways of life in society are 
expressed. 
 In this descriptive sense, diversity in online music would be the spectrum of 
different cultural identities as conveyed through music distributed online. 
 However, an analysis of the relevant UNESCO or CoE instruments addressing 
cultural diversity until the mid-1990s shows that cultural diversity has not only 
been used in this descriptive sense but with varying connotations, serving as an 
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argument to support diverse political goals.  While the particular political goals 
changed over time, the theoretical framework under which they developed and 
which informed the use of the concept of cultural diversity was that of cultural 
pluralism.  At the core of cultural pluralism is the conviction that cultures – 
although being different – are of equal dignity and value and that everyone 
affiliating themselves with a certain culture must be able to express and preserve 
them.  Where the notion of ‘cultural diversity’ is used in the sense of cultural 
pluralism, its descriptive, factual character is thus supplemented by the 
normative subtext of the latter.  It still denotes the extent to which the various 
identities or ways of life in society are expressed but also signals that the desired 
degree of diversity would be a state in which they can all be freely expressed.  
Calling for diversity in online music would thus mean to call for a situation in 
which all cultural identities may be expressed through music that is available 
online. 
 Since the late 1990s, UNESCO and CoE materials on cultural diversity have 
increasingly conflated the concept with that of intercultural dialogue, stressing 
the need for exchange between different cultures in pursuit of mutual 
enrichment.  Against this background, calling for diversity in online music 
would also call for the availability of online music expressing identities or ways 
of life that are different from the consumers’ own. 
 Cultural diversity has also been an often-evoked argument in the debate on 
whether cultural goods and services require special treatment under 
international trade liberation regimes.  Three international instruments 
specifically address the connection of cultural diversity and free trade.  The 2005 
Convention is the only legally binding and thus the most important one 
although it is limited in scope to the diversity of expressions of cultural (which in 
turn are distinguished from cultural heritage).  Upon closer examination, it 
becomes apparent that these instruments did not seek to change the normative 
connotation of cultural diversity as intercultural pluralism.  It is true that the 
2005 Convention allows parties to take measures to protect and preserve 
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cultural expressions under exceptional circumstances (Article 8), but at the same 
time it expressly aspires to the ideals of cultural pluralism and intercultural 
dialogue. 
 Implicit in the understanding of cultural diversity in the sense of intercultural 
pluralism is also a desired level of diversity – a level which would be achieved if 
all groups and individual who wish to do so could express their cultural 
identities.  
 The interpretation of cultural diversity in the sense of intercultural pluralism is 
also appropriate under EU law as it ensures consistency.  This result finds 
additional confirmation in the drafting history of TFEU Article 167(4) as well as 
the political practice of the EU institutions. 
In part 3 we aimed to develop the formulated concept of cultural diversity into a more 
workable guideline for analysing the multi-territorial licensing of authors’ rights in 
online music.  Chapter 7 offered an enquiry into the exact scope of the obligation to 
respect and promote the diversity of the EU’s cultures in TFEU Article 167(4) and 
how it applies to online music.  The main conclusions were:  
 When adopting predominantly non-cultural measures, the EU institutions are 
bound by TFEU Article 167(4) to choose, amongst several ones equally suited to 
achieve the pursued goal, the most culturally-friendly one.  As the EU’s previous 
interventions in the area of multi-territorial licensing of authors’ rights in online 
music, ie the 2005 Recommendation and the 2008 CISAC Decision, responded 
primarily to internal market and competition law concerns, they are examples of 
measures to which TFEU Article 167(4) applied and any further EU measure in 
that area would also need to comply with that norm. 
 The 2005 Convention provides for an internationally accepted system of values, 
principles and objectives in relation to the diversity of cultural expressions and its 
Article 7 obliges the parties to the Convention to endeavour to promote the 
diversity of cultural expressions.  Our interpretation of the 2005 Convention 
concludes that the diversity of cultural expressions is promoted through measures 
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that encourage all groups and individuals in society to create expressions of their 
cultural identity as well as measures enhancing access to the expressions of these 
groups and individuals as well as those of others irrespective of their location.  
Parties to the Convention may also achieve this type of encouragement indirectly 
through the support of those who facilitate cultural creation or of organizations 
that support the work of the creators, such as collecting societies.   
 One important objective that provides guidance in the interpretation of Article 7 is 
that of equal dignity of and respect for all cultures (Article 2(3)). It allows us to 
draw additional conclusions as to how measures to promote the diversity of cultural 
expressions would be designed.  Notably, no cultural group may be unduly 
favoured, which does not imply equal support but rather presupposes that 
promotive measure be tailored to the particular situation of a cultural group.  
Where a group faces particular difficulties in expressing their culture, it would be 
legitimate for that group to receive more support than other groups.  On the other 
hand, measures to promote the diversity of cultural expressions should be limited 
to encourage cultural expression – whether a particular group in society wishes to 
make use of that opportunity is a decision to be made by that group.  
 TFEU Article 167(4) and Article 7 of the 2005 Convention contain largely 
overlapping rules as to how to deal with cultural diversity and both bind the EU.  
More specifically, the latter is restricted to a subset of cultural diversity, namely the 
diversity of cultural expressions.  To achieve coherence between these two norms, 
we suggest a harmonious interpretation of Article 167(4) in light of Article 7 of the 
2005 Convention.  For the implementation of Article 167(4), this has the practical 
advantage that recourse can be had to the values, principles and objectives of the 
2005 Convention.   
 Based on the proposed harmonious interpretation, we are able to further 
substantiate how Article 167(4) would apply to online music.  Notably, the EU 
would ‘promote the diversity of its cultures’ if it created an environment that 
enabled and encouraged all groups and individuals to express their cultural 
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identities through online music and to have access to online music expressing their 
own cultural identities as well as those of others, irrespective of their location. 
 At a more general level, the harmonious interpretation strengthens the 
implementation of the 2005 Convention in as much as the best endeavour 
obligation of parties to the Convention to promote the diversity of cultural 
expressions in effect becomes an obligation to take the promotion of the diversity 
of cultural expressions into account wherever a predominantly non-cultural 
measure may affect the diversity of cultural expressions.  
In chapter 8, we determined how measures regulating the EU framework for the 
licensing of authors’ rights could promote the diversity in online music.  The most 
pertinent conclusions were:  
 The analysis of the various steps in the value chain of online music reveals that the 
diversity of online music most crucially depends on the creation of a diverse body 
of music and on appropriate licensing conditions that allow for that diverse body of 
music to be turned into a sound recording offered through online means.   
 The framework for the licensing of authors’ rights in music has the most direct 
influence on the diversity of online music when a licence is needed to record music 
and to distribute it online.  To promote diversity in online music, any measure 
affecting the licensing system should make it possible for producers of sound 
recordings and digital music retailers to clear the rights in the entire domestic 
repertoire in an easy and efficient manner, regardless of the cultural identity 
expressed.  In order to allow for the access of diverse online music from other 
countries of the world, the authors’ rights in a diverse foreign repertoire, ideally the 
entire worldwide repertoire, should be available for licensing to digital music 
retailers.   
Chapter 9 reviewed the existing economic literature on the measuring of diversity, 
cultural diversity and musical diversity.  We concluded:  
 Conceptualising diversity as the interplay of variety, balance and disparity has the 
merit of not only making the existence and interdependence of these three 
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properties explicit.  It also illustrates that diversity is inherently subjective – both as 
regards the categorisation and the evaluation of how disparate the chosen categories 
are; depending on these choices, the matrix as whole changes.  This also leads to 
the realisation that there is no one single indicator that could describe diversity in 
any area.  
 It is impossible to measure diversity in online music.  Already a limited analysis of 
the available online music in a given territory would require unfeasible quantitative 
data and difficult choices of the appropriate categorisation as well as qualitative 
indicators of disparity.  It would be even less viable to bring the normative element 
of cultural diversity into the equation.   
 Nevertheless, the conceptualisation of diversity as the interplay of variety, balance 
and disparity is a helpful starting point for assessing policy measures as to whether 
they improve or decrease the diversity of online music.  Notably, it is useful to 
analyse which of these three properties are affected by the measure in question and 
how such effects would change the matrix of the three properties on the whole.  
Such an analysis of the modus operandi of the measure could help make an informed 
assertion as to whether the measure is at all appropriate to influence the diversity in 
online music. 
Part 4 examined whether the explicit cultural functions of authors’ societies 
contributed to the diversity in online music.  The introductory overview of the system 
of collective rights management noted (chapter 10):  
 The primary rationale of collecting societies is economic in nature as they allow for 
the exploitation of the authors’ rights in situations in which otherwise authors 
would not be able to monetize their rights.  This creates revenue for authors and 
thus implements the premise of copyright to incentivise creativity through 
monetary rewards.  
 In addition, collecting societies act more broadly in the interests of their members, 
manage their members’ right collectively in ways that present certain in-built 
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features of solidarity between successful and less successful authors and operate 
schemes with explicitly cultural and social goals for the benefits of their members.  
In chapter 11, we assessed whether GEMA’s cultural considerations in the distribution 
of royalties could be seen as promoting the diversity of online music, with the 
following results:  
 In its allocation procedure GEMA favours culturally important works.  In practice, 
GEMA regards those works as culturally important that are complex.  The criterion 
of complexity, however, is unable to accommodate the normative element in the 
concept of cultural diversity, which, based on the principle of equal dignity of and 
respect for all cultural groups, requires that all cultural groups are to the 
encouraged to express their identity through music.  The allocation procedure, 
therefore, does not promote the diversity of online music.  
 Collecting societies could, at least in countries in which no cultural group faces 
legal or practical obstacles in expressing themselves through music, use the 
redistribution of royalties as an instrument to promote a diverse musical creation if 
the criteria for such redistribution were in line with TFEU Article 167(4) and the 
2005 Convention.  Such a criterion could be the lack of demand for musical works.  
 The additional payments that some authors receive as a consequence of GEMA’s 
evaluation procedure favour successful, long-standing authors with a high repute.  
As they are inherent evaluative, they fail to encourage all groups in society to 
express their identity through music and, consequently, fail to promote a diverse 
musical creation.  
 GEMA also runs several other more limited schemes with the potential to be an 
appropriate tool to promote a diverse musical creation.  Their practical 
implementation, however, lacks transparency, which is why it could not be 
established whether in practice they promote musical diversity. 
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In part 5 we presented practical changes that have been prompted by the 2005 
Recommendation and the 2008 CISAC Decision and determined whether they 
promoted diversity in online music.  We concluded: 
 After the adoption of the 2005 Recommendation, pan-European licensing 
initiatives started to form.  Most of them are controlled by Anglo-American music 
publishers and jointly operated with one of the bigger EU collecting societies.  Two 
other initiatives, however, rely on the pooling of repertoires of several domestic 
authors’ societies.  
 The pan-European licensing initiatives formed in unequal ways as their creation was 
dependent on a publisher’s control of the reproduction rights in music, the ease 
with which they were able to withdraw them from the system of collective rights 
management and the ability of a partner author society to jointly license the 
corresponding making available rights. 
 The 2008 CISAC Decision led to a renegotiation of the existing reciprocal 
representation agreements in place between the authors’ societies in the EU.  As a 
result, an element of inequality was introduced into the system as today only those 
societies which operate efficiently or those with strong bargaining power (ie those 
with a highly attractive own repertoire) are able to grant licences of the widest reach 
possible.  Smaller societies with a less frequently requested own repertoire, on the 
other hand, do not even have the mandate to represent the attractive repertoires of 
their sister societies on a pan-European scale. 
 As a result of both practical developments, there is a clearly discernible risk for less 
popular EU repertoire of no longer being available to the end consumers of online 
music services across the EU unless the service provider makes an additional effort 
to clear these rights.  As this decreases the ease and efficiency with which the online 
music provider can clear the authors’ rights in a diverse foreign repertoire, both 
new developments – the trend towards pan-European licensing as well as the re-
negotiated reciprocal representation agreements – thus did not promote the 
diversity of online music. 
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Annex: Questionnaires Sent to GEMA 
First Questionnaire (Responses Received on 26 March 2012) 
GEMA Lizenzierungspraxis für Onlinenutzungen – national   
 Wie sind die aktuell zwischen der GEMA und Internetmusikdiensten gültigen 
Lizenzerträge über Streaming und Download gestaltet? Gelten die Tarife VR-OD 2 
und VR-OD 3 oder sind einzelvertragliche Bestimmungen ausgehandelt worden? 
 Im Falle von Einzelabreden, wie hoch ist die von den Internetmusikdiensten 
gezahlte Vergütung? 
 Falls die Tarifhöhe nicht öffentlich gemacht wird, drängt die GEMA oder drängen 
die Internetmuskdienste auf eine Geheimhaltung? Was ist die Motivation? 
 Umfassen aktuelle Lizenzverträge zum Download / Streaming das gesamte GEMA 
Repertoire im Wege einer Blankettlizenz oder kann ein Internetmusikdienst auch 
Lizenzen für nur einen Teil des GEMA Repertoires erwerben?  
 Was waren die Hauptstreitpunkte in den Verhandlungen mit YouTube? 
 Der Verteilungsplan C geht vom Grundsatz der Nettoeinzelverrechnung aus. Wie 
ist das in der Praxis: Kann überhaupt eine Nettoeinzelverrechnung durchgeführt 
werden? Bei welchen Nutzungsarten wird kollektiv verrechnet?  
 Ist der einheitliche Kostensatz für den Verteilungsplan C öffentlich bekannt?  
GEMA Lizenzierungspraxis für Onlinenutzungen – multi-territorial 
 Welche Prinzipien waren aus Sicht der GEMA für die Neuverhandlung der 
Gegenseitigkeitsverträge mit den Schwestergesellschaften maßgeblich? 
 Inwiefern kann die GEMA einem deutschen Onlinemusikdienst, nachdem die 
Gegenseitigkeitsverträge neu verhandelt wurden, multi-territoriale Lizenzen 
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erteilen? Für welche Repertoires kann die GEMA das Recht zur öffentlichen 
Zugänglichmachung sowie das mechanische Onlinerecht (mglw. im 
Zusammenspiel mit den von den großen Musikverlegern für die mechanischen 
Onlinerechte am anglo-amerikanischen Repertoire geschaffenen Zentralstellen) 
vermitteln?  
 Stimmt es, dass die Initiativen zwischen einzelnen europäischen 
Verwertungsgesellschaften und den großen Musikverlagen zur europaweiten 
Lizenzierung der mechanischen Onlinerechte des anglo-amerikanischen 
Repertoires der Verlage nicht mehr ausschließlich sind? Kann z.B. die SACEM 
EMIs anglo-amerikanisches Repertoire in Frankreich lizenzieren?  
 Wie steht die GEMA der Idee eines Poolings der Repertoires verschiedener 
Verwertungsgesellschaften für multi-territoriale Lizenzen gegenüber? Unterstützt 
die GEMA die Pan-European Platform Idee der CELAS? Unterstützt die GEMA 
die PRS Idee, sogenannte Hubs in Europa zu gründen? Wie schätzt die GEMA die 
Chancen der Realisierung der beiden Modelle ein?  
 Welches sind aus Sicht der GEMA die Hauptargumente, die dagegen sprechen, die 
Ausschließlichkeit im Verhältnis der Rechteübertragung zwischen dem Mitglied 
und der Verwertungsgesellschaft aufzuheben und daneben eine direkte 
Lizenzierung zuzulassen? 
 Wie steht die GEMA zu dem Vorschlag, dass Anbieter von Musikdiensten im 
Internet multiterritoriale Lizenzen von der lokalen Verwertungsgesellschaft 
bekommen sollen, die die hierzu nötigen Rechte ihrerseits im Wege der 
erweiterten kollektiven Rechtewahrnehmung bekommt?  
 Warum wird von Seiten der europäischen Verwertungsgesellschaften ein dem 
Simulcasting Abkommen nachempfundenes Modell abgelehnt? 
 Wie sähe aus Sicht der GEMA eine ideale Regelung der Vergabe von 
multiterritorialen Lizenzen für Onlinenutzungen in der angekündigten EU 
Rahmenrichtlinie aus? 
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 Was wäre aus Sicht der GEMA das „worst-case“ Szenario für eine zukünftige 
europäische Regelung? 
 Sollte das EuG den Verwertungsgesellschaften in der CISAC Entscheidung in der 
Einschätzung folgen, dass die territorial begrenzten Gegenseitigkeitsträge keinen 
Wettbewerb unterbinden, der schützenswert i.S.v. jetzt Art. 101 AEUV ist, wäre es 
nach der Neuverhandlung der Gegenseitigkeitsverträge überhaupt möglich zum 
status quo ante zurückzukehren? 
Verteilungsverfahren: 
 Nach welchen Kriterien entscheidet der Werkausschuss, dass ein 
Unterhaltungsmusikwerk von besonderem künstlerischen Wert ist ist (Abschn. XI 
Ziff. 7 Ausführungsbestimmungen zum Verteilungsplan A) oder dass ein Werk 
nach Abschnitt XI eine erhöhte Punktbewertung im Rundfunk erhalten soll?  
 Wird der 10 % Abzug von allen Einnahmen, die gemäß Verteilungsplan A 
verrechnet werden, abgezogen oder nur dort, wo keine Nettoeinzelverrechnung 
stattfindet? Wie ist es konkret mit den Einnahmen aus der Onlinenutzung, die 
nach Verteilungsplan A verteilt werden?   
Wertungsverfahren: 
 Wie erklärt sich die Aufteilung des für soziale und kulturelle Zwecke zur 
Verfügung stehenden Betrages nach Abzug des (gedeckelten) Bedarfs der 
Sozialkasse auf Wertung E (30,07 %), Wertung U (58,67 %), Alterssicherung 
(6,9 %) und Schätzungsverfahren (4,36 %)? Ist dies aktuell noch gültig? 
 Wie erklärt sich die Aufteilung der Wertungsmittel auf die verschiedenen 
Berufsgruppen (Fußnote 1 zu den Allg. Grundsätzen des Verteilungsplans A)? 
 Wie hoch war die Wertungsmark im letzten Jahr in den verschiedenen 
Wertungsverfahren? 
 In der Wertung KE und TE wird das berücksichtigungsfähige Aufkommen in der 
Sparte E insofern begrenzt, als ein über € 9 000 hinausgehender Anteil nur 
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berücksichtigt wird, sofern er das 10fache des Aufkommens in den Sparten R und 
FS nicht übersteigt. Hiermit sollen künstliche Erhöhungen durch 
Selbstaufführungen verhindert werden. Was aber ist der Grund für die im 
Rahmen der Wertung KE und TE geltenden Beschränkungen bei der 
Berücksichtigung des Aufkommens in den Sparten KI und FKI (Fn. 3 zu § 5 I GO 
Wertung KE) und den Sparten R und FS, sowie die im Rahmen der Wertung U 
geltenden Beschränkungen des Aufkommens in den Sparten R, FS und T FS (§ 5 I 
GO Wertung U)? 
 Nach welchen Kriterien wird die Bewertung der künstlerischen Persönlichkeit 
nach § 5 III H) b) GO Wertung KE durchgeführt? Was wird unter einer 
„angemessenen Anzahl von Aufführungen und Sendungen“ verstanden?  
 Nach welchen Kriterien wird die Bewertung von Komponisten von Kirchen- und 
Chormusik nach § 5 III H) c) und d) GO Wertung E durchgeführt? Warum wird 
hier auf die Forderung einer angemessenen Anzahl von Aufführungen und 
Sendungen verzichtet? 
 Welche Rolle spielen in der heutigen Praxis Zuschläge für Unterhaltungsmusik 
gem. § 5 III B) GO Wertung U? 
 Nach welchen Kriterien wird das „Gesamtschaffen“ und die „Bedeutung als 
Urheber“ in § 5 III I GO Wertung U bewertet? In welchem Verhältnis stehen die 
beiden Begriffe?  
 Die GOen zur Wertung enthalten Höchstsätze für Mittel, die den Ausgleichsfonds 
zugeführt werden: für Komponisten in der Sparte E maximal 3 % gemäß § 4 I und 
II GO Wertung E, für Textdichter in der Sparte E maximal 3 % gemäß § 2 GO 
Wertung TE i.V.m. § 4 I und II GO Wertung E, für Verleger in der Sparte E 
maximal 20 % für Ausleichsfonds und zeitgenössisches Musikschaffen zusammen 
gemäß § 3 I GO Wertung VE und für Komponisten, Textdichter und Verleger der 
Sparte U maximal 10 % gemäß § 4 I und II GO Wertung U. Wie hoch ist die 
Mittelvergabe tatsächlich (absolut und prozentual)? Werden diese Höchstgrenzen 
ausgeschöpft?  
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 Sofern die Mittel der Ausgleichsfonds zur Linderung von Härtefällen verwandt 
werden, nach welchen Kriterien werden die Begriffe „kulturell besonders 
förderungswürdig“ und „künstlerisch erfolgreich“ ausgelegt (§ 4 I und II GO 
Wertung E, § 3 I GO Wertung VE und § 4 I und II GO Wertung U)? 
 Die GOen zur Wertung enhalten z.T. Höchstsätze für Mittel, die für die 
Förderung zeitgenössischen Musikschaffens zur Verfügung gestellt werden: 
maximal 20 % gemäß § 4 III GO Wertung KE, maximal 20 % für Ausgleichsfonds 
und zeitgenössisches Musikschaffen zusammen gemäß § 3 I GO Wertung VE und 
keine Begrenzung gemäß § 4 III GO Wertung U. Wie hoch waren die tatsächlich 
im letzten Jahr zur Förderung zeitgenössischen Musikschaffens zur Verfügung 
gestellten Mittel (absolut und prozentual)? Werden die z.T. vorhandenen 
Höchstgrenzen ausgeschöpft? 
 Nach welchen Kriterien werden die Mittel zur Förderung zeitgenössischen 
Musikschaffens vergeben? Welche Projekte werden hier konkret gefördert? Ist dies 
die Grundlage für die 2008 unter dem Stichwort „Neues Kulturkonzept“ 
eingeführten Neuerungen (Deutscher Musikautorenpreis, Euroäisches 
Musikautorenstipendium, Composers in Residence, Initiative Musik, GEMA-
Campus)? 
 Wie haben sich die vorstehenden Initiativen in den letzten Jahren entwickelt? 
Wenn sie nicht aus Mitteln für die Förderung zeitgenössischen Musikschaffens 
finanziert werden, wie dann und in welchem Maße?  
 Ist die Befristung der Regelungen, Mittel für zeitgenössisches Musikschaffen zur 
Verfügung zu stellen, verlängert worden? 
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Second Questionnaire (Responses Received on 6 April 2012) 
Lizenzierungspraxis:  
Repertoire der Schwesterngesellschaften für nationale Onlinedienste  
 Dr. Stefan Müller (ZUM 2011, 13 ff.) beschreibt, dass sie die neu abgeschlossenen 
Gegenseitigkeitsverträge im Wesentlichen einteilen lassen in Verträge mit 
unbeschränkter Mandatierung, solche mit auf nationale Onlinedienste 
beschränkter Mandatierung und solche, die keine Rechte übertragen, sondern 
lediglich von Mandatierungen im Einzelfall ausgehen. Entspricht dies noch den 
aktuellen Gegebenheiten? 
 Gilt das Gegenseitigkeitselement in den bilateralen Verträgen noch 
uneingeschränkt oder kommt es in der Praxis vor, dass Gesellschaft A Gesellschaft 
B unbeschränkt mandatiert, im Gegenzug die Mandatierung von Gesellschaft A 
durch Gesellschaft B mit Beschränkungen versehen ist? 
 Welchen Vorteil hat es für eine Verwertungsgesellschaft, nicht unmittelbar in den 
Gegenseitigkeitsverträgen Rechte zu übertragen, sondern lediglich 
Einzelmandatierungen vorzusehen? Kann die mandatierende Gesellschaft hier 
mehr Einfluss nehmen und Vorgaben machen zu a) Tarifen, b) Verwaltungskosten 
und c) kulturellen und sozialen Abzügen? 
Lizenzierungspraxis:  
Repertoire der Schwesterngesellschaften für multiterritoriale Onlinedienste  
 Wenn der GEMA durch die Gegenseitigkeitsverträge die Befugnis eingeräumt ist, 
multi-territoriale Lizenzen für das Repertoire einer ihrer Schwestergesellschaften zu 
erteilen, wie berechnet sich der anzuwendendeTarif? Gilt hier das 
Bestimmungslandprinzip? 
 Sofern die gegenseitige Mandatierung beschränkt ist auf nationale Onlinedienste 
bzw. die Gegenseitigkeitsverträge selbst gar keine Rechte einräumen, werden in der 
Praxis von den Schwestergesellschaften der GEMA Einzelmandate für multi-
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territoriale Onlinedieste erteilt, wenn ein solcher Anbieter an die GEMA 
herantritt mit dem Wunsch einer im Hinblick auf Repertoire sowie territoriale 
Geltung umfassenden Lizenzierung? 
 Ist es schwieriger, solche Einzelmandate zu erreichen, wenn 
Verwertungsgesellschaften sich zur direkten pan-Europäischen Lizenzierung 
zusammengeschlossen haben, wie z.B. bei Armonia? 
 Welchen Vorteil hat es für die mandatierende Gesellschaft, lediglich 
Einzelmandate zu erteilen? 
Lizenzierungspraxis:  
Repertoire der direkt lizenzierenden Verlage für nationale Onlinedienste  
 Kann die GEMA für nationale Onlinedienste das Repertoire lizenzieren, dass auf 
pan-Europäischer Ebene von den Joint Ventures der Majors und der jeweils 
beteiligen Verwertungsgesellschaft vergeben wird? Für welche Majorverlage ist das 
der Fall? 
 Wenn ja, auf welcher Basis? Werden die nötigen mechnischen Onlinerechte über 
den Weg Major – kooperierende Verwertungsgesellschaft – GEMA zugänglich 
gemacht oder muss die GEMA mit dem Major direkt verhandeln? Geschieht dies 
im Wege der Einzelmandatierung? 
 Soweit die GEMA hiervon Kenntnis hat, wird nationalen 
Verwertungsgesellschaften grundsätzlich die Möglichkeit der Lizenzierung des von 
den Majors kontrollieren Repertoirs geboten oder ist dies einzelfallabhängig? 
Lizenzierungspraxis:  
Repertoire der direkt lizenzierenden Verlage für multi-territoriale Onlinedienste  
 Laut Dr. Stefan Müller (ZUM 2011, 13 ff.) gewährenden die direkt lizenzierenden 
Joint Ventures im Einzelfall der GEMA Mandate ihr Repertoire auch multi-
territorial wahrzunehmen. Ist dies noch der Fall?  
 Gibt es Majorinitiativen, die dies ablehnen (Dr. Müller bspw. nennt DEAL)? 
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 Inwiefern kann im Falle von solchen Einzelmandatierungen der jeweilige Verlag 
Einfluss nehmen auf a) Tarifen, b) Verwaltungskosten und c) kulturellen und 
sozialen Abzügen? 
 Ist die Möglichkeit der Einflussnahme hier größer als bei den 
Einzelmandatierungen durch Schwestergesellschaften für deren eigenes Repertoire, 
z.B. weil die Verlage nicht den treuhänderischen Bindungen einer 
Verwertungsgesellschaft unterliegen? 
 Sie schreiben, dass sich PEDL in der Praxis nicht bewährt hat. Liegt das daran, 
dass die beteiligten Verwertungsgesellschaften, mit Ausnahme der PRS, keinen 
direkten Zugang zu den online performing rights des UK Warner Repertoires 
haben und daher PRS grundsätzlich beteiligt werden muss?  
 Wenn CELAS das anglo-amerikanische EMI Repertoires an multi-territoriale 
Nutzer lizenziert, wird dann gleichzeitig, sofern gewünscht, GEMA-eigenes 
Repertoire mitlizenziert? Wenn ja, nur das deutsche EMI Repertoire oder das 
gesamte Repertoire für das die GEMA sowohl die online performing wie auch 
mechanical rights inne hat? 
 Verfahren die anderen Majorinitiativen, soweit der GEMA dies bekannt ist, 
ähnlich? 
Förderung zeitgenössichen Musikschaffens: 
 Sie schreiben, dass die Mittel zur Förderung zeitnenössischen Musikschaffen 
dadurch, dass sie im Rahmen des Wertungsverfahrens zugewiesen werden, nur 
Urhebern zugute kommen können. Verstehe ich das richtig, dass das bedeutet, 
dass nur GEMA Mitglieder durch diese Mittel gefördert werden können? 
 Wie funktioniert die Förderung in der Praxis? Stellen interessierte Urheber 
Förderanträge? Werden bestimmte Maßnahmen vorgeschlagen, auf die Urheber 
sich bewerben können?  
 Ist es richtig, dass bei der Vergabe der Fördermittel für zeitgenössisches 
Musikschaffen, anders als bei der eigentlichen Wertung, die Dauer der 
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Mitgliedschaft bzw. die Nutzung der Werke des interessierten Urhebers keine 
Rolle spielen? 
 Gibt es andere kurturelle Maßnahmen der GEMA außerhalb der Fördermittel für 
zeitgenössisches Musikschaffen, die Mitgliedern ohne Ansehung der 
Mitgliedsdauer und der Nutzung ihrer Werke zugute kommen können? 
Kulturelle Fördermaßnahmen generell: 
 Inwiefern spielen die von der GEMA im Jahr 2008 angekündigen neuen 
Kulturinitiativen in der Praxis eine Rolle (Deutscher Musikautorenpreis, 
Europäisches Musikautorenstipendium, Composers in Residence, Initative Musik, 
GEMA-Campus)? Finden diese statt? 
 Das Europäische Musikautorenstipendium wird durch Mittel aus der Förderung 
zeitgenössischen Musikschaffens ermöglicht. Wie werden die anderen Projekte 
finanziert? 
Allgemein gefragt: Betreibt die GEMA Kulturförderung außerhalb des 
Verteilungs- und Wertungsverfahrens? Wenn ja, können von solchen 
Fördermaßnahmen auch Nichtmitglieder profitieren? 
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